Between media and politics: can government press officers hold the line in the age of ‘political spin’? The case of the UK after 1997 by Garland, Ruth
1 
 
Between media and politics: 
Can government press officers hold the line 
in the age of ‘political spin’? The case of the 
UK after 1997 
 
 
Ruth Garland 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
Department of Media and Communications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted to the University of London in partial fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy  
2 
 
Declaration 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly 
indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by 
me and any other person is clearly identified in it). 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author.  Quotation from it is permitted, provided that 
full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written 
consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe in the rights 
of any third party. 
 
I declare that my thesis consists of 94,829 words. 
  
3 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this study is to use the concept of ‘mediatization’ to inform a critical, grounded and 
fine-grained empirical analysis of the institutional dynamics that operate at the interface between 
government and the media in a liberal democracy.  This thesis applies a novel theoretical and 
empirical approach to the familiar narrative of ‘political spin’, challenging the common 
assumption that government communications is either a neutral professional function, or an 
inherently unethical form of distorted communication.  In May 1997, Labour came into power on 
a landslide, bringing into government its 24/7 strategic communications operation, determined 
to neutralise what it saw as the default right-wing bias of the national media.  In the process, the 
rules of engagement between government and the media were transformed, undermining the 
resilience of government communications and unleashing a wave of resistance and response.  
Much academic attention to date has focused on party political news management, while the 
larger but less visible civil service media operation remains relatively un-examined and under-
theorised, although some northern European scholars are exploring mediatization from within 
public bureaucracies. This study takes a qualitative approach to analyzing change between 1997 
and 2014, through 16 in-depth interviews with former, largely middle-ranking, departmental 
government communicators, most of whom had performed media relations roles. This was a 
group of civil servants that had spent their working lives in close proximity to ministers during a 
time of rapidly increasing media scrutiny.  These witness accounts were augmented by interviews 
with six journalists and three politically-appointed special advisers, together with a systematic 
analysis of key contemporary and archival documents.  The aim was to provide insights into 
change over time within a shared policy and representational space that is theorised here as the 
‘cross-field’, where media act as a catalyst for the concentration of political power.   What can and 
does government communication in its current form contribute to the democratic ideal of the 
informed citizen? 
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Prologue: Government communications and the road to 
the 2003 Iraq war 
The publication by the UK government of the dossier, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass 
Destruction on 24 September 2002, and everything that followed in the lead up to the 
death of the weapons expert Dr David Kelly on 17 July 2003, has been, and continues 
to be, widely scrutinised (Butler, 2004; Chilcot, 2016a; Hutton, 2004).   What is less 
well-known is the role of  the government information service in producing what 
turned out to be an inaccurate document in which "more weight was placed on the 
intelligence than it could bear", and which stretched available intelligence "to the 
outer limits"(Butler, 2004).  The chain of events was unique; in his public statement 
at the launch of the Iraq Inquiry on 6 July 2016, Sir John Chilcot described the UK’s 
actions in going to war as its first “invasion and full-scale occupation of a sovereign 
state” since the Second World War. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that this was 
typical of media operations within government (Chilcot, 2016b).  What it does show, 
I would contend, is that a government with an unassailable parliamentary majority, 
in charge of a powerful narrative, in control of the official tools through which to 
disseminate the narrative, and without sufficient challenge, is capable of delivering a 
campaign which is, at best, partial, and at worst, deceptive (P. Taylor, 2013).  The 
effect of the promotional campaign associated with the dossier of September 2002 
was profound, resulting in lasting damage to the reputation of Tony Blair, and, 
according to the Chilcot report, providing a “damaging legacy, including undermining 
trust and confidence in Government statements” which “may make it more difficult 
to secure support for Government policy” (Executive Summary, Chilcot, 2016a, pp. 
131, 116), see also (Seldon, 2005; Whiteley, Clarke, Sanders, & Stewart, 2016).   
Herring and Robinson’s analysis of the paper trail of documents  leading up to the 
production of the dossier concluded that the “inaccurate picture” presented, and the 
publicity around it, formed “the core component of deceptive, organised political 
persuasion which involved communication officials working closely with politicians 
and intelligence officials” (Herring & Robinson, 2014, pp. 579-580).  The most visible 
component of the campaign was the widely publicised claim, as stated by Tony Blair 
in the foreword to the dossier, that Saddam’s “military planning allows for some of 
the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them” (HM Government, 
2002, p. 4), a claim which arose a few weeks before the dossier was published but was 
“deemed unreliable” less than two years later   (Herring & Robinson, 2014, p. 574).  
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The claim appeared as the second judgement in the executive summary of the dossier, 
was highlighted by Tony Blair in his statement to Parliament on 24 September, and 
appeared in newspaper headlines like ‘45 minutes from attack’ (Evening Standard, 
24/9/2002), and ‘Brits 45mins from doom’ (The Sun, 25/9/2002)(HM Government, 
2002, p. 5). 
One little-known player was John Williams, the former journalist who succeeded 
Alastair Campbell as political editor at The Daily Mirror in 1994, and become 
Director of Communication at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in July 2000. 
His background was untypical for the Foreign Office, which usually appointed 
departmental civil servants into roles in the press office, but was not unusual for one 
of the new breed of press officer recruited into government following the departure of 
most of the Heads of Communication after 1997 (Kuhn, 2007; R Negrine, 2008).  As 
is evident from Williams’ statement to the Chilcot Inquiry 1 , his experience as a 
journalist did not equip him to handle complex political crosswinds and spot the 
institutional pitfalls quickly enough to avoid them (John Williams: Statement for the 
Iraq Inquiry, 2010).   
We can see from Williams’ statement that although he was close to the Foreign 
Secretary and travelled everywhere with him, his knowledge was “partial”; he had not 
been aware, for example, of important correspondence between 10 Downing Street 
and the White House, or of concerns among officials within his own department.  This 
led him to believe that “the Foreign Office was playing a more important role in Iraq 
policy than I now believe to be the case,” a factor related to the centralization of 
communications activity and the ‘freezing out’ of the Foreign Office from No.10 
policy-making on Iraq after 2001 (Meyer, 2006). Williams was aware of the FCO’s 
view that “the material available was weak on Iraq” so was “instinctively against the 
idea of a dossier” because the exercise “seemed to me to rest on uncertainties” but his 
lack of knowledge or involvement in key meetings made it difficult for him to 
challenge No.10’s request, in March 2002, to produce a note setting out ideas for a 
media campaign.  The first he knew about the decision to publish a dossier was when 
he read about it in a newspaper2.  
                                                          
1 The full statement is available at www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/50500/JohnWilliams-
witness-statement.pdf 
2 On April 5, The Independent reported that “A dossier detailing alleged links between Iraq 
and international terrorists has been delayed, but Mr Blair's spokesman said the information 
will be released in the public domain ‘at the appropriate time’". April 2002 was the month 
when Blair met Bush at his Crawford ranch and they discussed the international situation 
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Williams warned in a memo of 4 September 2002 that: “there is no ‘killer fact’ that 
proves that Saddam must be taken on now”.  It appears that the 45-minute claim 
became the ‘killer fact’.  At a meeting on 5 September he was asked by John Scarlett 
to be the ‘golden pen’; the person with the skills to produce a document fit for 
publication.  The next day, Jack Straw and the Permanent Secretary at the FCO, 
Michael Jay, made clear that the document should be produced by the Foreign Office, 
not No.10, and agreed that Williams should be the ‘golden pen’.  He did this “routine 
job” over the weekend, which involved “taking the strongest points and putting them 
in an executive summary” but felt that “the result was underwhelming”.  At this stage, 
there was no reference to the 45-minute claim.  Despite government claims that the 
first draft was produced by the Joint Intelligence Committee, Williams’ draft 
preceded it and bears a strong resemblance to it (Herring & Robinson, 2014).  
He expresses regret at not consulting middle-ranking officials at the FCO who he now 
knows had had serious doubts about Iraq’s WMDs, and at not raising his own doubts 
“more robustly and directly with Alastair Campbell”.  Although he accepts that his 
role as Director of Communication was to offer the “yes, but” challenge, he felt “it 
would have been improper for a spokesman to question the accuracy of intelligence”.  
He explains that “I followed the policy laid down by the elected Prime Minister, and 
had no objection to it other than my own instincts, which I felt were outweighed by 
his” (my emphasis). From his Chilcot submission, he appears to have been struggling 
to see the full picture, caught between No.10 and the Foreign Office over the Iraq 
agenda, and only intermittently involved in discussions about the communications 
plan leading up to the House of Commons debate on 24 September at which the Prime 
Minister made a persuasive case against Saddam Hussein.  Williams appeared 
isolated from his peers in the Government Information and Communication Service 
(GICS), and the special advisers within the FCO, so had no obvious peer networks that 
could have helped him to piece together a fuller picture. In this sense, far from simply 
being part of a ‘political spin’ operation, he had become an accessory in a political 
battle being waged above him (Garnett, 2010; Kuhn, 2007).    
The cautiously-worded yet critical official report into the quality of intelligence 
leading up to the Iraq War, the so-called Butler report, criticized the dossier for not 
including sufficient caveats as to the uncertainty behind some of the claims (Butler, 
2004; Wring, 2005a).  The report stated that the informal nature of decision-making 
                                                          
over a barbecue. See http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/blair-meets-
bush-to-discuss-peace-plan-prospects-9130462.html 
13 
 
(so-called ‘sofa government’) “made it much more difficult for members of the cabinet 
outside the small circle directly involved to bring their political judgment and 
experience to bear on the major decisions for which the Cabinet as a whole must carry 
responsibility” (Butler, 2004)(paras 609-610).  Twelve years later, the Chilcot Report 
agreed that there were a number of occasions when the Cabinet was not consulted 
when it should have been and that the dossier was presented “with a certainty that 
was not justified” (Chilcot, 2016a).  In the House of Lords debate on 12 July 2016 in 
response to the Chilcot report’s publication, Lord Butler went further, describing the 
then government as “dysfunctional”, and its “disregard for the machinery of 
government” as irresponsible (Foster, 2016). 
There is always the risk that a headline event such as the UK government dossier of 
September 2002 reveals and obscures in equal measure.  Chilcot accepts that many 
of the lessons learned from this case are “context dependent” but that general lessons 
can and should be applied in relation to the decision-making process in government.  
The report agrees with Butler in calling for a clear distinction to be drawn between 
the political imperative to argue for particular policy actions, and the requirement on 
the part of officials to present evidence (Chilcot, 2016a).  As this study will 
demonstrate, this distinction was a key underlying principle of the government 
communications service as established after WW2.  The undermining of this 
distinction is considered by critics to be a root cause of the crisis in public trust and 
public communication “that is sapping the vitality of democratic political culture” 
(Blumler & Coleman, 2010, p. 140).  This thesis provides an in-depth, empirically 
grounded study of the role of the government information service, from the point of 
view of those who had ‘situated agency’ within it, to find out how typical the type of 
marginalization described by John Williams might be, what principles determine 
public communication on the part of governing politicians and officials, and how both 
principle and practice in government communications have changed since 1997.   
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Chapter 1:  A critique of the narrative of ‘political spin’  
1.1 Introduction 
“Privileged access to the sources of relevant knowledge makes possible an inconspicuous 
domination over the colonized public of citizens cut off from these sources and placated 
with symbolic politics”(Habermas, 2008, p. 317).  
National governments play a dominant role as both a source of news for journalists, 
and as co-creators of political narratives (Cook, 1998; Graber, 2003). We have seen 
how the case of the Iraq War provided a conspicuous example of government-led 
news management.  Less visible is what goes on day-to-day inside the corridors of 
power, leading to the suspicion that high-profile controversies such as the Iraq War 
are the tip of the iceberg.  This suspicion is manifested in the narrative of ‘political 
spin’, where ‘spin’ is a colloquial term that can be loosely defined here as the practice 
whereby governments routinely exploit their dominant position as news providers for 
partisan purposes.  This suspicion has generated much academic and public attention 
since the term was first coined in the 1980s3 but much of this attention is anecdotal, 
rather than empirically grounded, and focuses on party political news management.  
The much larger civil service-led communications operation has been “strangely 
neglected” (Strömbäck, 2011); attracting relatively little academic attention (Sanders, 
2011, p. 11).  According to two scholars who have conducted research into UK 
government communications, the subject “remains, as yet, chronically under-
researched, despite its increasing centrality to democratic governance” (Moore, 2006, 
p. 11), while the wider issue of “the institutionalisation of PR as part of government 
has largely been ignored” (Macnamara, 2014, p. 30). 
I will argue that the conventional narrative of political spin correctly identifies some 
troubling developments in the way governments communicate with the public 
through the media, but that it simplifies and demonises the process of strategic 
communications by governments while underplaying its importance in the exercise 
of political power.  Rather than helping to explain recent changes in how governments 
                                                          
3 3 It is not clear when the use of the term ‘political spin’ began, but, according to one 
account, the first use of the term ‘spin doctor’ has been traced to The New York Times in 
1984, in an article about the aftermath of the televised debate between the US presidential 
candidates Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale. See 
www.theguardian.com/notesandqueries’query/0.5753,-1124.00.htm. 
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communicate through the media, the charge of political spin has a more symbolic 
purpose: as an indicator of public disquiet, and as a form of name-calling which holds 
certain agents responsible for manipulative and distorted public communication. In 
this chapter I will challenge some of the assumptions behind this narrative as it 
applies to the UK context, and explain how this will be explored theoretically and 
empirically in this thesis.   
The conventional narrative is that political spin arrived with New Labour in 1997 and 
that it is “always dangerous” (King & Crewe, 2013, p. 301; Oborne, 1999).  The issue 
is more nuanced. Indeed, Moore has argued from his archival study of the post-war 
development of UK government communications that ‘modern spin’ originated 
during the 1940s when the Labour government realised that it could not rely on either 
the BBC or the newspapers to deliver its messages as reliably as they had done during 
the war.  In addition, when considering UK government communications as an 
institution, this period is also an important reference point since this is when the UK 
government’s information service was conceived in its current form (Moore, 2006).   
Although the arrival of New Labour in May 1997 is suggested as a turning point, in 
order to establish what was new, if anything, about government’s relations with the 
media after 1997, we need to examine some more recent antecedents.  Especially 
important is the period of far-reaching media transformation known as the “third 
age” of political communication from the late 1980s onwards, when 24/7 media 
became established and the ground was laid for the creation of the marketing-
oriented party communication machines across the political spectrum (Blumler, 
2001; Wring, 2001), not just in the UK but in other liberal democracies.  This opens 
up the question of the extent to which the UK’s national governing executive, known 
as Whitehall, is distinctive or comparable with other liberal democracies.   
It is no coincidence that the narrative of political spin took off after 1997.  Although 
there were continuities, the changes that took place from May 1997 were not simply a 
continuation of what had gone before.  As contemporary accounts have shown, 
Labour came into power on a landslide, determined to develop and exploit the 
resources of the civil service information machine in order to better arm themselves 
against what they saw as the default right-wing bias of the national media, especially 
the national press, which they believed had kept the party out of power for 18 years, 
especially through personal attacks on Neil Kinnock as party leader (Campbell, 2012; 
Macintyre, 1999).  The nimble, aggressive, 24/7 strategic communications operation 
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that they brought into government with them had already encountered the 
Government Information Service (GIS), staffed by civil servants, while in opposition, 
and had formed a “poor opinion” of it, having “run rings around it while Major was 
still Prime Minister”(Negrine, 2008; Seldon, 2005, p. 301).  Within two years of the 
election, the number of politically-appointed special advisers had doubled, virtually 
the entire leadership of the (renamed) GICS4 had been replaced, a review hastily 
commissioned by the Cabinet Secretary had recommended improved standards while 
retaining impartiality, and the Public Administration Select Committee had 
published an inquiry which noted poor morale among government communicators 
and called for better co-operation between press offices, special advisers and 
ministers (Mountfield, 1997; Public Administration Select Committee, 1998).    
Similar developments have been observed through comparative studies conducted in 
a wide range of jurisdictions within Europe, the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2007; 2010; Esser, 2001; 2008; Esser & Pfetsch, 2004; 
Esser & Strömbäck, 2014).  It has been claimed that the increase in resources devoted 
to specialist communications staff, the introduction of greater central coordination 
and a more proactive and planned approach to news management, led to 
‘politicization’, that is, the exertion of greater power and control over the central 
bureaucracy by ruling politicians (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008; Shaw & Eichbaum, 
2014).  In this thesis I argue that such changes did take place and they were profound 
and permanent, threatening the resilience of the post-war communications structure, 
which had been in place since 1946, and unleashing a wave of resistance and 
response.   
Much of the blame for political spin has been laid at the door of politicians and their 
politically-appointed so-called ‘spin doctors’, special advisers of whom the Director of 
Communications at No.10, Alastair Campbell (1997-2003), is the best known 
However, the voices of middle-ranking civil servants, those at Director level and 
below, based in the departments, where most policy and legislative development and 
communications take place, have barely been heard, and their particular contribution 
to government communication through the media since 1997 is little known.  There 
are several reasons for this: convention holds that civil servants do not speak in 
public, they rarely publish memoirs and, as mentioned in the opening to this chapter, 
                                                          
4 As of November 1997, the GIS became the Government Information and Communication 
Service (GICS). 
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the academy rarely considers the bureaucratic dimension of government 
communications, either in its own right, or as part of the ecology of political 
communication. 
This introductory chapter will critically review the conventional narrative that I am 
referring to as ‘the narrative of political spin’.  I will analyze some of its key 
assumptions and claims, suggesting that if the issues are to be properly understood 
and investigated, the debate should be reframed as a tri-partite interaction, involving 
both cooperation and struggle between party politics and the public bureaucracy, and 
their relations with media.  At the meso-level, it has been suggested that under the 
pressure of media change, the process of politicization mutually reinforces 
mediatization – the meta-process defined as the increasing institutionalization of 
media throughout society (Hepp, Hjarvard, & Lundby, 2015).  Rather than 
apportioning blame to media and/or political actors, the mediatization approach 
examines higher order influences on both domains.  I will argue that where the 
struggle for party political control over the public presentation, or re-presentation, of 
government actions and decisions, is seen to serve special interests over and above 
the public interest, there is a risk that, ultimately, public support for democratic 
institutions will be undermined.   Furthermore, as Cappella and Jamieson have 
argued, when the mainstream media operate on the (in their view) false assumption 
that political leaders are inherently self-interested to the exclusion of the public good, 
citizens will increasingly accept “attributions that induce mistrust” leading to a 
corrosive ‘spiral of cynicism’ (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, p. 142).    
At the outset, it should be made clear what we mean by government communications.  
This study is concerned with changes over time in the ways in which the UK’s national 
governing executive managed its relations with media, and most particularly, its 
relations with the highly centralised, adversarial and partisan national press and the 
regulated broadcasting sector dominated by the public service broadcaster, the BBC 
(Sanders & Canel, 2013).  This must take into account the extent to which the 
government as a whole, through ministers, special advisers and civil servants, serves 
the communications needs of the public, and whether the impartial principle is being 
overshadowed or even eclipsed, by party political interest.    
Whitehall is defined here as the central public bureaucracy, the civil service, operating 
together with the party in power through the ministers who provide political 
leadership for the 20 or so departments of state.  Excluded from this analysis are the 
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executive agencies and regulatory bodies associated with the national public sector, 
local government, the devolved administrations of Wales, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland, and other agencies such as the NHS and police. Also beyond the scope of 
this thesis are the media relations and public consultation activities of policy 
specialists within the civil service, which may be considerable and are also worthy of 
study.  ‘Westminster’ refers to the legislature; most specifically the Houses of 
Commons and Lords, and the Select Committees that hold government departments 
to account.  It has also given its name to a type of non-Presidential political system 
with unitary powers, such as those operating in the former British territories of New 
Zealand, Australia and Canada, where the Prime Minister is also the leader of the 
political party that commands the majority in parliament. 
Our concern is most specifically with the officials who conduct media relations on 
behalf of the government, rather than the government communications service as a 
whole.  Even Parliamentary select committees have found it almost impossible to 
establish the number of civil servants employed to manage the media, since they are 
categorised in different ways in different departments but one estimate puts the 
numbers of communications staff at 3,000 by 2013 (Hood & Dixon, 2015).  At a crude 
estimate, around 30% are press officers, equivalent to about 750 FTE staff covering 
central government as a whole.  However, although our focus is on officials who 
specialise in media relations, we need to consider the ecology of government 
communications as a whole, and most particularly, changes over time in the priority 
given to different types of communication, whether direct, such as advertising and 
other forms of paid for publicity, or mediated, as with the various ways in which 
government officials communicate with the public through the media.  These officials 
are not simply the press officers officially designated as government spokespeople, 
but increasingly the politically appointed special advisers – temporary civil servants 
who are exempt from the requirement of impartiality - who manage the media on 
behalf of ministers. 
 
1 .2 The narrative of political spin 
In his evidence to the Leveson Inquiry, Alastair Campbell claimed that "the systematic 
undermining of Labour and its leader and policies…was a factor in Labour's inability 
properly to connect with the public and ultimate defeat"(Campbell, 2012). John 
Major told Leveson that his own “lack of a close relationship with any part of the 
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media may have been a contributory factor to the hostile media the 1990-97 
governments often received” and that this had influenced “the very close relationship 
with the media sought by my immediate successors” (Major, 2012).   The suggestion 
from both sides of the political spectrum is that British governments prior to 1997 had 
failed to prioritise news management; a state of affairs that was rapidly transformed 
after 1997.  
Deploying the narrative of political spin, critics claimed that politicians increasingly 
interfered with the day to day work of government press officers, and employed 
politically-aligned special advisers to carry out media relations tasks that previously 
would have been carried out by impartial government press officers5.    The use of the 
term ‘political spin’ by journalists to accuse special advisers of trading privileged 
government information in exchange for self-advantaging media coverage can be seen 
as a partial one since it ignores their own participation in what is a mutual process. 
Conversely, the political strategists at the heart of New Labour argued that the form 
of ‘aggressive political PR’ (Moloney, 2001) which led to accusations that the 
government of 1997 had ushered in a new age of political spin, was born from the 
scars of the fourth successive election defeat in 1992 which threatened the very 
existence of Labour as an electoral force (Hyman, 2012; Mandelson, 2012). Philip 
Gould, one of the architects of New Labour, saw the task of overcoming the electoral 
weaknesses caused by a partisan right-wing press as a legitimate political battle 
fought using media management as a weapon (Gould, 1998; Hewitt & Gould, 1993).   
In setting out the background to the questions posed by this study, this chapter will 
discuss the following three assumptions that lie behind the established narrative of 
political spin:  
1. A continuing professed attachment to the ideal of impartiality together with 
persistent consequent claims of politicization  
2. The use of ideas of demonization and corruption to explain the changing 
relationship between politicians and the media  
                                                          
5 A google scholar search of academic articles published between 1990 and 2016 using the 
terms ‘political spin’, ‘spin doctor’ or ‘special adviser/UK’ found 3,440, 4,920 and 6,280 
references respectively.  The most significant critiques from authors such as Gaber, Davis, 
McNair, Franklin, Macnamara, Moloney, Moore, Oborne, Jones, Sixsmith and many others, 
are referred to in detail elsewhere in this thesis. 
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3. The role of ethics and propriety in defending government communications 
against the charge of party political propaganda. 
1.2.1 Civil service impartiality and the threat of politicization 
In its most basic sense, impartiality, defined as neutrality whereby a body of 
permanent officials serve successive governments, persists as an almost universally 
upheld ideal, not only among civil servants but also among politicians and 
commentators (Blair, 2004; Casalicchio & Foster, 2016).  The current Civil Service 
Code defines impartiality as “acting solely according to the merits of the case and 
serving equally well governments of different political persuasions” (Civil Service, 
2015).  This interpretation conceives of the impartial official as a blank slate on which 
governments imprint their own ambitions and aspirations, and downplays the role of 
independence in delivering good government.  In a speech given in 2014, one of the 
UK’s most respected senior civil servants, the then Permanent Secretary for Business 
Innovation and Skills, Martin Donnelly, broadened the interpretation to argue that 
impartial advice from permanent officials is key to effective decision-making and 
therefore good government (my emphasis): 
Independence offers a promising starting point. It limits the attractions of 
telling Ministers what they might like to hear and provides a framework to 
offer a more objective assessment of options (Donnelly, 2014). 
Donnelly warns of the risk of senior civil servants becoming “uncritical” through their 
close working relationships with ministerial teams, and considers the exercise of 
impartiality as being enacted in three main ways: through neutrality, as referred to 
above, through challenging what he refers to as a bias towards optimism on the part 
of ministers, and through the capacity to provide opposing viewpoints, however 
unwelcome. Ministers have the “last word” but the fundamental responsibility of the 
senior civil servant is the “honest management of public money”.  This is a tacit 
acknowledgement that, far from delivering a blank sheet to ministers, impartiality is 
a public good, which takes effort and work to sustain and requires some autonomy on 
the part of officials to act in the public interest.  According to this interpretation, the 
practice of impartiality requires the official to put public welfare above individual 
inclination to serve particular interest groups (Scott, 1996). This leaves open the 
question of who defines effective decision-making, good government, public welfare 
and honest management of public money but implies that such distinctions must be 
negotiated by political and administrative elites.  This opens up the possibility that 
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even subtle changes in common understandings over time of what constitutes 
impartiality can lead to changes in how it is exercised; in other words, impartiality is 
both a living practice and an abstract ideal. 
In her definition of impartiality, Mendus considers that “impartiality is best made 
manifest through the concept of agreement” although it is not clear who is or should 
be party to this agreement and what role citizens might play as opposed to elites 
(Mendus, 2008). Part of this agreement, she argues, is the widespread, even 
unanimous, agreement that impartiality reflects a commitment to equality.  This 
provides a moral and ethical charge to the ideal of impartiality based on the 
suggestion that citizens need assurance from those placed in positions of power over 
them that “the principles governing our society are such that they can be defended 
even to those who do least well under them”.   This raises the issues of accountability 
and compliance and the question of to what extent partial concerns can be permitted 
to override impartial ones.  This question has run like a thread through most of the 
critiques of government communications since 1997, and, however implicitly, 
through the narrative of political spin, as we shall see. 
Critics of modern government, and especially of the role of special advisers in 
promoting ‘political spin’, argue that many of the government-led reforms since the 
1980s aimed at speeding up ‘delivery’ in line with the aspirations of the government 
of the day have successively undermined the practice of impartiality, if not the ideal.  
This has led to charges of ‘seeping politicization’ (Hennessy, 1999) and see also 
(Foster, 2001; 2005; 2014; Gaber, 2004; Harris, 1990; Ingham, 2010; Jones, 2001; 
Lodge, 2007; Sixsmith, 2007; Wheeler, 2003).  Diamond, however, refers to such 
critiques of the almost constant machinery of government reforms since the 1980s 
(Dunleavy & White, 2010) (Hood & Dixon, 2015) as the “end of Whitehall” thesis, 
which valorises the idea of civil service neutrality and impartiality without 
questioning it (Diamond, 2014b, p. 394).  One critic, for example, went so far as to 
accuse Labour after 1997 of “sweeping away the notion of Civil Service impartiality 
and effectively ‘politicising’ all government communication” (Louw, 2005, p. 91).   
As might be expected, Britain’s former and serving senior civil servants refer to a 
politically impartial Civil Service as “fundamental” (Phillips, 2005); as “the greatest 
bequest of Northcote Trevelyan”6(O'Donnell, 2005); supported by “a strong political 
                                                          
6 The Northcote Trevelyan report of 1854 established a merit-based, permanent bureaucracy 
for the first time (Northcote & Trevelyan, 1854). 
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consensus” (Turnbull, 2005); and potentially at risk from “recent reforms (that) 
might erode the traditional values of the civil service” (Prashar, 2005).   But it is not 
just civil servants who regularly reiterate their support.  Political leaders on all sides 
continue to publicly uphold the values of the British civil service in principle, while 
criticising them in practice.  In a speech to civil servants in 2004,7 Tony Blair stated 
that the “enduring values (…) of integrity, impartiality and merit have proved 
timeless”, before going on to criticize the service for failing to adapt to changing times 
(Blair, 2004).  In a speech8 given in September 2012 the Conservative government 
minister Oliver Letwin described the civil service as “one of the great bulwarks against 
tyranny” because it “provides a continuing safeguard that ministers of any persuasion 
will not be able to use the machinery of the state to personal or party political 
advantage”(Letwin, 2012).  Yet, at the same time, both David Cameron and the 
Cabinet Office minister, Francis Maude, delivered unprecedented public criticism of 
the obstructiveness of civil servants (Cameron, 2012; Mason, 2012). Maude accused 
permanent secretaries of having “blocked agreed Government policy from going 
ahead or advised other officials not to implement ministerial decisions – that is 
unacceptable” (Mason, 2012) 9 .   Similarly, in “one of the most stinging attacks 
launched by a Prime Minister”, David Cameron told activists at the 2011 Conservative 
Spring Forum that Whitehall “bureaucrats in government departments” were “the 
enemies of enterprise” (Adetunji, 2011).  This contrasts with his outgoing speech as 
he left office on 13 July 2016 when he praised civil servants, “whose professionalism 
and impartiality is one of our country’s greatest strengths” (Casalicchio & Foster, 
2016).   
Many arguments about change in Whitehall after 1997 deploy the notion of  
‘politicization’, defined as a dynamic process whereby public service becomes more 
compatible with the partisan and policy preferences of elected politicians (Peters & 
Pierre, 2004b), thereby constraining the public servant’s capacity to “speak truth to 
power” (Wildavsky, 1979).  Eichbaum defines politicization more specifically as 
“substantive administrative politicization”; the increasingly partisan, or party 
                                                          
7 Read the full speech at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2004/feb/24/Whitehall.uk1 
8 For the full speech see http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/events/why-mandarins-
matter-keynote-speech-rt-hon-oliver-letwin-mp. 
9 The former Conservative Cabinet Minister, William Waldegrave, who served between 1990 
and 1997, after an early career as a political adviser at No 10 (1971-75), told Peter Hennessy in 
a recent interview that: “I never for a moment accepted the idea that civil servants were 
obstructive. It is the definition of a feeble minister if he starts to blame the civil service for not 
getting his way or not delivering his policies.”  His officials had doubts about the poll tax, and 
told him so. (Civil Service World, 5/8/2015).   
   
23 
 
political, influence over the substance of officials’ advice or outputs, whether White 
Papers, policy briefings, Parliamentary answers, PR campaigns or press releases.  He 
claims that this presents “a clear and persistent threat to civil service 
impartiality”(Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008, p. 357) which, by “blurring boundaries of 
what is deemed appropriate,” has a “ratchet effect…where tasks which once civil 
servants would have refused to do, over time become standard”(Dowding, 1995, p. 
120).   
Central to the argument relating to politicization is Britain’s historic uncodified 
constitution, and the role of ministers in co-ordinating and prioritising government 
communications.  The UK remains a political system with the greatest ‘executive 
dominance’ (Lijphart, 1999), despite the devolved regional governments and 
assemblies of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.  Within this majoritarian and 
still largely unitary structure, “the Prime Minister’s powers are very extensive” 
although limited “largely by political constraints” (Hazell, Young, Waller, & Walker, 
2012).  Illustrating the “fusion of powers” within the UK parliament, as at March 2011, 
20% of Coalition government MPs were on the executive payroll, either as ministers 
or parliamentary aides, and were therefore obliged to vote with the Government 
(Benwell & Gay, 2011; Public Administration Select Committee, 2011).  In spite of the 
retrospective scrutiny of the select committee system, a strong leader, like Tony Blair, 
with a large Parliamentary majority, had the political capital to exploit the use of 
prerogative powers (in other countries, such as the US, known as executive powers), 
and, by making use of a “highly advanced, sophisticated and influential politics of 
national leadership” (Foley, 2013), to command the government’s communications 
agenda.  Chilcot makes clear that this was the case in relation to the release of the 
2002 Iraq dossier, for example (Chilcot, 2016a). However, one of the constraints on 
any Prime Minister is Whitehall departmentalism and the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility, which confer “considerable influence and leverage on ministers” 
(Diamond, 2014b, p. 279).  This does not deny the powers of the Prime Minister but 
suggests that, in seeking to identify political sources of power of government 
communications, it would be fruitful to look to the departments, as well as No.10. 
1.2.2 Politicians and the media: a narrative of demonization and corruption 
Emotive language and the demonization of politically-appointed special advisers as 
mere ‘spin doctors’, typify political and journalistic discourse about the negative 
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impacts of political spin.  These hybrid officials10, who are employed as temporary 
civil servants but exempted from the requirement of impartiality and answerable only 
to ministers and ultimately the Prime Minister, largely work in the shadow of their 
political masters, and attract a particular kind of dislike from politicians, journalists, 
civil servants and even members of the public. Tony Wright, the former Labour Chair 
of the Public Administration Select Committee, noted that special advisers are 
“ranked somewhere alongside paedophiles in the lexicon of media opprobrium” 
(Wright, 2002).  The reasons for this are not clear but it may have something to do 
with their new and ambivalent position.  Special advisers originated during the 
Labour government of Harold Wilson in 1974, they perform ill-defined roles for 
particular political masters; and their influence appears to be growing in apparently 
unaccountable ways, ensuring that their institutional position remains fluid and 
contested.  Yet despite the condemnation, their numbers continue to rise, they 
increasingly perform media relations roles, and they continue to attract controversy 
(Blick & Jones, 2013; Foster, 2014; Gay, 1992, 2013; Hillman, 2014; 2013b; Yong & 
Hazell, 2014).    
Their impact has been considered so toxic that the convention since the 1970s that 
each Secretary of State can have no more than two special advisers was only seriously 
challenged from 2012 onwards by the proposal for Extended Ministerial Offices 
(EMOs) which allowed ministers the option of taking direct and full responsibility for 
appointments and management of staff, albeit in consultation with the departmental 
Permanent Secretary (Civil Service Reform Plan, 2012; Cabinet Office, 2013a).  At 
the time of writing this development appears to have been halted and the five existing 
pilot EMOs are currently being dismantled11.  If implemented across government, this 
would have dramatically increased the number of ministerial personal appointees at 
the top of the civil service, bringing Whitehall closer to most other civil services in the 
level of political support offered to ministers.  For critics, the proposal for EMOs  
raised the spectre of French-style ‘cabinetization’ by stealth (Gouglas & Brans, 2016) 
and it was subject to sustained opposition from the House of Lords, retired civil 
                                                          
10 In their analysis of the working practices of more than 100 special advisers, Yong and Hazell 
concluded that “almost all ministers now regard them as indispensable” and that 60-70 hour 
working weeks were not uncommon (Yong & Hazell, 2014, p. 3). 
11 The reversal of the programme was confirmed by the Cabinet Office minister Ben Gummer 
in Civil Service World, Existing EMOs to be “dismantled”, 17 January 2017. See also recent 
commentary from the Institute for Government on the latest reiteration of the Ministerial 
Code  (2016) https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/scrapping-extended-
ministerial-offices-mistake 
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servants and various Parliamentary Committees (Lodge, Kalitowski, Pearce, & Muir, 
2013; Maude, 2013; Paun, 2013).  The on-off implementation of the EMO illustrates 
an ongoing internal struggle taking place within Whitehall which will probably 
continue, between those who argue that more political appointments at departmental 
level would improve policy deliberation and implementation, and those who believe 
it would disrupt and ‘politicize’ the smooth running of government.  
Opposition politicians frequently criticize ministerial aides but remain silent about 
them while in government.  The opposition leader for the Conservatives, Michael 
Howard, had a famously proactive and combative approach to media management 
when he was Home Secretary12 (Jones, 2010; Silverman, 2012) but in opposition 
accused Tony Blair of “being prepared to sell his soul to this political devil” (Sands, 
2007).  He called on the Prime Minister to take “responsibility for the activities of 
Alastair Campbell, who has lied and bullied his way across our political life and done 
more than anyone else to lower the tone of British politics in the past ten years”.  John 
Major condemned Labour’s “slick presentation”, describing it as “the pornography of 
politics.  It perverts.  It is deceit licensed by the government” (Major, 2003, p. 12).   
Yet one journalist at the time recalled how, as Prime Minister, John Major was not 
only “obsessed” with what journalists were saying about him, but was frequently given 
to briefing them off the record, against the advice of his own press secretaries, often 
with disastrous results (Price, 2010).   
Journalists are just as judgmental and ready to contrast their own “utopian and 
fantasized view of the media” with the cynical behaviour of politicians (Savage & 
Riffen, 2007, p. 92).  By attributing spin to others, journalists “lionise themselves as 
protectors of the audience’s interests” (Atkinson, 2005).  The journalist Mark Day, for 
example, referred to “the tentacles of spin” which “reach into every part of news 
gathering, clouding or corrupting the facts” (Day, 2013).  The most extreme name-
calling was reserved for Peter Mandelson, the Labour Director of Communications-
turned Minister, who although never a special adviser, continued to advise Tony Blair 
on strategy and communication after he became an MP in 1992.  He was frequently 
referred to as Dracula (Knight, 2011) and the Prince of Darkness13.  Following his 1998 
                                                          
12 His special adviser was the future Prime Minister, David Cameron. 
13 ‘Prince of Darkness Returns’, BBC News, 12/10/1999. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/404194.stm, and ‘Peter Mandelson: Prince of 
Darkness who travels the world spreading the gospel of New Labour’, Andrew Grice, the 
Independent, 20/04/2003. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/peter-
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resignation, the myth developed that Mandelson, “having hairy arms, shaved the hair 
on the back of his hands”, and advised other MPs to do the same (Macintyre, 1999, p. 
344).  When he resigned in 2001 for the second time, he was described by the Sun 
newspaper as “a lying, manipulative, oily, two-faced, nasty piece of work who should 
never have been allowed back into Government” (25 January 2001).  The broadsheet 
journalist, Andrew Rawnsley, describes “the trade of spin-doctoring” as “notorious 
for its flexible interpretation of the truth” (Rawnsley, 2000, p. 97) while the stalwart 
critic of New Labour’s approach to media relations, the former BBC journalist 
Nicholas Jones, referred to Alastair Campbell as “a masterly propagandist” (Jones, 
2001, p. 185). Other journalists recalling their days in or close to the political lobby 
speak in similar terms (Oborne, 1999, 2005; Robinson, 2012; Sixsmith, 2007). 
This form of political meta-coverage serves the purposes of both journalists and 
politicians by using the narrative of political spin to create “pantomime villains” as 
“the ones we love to hate, and then to blame them for what we perceive to be the 
excesses of contemporary political communication” (McNair, 2007b, p. 94).   The 
Labour strategist, Philip Gould, saw the term “spin doctor” as a construct used by the 
media “without thought or understanding”.  For him, “spin” was a neutral process, “a 
completely unexceptional activity” and that “putting the best progressive case to the 
media should not be a reason for criticism but a cause for pride” (Hewitt & Gould, 
1993, p. 33).  For politicians, deflecting blame in the name of spin conceals their own 
roles in manipulation, and even deceit, in order to gain advantage on the political 
battlefield.   Critics, including academics, who pin the blame for deceptive 
communication on the ‘spin doctors,’ and frame the activity as mere PR, are in danger 
of downplaying the role of spin as a force in politics (Kuhn & Neveu, 2002).  Esser 
argues that the term ‘spin doctor’ is used by journalists “indiscriminately to demonize 
any kind of professional PR” and to discredit a perfectly legitimate process – the 
strategic communication of policy by politicians, parties and governments “in the face 
of an autonomous and powerful journalism that pursues an agenda of its own and 
whose mechanisms and motives are not always exclusively oriented toward the public 
welfare” (Esser, 2001, pp. 40, 39).    
The indiscriminate use of the term ‘spin’ and ‘spin doctor’ to describe any form of 
promotional activity forecloses the possibility that there could be a distinction 
                                                          
mandelson-prince-of-darkness-who-travels-the-world-spreading-the-gospel-for-new-
labour-115966.html  
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between legitimate and illegitimate, or proper and improper, political 
communication.  According to the PR theorist, Jim Macnamara, who has carried out 
comparative research into government communications, the so-called “discourse of 
spin” does not stand up to scrutiny and serves only to “misrepresent reality in order 
to maintain power relations and the status quo” (Macnamara, 2014, p. 143).  Others 
argue that the “dismissive labelling” of strategic PR as ‘spin’ “fails to accurately reflect 
how it might actually comprise part of the legitimate information management 
machinery of democratic societies” (L'Etang & Pieczka, 2006, p. 7).   Equally, this also 
fails to consider how and in what circumstances strategic communications, or ‘spin,’ 
might become illegitimate.  PR professionals themselves, the so-called spin doctors, 
whether government press officers or special advisers who “do the media”, to quote 
Gus O’Donnell (2013b), rarely speak up in their own defence or offer critiques of their 
practices.  
1.2.4 Propriety and ethics in government communications 
The conduct of Whitehall ministers, special advisers and civil servants is regulated 
internally according to a series of propriety codes that hold government press officers 
responsible for providing a check on the politically-motivated news management 
operation favoured by ministers.  Press officers are expected to provide “positive 
presentation of government policies and achievements, not misleading spin” but this 
makes the assumption that information-giving is quite separate from persuasion 
(Phillis, 2004). McNair argues that this unthinking demonization of persuasive 
communications in government is “echoed in the academy, where the critical 
traditions in media studies and political science have tended to view the modern 
practice of government communication as a perversion of what normative theory 
decrees the public sphere to be for”.  What is required is a far more critical form of 
analysis, namely, the “demystification and deconstruction of a potentially 
undemocratic communication practice” which takes place “behind the closed doors 
of power” (McNair, 2007b, p. 95).  This thesis addresses this concern by examining 
the witness accounts of those who not only observed the changes in government 
communications post-1997, but were held responsible for implementing and policing 
them. 
The problematic distinction between information and spin carries through into more 
theoretical understandings of the relations between the media and deliberative 
democracy. Habermas’ influential critique of “personally represented authority”, or 
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“re-feudalisation” was set against the ideal of deliberative democracy, and scholars 
tend to condemn outright what they see as the trend towards “more professionally 
managed structures of government communications” (McNair, 2007, p95).  
Historically, Habermas considered the link between the public and private spheres to 
be a mediated one, as “manifested in the clubs and organizational forms of a reading 
public composed of bourgeois private persons and crystallizing around newspapers 
and journals”.  Yet he shows a particular distaste for the modern mediatized reality of 
“a public sphere dominated by mass media and large agencies, observed by market 
and opinion research, and inundated by the public relations work, propaganda, and 
advertising of political parties and groups”(Habermas, 2008, pp. 366, 367) .    
The tendency to throw all the evils of promotional culture into a disreputable black 
box is also seen in King and Crew’s otherwise thorough investigation into disastrous 
policy-making, The Blunders of Our Governments, in which they claim that “all 
governments spin in some degree.  All of them engage from time to time in symbolic 
politics, whether pure or otherwise.  But symbolism and spin are always dangerous, 
including to the symbolists and the spinners” (my emphasis).  This implies that well-
marshalled, targeted and persuasive messaging is essentially corrupting, leading to 
the illogical conclusion that poorly-executed PR is more acceptable than good quality 
PR, and that symbolism has no place in politics (King & Crewe, 2013, p. 304).  Marsh 
too, flatly condemns political promotional culture with his claim that “a rampant 
populism abetted by focus group politics, the marketing model and a 24-hour media 
cycle is surely profoundly corrupted” (Marsh, 2013).   This fails to disaggregate the 
substance of strategic forms of communication or to acknowledge the quite legitimate 
and indeed essential role of rhetoric and persuasion in mainstream politics as a means 
of engaging the public, creating political consensus, and establishing a collective 
identity. As Manin states,   “Only persuasive discourse seeking to change the opinion 
of others is in fact capable of eliciting the consent of a majority where, at the outset, 
there is nothing but a large number of divergent opinions” (Manin, 1997, p. 198). 
From the standpoint of political representation, the theorist Michael Saward 
considers “the active making of symbols or images of what is to be represented” as 
being of central importance in politics (Saward, 2010, p. 15).  
Little is known about the mechanics of how politicians and civil servants work 
together at departmental level to craft government messages for public consumption. 
One of the few academics to have carried out ethnographic observations from within 
a Whitehall department refers to departments as “medieval baronies” ruled over by 
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departmental ministers (Rhodes, 2011).  Norton, who conducted interviews with a 
quarter of all ministers serving between 1979 and 1997, describes departments as “the 
essential structural components of government”, where, unlike the Prime Minister, 
Secretaries of State exercise specific statutory powers within their own domains 
(Norton, 2000, p. 107).   Davis, who has interviewed hundreds of civil servants, 
politicians and journalists, agrees that the “machinery of political publicity is driven 
by government departments and the competing leaderships of the main political 
parties” (Davis, 2010, p. 32)   Thus, government communicators, and in particular 
press officers, work within a dual system of accountabilities, through political and 
civil service heads in both the departments and at the centre.  
This places the Whitehall press officer at the centre of four sets of dynamics: the 
professional requirement to promote government policy; the commitment to serve 
the rights and needs of all citizens; the desire of political parties to promote 
themselves at the ballot box; and, as part of this, pressure from ministers to hide 
politically damaging activity (Turnbull, 2007).   To this are added two further 
demands: the need to protect ministers from the temptation to abuse government 
information resources, and to ensure that departmental messages are coordinated 
with the corporate line from No.10.  Their current proprietary code, like its previous 
iterations, has requirements that appear contradictory, or at best, difficult to 
reconcile, for example, stating that press officers must “remain impartial” while being 
“ready to promote the policies of the department and of the government as a whole”.  
In the five pages (out of 38) devoted to politicians and the press, they are advised to 
“maintain professional distance from ministers” while protecting them from 
“accusations of using public resources for party political purposes” (Government 
Communications Service, 2014b).  
According to convention, the tool which enables civil servants to resist the dangers of 
politicization, is the doctrine, or article of faith held to be self-evident and only 
recently enshrined in law14: civil service impartiality.  The blurring of boundaries 
between politics and an impartial civil service is a recurring theme in critiques of 
political spin in government.  It is on this ground that the battle for control over the 
political agenda within the civil service has been fought almost continuously at least 
since the arrival at No.10 of Margaret Thatcher.  Politicization, it is claimed, has 
                                                          
14 The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010.  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/25/pdfs/ukpga_20100025_en.pdf   
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accelerated since the 1980s and become “the main source of disquiet” (Sausman & 
Locke, 2004) because it challenges the long-standing principle that civil servants 
need independence, or autonomy, to challenge their political masters – an important 
internal check on ministerial power.   Bernard Ingham, Margaret Thatcher’s long-
serving chief press secretary, warned that New Labour had “effectively created a 
hybrid system…without the consent or proper debate in Parliament that such a 
constitutional shift demands”(Ingham, 2003, p. 243).   
Impartiality is considered to be both a norm and a cultural value which applies not 
only to the civil service but to national institutions such as the monarchy, the 
judiciary, the police, the universities and the BBC.  For historian David Marquand, 
such “intermediate institutions” have traditionally protected the public from the 
politics of favouritism and patronage.  An invisible line separating party political bias, 
and neutrality, is policed on trust by establishment officials, often in the face of debate 
and criticism, since impartiality is a principle of justice and equity which is context-
dependent (Mendus, 2008).   Marquand argues that the rise of “new managerialism” 
during the Thatcher years, which continued under Labour, placed public service 
values such as impartiality under threat (Marquand, 2004). The long-standing critic 
of the Blair government’s approach to media management, the former civil servant 
Christopher Foster, claims that major changes in practice that allowed ministers more 
control over senior appointments, were “as much an undermining of independence 
and impartiality as they would be of the judges” (Foster, 2005, p285). 
Looking back over 20 years of attempts by politicians to reform Whitehall by making 
it more “responsive”, a paradox emerges.  As we saw earlier, while all participants in 
the debate repeatedly reiterate their support for the ideal of Civil Service impartiality, 
ministers are increasingly publicly critical of what they see as civil service resistance 
to their reform agenda (Talbot, 2013).  Here we see a power asymmetry: civil servants 
are duty bound to implement ministerial demands and proposals, but they neither 
initiate them nor have the right to publicly criticize them. Dowding questions the 
received wisdom on impartiality as a straightforward value, implying that, in practice, 
what is at stake is a power struggle over who wields power within the executive 
(Dowding, 1995, p.107).   
These statements about impartiality from two powerful Conservative politicians, who 
disagree profoundly about civil service reform, show how elastic and contingent the 
concept of impartiality can be: 
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Governments come and go, and, in the absence of a codified constitution or formal 
separation of powers, it is this body of permanent officials that underpins the 
constitutional stability of our country.  That is why a permanent and impartial civil 
service was established.  Bernard Jenkin, Chair, Public Administration Select 
Committee, April 2014 (Jenkin, 2014) 
The essence of impartiality is not indifference to the Government of the day but the 
ability to be equally passionate and committed to implementing a future 
Government’s priorities and programme…It must be a passionate commitment to 
delivering the Government of the day’s priorities.  Francis Maude, Minister for the 
Cabinet Office, April 2014 (Maude, 2014). 
As chair of the Committee that provides legislative challenge to the executive and 
monitors the civil service, Jenkin sees impartiality as a value that rises above party 
politics and the requirements of individual governments.  As the (then) minister in 
charge of coordinating the communication of government policy from the centre, 
Maude sees it as a value that is subservient to the needs of the government of the day.   
The discrepancy between ministerial pronouncements in favour of civil service 
impartiality, and their actions, can be seen as a form of “symbolic behaviour… a 
strategic element in political competition” where “individuals and groups are 
frequently hypocritical, reciting sacred myths without believing them and while 
violating their implications”(March & Olsen, 1984, p. 744).   Within what remains 
predominantly a two-party political cartel, the UK’s official Opposition may complain, 
but in practice knows that it will reap the benefits of incumbency (Katz & Mair, 2009).  
For Diamond the promise of benefits that accrue to governments within a power 
hoarding system, such as a discreet and compliant civil service, explains the 
persistence of executive dominance within the British political tradition (Diamond, 
2014b).   This will be discussed further in the next chapter, but it goes some way to 
explain, for example, why opposition politicians so frequently complain about the 
growth in the number of special advisers and the dangers of political spin, and yet 
when in power continue the process of increasing their numbers, as observed after 
the 1997 and 2010 elections15.  
                                                          
15 A House of Commons Standard Note in 2013 found that numbers had increased from 68 
in 2010 to 98 as at 25 October 2013, while the special adviser wage bill rose from £2.1m in 
2010 to £7.2m, at a time when the civil service as a whole experienced headcount reductions 
of 15% (Gay, 2013).  
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Civil servants are not immune from myth-making, especially when defending 
themselves against threats.   One study examined speeches and statements made by 
civil service leaders in three Westminster–style systems – Australia, Canada and the 
UK, at a time when New Public Management was challenging their hegemony. The 
civil service leaders drew on specific, nostalgic readings of their own history, 
employing the rarely read but regularly cited Northcote Trevelyan report of 1854 
(Northcote & Trevelyan, 1854) as “a myth set up as an ideal and used as a defence” 
(Rhodes, Wanna, & Weller, 2008, p. 468).  However, civil servants’ critiques cannot 
be entirely dismissed as rhetoric laden with golden-age-ism. The former senior civil 
servant Christopher Foster argues that the Blair government by-passed the 
safeguards of the civil service and “told untruths as an aspect of news management”, 
producing public documents which were “propagandist” as opposed to providing 
“clear and detailed information”(Foster, 2005, p. 182).  In a more recent paper he 
argues that the civil service has a dual, even contradictory role: “a duty to support the 
government of the day in developing and implementing its policies”, and a watchdog 
role on behalf of citizens in the form of “a duty to the state to seek to ensure that the 
business of government is conducted honestly and properly” (Foster, 2014, p. 1).   
 
1.3 Conclusion 
The narrative of political spin is inconsistent and self-serving on the part of 
politicians, journalists and civil servants.  We have discussed the sometimes 
unrealistic and contradictory pressures this narrative places on individuals such as 
government press officers to uphold the purity of the system.  The narrative is 
compelling but simplistic in that it deploys notions of the corruption of the political 
public sphere by persuasive discourse fed to the media by demonised spin doctors.  
This rightly raises the issue of distorted public communication but its agent-centred 
focus serves to disguise a number of more profound and troubling developments at 
the meso-level.  These include the use of government communications by political 
parties to gain advantage on the political battlefield; the cultural and institutional 
changes within the public bureaucracy that make it more difficult for dissenting voices 
to be heard in relation to politically-inspired government narratives; and a growing 
responsiveness to the mutually reinforcing pressures of politicization and 
mediatization through symbolic decision-making and action disguised as a neutral 
representation of government policy.   
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This thesis asks whether we are indeed looking at deep-seated and possibly still 
largely uncharted structural changes associated with media transformation within 
political institutions like the civil service.  In their seminal work on the mediatization 
of politics, Mazzoleni and Schulz warned of the dangers of distortion in public 
communication that could challenge democracy itself (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; T. 
Meyer & Hinchman, 2002; Zaller, 1999).   The concern with political spin has 
coincided with a deepening distrust of politicians and a corresponding decline in 
party engagement and electoral participation (Allen & Birch, 2015; IpsosMORI, 2016; 
Saward, 2010).  Behind this lies the fundamental normative institutional question: 
what is the role of impartiality as a public sector value that seeks to protect ‘good 
government’, and how has it fared in the age of political spin?   
This thesis will use witness accounts from government actors as well as archival and 
documentary evidence to establish chronology in relation to the changes in 1997 so as 
to tease out the various elements that make up the ‘black box’ of government 
communications.  One original contribution will be to hear and acknowledge the 
voices of UK government press officers, not only as significant actors who are 
frequently criticized yet under-researched, but as participants in and witnesses to a 
historic change in the political/media landscape. The evidence for and against the 
process of ‘politicization’ as a progressive process of boundary transgression over 
time, where what would have seemed improper at one time later becomes acceptable 
or appropriate, is a recurring theme that will be discussed in the next chapter and will 
form the background to the four main findings chapters 4-7.  At the heart of this 
discussion is the concept, or doctrine, of impartiality, which requires further 
dissection. 
In Chapter 2, I examine continuity and change in the relations between governments 
and the media after 1997, asking how the concepts of politicization, personalization, 
presidentialization and mediatization can contribute towards a deeper theoretical 
understanding of the changing relationship between politicians, political parties, and 
the mass media.  The chapter will review three diverse strands of literature to produce 
a conceptual framework that underpins the research questions and the empirical task: 
public administration accounts of changes in political institutions in relation to 
media; political communications studies of the relation between political and media 
elites; and mediatization approaches to media transformation as a global historical 
process which is transforming society at all levels.  The review looks beyond media 
institutions and actors to study the dimensions and complications of pervasive media 
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change within political/administrative fields and institutions.  In the light of this, 
government press officers can be seen as actors who navigate within a highly 
mediatized and politicized environment to perform a frequently uncomfortable but 
often bridging role between two highly competitive but also mutually reinforcing 
fields – media and politics.   
Chapter 3, Research Design and Methodology, explains how and why qualitative 
research into the working practices, beliefs, perceptions and experiences of 
government press officers was carried out, how this evidence was contextualised by 
further interviews and documentary analysis, and how the data were analyzed.  The 
four findings chapters (4-7) present the findings in relation to four concepts newly-
applied to government communications.  The first three, resilience, resistance and 
responsiveness, relate to mediatization as a process of change over time.  A fourth 
concept, representing the public, will address the dual claim of civil servants to 
represent the government of the day and perform a watchdog role over the longer 
term interests of the public.  
Some critics argue that the processes of “spin” and “meta coverage” are self-limiting, 
and that during the modern era, we are observing a distinctive historical process 
which has or will run its course. In 2007, McNair suggested that “we have reached the 
end of a cycle in government communication in the UK, and are now returning to an 
era of clearer separation between the ideologically motivated pursuit of party-political 
communication and that undertaken by government and the state on the behalf of the 
public”(McNair, 2007b, p. 108).  Similarly, Gaber has recently argued that, partly in 
response to developments in the “digital public sphere” which has increased public 
access to political information, the so-called crisis in public communications asserted 
by Blumler and Coleman has passed its high point, in the UK at least (Blumler & 
Coleman, 2010, 2015; Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995; Gaber, 2016).   Whether this is 
really the case, or whether the power struggle has taken on a new and as yet 
undiscovered form, will be an important consideration throughout this thesis.  The 
research questions raised by this study will challenge the idea that political spin per 
se has corrupted modern politics.  Instead, the study seeks to reveal and explain 
changes in the culture and internal dynamics that operate within and between media 
and political intermediaries at the interface between politics, the government 
bureaucracy and the media, at a time of profound and dramatic media 
transformation. At the heart of this research, then, is this overarching question:  
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In response to the pressures of mediatization after 1997, did the UK 
government communications service have sufficient resilience to deliver a 
public communications function consistent with its own stated purposes?   
By relating mediatization to the concept of resilience and placing it within the context 
of the stated purposes of government communications, the question is an empirical 
one concerning change over time within the existing paradigm of government 
communications.  This does not preclude comment on the issue of whether the 
paradigm itself is or is not appropriate but that is a question for the conclusion. 
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Chapter 2:  Continuity and change in the relations 
between government and the media – a theoretical 
framework 
 
“Nothing, but nothing, prepares you for working in Downing Street in intimate 
relationship with the Prime Minister…the pressure of events almost suffocates in its 
intensity…you are cut off from the outside world.  You function inside a combination 
of hothouse and bunker…you keep going on the adrenalin and the thrill of being at the 
summit of things”.  Christopher Meyer, former Chief Press Secretary to John Major 
(Meyer, 2006, p. 13). 
This recollection from Christopher Meyer, the civil servant who managed John 
Major’s relations with media between 1994 and 1997, is a powerful depiction of life at 
the interface between the government, politics and the media.  It reflects the 
complexity of this elite mediatized political world and acts as a warning to researchers 
to consider the role of media holistically as “part of the general texture of experience”, 
which has cultural, institutional and personal dimensions (Silverstone, 1999, p. 2).  It 
depicts a world of risk, uncertainty and isolation; not an environment conducive to 
straightforward or open communication. 
This chapter will attempt to synthesize various conceptions of government 
communications derived from three distinctive areas of study: public administration 
accounts of changes in political institutions in relation to media; political 
communications studies of the relation between politics and the media; and 
mediatization studies, which consider media transformation as a global historical 
meta-process that is radically reshaping society at all levels.  Relevant literatures from 
these three distinctive scholarly fields will allow us to reach a fuller and more 
integrated conceptualisation of the complexity of government communications that 
can be applied beyond the British case to liberal democracies in general.  I will argue 
that a particular kind of mediatization approach, which I identify here as an 
“embedded media” field approach, is best placed to address the question of how social 
and cultural change linked to media change may impact on the communications 
function of central bureaucracies, and specifically on asymmetries between the party 
political and administrative arms of government.    
This approach takes into account four important social and cultural changes which 
require further theorisation:  
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1. The higher premium placed on persuasion by both journalists and politicians 
as they battle for attention in an increasingly competitive marketplace 
(Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012);  
2. The use of media-led strategic communications as a defensive strategy by 
political parties and individual politicians, when news can travel round the 
globe in seconds;  
3. The steady growth in the scale, scope and status of PR and promotional culture   
(Davis, 2013b; Edwards, 2011, p. 5; Wernick, 1991);  
4. The shrinking of the public domain and the so-called ‘hollowing out’ of the 
state, especially ”the senior civil service where the frontiers of the public 
domain had been most zealously guarded” (Diamond, 2014b; Marquand, 
2004, p. 2; 2008). 
The chapter begins by looking at the media/political interface within government, 
focusing on the role of politicians in determining the shape and purposes of 
government communications, and the changing institutional and professional 
arrangements for managing the media within Whitehall after 1997.  The second 
section examines ways in which change within government communications is 
currently understood, looking more closely at such concepts as politicization, 
centralization, personalization, and presidentialization and reviewing the evidence 
for qualitative change in the relationship between politicians and the mass media in 
recent decades.  I will argue that it is essential to consider government 
communications within its changing political and institutional context; one which is 
itself subject to the over-arching meta-process of mediatization.  In the third section, 
I present a conceptual framework for government communications which applies a 
field approach to the concept of mediatization in order to  facilitate a more grounded, 
fine-grained and critical understanding of the complex dynamics which operate at the 
interface between government, politics and the media. 
 
2.1 The media-political interface within government 
UK Government communications has been little researched from within, although 
recent studies into public bureaucracies’ relations to media have been carried out in 
Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Australia (Pallas & Fredriksson, 2014) 
(Figenschou & Thorbjornsrud, 2015; Schillemans, 2012). What little evidence there 
is, is selective rather than systematic, but it suggests that, within the larger 
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government communications workforce, a relatively small group of about 750 people 
working as media relations specialists within the UK’s 20 or so 16  ministerial 
departments, have been disproportionately affected by the three main forces thought 
to be linked to politicization: the influence of political parties and politicians on the 
structure and function of government media relations, changes in job security among 
civil servants who specialise in strategic communications, and the rise of a new type 
of temporary civil servant, the politically-appointed special adviser.   I discuss each of 
these claims in turn. 
2.1.1 The changing relationship between politicians and political parties, and 
the mass media 
Political spin is more than an approach to media management.  It is the pursuit of 
politics using the latest communications tools in order to exploit media power, and 
applied by politicians and political parties in a political battle field context.  This is 
certainly the view of three of the founders of New Labour, Philip Gould, Alastair 
Campbell and Peter Mandelson, who, one can argue, were political as well as media 
actors (Lee, 1999; Pitcher, 2003).  This battlefield has long been identified as the 
arena in which elections are fought, but with the rise of the permanent campaign, the 
field of battle has extended into the executive (Blumenthal, 1982; Norris, 2000a).  As 
a matter of survival, politicians are demanding that all available tools in the media 
armoury are deployed in their interest, both as individuals and as representatives of 
political parties.  This chapter aims to demonstrate that the process by which media 
cultures and considerations become increasingly embedded within political 
institutions, can be seen as a primary driver of political behaviour, both within and 
outside government. 
Studies of the media activities of serving politicians in a number of countries have 
shown that they actively court media attention, and believe that the mass media, 
especially national press and broadcast news, can determine their futures (Davis, 
2007a; Elmelund-Præstekær, Hopmann, & Sonne Nørgaard, 2011;.Foster, 2005; 
Hennessy, 2014; Strömbäck, 2011; van Aelst, Shehata, & van Dalen, 2010; Van Aelst 
& Walgrave, 2011).  Davis’s interview study with 60 British MPs, found that most 
                                                          
16  Taking Hood and Dixon’s (2015)  estimate that there were about 3000  communications 
staff working in Whitehall departments in  2013, of whom  around 30%, or about 750, 
specialised in media relations, communications staff represented about 0.7% of the 405,000 
employees working in the civil service.  
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talked to journalists every day, to the extent that the relationship had become one of 
mutual dependence between “quasi-colleagues” (Davis, 2007a, p. 76).  Politicians are 
dominant suppliers of news (Barnett & Gaber, 2001b; McNair, 2007a), while 
journalists are the gatekeepers to public attention that “confers political legitimacy on 
those already in power” (Davis, 2007b, p. 83), with the result that media and political 
elites have become “inextricably intertwined” (Blumler & Gurevitch, 1995, p. 26).  It 
has been argued that the development of strategic political communications in Britain 
since the 1990s has been led by increasingly centralised political parties and hence 
influenced by party ideology (Harrop, 2001; Wring, 2001).  Others go further to argue 
that a predominantly two-party system such as that operating in the UK increasingly 
functions like a cartel, deploying the resources of the state to manage political 
competition, and capturing elements of the state apparatus (such as the government 
communications machine in our case) to promote party interests (Katz & Mair, 2009).  
By 1997 it was actually politicians within the main political parties who were driving 
the communications agenda rather than so-called ‘spin doctors’ (Brandenburg, 
2002).   
Subjective accounts provide evidence for the increasing importance of media 
management in the lives of politicians.  Political and journalistic memoirs from the 
1990s onwards have vividly described the increasingly jumpy atmosphere around 
ministers coping with life on the media frontline (Blair, 2010; Campbell & Hagerty, 
2011; Fowler, 1991; M Garnett, 2010; Major, 2003; Mattinson, 2010; Mullin & 
Winstone, 2010; Powell, 2010; Price, 2005, 2010).  Most revealing are the testimonies 
of current and former ministers at the Leveson Inquiry (Leveson, 2012) which 
demonstrate the existential fears and consequent actions of a political class grappling 
with media transformation.  This disparate group of senior politicians is convinced 
that the mass media, and especially the national tabloids, are a source of power which 
they must at least appease, if not control and exploit.  The witness statements to 
Leveson from former cabinet ministers from both political parties provide a litany of 
emotion; largely fear.   
Kenneth Clarke describes people being "driven away" from politics by the fear of 
exposure (Evidence session: 30/5/2012). Chris Patten refers to politicians being 
unable to sleep (Evidence session: 23/1/2011).  Peter Mandelson describes the 
"relentless hostility" of certain newspapers as "horrible and bloody" (Witness 
statement: 21/5/2012), and Alan Johnson refers to senior politicians as being 
"pilloried" and subjected to "fictitious stories" which can "damage your life forever" 
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(Evidence session: 22/5/2012)  Most pejorative is the contribution from Tony Blair, 
who describes the behaviour of the media as "an abuse of power", and journalists as 
"these people" who are "all out against you", and who will engage in "long and 
sustained", "full on, full frontal, day in day out", "relentless and unremitting" "attack" 
that can "literally wash a government away" (Evidence session: 28/5/2012).   
They express distaste for this “crude and sometimes debasing but nonetheless 
unavoidable…transactional” relationship with journalists” (Peter Mandelson). Tony 
Blair considers the apparent "closeness" between politicians and the media as 
"unhealthy", and built on fear.  Jack Straw warns "if you get too close, your own 
position becomes compromised" (Evidence session: 16/5/2012).  Alastair Campbell 
accepts that "at times we were probably too controlling" (Written statement: 
30/4/2012), while his former deputy Lance Price is critical of his own role as "part of 
the process whereby No.10 would ask for announcements before departments had a 
policy that was ready to announce" (Evidence session: 12/4/2012).  The two Coalition 
politicians explain why they were so determined to employ the controversial former 
News of the World editor, Andy Coulson, who was later jailed for his role in phone 
hacking.  David Cameron wanted "someone tough and robust" who could handle "the 
huge media pressure" and "help you through what can be an absolute storm", where 
even the innocent are "thrown to the wolves" (Evidence session: 14/6/2012).  George 
Osborne explains that Coulson was recruited because he had the experience to cope 
when things are "thrown at you very quickly" (Written statement: 4/5/2012)17.   
Politicians’ from both ends of the political spectrum expressed similar sentiments, 
suggesting that the standard criticism of the British press, that it has consistently 
promoted centre-right perspectives, may need augmenting (Curran & Seaton, 2010).  
Van Dalen et al. conducted a survey of 425 political journalists from the UK, 
Denmark, Germany and Spain between 2007 and 2009, supplemented by a content 
analysis of 1035 news articles in a range of quality newspapers.  They found a uniquely 
negative tone towards all politicians in the British newspapers studied18 that applied 
equally to left-leaning and right-leaning politicians (Van Dalen et al., 2012).  Bartle 
tracked the changes in partisan alignment following the election of Tony Blair as 
Labour leader in 1994, and found that Labour received endorsements from six out of 
                                                          
17 Selected quotes taken from the testimony to Leveson of 11 politicians and two of their media 
aides appear in Appendix 1.   
18 The Daily Telegraph and The Guardian. 
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the 11 national daily newspapers in 1997, rising to seven in 2001.  Even in 2005, 
despite Blair’s relative unpopularity following the Iraq War, Labour was endorsed by 
six out of 11, representing 58% of daily newspaper circulation compared to 34% for 
the Conservatives (Bartle, 2005).   Wring agrees that the turning point in newspaper 
partisanship came after 1994, when the so-called ‘Tory press’ detached themselves 
from the Conservative project launched by Margaret Thatcher in 1979 by endorsing 
Tony Blair (Wring, 2005b).    
In their 2012 report for Democratic Audit, Wilks-Hegg et al. concluded that the 
political affiliations of the UK national press became more fluid after 1997 but 
conservative dominance appears to have returned by 2010.   Taking the period of 1945 
to 2010, the Conservatives achieved 50-55% support by circulation overall, compared 
to 38-44% for Labour and 5-10% for the Liberals.  This disguises significant 
fluctuation; from 1979 to 1992, Conservative support among national newspapers 
averaged just over 70% by circulation.  Between 1997 and 2005, Labour support 
averaged 63%.  By 2010, Conservative support had returned to 71% by circulation 
(Wilks-Hegg et al. 2012, citing Butler & Butler 2000 and 2006, and Wring, 2010).   
In his own evidence to the Leveson Inquiry, the media scholar James Curran argued 
that although press partisanship was still important, UK politicians’ relationships 
with the press were more influenced by fear of ridicule and hostility: “when in attack 
mode, national papers can be bullying, witty and unconstrained.  It is this 
concentration of firepower that can be turned on and off that partly accounts for 
politicians’ desire to court the press” (Curran, 2012, pp. 5-6).   Such a discourse of 
powerlessness on the part of the most powerful politicians in the UK, in the face of 
what they consider to be an increasingly uncontrollable force, helps to explain the 
drive on the part of ministers to employ more and more personal aides to manage the 
media, and why a proactive (even hyperactive) government communications machine 
is so important to them:  too important, indeed, to be left to bureaucrats.   
2.1.2 The rise of the special adviser 
Numerically small but steadily growing, the significance of special advisers (known 
colloquially as SpAds) derives from their proximity to ministers and through their 
collective influence on government narratives.  The modern special adviser originated 
in 1964 when the incoming Wilson government appointed five to No.10 and the 
Treasury to bring more technical and economic expertise into government and to 
overcome what Labour saw as a naturally conservative bias within the civil service 
42 
 
(Blick & Jones, 2010).  They attracted “much contemporary media interest” but were 
welcomed as a means of bringing new talent and expertise into public service (Fulton 
Report on the Civil Service, 1968, p. 74).  Conservative administrations showed less 
interest in special advisers – Heath recorded just 10 – but the Labour governments of 
1974-79 provided the “breakthrough (which) took place alongside a more general 
professionalization of politics” (Blick, 2004, p. 148) when numbers rose beyond 30 
for the first time19 .  The biggest rise came after 1997; in March 1989 there were just 
over 30.  By 1999, there were 68 in post across government, rising to 78 in July 2000. 
In opposition, the Conservatives were frequently critical of New Labour’s special 
advisers, especially their role in briefing the media (BBC News, 2000; Davis, 2003; 
Maude, 2010) and pledged in their 2010 Manifesto to cap their numbers in 
government (Conservative Party, 2010).  The 2012 Ministerial Code was amended to 
impose an official limit of two per cabinet minister but numbers rose from 66 in June 
2010 to 74 in March 2011, the same number as in 2009 (McClory, 2011).  Official 
figures released in July 2012 showed that numbers had risen further to 79, rising to 
103 by November 2014, and 114 by December 2015 (Cabinet Office, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015b; Gay, 2013).  As we saw in Chapter 1, the idea of the Extended Ministerial Office 
continued to be developed and they were formally adopted in five departments during 
the Cameron administration (2010-2015) (Faulkner & Everett, 2015).   The 
Ministerial Code issued on behalf of the new Prime Minister Theresa May in 
December 2016 quietly removed the facility for EMOs 20  (Cabinet Office, 2016; 
Hughes, 2017). 
The role of the special adviser has evolved since the 1990s when they were mainly 
seen as trainee MPs.  One long-standing critic concludes that during the New Labour 
period, they were recruited mainly as media specialists and spent much of their time 
at the “front line of the vastly expanded interface between politicians and journalists”, 
(Jones, 2001, p. 68), bringing them into increasing contact with the government 
information service staffed by civil servants.  This increasing media specialisation 
                                                          
19 This tally does not include unpaid or unofficial advice from supporters such as Tim Bell, the 
advertising and PR specialist during successive elections, and most importantly, during the 
Miners' Strike of 1984-5, or advisers on presentation such as Gordon Reece (Hollingsworth, 
1997). 
20 See 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/579752/
ministerial_code_december_2016.pdf 
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appears to be continuing.  In 2010, an estimated 89% of Coalition special advisers 
newly recruited into departmental positions had been brought in from roles within 
either Party HQ or with MPs, where media relations formed a large part of their role 
(Ingham, 2010).  They are more likely now to have had pre-government experience 
as party appointees working in media relations or public affairs than previously, when 
they were more likely to come from business, academia or the civil service (Yong & 
Hazell, 2014). 
Little is known about how media special advisers operate day-to-day, although a 
series of recent scandals leading to high profile resignations of special advisers21, and 
a rare insider account by the former SpAd Nick Hillman (Hillman, 2014), suggest that 
many are given free reign by their ministers to brief journalists, write blogs, give 
presentations and tweet.  For Yong and Hazell “special advisers exist because 
ministers need them, and much of their value lies in the flexibility and relative 
freedom from hierarchy and neutrality” (Yong & Hazell, 2014, p. 18).  The ill-defined 
nature of the role has an advantage for ministers.  A lack of formal oversight, for 
example, allows ministers to deny knowledge of the actions of their aides.  The 
behaviour of Damian McBride in briefing against Gordon Brown’s opponents, which 
Brown claimed not to know about, is a case in point (McBride, 2013; Seldon, 2005)22.    
The latest of a series of official reviews into the conduct of special advisers endorsed 
the legitimacy of the role in principle but raised concerns about lack of accountability 
and poor management (Public Administration Select Committee, 2012).  A recent 
interview study found that although many insiders saw special advisers as a “firewall” 
protecting the civil service from politicization there were accusations that special 
advisers shouted at and bullied junior civil servants, prompting claims of “a 
fundamental breakdown of relationships between special advisers and departmental 
civil servants” (Gruhn & Slater, 2012, p. 10).   
                                                          
21 The Culture Secretary’s special adviser resigned in April 2012 following allegations that he 
held inappropriate discussions with News Corporation while the company was bidding to take 
over BskyB. The Home Secretary's adviser resigned in June 2014 for briefing against another 
cabinet minister.   
22 Following McBride's resignation over personal smears against opponents, Gordon Brown 
wrote to the Cabinet Secretary, Gus O'Donnell, assuring him that "no Minister and no political 
adviser other than the person involved had any knowledge of or involvement in these private 
emails" and asking that the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers be amended so that special 
advisers caught making "personal attacks" would "automatically lose their jobs" (Gordon 
Brown letter, 13 April 2009). 
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Concerns about the media role of special advisers led to a warning from the Public 
Affairs Select Committee (PASC) as long ago as 1998 that “the existence of two 
different officials, responsible for briefing the press on different aspects of Ministerial 
policy, is bound to lead to problems” such as duplication and substitution of the work 
of government press officers (Public Administration Select Committee, 1998, para. 
32).  Mike Granatt, then head of profession for government communications, told the 
Committee that about 40 special advisers (half the total at the time) dealt with the 
media, which included contributing to the wording of press releases, a practice he felt 
was appropriate (Blick, 2004).  A former Head of Information claimed that advisers 
frequently instructed press officers on how to draft press releases and “sought to 
reproduce the tone of the Labour manifesto and repeat its election commitments as 
emerging news” (Oborne, 1999; Reardon, 1998).   Successive reviews since have 
reiterated these concerns and called for a clearer distinction to be drawn between the 
media management roles of civil service communicators and special advisers (Gay, 
2013; Public Administration Select Committee, 2000; 2002; 2012; Wicks, 2003) (See 
Appendix 2 for full list of reviews and their conclusions).    
2.1.3 Job insecurity in government communications 
Job insecurity, or what is usually referred to as ‘churn’ within a Whitehall-style civil 
service, can be seen as an indirect measure of politicization, as it indicates the extent 
to which officials move on with a change in political leadership.  Sausman and Locke 
found significant churn within the UK civil service after the 1997 election but only 
within the Government Information Service, where it was particularly high among 
top ranking professionals (Sausman & Locke, 2004).  It remains to be demonstrated 
that this was indeed “completely unprecedented” (Oborne, 1999) or that it was solely 
due to politicization. It could, for example, be the outcome of a natural turnover of 
ambitious civil servants who move on having developed close and trusting relations 
with particular ministers, in which case it could be an example of personalization. 
Equally, it could involve professionalization – planned moves within the service to 
gain experience and promotion which had been delayed by the election.   
However, it is clear that the turnover in government communications was significant 
after 1997.  During the first year of the Blair Government, 25 heads and deputy heads 
of information were replaced – 50% of the total – and by August 1999, all but two 
Heads of Information had been replaced (Oborne, 1999). By 2002, none of the Heads 
was still in post (Franklin, 2004).  This was in spite of assurances given by the 
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incoming Prime Minister’s press secretary, Alastair Campbell, at his first meeting 
with the Information Heads on 3 May 1997 that no great purge of civil service jobs 
was planned. In his Diary entry for 2 May, Campbell writes: “The press office people 
were nervous…They…sensed, rightly, that I had not been impressed by the John 
Major press operation and would want to make changes”.  Describing the meeting 
itself, he writes: “The press officers were a mixed bunch, but gave off the sense of 
being terrified” (Campbell & Hagerty, 2011).  Later, he describes them as “a pretty 
dull and uninspiring lot” (entry for 13 May), and the “culture in which they had grown 
up” as being “way behind the times” (entry for 2 June).  By 9 June, he was “beginning 
to think the majority were useless” 23.   
In his entry for 16 October Campbell refers to media complaints of politicization in 
government communications as “preposterous rubbish”, “a lot of guff” and “more of 
the same crap”.  Yet, a few months earlier, he had written: “I was more convinced than 
ever that it can only work if you are clear you are working for the politician, not for 
the press” (29 May).  Here, he is identifying the public interest with the elected 
politician, not the media, or indeed, the public servant.  On 26 September, he writes: 
“I was trying to modernise the GIS because it needed modernising, but I was also 
trying to make changes that would benefit us” (my emphasis).  This begs the 
question, what does he mean by us?  Is he referring to government in general or New 
Labour in particular?  Or even to Tony Blair? Campbell was, above all, a Labour 
loyalist, so it seems likely he was speaking in both party political terms and in support 
of the Prime Minister’s aspiration that the service should be more responsive to 
steering from the centre (Negrine, 2008).  If so, there must have been at least the risk 
of party politicization, and a consequent undermining of the impartiality of civil 
service communications.  
Campbell’s supporters emphasise his determination to modernise and professionalise 
civil service communications.  In his memoir, Tony Blair’s chief of staff, Jonathan 
Powell, defends the record of his former colleague: “Alastair was unfairly criticized 
for politicising the government press service.  Actually, what he did was 
professionalise and modernise it” (Powell, 2010, pp. 193-194).  Powell does not 
consider the possibility that professionalization or modernisation does not preclude 
politicization; if politicians are driving the modernization process and applying party 
                                                          
23 The term “useless” to describe officials is also used by Alan Milburn, then Secretary of State 
for Health, over supper in 2002, as noted by Chris Mullin in his diary (Mullin & Winstone, 
2010), entry for 5 March). 
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political preferences, the process is de facto politicized, however well-intentioned or 
overdue. Contemporary accounts suggest that during the 1990s, there had been a 
consistent failure to recognise and respond to changes in the media. As we have seen, 
John Major later admitted that he was suspicious of ‘political spin’, telling the 
Leveson Inquiry that his lack of close relationships with the media had contributed to 
the hostile media the 1990-97 government often received”(Bale & Sanders, 2001; 
Hogg, 1995; Leveson, 2012).  Others argue that the notion of modernisation itself is 
not a straightforward or neutral management reform process but “a rhetorical stance 
that puts effort into conveying an image of shiny modernity and purposive energy” 
(Hood & Dixon, 2015, p. 192).    
By June 1998, the House of Commons Select Committee24 had picked up enough 
disquiet to launch its own short enquiry.  The report described turnover in 
government communications as “unusual”, noting that some departures were related 
to a lack of “personal chemistry with their Minister” (Public Administration Select 
Committee, 1998 para.33).  Sausman and Locke claim “that some press officers left 
because of a desire on the part of ministers for information officers to be ‘less neutral’ 
than their civil service terms allowed” (Sausman & Locke, 2004, p. 114). From the 
beginning of Blair’s first term then, concerned observers were noting two forces at 
play regarding the retention of senior publicity officials – the personal influence of 
ministers, and their desire for a closer alignment between government 
communications and the aspirations of the party-in-government.  Together, these 
traits could perhaps more accurately be described as 'political responsiveness':  a 
process whereby the priorities and working habits of civil servants are determined by 
ministers and their aides (Mulgan, 2008).   We return to the idea of responsiveness 
as part of a process of change later in the chapter. 
2.2 Understanding change within government 
communications after 1997 
Officials and politicians working at the centre of Whitehall frequently bemoan and 
attempt to mitigate the variation in standards between departments (Kerslake, 2014).  
The Mountfield Report, for example, stated early in New Labour’s first term that 
“responsibility for ensuring practices within press offices are fully effective and up to 
date rests primarily with departmental heads of information” but found that “the 
                                                          
24 Renamed the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee after the 2015 
election. 
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quality of these practices and arrangements varied between Departments” 
(Mountfield, 1997). Downing Street may be more or less active in managing the 
coordination of government information, depending on political and personal factors, 
but it can only operate through influencing departments, not instructing them 
(Heffernan & Webb, 2005).  In his history of 20th century British government 
propaganda, Taylor shows how key departments such as the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, the Treasury and No.10, developed their own specialised and 
sometimes competing ways of briefing the press (P. M. Taylor, 1999).  The norm 
within government communications oscillated between central coordination and 
resourcing, and a push back to departments, combined with retrenchment.  
Frequently, both states pertained, often uncomfortably, as for example, during the 
appeasement period leading up to 1938 when the Foreign Office frequently 
confounded No.10 by issuing anti-appeasement messages (Price, 2010, p. 81). 
The historical evidence, plus anecdotal accounts of the competing media briefing 
regimes of No.10 and the Treasury during the Thatcher and Blair administrations, 
suggests that centralization is a cyclical process inherent in departmentalised, 
Whitehall-style systems. It is therefore more likely to be a background factor in 
increasing political control over government communications than a deciding one.  
However, as we saw in the Prologue, the freezing out of the Foreign Office during the 
production of the infamous dossier of 24 September 2002 (HM Government, 2002) 
led to the loss of an alternative voice within government that might have challenged 
the Blair narrative (Rogers, 2003).  The growth in the Prime Minister’s policy staff 
after 1997, as identified by a number of scholars, also enabled Blair to bypass the 
advice of the Foreign Office during preparations for the 2003 Iraq War (Blick & Jones, 
2010; Heffernan & Webb, 2005; Yong & Hazell, 2014).  While not explicitly 
challenging the departmentalised model of Whitehall, cumulative structural change 
since 1997 led to what some have identified as a ‘de facto’ Prime Minister’s 
department, a transformation that has taken place “quietly and without publicity …in 
a manner that is typically British” (Burch & Holliday, 1999, p. 43).  A concern on the 
part of politicians with media management has been central to this change.  
Centralization is better understood when analyzed in association with concepts such 
as personalization and presidentialization, defined as a concentration of power, both 
real and symbolic, within the political leadership.  Webb and Poguntke’s comparative 
study of presidentialization found overwhelming agreement among 14 country 
experts that long-term structural change within central bureaucracies had taken place 
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to facilitate greater control by political leaders, and that the personalization of media 
image-making played a key part in the process (Webb & Poguntke, 2005). Indeed, 
Langer’s content analysis of references to British Prime Ministers in the Times 
newspaper between 1945 and 2008 found a large increase after 1979 in the proportion 
of articles mentioning Prime Ministers and referring to them in personal terms 
(Langer, 2006; 2010). She argues however, that “parties have an enduring 
importance in British politics and its media coverage” (p76).  Karvonen is critical of 
the so-called “personalization thesis” which claims that individual politicians, and 
especially political leaders, increasingly determine the way people understand politics 
and express their political preferences (Karvonen, 2010). His comparative literature 
review of Western liberal democracies since the 1970s, finds little evidence for 
systematic and sustained increases in party leader impacts on electoral behaviour or 
that election coverage has become more personal and less party-oriented.  Citizens do 
not vote for leaders instead of parties, he claims, since “the party leader factor is, by 
and large, a function of the party factor” (p84).   
The focus on personality, either of itself or as shorthand for the public representation 
of political ideas or parties, downplays the crucial role of institutions such as political 
parties and central bureaucracies in driving or responding to changes in political 
communication.   To provide some key examples from a vast literature, one 
substantial study of party leader effects on party choice in nine Western democracies 
showed that “overall party evaluations predominate over party leader 
evaluations”(Holmberg & Oscarsson, 2004, cited in Karvonen, 2010, p66).  King’s six-
country study concluded that “leaders are normally not decisive for election 
outcomes” and there are no indications that this is changing (King, 2003, p. 67).  
Poguntke and Webb are among those who conclude that partisan considerations still 
dominate voter assessments at election time, but that leader-centred campaigning 
and media coverage have increased significantly in most liberal democracies (Garzia, 
2011; Poguntke & Webb, 2005).   
The presidentialization thesis thus brings together the notions of an increasingly 
mediated form of personalization, and longer-term structural change within political 
systems.  Passarelli argues persuasively that personalization is subordinate to 
presidentialization, even within parliamentary systems such as Westminster, where 
strong, leader-led political parties, and a unitary state in which party leaders 
increasingly operate as chief executives,  encourages the marginalization of mid-level 
political actors and institutions such as party cadres, bureaucrats and parliaments 
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(Passarelli & Palgrave, 2015).  Webb and Poguntke argue that many modern liberal 
democracies are moving towards a ‘neo-elitist’ form of plebiscitary democratic 
accountability where leaders become both more responsive and more vulnerable to 
(highly-mediated) assessments of public mood (Webb & Poguntke, 2005).  Two 
powerful themes emerge from the presidentialization thesis which are particularly 
pertinent to this study: the significance of little-publicised changes within the public 
bureaucracy, and closer integration between political leadership and news 
management. 
 
2.3 The administrative and political dimensions of 
government communications 
The Westminster model of public administration has been characterised as “the 
world’s leading example of majoritarian democracy”, where power is concentrated in 
the executive, and there are few ‘veto points’ (Lijphart, 1999, p. 314), and see also 
(Hood & Dixon, 2015).   Civil servants navigate between the demands of politicians 
and their own traditional codes and norms but these are not immutable.  The 2006 
Civil Service Code, for example, insisted that civil servants must act “solely according 
to the merits of the case” and serve “equally well governments of different political 
persuasions” (Civil Service, 2006).  They were also required to ensure fair, just and 
equal treatment of citizens when implementing public policy; a stricture which 
acknowledged a public interest element within the notion of impartiality (Burnham, 
2008).  In 2015, the code was reworded, requiring that civil servants “act in a way 
which deserves and retains the confidence of ministers” while ensuring that they can 
“establish the same relationship with those whom you may be required to serve in 
some future government” (Civil Service, 2015).  This subtle difference removes the 
idea of the “merits of the case”, focusing on the perceptions of ministers, and leaving 
it to the civil servant to chart their own path between the need to retain the confidence 
of ministers while not engaging in undue criticism of the opposition.  This has a 
bearing on the ways in which impartiality can be practiced within government 
communications, as we shall see. 
The media environment within which civil servants who specialise in media relations 
must operate has become more complex and demanding.  They must accommodate 
not only the increasing “ubiquity and complexity” of media (Silverstone, 1999) but 
also the drive by politicians to manage their reputations in what has become a “more 
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complex, media-driven and ‘name, blame and shame’ environment” (Lindquist & 
Rasmussen, 2012, p. 188).  The constitutional, albeit uncodified, role of the UK civil 
service has been described in terms of the “restraints” or “checks and balances” that 
it places on political power within the executive in order to provide “an institutional 
counterbalance to the majoritarian concentration of power in the 
executive”(Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, p. 7), see also  (Lodge et al., 2013).  Central to 
this is the often-quoted need to “speak truth to power” (Wildavsky, 1979).   This raises 
the question of the extent to which the civil service communications function has the 
resilience to resist increasing pressure to manage the news for party political purposes 
on the part of their political masters. 
Loyalty to ministers is a powerful determinant of behaviour on the part of senior 
officials according to the few observational studies of the UK’s central governing 
bureaucracy. In his analysis of everyday policymaking within six jurisdictions, 
including the UK, Page found that political control over bureaucratic policy 
development rarely takes the form of direct commands but proceeds through “the 
anticipation or indirect divination of the wishes of the minister”(E. Page, 2012, p. 47). 
Similarly, Rhodes concluded from his ethnographic study within a UK government 
department that “loyalty is a core belief and practice socialized into the newest recruit 
to the senior civil service.  And that loyalty can spill over into, literally, devotion” 
(Rhodes, 2011, pp. 129-130).  An ingrained dedication to providing personal support 
to ministers is built into UK civil service culture, and is at least as important an article 
of faith as the doctrine of impartiality, which in principle at least, enshrines the 
possibility, even the necessity, of resistance or challenge (Foster, 2005; 2014; Page, 
2010).    
Robert Armstrong, the former Cabinet Secretary to Margaret Thatcher (1979-87) 
implied that obstruction was inherent in the exercise of impartiality by government 
communicators, when he told the House of Lords Communications Committee in 
2008 that: “The professional civil service communicator is one of the bulwarks 
against a blurring of the distinction between party political and government 
communications” (House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2008).   By 
using the metaphor of the bulwark, he suggested that the government press officer 
had a duty to obstruct attempts by ministers to exploit the government 
communications machine for party political purposes.  Logically, then, as the media 
environment becomes, or is perceived to be, more complex, demanding, and 
unforgiving, and news cycles speed up, we would expect bulwarks to become less 
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tolerable, possibly even unsustainable, from the point of view of politicians and their 
aides desperate to get their message across and living with existential anxiety.   
To what extent, then, has there been a change in the balance between restraint (and 
resistance), and loyalty (or responsiveness) in government communications since 
1997?  Many accounts of bureaucracy in recent decades claim that the balance of 
power has tilted in favour of politicians as the civil service experiences a significant 
decline in its autonomy and status (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010; Hustedt & Salomonsen, 
2014; Meer, 2011; Page, 2007; Page, Pearson, Jurgeit, & Kidson, 2012).   Peters claims 
that there has been an increase in “top down politicization” since the 1950s, and that 
the “principal agents of this phenomenon (are) the political parties” (Peters & Pierre, 
2004a, p. 287).   Control over the communications function within central state 
bureaucracies is a particular concern for governing politicians so it is not surprising 
that reforms have been targeted at “communications functions …an area in which 
some of the more egregious failings on the part of political operatives…have been 
made manifest”(Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, p. 205).   
One prominent critic of the impact of mass media on public administration considers 
impartiality within Westminster systems to be an ideal that enshrines two 
obligations:  to serve all citizens, and to give impartial advice to ministers (Aucoin, 
2012).  Aucoin sees an increasingly audited, mediatized and politically-aligned public 
administration as a “corrupt form of politicization”, where impartiality is undermined 
by the misuse of public service to secure “partisan advantage” (p178).  The public 
servant thereby becomes a “promiscuous partisan” – someone who must be seen to 
enthusiastically serve the needs of ministers at all times and, most crucially, to 
actively promote the government agenda to external stakeholders.   Of all specialist 
functions of government, he argues, the communications function most risks 
becoming “the black hole of public service impartiality” (p183), especially when civil 
servants are explicitly required to promote the government’s message by advancing 
and defending its merits.  The subtle differences between the 2006 and 2015 
iterations of the Civil Service Code, provide an illustration of such an evolution.    
It has been claimed that a reduction in Whitehall’s capacity to provide a “check on 
government” by providing “an assured conduit for good advice” has made it harder 
for individual civil servants to “stand up to ministers without paying a price”(Greer, 
2008, p. 123). Greer argues that in recent decades the service has been re-shaped by 
politicians of both parties who “have wanted the civil service to be more of a tool than 
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a guardian”.  Special advisers are “a direct manifestation of political responsiveness” 
(p132), he states, and a symptom of a wider failing – a civil service which carries out 
political instructions rather than influencing and assisting in political decision-
making.  Without elaborating, he argues that the need to delineate between partisan 
and non-partisan tasks is “most pressing in media and communications issues” 
(p134).  Gains and Stoker also take seriously the collective impact of special advisers, 
arguing that, far from being situated outside the political and bureaucratic 
constitutional settlement, special advisers working for UK government ministers 
should be officially integrated into the civil service and critically evaluated as political 
actors in their own right, not simply as extensions of their ministers (Gains & Stoker, 
2011). Hood and Dixon consider the rise of special advisers as the formal recognition 
of a political civil service (Hood & Dixon, 2015, p. 29) while others agree that the 
power and influence of political appointees in Westminster-style systems is “hugely 
under-rated” (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2014, p. 599).  Despite this, as special advisers have 
noted themselves, there is little regulation, monitoring or understanding about what 
they actually do (Hillman, 2014; Wilkes, 2014).   
The phenomenon of increasing political control within public bureaucracies is also 
observed in jurisdictions beyond Westminster but takes different institutional forms.  
For Eichbaum and Shaw, civil servants in many jurisdictions may “surrender the 
safety of distance, in an attempt to best serve their political masters”. This risks a slide 
into complicity, where challenging ministers becomes increasingly difficult 
(Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010, p. 9).  One study examined political responsiveness since 
the 1960s within four ministerial bureaucracies, Germany, Belgium, Denmark and 
the UK (Hustedt & Salomonsen, 2014).  It found that all bureaucracies accommodated 
the drive for political responsiveness in different ways: Germany by extending the 
removal of senior civil servants after a change of government, Belgium by more than 
doubling the size of ministerial ‘cabinets’, and the UK by employing politically aligned 
special advisers.  Danish ministers also employ party political advisers to manage the 
media, but, in contrast to the UK, they have the authority to instruct civil servants on 
media matters.  The authors argue that what is exceptional about the UK case, is the 
extent to which public and media criticism of some of the worst behaviour excesses of 
special advisers has enabled the civil service to ‘push back’, at least in some areas.   
Little is known about the responsiveness or otherwise of UK civil service 
communicators at departmental level, but the roles of Bernard Ingham and Alastair 
Campbell as No.10 Chief Press Secretaries have been subjected to much scrutiny and 
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both have written extensively about their activities in government.  Ingham’s success 
as the Prime Minister’s spokesman led to accusations that he failed as a medium for 
properly informing the public because he had become “too partisan”(Cockerell, 
Hennessy, & Walker, 1984, p. 72), an accusation also levelled at Campbell (Moran, 
2005; Tumber, 2000; Weir, 1998). Of course, the role of the Prime Ministers’ Press 
Secretary is unique, but the related issue of the closeness of the relationship between 
the Secretary of State and the departmental Director of Communications and Head of 
News is rarely discussed.  This has not been investigated empirically, but there must 
be at least the potential for a similar contradiction within the role of departmental 
government communicator between the need to work to the partisan and personal 
agendas of their political masters, and the wider information needs of the public. It is 
at departmental level that most interactions between media and government take 
place, since the Whitehall department is  “the key unit where legal powers are 
generally held, political action assumed, and legal loyalties focused”(Daintith, 2001, 
p. 604; Davis, 2002). This is where the constraints, codes, norms and learned 
behaviours of civil service communicators and their managers are most commonly 
enacted, behind the scenes and beyond the scrutiny of the public, parliament or the 
media.   
2.3.2 Political communications: media and politics as ‘mutually 
reinforcing’ dynamics  
Much political communications research focuses on more spectacular and observable 
aspects such as party political election campaigns, the relationship between 
politicians and journalists, and the activities of party political PR consultants.  The 
activities of government press officers are largely uncharted.  Some commentators 
argue that the daily drip-drip effect of political messaging is more important than 
moments of transition such as elections (Norris, 2001).  Official sources of news such 
as government departments and arms-length executive agencies are seen as 
paramount in setting the news agenda and filling newspapers in routine times 
(Barnett & Gaber, 2001a; 2001b); Davis, 2007b; McNair, 2007a).  Further, it is 
argued that influencing public opinion over the long term is most effectively carried 
out when it is covert: “concealment being critical since once this influence becomes 
public the information loses its credibility” (Moore, 2006, p. 3).  Much of the 
negotiation about what becomes news takes place behind the scenes between political 
and government sources, and journalists, as Cook found in his examination of the 
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relations between US government officials and beat reporters during the 1980s and 
90s  (Cook, 2006; 1998). 
Party competition has a more subtle role to play in unofficially regulating power 
relations within the executive.  Oppositions within two-party systems collude with the 
party-in-government to condone the concentration of party political power in various 
forms, while decrying it in public.  As we saw in Chapter 1, politicians from both main 
parties have publicly upheld, even celebrated, civil service impartiality for example, 
whilst criticising civil servants for being obstructive.  Similarly, opposition politicians 
condemn special advisers, while appointing them once in power.  
Political language must be engaging and persuasive but it has been argued that this 
can militate against good public communication and even decision making in 
government. Coelho, for example, argues that the strategic use of information within 
adversarial parliamentary systems like Westminster reduces the government’s 
capacity to take sensible long term decisions because  “an intensely partisan and 
adversarial political environment creates incentives for parties and legitimate interest 
groups to misrepresent or manipulate information strategically” (Coelho, 2015, 
blogpost).  Flinders agrees that the strategic deployment of information in parliament 
conflicts with the more sober responsibilities of statecraft because the partisan 
pressures on parliamentary accountability encourage the use of information in a party 
political battlefield context rather than as part of a balanced and constructive 
deliberation (Flinders, 2007).  The government press officer seeking to challenge a 
politically inspired narrative has to work against the grain of a party political and 
parliamentary culture, which routinely makes use of the media to utilise information 
as a political weapon rather than a source of public insight.   
As we saw in Chapter 1, it has been argued that the development of strategic political 
communications in Britain since the 1990s has been led by increasingly centralised 
political parties (Harrop, 2001; Wring, 2001).  Mair acknowledged that the move by 
electorates away from lifelong party allegiance and declining involvement with 
mainstream politics allowed the media more scope to collude with party leaderships 
to set the agenda by drawing attention to short-term and more personalised and 
hence newsworthy considerations. Losing their community base, political parties 
become primarily office-seeking, staffed and controlled by professional political 
elites, and more integrated with the process of governing – either as the government 
or government-in-waiting - and disconnected from what they see as the insecurity of 
a “disengaged and random electorate” (Mair, 2013, pp. 42, 98).  In the eyes of the 
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professional political class, the distant electorate, disenfranchised as a result of 
disengagement from political parties, becomes less of a citizen and more the member 
of an unknowable and unpredictable mass audience (Livingstone, 2005).   
 
2.4 Mediatization: a field-based approach 
“The media do more than mediate in the sense of ‘getting in between’.  Rather, they 
also alter the historical possibilities for human communication by reshaping 
relations not just among media organisations and their publics but among all social 
institutions…The concept allows us to rethink questions of media power in terms of 
richly contextualised, strongly historical processes that reject narrowly linear 
assumptions about media effects or impacts.” (Livingstone, 2009) 
Much of the literature concerning public administration and political communication 
is, however implicitly, concerned with dualisms, or dichotomies, such as 
personalization/politicization, bureaucratic/political or traditional/modern.  The risk 
of relying too heavily on such dualisms is that they can simplify and misrepresent a 
complex reality.  It is commonplace, for example, for personalised communication to 
be party political, for political actors to be media actors, and for journalists to become 
political actors.  Civil servants within an intensely political environment need to 
operate politically, while special advisers are also bureaucratic actors. In his writings 
on governmentality, Foucault proposed that “for these dichotomies I would like to 
substitute the analysis of a field of simultaneous differences and successive 
differences” (Miller, Gordon, & Burchell, 1991, p. 62) (my emphasis), an aspiration 
which is consistent with a mediatization approach.  This study’s field-based approach 
to mediatization seeks to examine a changing process over time as it applies to all 
actors within a particular domain, defined here as the ‘cross-field.  This approach 
combines a meso-level approach to empirically examining actors who have ‘situated 
agency’ within institutions, with an understanding of fields, where boundaries 
between the roles, purposes and practices of actors within different institutions 
become blurred or distorted in response to mediatization. 
Mediatization scholars have argued that media and politics may “work in tandem, 
enabling a simultaneous mediatization of politics and a politicization of media” (Hepp 
et al., 2015, pp. 4-5).   Mediatization interacts with politicization to become “an 
accelerating factor, causing political decisions to be made hastily without due 
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consideration” (Koch-Baumgarten & Voltmer, 2010, p. 224). Hyperactive decision-
making and the forms of public communication that seek to justify this serve to 
foreclose deliberation and reduce public trust.  Moss and O’Loughlin used in-depth 
interviews and focus groups with 200 members of the public following 9/11, to argue 
that the process of mediatization leads to politics developing an increasing symbiotic 
relation to the news cycle.  This mutual exchange between political and media elites 
results in an increase in resistance, antagonism and disbelief on the part of the public 
(Moss & O’Loughlin, 2008).   Thus, a mediatized form of political discourse may in 
some way be related to a loss of public trust, a fear which, as we shall see, has also 
been articulated by public servants. 
So far, we have begun to draw together a more critical, fine-grained understanding of 
the dynamics that might be operating at the interface between government and the 
media and which might, therefore, form the basis for an empirical study.  We have 
seen how political party influence over government narratives increases as ruling 
politicians prioritise media management and associate it with their own political 
survival.  Political influence over central public bureaucracies increases, making it 
harder for officials to resist challenges to traditional norms such as impartiality. 
Meanwhile, loyalty and responsiveness within Whitehall-style systems intensify as 
ministers seek, and indeed, insist upon, protection from potentially damaging media 
exposure.  As governments prioritise strategic news management over direct forms of 
communication, such as advertising or statements to parliament, we would expect 
storytelling to take precedence over information-giving, and civil servants concerned 
with media relations to face more pressure to respond to the dual demands of an 
adversarial media and political arena.  
I want to argue here that a field-based mediatization approach is capable of 
accommodating complexity and change, and can avoid some of the risks of dualism, 
by offering a broader and more holistic perspective. Proponents of the mediatization 
approach suggest that it can be considered empirically as a non-normative, dynamic 
process which operates over time at particular sites of exchange (Lundby, 2014a); in 
this case, the institutions and actors situated at the interface, or ‘cross-field,’ between 
bureaucracy, media and politics. I argue that an empirical approach to a meso-level 
institutional analysis informed by the meta-concept of mediatization holds out the 
promise of a more sophisticated and inclusive insight into the problem of government 
communications, and places media at the centre as a force for change, while 
continuing to engage with other ideas, such as politicization and presidentialization.   
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2.4.1 Theoretical background to mediatization  
Broadly speaking, there are two dominant traditions in what is still a relatively new 
area of theoretical development.  I refer to these as the media logic tradition, and the 
embedded media tradition.  The former argues that “changes associated with 
communications media and their development,” as originally theorised by Schulz 
(Schulz, 2004, p. 88), have led to “the growing intrusion of media logic as an 
institutional rule into other fields where it now supplements (and in extreme cases 
replaces) existing rules for defining appropriate behaviour” (Esser, 2013, p. 160).  The 
embedded media tradition argues that the social, institutional and cultural changes 
related to developments in media are more profound than media logic would suggest, 
constituting a deep and long-term transformation in which more and more areas of 
human life are “communicatively constructed in a mediatized way”(Krotz, 2014, p. 
139).  The field-based approach that I am proposing here is a development of the 
embedded media tradition but before turning to this, I will briefly examine some of 
the claims of the media logic approach insofar as they relate to government 
communications.     
The idea of media logic originated with the work of Altheide and Snow, who described 
it as a taken-for-granted set of assumptions through which political discourse is 
filtered through media and normalised as entertainment (Altheide & Snow, 2004). In 
his influential book Media Democracy, Meyer argued that the mass media had come 
to influence “the selection and shape of politics and the entire political process” to 
such an extent that politics had surrendered unconditionally “to the logic of the media 
system” ((Meyer & Hinchman, 2002, pp. xi, 57).  In an echo of the presidentialization 
thesis discussed earlier, policy decision-making had shifted from the deliberations of 
the political party into “the inner circle of advisers around those top politicians whose 
power and position rest on personal, charismatic ties to the media” (p63).   He argued 
that political parties, most notably Labour during the late 1980s, attempted to 
reorganise their strategic communications structures in order to gain more influence 
over media representations of political reality.  He claims, however, that, politicians 
were “by nature unsuited to this sort of thing” (p107-8).   On the contrary, as we have 
seen, far from being unsuited to media management, politicians and political parties 
seem able and willing to exploit the new political marketing techniques and have 
driven innovation in party political and government communications, both in and out 
of office.  
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The pessimistic view of mediatization as the colonization of politics by media, or of 
politicians as reluctant players in the media game, is challenged by Mazzoleni and 
Schulz (Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999), who argue that there has not been a ‘takeover’ of 
political institutions by the media, but the evolution of a new, symbiotic relationship 
between politics and media.   Although media can have distorting effects on the 
political process, in European democracies at least, media power is counterbalanced, 
even exceeded, by the power of political parties and institutions.  Strömbäck and Van 
Aelst, scholars who have consistently spanned political communications and 
mediatization approaches, develop the idea of symbiosis as a process which acts 
through the “dual and integral role of the media” in political processes, identifying 
four dimensions of mediatization.   The fourth dimension is the deepest form of 
adaptation, to the extent that “political actors adjust their perceptions and behaviour 
to news media logic”.  As part of this adaptation, strategic communication specialists 
become part of the dominant coalition at the top of political parties, leaders stand or 
fall by their ability to handle the media, and parties provide a steady flow of 
information subsidies to journalists (Strömbäck & Van Aelst, 2013, pp. 348, 344) and 
see also (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014).    
Schulz’s four levels of media-related social change similarly depict an intensifying 
process of social historical change whereby media first “extend the natural limits of 
human communication capacities; second, the media substitute social activities and 
social institutions; third, media amalgamate with various non-media activities in 
social life; and fourth, the actors and organizations of all sectors of society 
accommodate to the media logic” (Schulz, 2004, p. 98).   Finally, politicians come to 
believe that: “If you don’t exist in the media, you don’t exist politically” (Wolfsfield, 
2011, p. 1), a conclusion which would be familiar to the angst-ridden politicians who 
gave evidence to Leveson.     
The embedded media tradition accepts that society has already exceeded the fourth 
stage of mediatization, and that further interpenetration continues, for example 
through the incorporation of social media into everyday life, and the consequent 
speeding up of the news cycle.  Rather than a takeover, or accommodation to media 
logic, mediatization is a “a historical, ongoing, long-term (meta-) process in which 
more and more media emerge and are institutionalized” so that “media in the long 
run increasingly become relevant for the social construction of everyday life, society 
and culture” (Krotz, 2009, p. 24).  The focus should not be on media institutions or 
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actors, but on “the illumination of some of the shifting relations between and across 
multiple actors and the media” (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015, p. 1325). 
With the exception of some research into the mediatization of public diplomacy and 
information warfare (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015; Pamment, 2015a, 2015b), 
mediatization is a concept rarely used by scholars examining government 
communications in the UK, although it is an important theme among media and 
communications researchers and theorists in Germany, the Netherlands, Scandinavia 
and Australia.  Couldry uses Bourdieu’s notion of meta-capital to argue that the 
symbolic power of media constitutes a field of influence which is so “overwhelming” 
that it can “dominate the whole social landscape” (Couldry, 2003, pp. 664, 668), while 
appearing natural and inevitable.  This acts as a warning to scholars to look beyond 
the more spectacular and visible manifestations of media change, to question media 
and political actors’ own estimations of their role in strategic political 
communications, and to challenge linear or causal explanations for the behaviour of 
media and political actors, for example where blame is attributed to media or media 
intermediaries in the name of “spin”.    
Hepp provides a useful starting point for establishing an empirical approach to the 
study of mediatization. In a recent joint paper with Hjarvard and Lundby, he argues 
for a holistic and dialectical approach to the interplay between media and 
communications on the one hand, and various social and cultural fields on the other, 
that does not depict media (or ‘media logic’) as either ‘colonizing’ of other domains, 
or as a zero sum game.  They argue that the study of the influence of media within 
other social and cultural domains (such as government, in our case), should consider 
resistance as well as response (Hepp et al., 2015).  This is directly relevant to this study 
since, as we saw earlier, British civil servants are required to both respond to and 
resist ministers.   
Ideally, this calls for a qualitative approach to methodology, where official accounts 
of institutional change can be set against an interpretative analysis of data from 
ethnographic observation or in-depth interviews.  Lundby, who developed the idea of 
the “media saturated society” (Lundby, 2009a, p. 2), agrees that the most interesting 
and fruitful question to ask is “how social and communicative forms are developed 
when media are taken into use in social interaction” (Lundby, 2009b, p. 117).   This 
type of approach has taken mediatization scholars into a wide range of arenas such as 
public bureaucracies, executive agencies and charities, political parties, parliaments, 
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even religious institutions, schools and the military (Crosbie, 2014; Hjarvard, 2013; 
Pallas & Fredriksson, 2013; Rawolle & Lingard, 2014;  Thorbjornsrud, Figenschou, & 
Ihlen, 2014; Waller, 2014).   
Empirical research into mediatization, then, should study culture change through “an 
empirically founded theorization of the manner in which our cultures are changing 
with the advance of mediatization”, (Hepp, 2013b, p. 142).  It is not a question of 
establishing a single theoretical framework, he argues, since these rapidly go out of 
date as media cultures change.  Instead, new theories can be “grounded” in and 
developed directly from, empirical work in particular spheres.  One attraction of the 
embedded media approach is that it allows for more open-minded research that does 
not depend on the notion of ‘logics’, or on a cascading narrative of corruption whereby 
media corrupt the political sphere, mediatized politics corrupts the civil service, and 
politicized government communications corrupts public discourse.  It has been 
suggested that the concept of mediatization is not a theory, or even a paradigm, since 
it is too broad to deliver “a coherent, robust and operational conceptual framework 
for a durable research programme”.   Instead, it should be seen as a sensitizing 
concept rather than a definitive one; as a bridge into the empirical social world 
(Jensen, 2013, p. 218). Lunt and Livingstone agree, suggesting that, as a ‘sensitizing 
concept’, mediatization can guide empirical study and offer a heightened historical 
awareness, allowing us to reinterpret social transformations across a range of 
domains, and to examine the intersection of various meta-processes (Lunt & 
Livingstone, 2016).   This has similarities with historical institutionalism, an 
approach widely used in political science although rarely in media and 
communications studies, which is referred to in the next chapter in relation to 
research design and methodology (Bannerman & Haggart, 2015; Hall & Taylor, 1996).   
By examining the processes which shape and structure political institutions and the 
beliefs and practices of those who have ‘situated agency’ within them, we come up 
against the question of what distinguishes fields and institutions.  In contrast to the 
relatively static identity held by even informal institutions, such as, say, journalism, a 
field can be seen as dynamic, fluid and unstable; as “a bounded space of competition 
over specific forms of capital by defined sets of actors”(Couldry, 2014, p. 9).  More 
specifically, the field can be defined as “a site of contestation over power” where 
“institutions, individuals or objects derive their distinctive properties from an 
internal relationship to all other positions in the field” (Akram, Emerson, & Marsh, 
2015, p. 351).  This way of conceptualising mediatization, derived from the work of 
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the Australian scholars Lingard and Rawolle, contains the possibility of interference 
between fields, and the creation of so-called ‘cross-fields’ – interfaces, or spaces, 
where two or more distinct fields collide and interact to produce a unique set of 
patterns.  This is explored more fully in the next section.  
2.4.2 Empirical research within the mediatization paradigm 
In their approach to mediatization, Kunelius and Reunanen have taken as the focus 
for their research the centrality of “attention” as the particular resource, or currency, 
that the media control, rather in the way that power is the resource of politics 
(Kunelius & Reunanen, 2013).  They argue that, as a form of shared currency in 
modern mediatized societies, attention can circulate widely and complicate 
institutional behaviours and norms, even structures.   This is consistent with findings 
by Schillemans et al, who carried out substantial empirical research within public, 
semi-public and third sector bureaucracies in the Netherlands and Australia.   Their 
content analysis of quality press coverage showed that, collectively, public sector 
providers were the subject of “vast, yet often inconspicuous media attention” 
(Schillemans, 2012, p. 11), accounting for over a third of all news stories.  Through a 
combination of interviews, surveys and focus groups they asked officials how 
important it was that they kept abreast of the news.  They found that: “the closer 
people work to the executive level of the organization, and the more strongly a field is 
politicized, the stronger this expectation of knowing the news seems to be” (p78).   
Further, “the organizations closest to the minister ‘suffered’ 25  the most from 
mediatization” (p101).    
The study of central public bureaucracies’ and executive agencies’ relations with 
media is a small but growing sub-field, in which scholars from different disciplines 
have used a combination of methods to identify ways in which these organisations 
adapt to mediatization (Cook, 2006; Deacon & Monk, 2001; Figenschou & 
Thorbjornsrud, 2015; Pallas & Fredriksson, 2013; Rawolle & Lingard, 2014; 
Thorbjornsrud et al., 2014). Pallas and Fredriksson have carried out a range of studies 
in Swedish executive agencies, using both documentary analysis and ethnographic 
observation, and conclude that organisations and the actors within them have 
“substantial agency” in how they adapt to and manage the media.  Utilising Schulz’s 
                                                          
25 The use of the word “suffered” implies but does not demonstrate, that mediatization is a 
negative phenomenon within public bureaucracies.  This implication also appears in the work 
of Thorbjornsrud et al.  I critically examine these ideas more fully in Chapter 7. 
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four dimensions of mediatization to examine the outputs from 20 randomly selected 
executive agencies, they conclude that organisations that are likely to be the subject 
of parliamentary attention through questions and statements are “considerably more 
mediatized than those who operate ‘under the radar’ of national politicians” 
(Fredriksson, Schillemans, & Pallas, 2015, p. 1062; Schulz, 2004).  Mediatization or 
what they term ‘mediability’ – the process through which organizations embed 
mediatization – takes place unevenly within organisations.  Thus, organizations can 
use their own autonomy and professional capital to “strategically navigate to avoid, 
negotiate and even resist mediatization pressures” which largely emanate from the 
domain of mediated politics (Pallas, 2016, p. 445; Pallas & Fredriksson, 2014).   The 
political domain is a major driver for mediatization, meaning that the less autonomy 
and political capital held within the organisation, the less capacity it has to resist the 
pressures of mediatization. 
This empirical exploration of the “(micro) processes and dynamics in which 
mediatization unfolds and gets enacted” prompts questions about the role of 
politicians in promoting strategic forms of communication from within public 
bureaucracies, which we have observed anecdotally within the UK.  According to 
Pallas and Fredriksson, the formal autonomy of even arms-length public 
bureaucracies is not enough to protect them from ‘political interference’.  In a move 
the authors define as ‘politicization through indirect mediatization’ officials tried to 
increase the media profile of their organisation as a way of pleasing politicians, hoping 
thereby to resist further interference (Fredriksson et al., 2015, p. 27).   Similarly, 
Thorbjornsrud et al.’s ethnographic study of a Norwegian executive agency found 
similar forms of adaptation to media amongst those closest to politicians, noting a 
struggle between backstage and public facing officials to uphold “legitimate 
bureaucratic governance” against so-called “arbitrary rule”.  They argue that media 
pressure threatens to drive civil servants towards the latter, challenging Weberian 
ideals of equal treatment and the neutral bureaucracy (Kjersti Thorbjornsrud et al., 
2014); bureaucrats have a rationale of their own which comes into conflict with a 
pervasive “diffuse, porous and informal” infiltrating rationale of mediatization.  
So how does the notion of fields, referred to above, relate to our discussion, or indeed 
to institutions and those with situated agency within them, which are the focus of this 
study?  As Schillemans has stated, the question is not a causal one about who does 
what to whom, but what is happening within and between “complex systems of 
governance” (Schillemans, 2012, p. 9).   Landerer, who has studied the contrast 
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between public media stances and the privately stated beliefs of Swiss political party 
actors, agrees that any causal link between media and politics is unclear. The 
domains, or fields, of media and politics, are equally dependent on mass public 
participation, either as voters, or as audiences and readers, and are hence both subject 
to the competitive pressures of marketization (Landerer, 2013). Again, attention 
becomes a form of currency dominant within the media field but also pervasive 
throughout society as part of the process of mediatization. 
The work of Lingard and Rawolle develops the social field approach more fully with 
reference to Bourdieu, and provides what I would argue is a powerful approach to 
understanding the relationship between modern governments and the media, and 
conducting empirical research at the interface between them.   Social fields “denote 
social spaces in which specific forms of competition operate with a distinctive logic of 
practice and a set of forces that act on people engaged in the competition”(Rawolle, 
2005, p. 2).  Thus, politicians and journalists, and political and media institutions, 
operate in distinctive ways both culturally and institutionally and yet occupy the same 
space as drivers of and as subject to the over-arching process of mediatization, as we 
have seen.   
It makes sense, then, that any approach which incorporates the idea of ‘social fields’ 
must also consider what happens when fields intersect.    In their examination of a 
specific policy case study, Lingard and Rawolle  develop the notion of ‘cross-field 
effects’ to explain the behaviour, culture and outputs of government actors 
negotiating with journalists to create and convey public messages (Lingard, Rawolle, 
& Taylor, 2005; Rawolle, 2005).  Their case study is the highly mediatized launch of 
Australia’s first ‘knowledge economy’ report in 1999, which drew on OECD categories 
to warn that the country was in danger of falling behind in the global race to exploit 
new technology.  Rather than taking a linear, or even a mutual exchange approach, 
where policy development and media coverage are seen to influence one another, the 
authors use a field approach to address a complex policy arena which is subject to a 
range of higher order influencers including the state, journalism, global business (and 
what they refer to as the “rhetoric of numbers” that surrounds it), party politics and 
neo-liberal ideology.   
At stake is the policy process itself: the attempt to name and manage social problems 
by diagnosing the cause and offering solutions.  Feeding into this process are the 
politics of policy development, which operates to the timescale of the electoral cycle, 
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and the much faster and increasingly dominant news cycle.  Education and the 
knowledge economy emerge as a “hot topic” that attracts public interest, and feeds 
into the news cycle.  For the duration of the policy development process, and in the 
struggle to name a particular social issue, a ‘temporary social field’ was created, in 
which “journalists and policy agents adopted a range of strategies that produced 
cross-field effects” (Lingard et al., 2005, p. 734).  An example of a ‘cross-field effect’, 
could be, for example, the media-friendly policy texts and speeches produced by 
government agencies during the lifetime of the ‘hot topic’, the decisions made during 
the media frenzy surrounding the ‘hot topic’, and the internal negotiations that take 
place between officials to sign them off.  A ‘temporary social field’ is one which 
emerges during the process of policy development, whereby short-term negotiations 
of meaning take place between different fields such as policy, journalism and politics 
(Rawolle & Lingard, 2014).  Thus, boundaries become fragile and fluid, and actors 
within each field become susceptible to mutual influence which itself is dependent on 
the power balances between actors in the different fields.  The authors argue that 
journalism increasingly frames the parameters of policy debate and ultimately 
channels, limits and compromises the narratives that reach the public.  
The metaphor of the cross-field as a shared policy and representational space which 
is subject to short-lived effects such as sudden shifts in power balances, changes in 
meaning and interpretation and a distorted relationship to time, is one that could 
helpfully be applied to many aspects of government media relations and the recurring 
media frenzies that affect and frequently destabilise governments, and, as we saw with 
Leveson, which preoccupy politicians.  It could also apply to longer-term strategic 
attempts by governments to re-frame public attitudes towards populist policy areas 
such as crime, immigration and welfare, or to more specific processes such as the 
campaign to persuade the British public to support the attack on Iraq in 2003.  
Lingard and Rawolle do not deploy a longitudinal or historical approach, however.  In 
order to establish a sustained and substantive ‘direction of travel’, this study will set 
such everyday instability against the durability or resilience of the institutional 
contexts within which such processes of change take place.   Inherent within this logic 
is the idea that change may be resisted or responded to.  Indeed, resilience may be 
said to incorporate both resistance to threats, and responses to change. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined a range of literatures and some documentary evidence to 
produce a synthesis of the changes which are generally thought to have impacted on 
the UK’s central government bureaucracy in relation to media change since 1997.  
These have included greater political competition for media attention, the use of 
strategic communications as a political resource, and long-term changes in the 
structure and culture of the UK’s central governing bureaucracy to accommodate both 
direct media demands, and indirect demands from ministers for media 
representation.  Politicians have emerged as key drivers of innovation in strategic 
communication within government; a preoccupation with media scrutiny dominates 
their thoughts and fears, and helps to explain their need to employ media aides who 
are responsible solely to them.  
Immediately after the 1997 election, those suspected of being less able to “benefit us” 
within the government communications leadership were weeded out, bringing in 
new, untried and more politically-aligned senior communicators.  It remains to be 
seen whether this is a long-term trend but it is likely to have increased perceptions of 
job insecurity among government communications specialists. Long overdue 
improvements to and greater investment in government communications took place 
after 1997 but these were implemented according to priorities set by party 
leaderships, leading to resistance on the part of parliamentary committees and the 
civil service in the form of a series of critical reviews and enquiries.  Many of these 
changes were inexorable and difficult to reverse, such as the priority given to news 
management over direct communication, the steady increase in the numbers of 
politically appointed special advisers, and their growing involvement in briefing 
journalists. Public administration scholars have suggested that through such factors 
as reduced job security and greater political control there has been a move away from 
the traditional model of impartiality to one of ‘‘promiscuous partisanship’, but this 
needs to be convincingly demonstrated (Aucoin, 2012; Grube, 2014).  Taken together, 
these changes indicate a radical and cumulative shift in both frontline practice and in 
what has come to be seen as appropriate within the Whitehall model.  Some scholars 
argue that this shift has disproportionately affected the government’s strategic 
communications function but again, this remains to be demonstrated (Sausman & 
Locke, 2004). 
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Tony Blair used his substantial political and media capital after 1997 to centralise 
government communications.  It has also been suggested that by reorganising and 
boosting staffing levels within his own office, he created a Prime Ministers’ 
department in everything but name (Burch & Holliday, 1999).  However, by itself, 
centralization is contingent on other factors and appears to be cyclical within a 
departmental system such as Whitehall.  I would argue that the balance between the 
centre – No.10, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury – and the powerful ministerial 
departments, is subject to fluctuation depending on political and personal factors 
within each administration. Political scientists and political communications scholars 
have deployed such terms as personalization (‘lack of chemistry’), presidentialization 
(‘Tony wants’), or politicization (‘not one of us’)26, to explain the direction of travel 
after 1997, linking these to a number of other changes, of which mediatization is one 
(Heffernan & Webb, 2005; Langer, 2011; Webb & Poguntke, 2005). 
The personal and political interests of ministers were increasingly served by a new 
breed of special adviser who managed the media but were given little guidance or 
training in relation to such politically sensitive and exposed roles, and had to learn on 
the job, sometimes with disruptive results.  This carries the risk of tribalism, whereby 
political appointees serve their political masters by attacking political opponents, 
often within their own party.  The briefing and counter-briefing by the Blair and 
Brown camps as depicted in many contemporary political biographies, and the more 
recent resignations of special advisers during the Coalition period, provide ample 
illustration of this (Bower, 2005; McBride, 2013; Seldon, 2005).  The suspicion that 
special advisers routinely trade privileged insider information in exchange for media 
coverage which is advantageous to their political masters is a major factor behind the 
charge of ‘political spin’, but there is little empirical evidence about what media 
special advisers actually do, and no detailed regulation of their role in this regard 
(Jones, 2006).   
What is clear is that the civil servants who operate at the interface between media and 
politics, namely government press officers and special advisers, are 
disproportionately affected by the speeding up and proliferation of media competing 
for public attention, and the increasing tendency for political storytelling to 
incorporate blame, challenges to personal integrity and factional conflict.  This study 
                                                          
26 The first two quotes refer to widely reported comments by government insiders during the 
first Blair administration, while ‘not one of us’ was a sentiment attributed to Margaret 
Thatcher in relation to what she saw as obstructive ministers or civil servants. 
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aims to challenge the idea that political spin per se has corrupted modern politics, 
and to reveal and explain changes in the culture and internal dynamics that operate 
within and between government and the media at a time of profound media 
transformation.  This requires placing media considerations centre-stage and opening 
up the ‘black box’ of political spin. 
As a conceptual framework, I propose to make use of the ‘embedded media’ approach 
to mediatization, and specifically Lingard and Rawolle’s metaphor of the cross-field, 
a shared arena where political and media fields interact to create cross-field effects 
(Lingard et al., 2005; Rawolle & Lingard, 2008; Rawolle & Lingard, 2014).  There are 
three main advantages of this approach: first, it is media-centred, although not 
media-centric, in that it places media impacts on non-media domains and institutions 
at the heart of study; second, it bypasses some of the problems of dualism and 
demonization and allows us to examine a complex picture non-normatively; and, 
third, it most closely matches the reality as depicted in biographical accounts such as 
Christopher Meyer’s and as glimpsed through flashes of controversy and witness 
accounts presented to government and parliamentary enquiries.    
The interface between media, politics and bureaucracy – here identified through the 
situated agency of government press officers, special advisers, ministers and 
journalists - can be seen as a permanent cross-field, where policies and actions are 
picked up, scrutinised and then dropped as part of the news cycle.   Drawing on the 
work of Andreas Hepp, these actors’ natural habitat, and the culture of norms, 
customs and beliefs within which they work, can be said to constitute a “culture of 
mediatization” which, over time, has developed its own distinctive ways of 
communicating, and where “life…is unimaginable without media”.   Within this cross-
field, the media are more than an afterthought; they “constitute and construct the 
centre” (Hepp, 2013b, pp. 70, 71).    
To investigate the micro-processes of mediatization taking place at this particular site, 
and through the ‘situated agency’ of key actors, it is essential to consider path 
dependency; that is, to observe “moments and objects along the way that demonstrate 
the transformation of the sociocultural practice or institution under study”(Lundby, 
2014a, p. 23).  Lundby proposes one example of a type of longitudinal approach which 
is pertinent to this study – interviews with retired legal professionals about changes 
in the media coverage of trials.  He concludes that although mediatization is a non-
normative concept, as a sensitizing concept it can help to answer the question of 
whether the process is changing things for better or worse.   Others agree that the 
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concept of mediatization by itself is too broad to deliver a coherent operational 
framework, but can provide a bridge into empirical social worlds where various meta-
processes intersect (Jensen, 2013; Lunt & Livingstone, 2016).  This study will shed 
some light on the question as to whether this is a valid and productive approach. 
Ultimately, I hope that this approach will facilitate three academic goals: to deliver 
empirical depth, allow for the development of theory, and help to answer normative 
questions about whether a mediatized culture of government communications puts 
at risk the democratic ideal of the informed citizen (Daintith, 2001).  The threat to 
democracy, I would contend, is the real danger that lies behind widespread fears of 
the growth of political spin.
Chapter 3:  Research Design and Methodology 
3.1   Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the site of interest for this study is the little-
understood interface between media and government, which is theorised here as the 
intersection, or cross-field, between three social fields: media, bureaucracy and 
politics.  Operating within this site are three main actors who have ‘situated agency’ 
to negotiate what becomes news: government press officers, politically appointed 
special advisers, and journalists.  The role of No.10 in commanding the news agenda 
since 1997 has been much commented upon but the experiences and perceptions of 
departmental press officers are little studied.  There has been, as we have seen, some 
ethnographic and interview based research carried out among government and 
executive agency press teams in the US, Sweden and Norway, but these studies are 
synchronic rather than diachronic (Cook, 1998; Figenschou & Thorbjornsrud, 2015; 
Fredriksson et al., 2015).   This study aims to fill this empirical gap by making visible 
the everyday processes and mechanisms that take place over time within this cross-
field, through the testimony of those most concerned with enacting them.  
As largely anonymous intermediaries, government press officers conduct their 
activities from within a “relatively closed” bureaucracy (Smith, 2008, p. 154), and are 
required by their professional and public service norms and ethics to conduct their 
activities anonymously.  With a few exceptions, such as Damian McBride, Gordon 
Brown’s notorious civil service press officer-turned-special adviser, and Bernard 
Ingham, Margaret Thatcher’s long-serving Chief Press Secretary (1979-1990), they do 
not speak in public or publish memoirs (Ingham, 2003; McBride, 2013).  Alastair 
Campbell, Tony Blair’s chief press secretary (1997-2003), has published edited 
versions of the diaries he wrote while in government, but on his own admission, and 
as discussed in chapter 2, he was primarily a political actor, rather than a civil servant, 
although technically he was a special adviser. 
Journalists too, rarely discuss in detail their working relationships with government 
press officers, preferring to use distancing tactics to deny any implication of 
dependence on official sources (Cook, 1998; Gravengaard, 2012).   Macnamara argues 
that social scientists and media and communications scholars have a blind spot to the 
workings of public relations in general, despite the industry’s growing size and 
significance (Macnamara, 2014; Miller, 2008), and are failing to critically examine 
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the process of political spin. Similarly, Aronczyk argues that research into political 
promotional culture must be taken seriously as “one step toward a pragmatic yet 
critical exploration of how political actors, intermediaries, journalists and citizens 
interact in and understand processes of political communication” (Aronczyk, 2015, p. 
2021). 
The approach taken in this study is distinctive in that it puts the civil service PR 
practitioner at the heart of the enquiry.  Collectively, they represent a large cadre of 
communication power, probably the largest single group of specialist communicators 
in the country (Moloney, 2006).  Within a centralised yet departmental system, where 
ministers have extensive executive and decision-making power, this resource adds up 
to a formidable machine, largely deployed at departmental level (Davis, 2002; 
Norton, 2000).  The departmental Directors of Communication, and through them, 
their staffs, are in daily contact with ministers and journalists.  From their position 
adjacent to the top of the departmental hierarchy, they observe ministers and Prime 
Ministers at their most vulnerable.  Finally, they have been at the sharp end of a series 
of major changes since the rise of TV in the 1960s: the advent of 24/7 news in the late 
1980s, and the explosion of digital communications from the mid-1990s onwards.   
The logic behind the research design discussed in this chapter has three key features 
that arise from the theoretical framework:  
1. Press officers are considered as both witnesses and actors within an 
institutional framework wherein they have ‘situated agency’. 
2. Since mediatization is a meta-process that takes place over time, the research 
method must be diachronic, that is, examining changing contexts, multiple 
levels of causation and sequences and differences between one period of time 
and another (Szreter, 2015).   
3. This study examines events in history through the narratives of primary 
witnesses and so is concerned with historical facts as well as narrative.  The 
evidence contained in key historical documents can help to anchor the 
chronology, and provide a check on the accounts of these primary witnesses. 
The initial intention was to focus solely on government press officers, but in doing so, 
it became clear that other participants involved in the process of government 
communication could contribute to a more rounded and critical understanding of the 
press officer’s role: namely, specialist policy journalists who encounter press officers 
as part of their regular ‘beats’, and special advisers who engage in media relations.  
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Official and archival documents – largely external but also some internal – played a 
key part in the initial literature review and scoping for the project, but at a later stage 
were also re-read and re-interpreted in the light of the interview material.  This is 
therefore a mixed methods qualitative study, involving in-depth semi-structured 
interviews with three types of participant, and the analysis of largely 
contemporaneous documents.  The data are therefore textual, and the analysis is 
mainly thematic but with narrative elements. 
Finally, I need to explain my part in the research process.  My experiences and 
position as a former long-serving public sector PR professional, although not in the 
civil service, played an important part in the identification of the problem, the 
development of the research idea, the conduct of the research itself, and the analysis 
and interpretation of the data.  This will be considered together with the ethical and 
political implications of the study 
 
3.2 Methodology – developing the research process 
3.2.1 Origins of the study 
The idea for the research originated in early 2011 while I was working for a local 
authority communications department and embarking on a part time diploma in 
public affairs as part of my professional development.  The Secretary of State for 
Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Eric Pickles, had just launched his 
Publicity Code for Local Government, which set out clear guidelines for impartial 
public communications.  This guidance has now been placed on a statutory footing27.  
This move was interpreted by some left-leaning boroughs, including the one I worked 
for, as a party political attempt to silence dissent.  Visiting the DCLG website to take 
a closer look at the code, and the stated rationale for it, I started to look at press 
releases issued by the department and was surprised by what seemed to me to be their 
party political flavour.  This experience, and the reading that followed from it, led to 
my diploma research project (Garland, 2011). This formed the basis of my PhD 
research proposal.   
                                                          
27 On 31 March 2011 the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government issued a 
new Publicity Code under section 4 of the Local Government Act 1986 (“the 1986 Act”). 
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There appeared to be a disparity between the ideal of impartiality and its practice, and 
some ambiguity in the propriety guidelines, which were supposed to ensure that 
government information remained non party-political.  As we have seen, there are at 
least two distinctive interpretations of impartiality, as a publicly-oriented value aimed 
at promoting good government, or as a straightforward enactment of political 
neutrality.  In practice, impartiality is something more experienced than clearly 
defined: as an article of faith it is frequently reiterated yet only vaguely explicated, so 
how can we be sure that different actors are interpreting it consistently, or that more 
powerful actors are not reinterpreting it to suit their own positions (I. Young, 1990)?  
We have seen how the Labour governments of 1997-2010 were hit by a series of 
controversies related to ‘political spin’, while after 2010 there were two high profile 
resignations by special advisers due to public relations misconduct28.   What was it 
about civil service culture and practice that allowed this to happen, despite the 
overwhelming continuing attachment to the ideal of impartiality?   
3.2.2 Which methods? 
Given that the object of study here is the individual with a particular form of situated 
agency, a qualitative approach involving an “in-depth exploration of a few carefully 
selected strategic or critical cases” is capable of generating data that has both 
analytical and empirical explanatory power (Karpf, Kreiss, Nielsen, & Powers, 2015).  
By listening to the voices of former government press officers through in-depth 
interviews, I sought to capture not only their factual accounts but a sense of the 
atmosphere and assumptions that influenced their day-to-day work.  Ostensibly this 
could have been achieved in three ways:  ethnographic observation from within a 
government department, interviews with serving officials, or interviews with former 
officials.  There were three methodological requirements of the research design:  to 
access key individuals who had directly witnessed significant change over time, to 
establish how key players interacted in responding to the challenges of mediatization, 
and to capture changing perceptions, expectations and practices during a crucial 
period between the late 1980s and up to and including the 2010-2015 Coalition 
government, but taking 1997 as a turning point.  An ethnographic study, assuming 
that access to a government department could have been achieved, would have 
captured the interactions of key players at a moment in time, but in-depth interviews 
with a range of former key players whose participation ranged over the period in 
                                                          
28 The resignation of Adam Smith, special adviser to the Secretary of State for Media, Culture 
and Sport in 2012, and Fiona Cunningham, special adviser to the Home Secretary in 2014.  
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question, was less risky for the participants, and was capable of capturing change.  
Methodologically, ethnographic research privileges the contemporary, providing an 
information-rich snapshot, or “thick description” (Geertz, 1975) of a moment in time.  
The other alternative, interviews with serving officials, would also be subject to 
negotiation, requiring permission at the highest level, and taking place while the 
individual is ‘in role’.   
Only one extensive ethnographic study from within a UK government setting has 
taken place to date.  Rhodes’ Everyday Life in British Government (2011) observed 
day to day life at the top of three middle-ranking government departments at various 
points between 2001 and 2005.  Access was subject to careful negotiation and re-
negotiation, and was, in part at least, facilitated by Rhodes' previous position as 
director of the large-scale ESRC Whitehall programme.  This was a £2.1m research 
programme brokered with the support of the then Cabinet Secretary, Sir Robin Butler, 
in 1993, which ran until 1999 and involved 23 projects (Rhodes, 2000a, 2000b). It is 
unlikely that another project on this scale will be agreed in the foreseeable future, 
while smaller ethnographic projects taking place under the radar would be difficult if 
not impossible in an office as visible, as sensitive, and as exposed to ministerial 
scrutiny, as the press office. Unfortunately, Rhodes’ account excluded observations of 
the press office and does not refer to press officers in any detail, even during his 
account of the media-frenzy surrounding the resignation of the minister, Estelle 
Morris.   
There are methodological advantages to interviewing former rather than serving 
officials for this study.  Since they are out of role, they have no responsibility to 
political or administrative masters and are free to express opinions.   Also, as they are 
speaking historically rather than contemporaneously, they are less likely to privilege 
the present over the past, and can view their careers over a span of time.  They are in 
a position to reflect on, and question, the situations they encountered while 
performing the role.  One possible bias is that memory is selective, leading to the risk 
of ‘golden ageism’ – a risk which can be mitigated through triangulation, and through 
checking their accounts against the official record. 
This project therefore combined interview analysis with documentary analysis in 
order to track changes in custom and practice over time, and to highlight possible 
discrepancies between practices and ideals.  The historical perspective, which derived 
from the systematic analysis of tranches of archived government documents dating 
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back to the early 1980s added “both empirical and analytical depth” (Layder, 1998, 
p68).  These texts not only provided evidence of historical change, and showed how 
the government and others chose to record events for posterity, but served “as tools 
whose production, consumption and use is part of the negotiation of difficult subjects” 
(Jones, 2011, p. 71).  Together, these methods enabled a meso-level approach, which 
allows us to “discern systematic patterns of change across time and space within a 
particular institutional framework” (Hjarvard, 2013, p. 154).  More particularly, since 
media change is not always continuous, but contains “eruptive moments” (such as the 
arrival of television, the internet, or 24-hour news), it makes sense to zoom in on a 
site of change in order to “carry out a deep analysis of its specific communicative 
figuration”(Hepp, 2013a, p. 626) where a ‘communicative figuration’ can be defined 
as a network of individuals which “constitutes a larger social entity through reciprocal 
interaction”(Hepp & Hasebrink) in (Lundby, 2014b, p. 259).   
This “qualitative, longitudinal deep case study method” is characteristic of the 
historical institutionalist approach common in political studies, which examines the 
interaction of institutions, ideas and agents (or interests) over time (Bannerman & 
Haggart, 2015, p. 10).  This approach to method involves selecting the case study and 
time period, identifying the institution and agents/actors to be studied, identifying 
mechanisms that strengthen or weaken the institutions, agents and ideas in play and 
establishing who gains and who loses during a period of change.  Such change could 
include, for example, the creation of new institutions, grafting new institutions on to 
old, or changing the functions of existing institutions.  Certain groups may be 
favoured or excluded, options may be constrained or extended, and new debates and 
agendas may emerge as others recede or drift into irrelevance.   
To take account of such macro- and micro-processes, the method must be sensitive 
enough to “examine informal routines and formal institutions over time, attending to 
path dependency, as well as to the fact that institutions contain conflicting forces that 
can be a source of instability”(p15).  Within a political institution like the civil service, 
such forces may be resisted or responded to, and certain aspects of a given institution 
or group of institutions may be more or less resilient in the face of certain kinds of 
change.  The institutions under study here are not only the established and 
understood institutions of the civil service, journalism and electoral politics, but the 
“formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organizational structure of the polity” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p.6).    
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3.2.3 Semi-structured interviews  
The main methodology was qualitative: in-depth, semi-structured, face-to-face 
interviews with three distinct groups of actors involved in the crafting of government 
news.  The initial interviews with former government press officers were 
complemented by a second, smaller set of interviews with long-serving (and mainly) 
former policy journalists to find out how they viewed the process of change not only 
in terms of the demands on them as a result of the expansion of 24/7 media, but how, 
as customers and ‘critical friends’, they viewed the work of government press officers.  
While interviewing journalists, it became clear that, in tandem with the steady 
increase in their numbers, particularly since 1997, special advisers were becoming 
more active as sources of government news, even to the extent of marginalising 
government press officers.  To obtain a richer analysis and an alternative perspective, 
I carried out a limited set of interviews with former special advisers, one from the 
Blair years, and two who had served during the 2010-2015 Coalition government.   
An acknowledged strength of this type of interview is that it can assist in developing 
“an understanding of the relations between social actors and their situation”, by 
providing “a fine textured understanding of beliefs, attitudes, values and motivations 
in relation to the behaviours of people in particular social contexts”(Gaskell, 2000, p. 
39).  These interviews are traditionally classified as ‘elite interviews’, but in practice 
were also peer encounters, with a measure of ‘shop talk’, partly due to my own career 
history.  Typically, elite interviews can yield not only colour, context, and chronology 
but also exclusive pieces of insider information offered both on and off the record 
(Goldstein, 2002), and that was the case here. The encounter was an active interview 
in that far from being “passive vessels”, the participants were aware of their role as 
witnesses to history, having had a part to play in a politically significant debate.  In 
this sense, the interview provided an occasion for “producing reportable knowledge” 
and “formally and systematically” activating the participants’ interpretive capabilities 
(Holstein & Gubrium, 1997, pp. 122, 114).     
There is also a group dimension to this approach.  Data gathered from a particular 
social or professional group has a form of collective explanatory power that is more 
than the sum of its parts.  As Gaskell puts it: “It is in the accumulation of insights from 
a set of interviews that one comes to understand the life worlds within a group of 
respondents” (Gaskell, 2000, p. 44).   To express this in more institutional terms, 
interviews with even a “relatively small sample of individuals may produce evidence 
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that is considered to provide an understanding of the inter-subjective meanings 
shared by the whole of a community” (Elliott, 2005, p. 28). 
The sampling, or more accurately, the selection process, was purposive, ‘non-
probability’ sampling, where “logic and power lies in selecting information-rich cases 
for in-depth study” (Layder, 1998, p. 46).  The selection involved some quota 
sampling in order to select a range of key characteristics: service at departmental level 
as well as at No.10, and post-holding at all points throughout the period between the 
Thatcher and Cameron period (1979-2016) (See Appendix 3 for metadata about the 
interviewees).  The sample is not representative but seeks to identify key figures 
involved in a specific set of events and processes taking place during a defined time 
and place (Tansey, 2007).  Purposive sampling, however, increases the likelihood of 
selection bias and reduces generalizability, which needs to be taken into account at 
the interpretation stage, but it creates a more concentrated data source that allows 
the researcher to “probe beyond official accounts and narratives and ask theoretically-
guided questions about issues that are highly specific to the research objectives” 
(Tansey, 2007, p.9).   
An initial target list was drawn up after researching key names emerging from 
government and parliamentary reviews and reports, press releases, media coverage 
and secondary accounts such as published memoirs, diaries, autobiographies and 
biographies, and by using these names to identify further contacts.   From this initial 
target list, 21 invitations were sent out to a range of former civil service 
communicators who had served in media relations roles between the late 1980s and 
2014, and had worked for a range of government departments, as well as No.10 and 
the Cabinet office, and at a range of grades, with more emphasis on those who had 
reached Director or Deputy Director level.  Snowball sampling was then used to 
extend the sample by a further six.  This was especially useful among the group that 
was hardest to reach - civil servants who had left their posts more recently.   
The length of the interview was set at one hour in order to provide time to establish 
trust, and penetrate the defences which characterise professionals who are practised 
in discretion, while also acknowledging that they are short of time (Harvey, 2011).   
The main topic guide (see Table 3.1) was designed with civil servants in mind, and 
was relatively open-ended, aimed at facilitating an ‘extended conversation’ in 
whatever order suited the participant around key topics related to the administrative 
and political dimensions of their work (Berger, 1998).  All were recorded to maintain 
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the flow of conversation and capture every detail (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002). The 
interviews were probing in that they sought to find out what government PR 
practitioners do, how they define their role, how they work with politicians and their 
advisers, and how it feels to operate at the interface between the government 
bureaucracy, party politics and the media.  The primary research focus was “the 
substantive content of the interview” (Elliott 2012, p.20) but the form, or narrative 
style, of the conversation was also important given the salience of the narrative of spin 
and ongoing controversies about the changing relationship between politicians and 
civil servants.    
Although rich and rewarding, the in-depth interview presents risks to the validity of 
the data, for example by the unintended use of leading questions, or a failure to take 
account of what might be at stake for the interviewee, especially where there may be 
a professional identification with the interviewer. Wengraf warns against 
‘contaminating’ an interview by letting the participant know too much about the 
research agenda (Wengraf, 2001).  This is a particular risk when the participant is 
well-informed, is speaking in professional mode, and is keen to establish for 
themselves the nature of the research at the outset.   Elite interviews in particular 
carry a risk of manipulation on the part of respondents (whether conscious or not) 
who are adept at staying ‘on message’ and representing their own contribution in the 
best possible light (Harvey, 2011).  As professional storytellers and advocates for both 
their organisation and internally for their somewhat contested position within it, one 
should be aware of the possibility that they would overplay the importance of their 
role, underplay some of the difficulties, and perhaps deflect blame on to others.   
As part of their professional socialisation, civil servants have been found to underplay 
their role in political decision-making (Tansey, 2007) and to provide “stock answers”, 
as found in numerous civil service studies (D. Marsh, 2001).  It has been argued that 
although “both ministers and officials believe that ‘ministers decide’…the reality is 
more complex”, and that, when interviewed in role, UK civil servants “have a 
presentation of self which conforms to that model” (Smith, 2008, pp. 154, 152).  This 
is to some extent mitigated here as the respondents are interviewed out of role but 
there may be an element of post-hoc justification, attempts to provide narrative 
coherence, ‘settling scores’, or a concern to present themselves positively.  Tansey 
argues that for these reasons, elite interviews should serve an “additive function”, 
providing an accompaniment to other data sources such as histories, memoirs and 
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other secondary sources, archival evidence and official documents (Tansey, 2007, p. 
7). 
The topic guide was designed so that the questioning did not explicitly refer to 
concepts key to the theoretical framework or research questions, such as 
‘politicization’, ‘mediatization’, ‘personalization’ or ‘spin’.  The same applied to the 
wording of invitation letters and during the preamble to each interview.  Although the 
year 1997 was the focal point for the study, this date was not mentioned specifically 
except as one of a series of dates when governments changed hands politically.   The 
well-recorded ‘churn’ in government communications following the 1997 election was 
also not referred to directly but was dealt with by a more general question about 
impacts on day to day work of a change of government.    
Table 3.1: Topic guide - civil servants 29 
Administrative Political 
Ethos and public service purpose Managing the boundary between 
government and party political PR 
Excellence and best practice; reputation 
and standing of PR within the civil service 
The impact of a change of government 
Nature of the job: highs and lows The role of ministers in media management 
Recruitment to senior positions in 
government communications 
The role of  ‘the centre’ in coordinating 
communications 
Efficacy of current codes and forms of 
redress 
The media responsibilities of special 
advisers 
 
The stance taken by the interviewer was one of party political neutrality in order to be 
consistent with the cultural norms and expectations of the interviewees, and also 
because questions about the partisan press, or ideological attitudes towards the public 
sector in general and the civil service in particular, were not the explicit research 
objectives of this study.  These factors were, however, raised indirectly in the context 
of changes in the way different governments communicate through the media, and 
what it felt like dealing with journalists, politicians and their aides. The 
operationalization of the key concepts in the topic guide is explained in Table 3.2 
                                                          
29 See Appendix 4 for full versions of the main topic guide.    
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below.  This conceptualisation is consistent with the theoretical framework outlined 
in chapter 2: mediatization is operationalised as the primary, overarching process 
within which other processes such as politicization, personalization and 
professionalization take place.   
Table 3.2: Operationalization of concepts 
Professionalization Politicization/personalization Institutional 
context 
Public purposes of 
government 
communications 
Experiencing a change of government Image and 
reputation of 
government PR 
Excellence in government 
communications 
Media relations role of ministers and 
special advisers 
Ethics, codes and 
common practice 
Mediatization – 
change over time 
→ → 
 
The phenomenon also highlighted by Wengraf, of “anxious defended subjectivity” on 
the part of interviewees, also had to be taken into account during the interviews and 
in the analysis, since distressing matters such as redundancy, bullying or dismissal 
were likely to come up (Wengraf, 2001, p. 59). There may well be significance in the 
unanswered question, or the question which prompts either a stereotyped, 
inarticulate or limited response.  
The research process was adaptive, using a phased approach, in that the core 
interviews with civil servants were carried out first followed by interviews with 
established policy journalists working for the national broadsheet press, a national 
news agency and broadcasters30.  Lobby journalists were largely excluded from this 
analysis since they liaise mainly with No.10 through the lobby system, which has 
already been extensively covered and is not the subject of this study (Cockerell et al., 
1984; Hennessy, 2000, 2001; Ingham, 2003; Robinson, 2012).  The sampling of 
journalists was again purposive, involving those covering specialist beats that 
                                                          
30 By adaptive, I am referring to the approach outlined by Derek Layder whereby theory 
adapts to, or is shaped by, incoming evidence, while data is filtered through prior 
frameworks, concepts and ideas (Layder 1998, p5). He argues that this approach is especially 
pertinent when examining dynamic 'lived experiences' and meanings, within a wider social 
and institutional context. 
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necessitated regular contact with government press officers from the 1960s to the 
present day.  Again, priority was given to length of service and to former rather than 
serving journalists in order to facilitate a historical approach.  The journalists’ topic 
guide was derived from the original civil servants’ topic guide, and was influenced by 
the interview content since it was produced after the press officer interviews had been 
transcribed and subjected to some ‘provisional coding’.  This "inherently open-ended" 
approach allows for changes and developments in theoretical direction (Layder, 1998, 
p. 55).  The journalist interviews covered similar ground to the civil servant 
interviews, but from the perspective of an ‘involved outsider’ or ‘critical friend’.   
Fewer interviews were needed since theirs was not a core contribution but contextual 
one, so nine journalists were approached of whom one had been a political 
correspondent for the Press Association (the UK’s main national news agency), two 
were former BBC TV specialist news correspondents, and five were specialist 
reporters/editors from national broadsheet newspapers.  Two were still working as 
journalists.  
Once all the journalists’ interviews had been transcribed and provisionally coded, it 
became clear that special advisers were playing an increasingly significant and 
hitherto uncharted role in media management, but one which loomed large in the 
working lives of press officers and journalists.  I approached six former special 
advisers representing the three political parties of government – Labour, 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat.   Three were interviewed using a topic guide 
derived from interviews with the civil servants and journalists.   While both pertinent 
and interesting, the data derived from interviews with such a small sample of special 
advisers can only represent the tip of the iceberg – special advisers are a particularly 
diverse and mobile group on the political scene.  Their media relations practices alone 
are worthy of study in their own right but this is beyond the scope of this research.  
The purpose of these interviews was to provide a check on the recollections of 
government press officers and journalists, and to examine some key concepts from an 
almost diametrically opposed perspective.   
The second and third tranches of interviews acted as a form of correction against the 
occupational biases of government press officers’ accounts of a particularly eventful 
period in their history.  They also provide some correction against social desirability 
bias, whereby the subject subconsciously or consciously responds to questions by 
providing socially acceptable answers.  This is particularly likely as a learned response 
among those operating in sensitive or competitive environments, where approval is 
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needed and reputation is the key to accessing desirable attributes such as promotion, 
professional identity, status, or power, or may even be seen as a condition of 
professional survival (Spector, 2004).   
3.2.4 Documentary and archive analysis 
Official documents are more than just a factual record, they are tools with which 
institutional actors negotiate “difficult subjects” or reconcile ambiguities (H. Jones, 
2011, p. 71).  The central focus of this study, how civil servants have, over time, 
negotiated the media ambitions of elected governments while maintaining 
impartiality, runs like a thread through countless primary and secondary 
documentary sources: the diary entries of Alastair Campbell and the memoirs of 
Damian McBride; the reform aspirations expressed by politicians like Francis Maude, 
Tony Blair and even Margaret Thatcher; the meta-coverage of media relations crises 
like the controversy over the case for the 2003 invasion of Iraq; and evidence sessions 
to inquiries conducted both inside and outside Parliament.   
My reading of documentary texts played an important part in every phase of this 
study: helping to identify the key problem, refining the research questions, 
influencing the research design, augmenting and triangulating the evidence derived 
from the interviews, and illuminating the interview findings.  Official documents and 
archive material were partners to the empirical and theoretical material of the 
literature review, as we saw in Chapter 2.  A thorough trawl of official published 
documents relating directly and indirectly to government communications after 1997 
was conducted and texts were analyzed both as part of the literature review and 
thematically as texts. By reading and re-reading selected documents, my aim was to 
become well-versed in official accounts of government media relations in order to 
extract from the interviews the key themes and narratives as they developed over 
time.  Which preoccupations appeared in the official literature most consistently?  
How was the problem of government media relations defined and delineated?  How 
did official accounts relate to or differ from the accounts of those delivering the 
service?  How important were civil service norms, rules and codes in influencing the 
behaviour of press officers and special advisers in relation to journalists?    
The archival approach taken here is necessarily diachronic rather than continuous 
due to the 30-20-year rule which restricts the release of government documents.  
There were three main tranches that were chosen for the initial trawl: No.10 papers 
concerned with the presentation of government policy between 1981 and 1983 (PREM 
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19/720/721) and 1983-86 (PREM 19/1775); the minutes of the two regular central 
coordinating Government Information Service meetings (MIO and MIO(E)) between 
1980 and 1985 (CAB 134/4487, CAB 134/4382, CAB 134/4919); and documents from 
the Ingham archive dated May 1979 to April 198531.  These include minutes, memos, 
letters, notes, briefings, and presentations relating to media matters, some with 
annotations from Margaret Thatcher.  They provide a useful baseline against which 
to situate some of the accounts of media management during the Blair and Brown era.  
In addition, I examined recently-released Treasury papers relating to the Thatcher 
government’s first annual spring Budget briefing of 1980 (T414/169 and 174).   This 
was in order to establish a baseline for the approach to media management of the 
government’s most important public announcement as conducted pre-1997. Martin 
Moore's archive-based history, The Origins of Modern Spin, was a guide to the origins 
of the UK government's information services since WW2 (Moore, 2006) but I also 
personally examined selected archival documents relating to the post-war 
organization of government publicity (CAB 78/37 and CAB 134/355).   
The documents that played a part in this study therefore fall into three main groups: 
externally published documents, internal documents, and archives.  A summary of 
documents used is presented in Table 3.3 below.   
Table 3.3: Key documents relating to government media relations  
Externally published Type of document 
Parliamentary Select Committees Reports, memos, submissions, correspondence and oral 
evidence sessions 
Parliamentary debates Hansard and UK Parliament 
Government reports and reviews Civil service, judge-led and independent inquiries. 
Machinery of government reports, reviews and speeches. 
House of Commons Standard Notes Research based summaries on subjects like the Ministerial 
Code, Special Advisers, Government Communications and 
Machinery of Government Changes. 
                                                          
31 Archived with the Margaret Thatcher Papers at 
https://www.chu.cam.ac.uk/archives/collections/thatcher-papers/ See also 
http://janus.lib.cam.ac.uk/db/node.xsp?id=EAD%2FGBR%2F0014%2FINGH 
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Codes and propriety guidance Civil Service Code, Code of Conduct for Special Advisers, 
Ministerial Code, Code of Recommended Practice on Local 
Authority Publicity. 
Acts of Parliament The Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. 
Civil Service Statistics Whitehall monitor (Institute for Government) 
Internal documents  
Departmental capability reviews 
Department of Transport (2012) 
Cabinet Office (2013) 
Professional handbooks   The GICS Handbook (1998), Guidance on the Work of the GIS 
(1997), GCS Handbook (2015). 
Government Communications 
contacts lists 
Government Department communications and agency 
contacts (2014 and 2015).  GCS People Finder - 
https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/people-finder/ 
Government Communications 
Network (GCN) notes 
Notes on the History, Reform and Structure of Government 
Communications (now archived) 
Internal propriety guidance Extended Ministerial Offices: guidance for departments, A 
Brief Guide to Propriety in Government Communications, 
GCS propriety guidance 
Government Communications 
Service (GCS) publications 
Governance of the Government Communications Service, 
Government Communications Plans (2013-2017), GCS 
Capability Reviews 
Archives  
Treasury papers 1980-81 T414/169 and T414/174 
No 10 Liaison Committee papers 
1980s 
PREM 19/720 and 721 
History of the Liaison Committee 
MIO(E) - 1980 Meetings of information officers involved in the presentation 
of economic policy: minutes, reports, recommendations 
MIO (1980) and (1985) Meetings of departmental chief information officers 
Margaret Thatcher Archive Papers of Bernard Ingham: May 1979-April 1985 
 
The two most significant parts of the documentary corpus, in terms of relevance and 
quantity, are firstly the documents relating to the House of Commons Public 
Administration Select Committee (PASC), which became the Public Administration 
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and Constitutional Affairs Committee after May 2015, and secondly government or 
government-commissioned reports and reviews into matters relating to media and 
communication.   These cover most of the period of interest to this study. The PASC 
documents include investigations into government communications and propriety, 
the work of special advisers, the machinery of government, and civil service reform.  
The government reviews referred to throughout this text include the Phillis Review of 
Government Communication (2004), the Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (2004), the Hutton Report (Hutton, 2004), the Butler Report (2004), the 
House of Lords Report on Government Communications (2008), the Leveson Report 
(2012) and the Chilcot Report (2016).   
The corpus also includes a range of internal and published documents relating to 
propriety guidance and civil service codes of conduct, such as the Ministerial Code, 
the Code of Conduct for Special Advisers and the Civil Service Code.   Documents 
relating to propriety and conduct in government communications are mainly 
considered to be internal documents, and so tend to be superseded and over-written, 
and hence lost, rather than archived systematically, which makes it harder to track 
changes over time.  The documents which I have managed to retrieve date from 1997 
to 2015 and include staff handbooks, propriety guidance, communications plans, a 
departmental communications capability review and information relating to 
governance.   
In broader methodological terms, such an approach which examines “the relationship 
between ways of seeing (documenting) things and forms of professional practice”, has 
been described as a “potentially important field for social scientific research”(Prior, 
2010, p. 74).  Given that documents have played an integral role in all aspects of this 
study, they should be seen not just as artefacts or sources of knowledge but as “a site 
or field of research” in its own right which deserves “parity of esteem with talk and 
behaviour in the execution of the research process” (Prior, 2010, pp. x, 68).  The 
production, distribution and use of official documents such as Parliamentary 
enquiries takes place in a political context and can be used by political and other 
actors as “allies in various forms of social, political and cultural struggle” (p13).   The 
process of archiving itself can be significant and illustrates the evolving dichotomy 
within the Whitehall system between its administrative and political dimensions. The 
status and positioning of government and parliamentary enquiries into the 
communications service should be seen in the context of accounts from other sources, 
such as archival and interview material.  Bernard Ingham published his memoirs but 
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also chose to archive official documentation within the Margaret Thatcher archive. 
Alastair Campbell published his contemporaneous diaries as a form of personal public 
record. Both are aware of their place in history, but Ingham prefers to be seen as part 
of Margaret Thatcher’s official record, Campbell as a self-determining political 
strategist.   
3.3 Collection and analysis of material 
Once the sampling frame had been completed all interviewees were contacted by 
letter or email.  The invitation to interview was short enough to fit on a single side of 
paper, and included the LSE logo, a brief description of the study, a reference to my 
career background, and the terms of the interview.  The initial letter, topic guide and 
the interview itself were piloted with the help of a former government press officer 
and her suggestions were included in the final version.  The invitations to journalists 
and special advisers were broadly similar32.  I had no prior personal or professional 
relationship with any of the respondents with the exception of one of the journalists, 
which I refer to in section 3.4, but he did not remember me.    
The description of the project was necessarily brief, stating that the aims of the project 
were: 
To obtain first-hand accounts of the government media relations operation, given the 
massive changes in media since at least the 1980s, and the constraints and demands of 
government. 
To examine how media demands, whether real or anticipated, influence modern 
government, since little empirical research has been done into this. 
I made clear that the interview would last no longer than one hour, that it could be 
conducted anonymously if required, and that I would meet them whenever and 
wherever was most suitable for them.  The questions would cover: 
The impact of media on time and policy decision-making and policy implementation, the 
role of politicians and special advisers in media relations, and how you saw the role and 
practice of government media relations over time, including during periods of transition 
from one administration to the next.  My focus is on the period from the 1990s up to the 
present day. 
                                                          
32 See invitation to interview in Appendix 5. 
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I referred them to my LSE profile, named my supervisors, and explained my 
background as follows: 
To tell you a bit more about myself, I worked in public sector media relations for more 
than 20 years - in public health, medical research, the BBC and local government.   
Of the 27 former civil servants approached, 16 (59%) replied and were interviewed, 
three declined and six (22%) did not reply.  One agreed to be interviewed but a date 
could not be arranged because he lives abroad.  Of the three who declined, two 
explained that they did not think they fitted into the remit for the study but suggested 
other potential interviewees.  One said he would not participate but did not give a 
reason.  Four agreed to be interviewed on the recommendation of other interviewees.  
Between them, the interviewees had spent a total of 243 years’ in government 
(average 15.2 years), from the 1960s to 2014. The average length of interview was 58 
minutes, running to an average of 7,754 words per interview.   
Of the nine journalists approached, six (67%) agreed to be interviewed. One did not 
respond, and two agreed to be interviewed in principle but despite numerous 
attempts, a date could not be arranged.  Of the six, two were practising journalists 
working on broadsheet newspapers, two had been broadsheet journalists, and two 
were former broadcast journalists.   Their length of service was even greater than civil 
servants, averaging 32 years (192 years in total).   Their interviews averaged 67 
minutes, and 7,521 words. 
Six former special advisers representing Labour, the Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats were approached and three (50%) accepted and were interviewed, one 
each from the three parties.  Their length of experience was notably less, 15 years in 
total, averaging 5 years – their employment is tied to that of their ministers and 
routinely ends once an election is called.  The interviews averaged 42.2 minutes in 
length and ran to an average of 6,849 words.   
Seven out of the 16 civil servants, five of the six journalists, and all three of the special 
advisers spoke on the record.  All were offered the chance to meet again and see their 
quotes in context before submission – a follow-up practice which has been described 
as “a venerated but not always executed, practice in qualitative research” (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, p. 275).  Eighteen of the 25 interviews responded to this offer: all 
three special advisers, four out of the six journalists, and 11 out of 16 civil servants.  
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De-briefing notes were written after each interview and were used to reflect on the 
interview process and to feed into the analysis (Wengraf, 2001). 
Table: 3.4: Breakdown of interviews.  
 Approached 
(no.) 
Interviewed 
(no/%) 
Length of 
service 
(mean 
years) 
No. on the 
record 
Civil 
Servants 
27 16 (59%) 15.2 6 
Journalists 9 6 (67%) 32 5 
Special 
advisers 
6 3 (50%) 5 3 
Total 42 25 (59.5%) 17.4 14  
See Appendix 3 for full details of participants, interview dates, and other metrics.   
Length of service is both a historical resource and a potentially complicating factor in 
the analysis since the six journalists were noticeably more long-serving than the other 
groups.  Civil servants too were long-serving but this disguises a wide variance, from 
an average of 21.5 years for the eight civil servants who started their employment 
before 1997 (range: 8-37 years), to 9 years for those who joined after 1997 (range: 2-
13). This demonstrates some diversity within the sample which acts as a mitigating 
factor against possible biases related to length of service. The special advisers’ 
perspective as short-term appointees, however, serves as a counterbalance to the 
relatively long service histories of all the journalists and many of the civil servants 
since they are less likely to have ‘bought in to’ long-established cultural norms or 
hidden assumptions, and hence are more likely to challenge them.   
In terms of the time span served by the interviewees, four left their positions during 
the 1990s, ten between 2000 and 2010, and eight during the period of the Coalition 
government between 2011 and 2014.  Three civil servants and two journalists 
experienced both the Labour and Coalition governments.  These two journalists were 
still in post at the time of writing.  Excluding these two, and the two civil servants who 
joined during the 1960s, the bulk of the interview evidence concerns the period from 
1978 to 2014, with 15 witness accounts relating to the period between 1997 and 2010, 
and ten relating to the period after 2010.  This suggests that the period after 1997 and 
up to 2014 is fairly evenly covered by the interviews. 
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3.3.2 Data Analysis 
The approach to analysis was a hybrid one, combining both deductive and inductive 
elements whereby “theory-driven” codes were integrated with “data-driven codes” 
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 83).  The interview topic guides were deductive 
in that they were derived from the literature review and theoretical background as 
outlined in Chapter 2, and from my own experience in performing public sector media 
relations roles.  This meant that the interviews were semi-structured around 
established themes, or ‘orienting concepts’, although these were not explicitly 
referred to in the interview questions: namely, politicization, personalization, 
professionalization and mediatization.  The notion of the ‘cross-field’, where 
journalists, press officers and politicians (or in this case, their aides) struggle to define 
policy problems and solutions, and avoid or seek attention, appears in the questions 
relating to media-related communicative action at the top of the departmental 
hierarchy.  The documents too were structured around established assumptions, 
especially those relating to impartiality, ‘political spin’ and ministerial responsibility, 
as iterated in various government and parliamentary enquiries and reviews. Once 
thematic analysis began, however, the process became more inductive, whereby the 
codes derived were based on the data, not established in advance.  This meant that 
concepts could be challenged and reconsidered in the light of the data.  This indeed 
happened, leading to the identification of a new set of organising themes, the four 
subsidiary concepts relating to mediatization, on which the four findings chapters are 
based, namely: resilience, resistance, responsiveness and representing the public.  
These concepts allowed for a fuller, more dynamic and more open analysis of both 
documentary and interview data than would have been possible using such notions 
as professionalization and personalization, as we shall see later in this chapter.  
The interviews with civil servants took place first, were recorded and transcribed by 
me within a week of each interview, and then subjected to a rolling manual thematic 
‘provisional coding’, or ‘indexing’ which ran alongside the interview process, and 
aimed to establish key themes and concepts, see (Layder, 1998).   This initial thematic 
coding was then used to produce topic guides for the interviews with journalists and 
special advisers, and the same process of purposive sampling and snowball 
interviewing took place.  This initial manual coding yielded a provisional coding 
frame based around the four main themes familiar from the literature review: 
politicization, professionalization, personalization and mediatization.  Even at this 
stage, it was clear that, although useful as a starting point, these were normative 
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labels, which were not sufficiently robust or precise to provide much explanatory 
power, as opposed to fundamental concepts or themes arising from the data itself 
which could address the research questions.    
The second phase of coding involved the sanitizing of the transcripts to remove false 
starts and hesitations, and these were uploaded into the text-processing package, 
NVivo, and subjected to thematic analysis.  To keep the coding as close as possible to 
the text, codes were not pre-assigned but emerged as the transcripts were re-read as 
NVivo documents.  The coding frame consisted of 76 separate codes, with a hierarchy 
of 2 or 3 levels, under 16 main headings33.   The form of analysis was cross sectional 
and categorical, since I was looking for accounts of particular events and institutional 
changes across all the interviews.  Key documents were also entered into NVivo and 
subjected to thematic analysis.  These included enquiries, evidence sessions, reviews 
and internal documents such as propriety guidance, codes of conduct and reports 
produced between 1998 and 2014 34 .  As one indication of salience, the greatest 
concentration of references within both the interviews and documents to particular 
codes is shown in Table 3.5.   
Table 3.5: References to most commonly cited codes  
Most commonly cited codes (30+ references 
in NVivo) 
No. 
references 
Impartiality/’crossing the line’ 81 
Change of government (1997) 72 
Perceptions of government communications by 
other civil servants 
51 
Change of government (2010) 46 
Alastair Campbell 45 
Iraq War 44 
Ministers’ perceptions of media 42 
No.10/Prime Minister 42 
                                                          
33 See Appendix 6 for a sample interview transcript and Appendix 7 for further detail about 
the coding frame. 
34 The Ingham documents, and records of meetings about government presentation during the 
1980s were all in hard copy only and were analysed manually. 
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Principles and purposes of government 
communications 
42 
Role of special advisers 38 
Positive evaluations of the job of press officer 38 
Problems with special advisers 34 
Broadcasters 33 
Propriety and codes 33 
Journalists’ relations with press office 30 
 
This listing is just one indication of salience, since this is not a quantitative study, and 
although inductively derived, these codes are inevitably linked to the topic guide since 
these were semi-structured interviews.  However, it is clear that the issue of 
impartiality, the changes of government in 1997 and 2010, the perceptions of 
government communications by other civil servants, and the role of Alastair 
Campbell, were all prominent issues.  The Iraq War remains significant, and perhaps 
surprisingly, there were plenty of references to the principles and purposes of 
government communications.  Special advisers attracted much comment – 74 
references if their role and problems with special advisers are combined.  It is also 
interesting to note that ministers’ perceptions of media attracted significant 
comment.  All these codes played a prominent role in the analysis of texts as the 
findings chapters will show.  
It is also interesting to note some of the codes that might have been expected to appear 
more frequently but did not.  Given the long-standing controversy over claims that 
civil service appointments have been politicized, there were just 12 references to 
recruitment.  Despite an interview question on the importance of digital 
communication and the web, these terms were referred to just 21 times.  The word 
‘spin’ appeared 171 times in official documents but on only 26, 23 and 2 occasions 
during the journalists’, civil servants’ and special advisers’ interviews respectively.  
Compare this with the use of the term ‘public’, which was cited on 2523 occasions, 
mainly in official documents but also 134 times by civil servants, 32 times by 
journalists, and four times by special advisers.   
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It is worth taking some time here to consider in more detail the four original labels 
identified in the topic guide and later used as part of the provisional coding process, 
namely: politicization, personalization, professionalization and mediatization.  These 
categories proved to be too large and general to provide much explanatory power and 
it was difficult to distinguish between them at times since they were multiply-
determined: for example, personalization and politicization often occur together.  The 
terms also have theoretical weaknesses.  The label ‘politicization’, for example, is 
essentially a categorical term used to describe a continuous process since 
politicization is a matter of degree, not a binary process, and is not mutually exclusive 
with the other terms.  Politicization also carries with it a negative charge – it is 
assumed to be ‘bad’, rather than a feature of a particular institutional or social 
configuration.  As the interviews made clear, government press officers, like other 
civil servants, may have an impartial ‘mind-set’, but they operate politically 
(Aberbach, 2000).  The impartial mind-set is contingent in that it is applied according 
to context, when it is seen as “natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate” to do so 
(March & Olsen, 2009, p. 3).    As indicated in Table 3.5, and as we shall see in the 
findings chapters, impartiality emerges as a powerful central theme.  This is picked 
up in relation to ideas such as representation, the public, and the informed citizen, in 
Chapter 7. 
Similarly, ‘personalization’ is assumed to be a contaminant of rational political 
discourse, although in practice it can be seen an integral part of the political process, 
since democratic politics is conducted by individual elected representatives.  Again, 
as the interview data show, the personality of ministers is crucial to the strategic 
operation of a government department.  The issue may not be whether an approach 
is personalised, per se, but the extent to which the personal ambitions of ministers 
are allowed to deflect the government from its public communications objectives; it 
then becomes an issue of who holds power over strategic communication. 
'Professionalization' too is a problematic term.  The increasing professionalization of 
government communications is referred to regularly in the literature and by my 
interviewees, especially when justifying some of the post-1997 changes, but it would 
be simplistic and inaccurate, for example, to claim that Bernard Ingham did not run 
a professional service during the 1980s, or that Harold Wilson’s, or even Lloyd 
George’s approach to publicity was amateurish (Negrine & Lilleker, 2002).  
The category, mediatization, when used as a thematic term, also lacked rigour, since 
it could be argued that all comment on government communications could be labelled 
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‘mediatization’.   This supports the theoretical framework from Chapter 2, which 
proposes that the concept be deployed as an overarching ‘sensitising concept’, not a 
category (Lunt & Livingstone, 2016).  It can then be used to address questions about 
how social change linked to media change impacts on government, and how or 
whether this leads to changes in the balance of power between the political and 
administrative dimensions of government.  As discussed in Chapter 2, mediatization 
is a non-normative, continuous concept which encompasses all the other variables 
and allows us to assess the complexity of media and political change over time and 
hence to answer the research question (Lunt & Livingstone, 2016).    
Later in this chapter we consider methodically and thematically how mediatization 
can be analyzed as a process which operates at the cross-field between the media and 
the two dimensions of government – bureaucracy and politics.  As the over-arching 
concept, mediatization is analyzed through four subsidiary although not entirely 
mutually exclusive concepts against which we can more effectively and critically 
examine historical change, namely, resilience, resistance, responsiveness, and 
representing the public.  These concepts arose inductively during the data analysis 
process and through concepts derived from the literature review, and especially the 
work of the mediatization scholars Hepp, Lingard and Rawolle, (Hepp, 2013b; Hepp 
et al., 2015; Rawolle, 2005).   A further explanation of the origin of these four concepts 
as part of this study and their relation to the research question are elaborated in the 
conclusion section to this chapter.   
 
3.4 Reflections on the interview process: ethical, political and 
personal considerations 
One of the strengths of the in-depth interview is its richness and complexity. By 
interviewing a relatively close-knit group of professionals who self-identify as a 
distinctive group, common patterns of thought and belief may emerge which 
represent a collective identity and which seek to legitimise certain roles or 
institutions.  As a distinctive profession within the civil service, government press 
officers straddle two professional identities: the civil servant, and the PR professional.  
In their outward-facing boundary role they are double advocates: for government to 
the outside world (via the media), and for the public’s right and need to know (also 
via the media) to the civil service.  Both advocacy positions can be problematic and 
are often contradictory.  In both senses, this advocacy role is doubly mediated, calling 
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into question claims that the process of ‘making the news’ (Cook, 1998) represents 
what 'the public' wants or believes.  Neither journalists nor press officers are likely to 
challenge the assumption that political news coverage is a proxy for public opinion, 
because this would challenge the basis of their own legitimacy within the political 
process.  This needs to be borne in mind in analyzing the interview texts.  
Hjarvard argues that the media coverage of politics can be read as a process of 
overhearing, whereby the media coverage of politics can be read in two ways 
(Hjarvard, 2013).  Readers assume that media coverage is concerned with the 
negotiation of “public consent for political decisions”, but inherent within this ‘honest 
broker’ role is a double mis-understanding. Political actors mis-understand news as 
a way of overhearing the conversation between journalists and members of the 
public.  Audiences mis-understand the news as a way of overhearing conversations 
between political actors.  In both cases, the media provide a prism whereby media and 
party logics (and increasingly commercial logic) deflect messages and themes as they 
move from government into the public sphere.  As interviewees, intermediaries such 
as government press officers, journalists and special advisers, are potentially in a 
position to disclose (inadvertently or otherwise) the mechanisms that form the 
process of mediation and thereby contribute to a more grounded critique of the 
political communications process.  
Earlier we discussed ways in which officials may present a biased account; this also 
applies to journalists.  Like officials, journalists have an incentive to downplay their 
own power as political actors as a way of professionally distancing themselves from 
the political process.   Special advisers, as relatively new and frequently demonised 
political and administrative actors, may feel the need to justify their position but as 
semi-outsiders can also provide a useful critique of traditional civil service values.  All 
three sets of interviewees share a characteristic that makes them especially valuable 
witnesses; they are ‘boundary spanners’, operating along and across institutional 
boundaries (Williams, 2010).  According to Cook, however exalted their position, 
officials who specialise in public communication “may be in but not of the political 
institution” and “fulfil a ‘boundary role’ that builds bridges to the other occupant of a 
boundary role, the reporter at the newsbeat” (Cook, 1998, p. 140). 
As a former public sector PR professional, I approached my civil service interviewees 
with some authority and with the promise that I would empathise with and 
understand their world.  As a press officer, I had worked at the frontline answering 
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journalists’ calls and had experienced the excitements and occasional terror of the 
‘cross-field’.  Now, as an interviewer, I occupied a new role as an academic researcher; 
my own experience was excluded from the encounter but the interviewees knew, that 
I knew, what they were talking about, and perhaps more importantly, what they 
weren’t talking about.  The interviews were overwhelmingly fluent, friendly, and rich 
in detail.   
The interviews with journalists re-played my experiences of the social distance 
between so-called ‘hacks’ and ‘flacks’35.  PR professionals are resigned to, and even 
sympathise with, journalists’ estimation of them as either closeted officials, failed 
journalists or dodgy salespeople, and since they spend their working hours serving 
their needs, they respect them, advocate for them within their organisations, and 
believe that by doing so, they are upholding the ideals of public accountability.  As 
such, both professional groups comply with Couldry’s notion of the ‘myth of the 
mediated centre’ whereby centralised media are socially constructed as the central 
access point to the realities of the social world (Couldry, 2005).  This notion brings 
with it certain ‘theoretical biases’ that originate from historical but not necessarily 
inevitable developments in media.  The six journalists interviewed here were all highly 
experienced, had reached the top of their profession and by temperament and 
background, were analytical and reflective about their former role.  The interviews 
therefore took place in an atmosphere more typical of elite interviews – that of respect 
and distance.  One respondent, Nicholas Timmins, a policy journalist with nearly 40 
years’ experience on broadsheet newspapers, had been a regular at the end of the 
phone during my days at the Health Education Council, although he hadn’t 
remembered this, and I felt again those mixed feelings of fear and awe about what 
kinds of ‘mischief’36 he might be getting up to.   
Originally, I resisted interviewing special advisers, partly due to an ingrained 
negativity bias but also because of the stated focus on government press officers.  This 
was challenged by two illuminating accounts of life as a special adviser (Hillman, 
2014; Wilkes, 2014), and the findings of the UCL Constitution Unit’s special advisers 
                                                          
35 As Cook puts it, for a journalist to be called a ‘flack’, is a serious “loss of prestige within a 
profession that lacks traditional markers for membership and accomplishment” which 
explains why they perform rituals in order to “distance themselves from their sources” (Cook, 
1998, p105). 
36 ‘Making mischief’ was a playful term used by my boss, the Head of BBC Television Publicity, 
Keith Samuel (a former journalist), to describe tricky questions and manoeuvres by journalists 
to try and give their story legs, often by introducing drama and conflict. 
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project (Yong & Hazell, 2014), which led me to reconsider my decision not to 
interview them.  I needed their perspective on journalists’ claims that the media role 
of special advisers was transforming the rules of engagement between government 
and the media. These final interviews confirmed that this group of actors was crucial 
to the government communications.  I found them open, easy to talk to, happy to help, 
and interested in the progress of this project. 
3.4.2 Ethical and political reflections on the interview process 
There are ethical and political dimensions to encounters such as interviews that invite 
participants to explicate their views and experiences in relation to a contested area in 
the public domain as is the case here.  Openly discussing a matter that is usually not 
publicly discussed is inherently exposing.  It can be, and is, distressing to recall events 
such as a loss of status or position, which challenge personal and professional identity, 
or offend a sense of justice.  It can be difficult to ensure anonymity within small 
professional networks so this was a priority where interviewees requested it.  The 
subject matter is politically sensitive, so there is a need to consider “the broader 
implication of research in terms of the impact it may have on society or on specific 
subgroups within society” (Elliott, 2005, p. 146).   
In relation to contested issues in the public domain, the mention of ‘Damian 
McBride’, or ‘Jo Moore’, and a raised eyebrow by the interviewee, spoke volumes 
about the ripple effect such events can have throughout a professional network, even 
many years later.  When contacting the 27 civil servants invited to interview, I tried 
to use a ‘softly-softly’ approach, sending just one invitation and no follow up requests, 
deliberately avoiding the appearance of putting them under pressure to respond.  I 
contacted Alastair Campbell twice, once directly, and once through a friendly 
journalist, giving him the chance to participate, since I had already interviewed two 
other former chief press secretaries, but he did not respond to the first and declined 
the second. However, his views are contained in detail in his published diaries and 
elsewhere. Matt Tee was also contacted twice and did not respond on either occasion.  
Prospective interviewees knew the risks and benefits of ‘going public’ and those who 
did not respond may not have wanted to be identified as having said ‘no’.  The only 
former civil servant who declined was brusque and to the point in his response; he 
had been a victim of the 1997 ‘cull’ and in any case had already spoken on the record.  
Discretion was also necessary when telling participants who had and had not 
participated in the study.  I sought permission from the participants before using their 
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names to encourage others to come forward, and did not refer at any point to the 
names of those who wanted to remain anonymous.  In giving them access to their 
quotes in context before submission, I also provided them with the opportunity to 
check that I had anonymised them sufficiently. 
Professional persona provides some protection against emotion – and indeed is 
integral to the neutral role of the public servant - but issues discussed in relation to 
day to day working life also reflect “life experiences and thus touch on issues of 
personal identity”(Elliott, 2005, p. 140).  Some interviewees felt that their reputations 
since leaving the service had been undermined; some expressed an enduring sense of 
injustice following the changes of government in 1997 and 2010, while others 
regretted the changes in the service that seemed to undermine their own 
achievements.   One participant asked to go off the record when talking about Damian 
McBride; another would not elaborate when asked about the difficulties he had 
experienced following the 2010 election.   
In terms of informed consent, the initial letter and the interview preamble all made 
clear on what terms the interviews were taking place.  The closing remarks included 
a further reference to the offer of a follow up.  This offer was repeated via email once 
the first draft of the thesis had been completed.  Nearly all responded and were shown 
their quotes in context either personally or via email.  Changes were made only to 
protect their anonymity or to clarify misunderstandings.  All the civil servants were 
told that I was also interviewing journalists, and none had difficulties with that.  I 
could not inform either them or the journalists about my interviews with special 
advisers as I had not at that stage made the decision to include them but several 
actually suggested this as a potentially useful addition to the study. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter explained how a qualitative and diachronic research design and 
methodology makes use of in-depth interview texts and a range of documents in order 
to operationalize the theoretical framework as outlined in Chapter 2, and address the 
research question posed at the end of Chapter 1.  Four subsidiary concepts have been 
proposed through which to analyze the mediatization of government communication: 
resilience, resistance, responsiveness and representing the public.  These concepts are 
derived logically from the concept of mediatization itself, and institutionally from the 
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dual function of the civil service as discussed in the literature review, namely, to 
provide a check on ministerial power (resistance), and to serve ministers 
(responsiveness). These concepts will be used in two ways: to orient the process of 
empirical analysis by organising the data, and to provide a provisional theoretical 
underpinning to the findings. 
We saw in Chapter 2 how, in order to serve ministers and preserve impartiality, civil 
servants were required to use their own judgement to provide a ‘bulwark’ or a check 
against excessive partisanship.  At the same time they were required to loyally serve 
not only the government of the day, but also individual ministers.  As we have seen, 
terms such as responsiveness and resistance are widely, if loosely, used by public 
administration scholars to refer to civil servants’ dual role in both challenging and 
loyally serving ministers.  The approach outlined here then, both operationalizes and 
analyzes changes impacting on a particular site within the public bureaucracy, 
theorised here as the cross-field.  This is an elite, semi-public sphere, which operates 
in opaque if not invisible ways, and where the largely hidden bridging activities of PR 
and media relations are enacted (Davis, 2010). 
The use of concepts such as responsiveness and resistance also relates directly to the 
concept of mediatization itself.  If, as we argued in Chapter 2, mediatization is an over-
arching meta-process that operates over time, it will inevitably encounter both 
opposing and enabling forces, namely, resistance or response.  This point was made 
by Hepp et al. when they proposed a holistic approach to studying mediatization that 
does not depict media influence as either ‘colonizing’ of other domains, or as a zero 
sum game.  They argued that both resistance and response to mediatization could and 
should be examined empirically (Hepp et al., 2015).  In this study, these two concepts 
are brought together within the concept of resilience, which expresses the durability 
of the institutional and cultural frameworks that shape relations within the ‘cross-
field’ over time.   Resistance relates to the extent to which the field in question 
maintains its integrity and shape in response to pressure, while responsiveness 
relates to the degree of elasticity of the field.  Finally, the concept of representing the 
public brings normative elements to bear on the question of how to understand and 
interpret change in government communications, both in relation to the ethics and 
norms of civil servants themselves, and as understood by theorists of representative 
democracy. 
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These four concepts, which head the following four findings chapters, can now be 
defined and aligned with the research questions and presented as sub-questions, as 
follows: 
 Chapter 4: Resilience - to what extent did government communications 
express, plan and deliver in relation to its public purposes and objectives, 
and what were its strengths and weaknesses over time? 
 Chapter 5: Resistance – how and when did government officials responsible 
for dealing with the media resist or challenge what they saw as media and/or 
political obstacles to their public purposes and objectives?  Did such 
resistance increase or decline over time? 
 Chapter 6: Responsiveness – how and when did government officials 
responsible for dealing with the media respond to the needs and demands of 
media and political actors?  What impact did such response have on its 
public purposes and objectives?   What is the relationship between political 
and media responsiveness? 
 Chapter 7: Representing the public - what are the stated public values of 
government communicators, how have they changed over time, and what 
kind of representative claim is implied by these values? 
Overall question: In response to the pressures of mediatization after 1997, did the 
UK government communications service have sufficient resilience to deliver a public 
communications function consistent with its own stated purposes?   
The four subsidiary concepts will be explicated further in the four findings chapters, 
4-7, to which they provide the chapter headings.  Each chapter will apply the relevant 
concept to answer the research questions.  Documentary and interview evidence will 
be examined together and chronology is contained within each chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Resilience 
“The civil service is quite resilient, you know, whether it be a sacking or a reshuffle, 
within two days, you would never have known, and you just get on with it.  The names 
have been changed and there are new pictures on the wall”.  Head of News (until 2014) 
C14. 
4.1 Introduction 
Resilience is the first of the four theoretical and operational concepts that I will be 
using to critically examine historical change in order to answer the overarching 
research question of this thesis:  in response to the pressures of mediatization after 
1997, did the UK government communications service have sufficient resilience to 
deliver a public communications function consistent with its own stated purposes?   
In navigating around a term like resilience which is now so nebulous and widely used 
that it is in danger of becoming a buzzword, it is essential to set out the scope and 
relevance of its use in relation to this study (Fainstein, 2015; Rose, 2007).  The term 
has become ubiquitous in policy documents issued by national and transnational 
bodies (Brassett, Croft, & Vaughan-Williams, 2013).  It is widely and variously 
deployed in a range of academic and policy contexts such as climate change and other 
environmental challenges and natural disasters; emergency planning, intelligence 
and security (especially in response to terrorism); the development of new 
technologies and digital governance; and in relation to individuals and communities 
thought to be vulnerable (Austin & Callen, 2012; Reid & Botterill, 2013). It has also 
been used as a measure of the capacities of democratic governments to achieve 
popular consent to govern in complex societies, as in claims that a “lack of resiliency 
in dealing with conflicts leads to lack of legitimacy in government itself”, and that 
“resilient government is government that can deal with value conflict (Anderson, 
2012, pp. 556, 561). 
Referring to governance, Bourbeau argues that although the term has been negatively 
associated with neo-liberal approaches because it calls on individuals to develop their 
own resilience, thereby “permitting states to abdicate responsibility in times of crisis” 
(p375), it can also be seen as a vital aspect of popular resistance to the neo-liberal 
state:  
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“To resist— and especially to resist one of the most powerful political organizations in 
the history of humankind (i.e., the state) — is not an easy course of action, and it is 
one that is calling for resilience to ensure its continuity” (Bourbeau, 2015, p. 388). 
In relation to public administration, Steinberg refers to the resilient institution as one 
that is “resilient to the extent that it maintains its effectiveness over time despite 
changing external conditions, where ‘effectiveness’ is the extent to which the 
institution fulfils the core mission envisioned by its founders” (Steinberg, 2009, p. 
65). To fulfil its mission and sustain its normative commitments, institutional 
arrangements need to be in place to advocate for them, even against internal and 
external challenge.  Hood adds that although resilience in public administration 
applies to the system’s robustness, adaptability, endurance and survival, it also relates 
to core public service values, such as honesty, legitimacy and trust (Hood, 1991).    
In a compelling theoretical synthesis between resilience thinking and public 
administration approaches, Duit argues that although the concept of resilience is “of 
central importance to the study of public administration”, the problem with most 
theorists is that they apply simplistic natural science models to social systems and fail 
to consider internal power dynamics such as the role of ‘veto players’ and the potential 
for ‘elite capture’ (Duit, 2016).  Glor examines resilience as the organizational capacity 
for fitness and survival in relation to its environment (my emphasis).  According to 
this conception, the capacity for fitness requires both adaptability and the ability to 
communicate, or at least to receive feedback from changing external and internal 
environments, so that “the messages being received about the need for change are 
very important”.  Adaptability requires the capacity to deal with challenges, so an 
organization that meets challenges is more fit.  Resilience, then, addresses the 
capacity to adapt, to receive and manage feedback, to face challenges and to survive.  
Ultimately, “failure to maintain core activities, boundaries and goals, which can be at 
risk at times of innovation and change, is a sign of organizational death” (Glor, 2015, 
pp. 34, 36).  However, although the idea of resilience is increasingly popular in 
organizational studies, Boin contends that empirical research on resilient 
organizations is actually quite rare (Boin, 2013, p. 429). 
Turning to our case study, resilience is a term which could fruitfully be applied in 
connection with the remarkable longevity of many British institutions, which are 
thought to combine elasticity, the flexibility to respond to change or threat and to 
spring back into shape, and toughness, the ability to recover quickly from difficulties 
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and challenges (Oxford University, 2000)37.  Yet, as we have seen, functional and 
structural concerns are not the only ones to consider.  Of particular interest when 
considering the mechanics of government communications is the culture, or the set 
of norms, customs and practices within which decisions to act are made.  In this sense, 
resilience can also be applied to March and Olsen’s idea of “the institutionalized 
capability for acting appropriately”, which, they argue, is determined by “the 
distribution and regulation of resources, competencies and organizing capacities” 
within the bureaucracy, (March & Olsen, 2009, p. 10).  The actions of certain key 
individuals, such as Bernard Ingham and Alastair Campbell, are made possible and 
become significant within the context of certain political and institutional norms, and 
the possibilities which emerge during times of change and conflict. 
For this chapter then, the resilience of the government information service during a 
period of intense and pervasive mediatization entails more than the elasticity and 
toughness that facilitate its continuity and survival.  How faithful is the service and 
those working within it to what it sees as its core mission, its values such as probity, 
public trust and impartiality, and the external environment, namely, the increasingly 
mediated democratic public sphere?  How resilient are the institutional arrangements 
that facilitate resistance to both internal and external challenge, and to what extent 
are these arrangements enabled or obstructed by power relations?  This chapter asks 
how and to what extent the media-related changes which began in the 1980s affected 
the capacity of the service, and the specialists working within it, to adapt, express, 
plan and deliver in relation to their public purposes and objectives, both implicit and 
explicit.  I will argue that the arrival of the New Labour government in 1997 with a 
particular approach to media relations exploited the weaknesses and threatened the 
resilience of a communications structure that had been in place since 1945, while 
enabling the service to become more responsive to ministers and the media.  Before 
1997, as we shall see, the drive by politicians to reduce the autonomy of the GIS, and 
to exert greater control over government messaging was taking place covertly, 
intensifying with the increasing pressures and possibilities of mediatization, as 
archival evidence from the 1980s shows. In strengthening political control over 
government communications, did successive governments undermine its resilience, 
and if so, how? 
                                                          
37 For the OED definition of resilience see 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/163619?redirectedFrom=Resilience#eid 
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This chapter will use evidence from interview texts, official literature and archival 
documents to explore the cultural and structural capacities of government 
communications over time, asking whether 1997 was indeed a turning point.  The 
resilience of government communications will be examined in the light of three 
historical developments:  
1. The establishment of the Government Information Service after 1945 as a 
separate network within the civil service, and the consequent impact of 
this on perceptions of the service and its practitioners. 
2. The role of politicians in instigating innovation and change - not just after 
1997, but following the Thatcher victory of 1979.  How did civil servants 
and journalists experience increasing job insecurity of the information 
service leadership after 1997 and 2010 and the ensuing changes in 
government communications?  
3. Attempts to make explicit the public purposes of government 
communications in the light of a series of publicized scandals in from 1997 
onwards.   What effect did successive reforms have on the autonomy and 
public purposes of the service? 
 
4.2 Structural and cultural continuities 
In Chapter 2, I argued that the departmentalized structure of Whitehall tends towards 
cyclical change in the power relationship between the centre and departments, rather 
than an inevitable tendency towards increasing centralization.  To counter such 
centrifugal tendencies, successive Prime Ministers and their advisers repeatedly 
devote ‘personal and institutional power resources’ in order to introduce a more 
integrated corporate model for communications (Heffernan, 2006).  Sir Bob 
Kerslake, joint Head of the Civil Service until 2015) was the most recent senior official 
to call for more consistency in standards between departments (Kerslake, 2014), 
while the current Executive Director, Alex Aiken, is the latest head of profession to 
seek to implement a more coordinated, coherent narrative across government, with a 
series of government-wide communications plans (Government Communications 
Service, 2013, 2014a, 2015b).  The drive for better coordination was a preoccupation 
of Bernard Ingham during his 11 years at No.10, and was a major part of Alastair 
Campbell’s drive to modernize the communications service (Campbell & Hagerty, 
2011; Ingham, 1981).   The Mountfield Review found that, despite the efforts of 
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Ingham between 1979 and 1990, by 1997 “responsibility for ensuring practices within 
press offices are fully effective and up to date rests primarily with departmental heads 
of information”, and that, in consequence, “the quality of these practices and 
arrangements varies between Departments” (Mountfield, 1997, para 41).   
The resilience of the service as a whole therefore rests on the resilience of both 
departmental and central communications leaderships, and their ability to form both 
political and administrative alliances towards a common goal. I hope to demonstrate 
that although the relationship between the centre and the departments is cyclical, and 
hence shows continuity over time, external factors such as the drive by politicians to 
manage their reputations in the face of increasing media scrutiny, can have wide-
ranging and possibly unintended effects that damage the relationship between 
governments and citizens (Foster, 2005).    
4.2.1  The Government Information Service after 1945: basic structure 
established 
Today’s Government Communications Service (GCS) on the face of it looks very like 
the structure that emerged from the delivery of wartime propaganda which, after a 
shaky start, was considered to have successfully mobilised the population on the 
‘home front’: the Ministry of Information (MOI) to deliver and coordinate effective 
propaganda, the No.10 press office and chief press secretary based in the Cabinet 
Office to serve the Cabinet and Prime Minister, and the departmental press offices to 
disseminate information about government policy (Grant, 1999; Maartens, 2016; 
Moore, 2006).   Soon after the Labour victory was declared on 26 July 1945, a Cabinet 
Committee chaired by the Prime Minister Clement Attlee quickly drew up plans for 
the post-war organization of Government Publicity (National Archives: Cabinet 
Papers CAB 78/37).   On 18 September, the Committee made the controversial 
decision to retain a single, centralised agency based on the Ministry of Information38 
model, despite the widespread assumpion that the MOI would be dissolved after the 
war.  The Committee noted that a centralised agency would provide a “unifying 
influence” over “publicity work on the home front”.  With the demands of postwar 
reconstruction and a radical agenda for change, the government felt it needed “a body 
of technically expert staff which knew how to conduct publicity without incurring the 
charge of propaganda”. This body of professionals would have a degree of autonomy 
                                                          
38 Renamed the Central Office of Information (COI) in 1946.  The decision was made in 2011 
to abolish it. It closed in 2012 and its tasks were transferred to the Cabinet Office.  For the 
background to the decision see (Horton & Gay, 2011; M Tee, 2011). 
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under a civil service director but would work to a Minister without portfolio who had 
responsibility for the coordination of what was then referred to as the presentation of 
government policy.   
The committee was aware of the potential problems associated with this model and 
anticipated criticism from both Parliament and the press 39 , but accepted that 
although “the boundaries between information, explanation and advocacy were 
tenuous” and there were risks of “embarrassment and misrepresentation”, 
governments had an obligation to provide “the material on which the public could 
reach an informed judgement on current affairs”.   A memo dated 14 September, from 
the Lord President, Herbert Morrison, who later became the minister in charge of 
government communications, stated in terms very similar to those stated by modern 
politicians that “there should be no return to the old timidity and reticence in the 
relation between Government departments and the public and press” but there must 
be “no questions of Government publicity being used to boost individual ministers”.    
Media relations was not a major concern of the new agency; the minutes of another 
Committee, the Cabinet Home Information Services (Official Committee), or I.H(O), 
which was formed in April 1946 and chaired by the Director General of the COI, show 
that government communication was heavily dominated by direct communication 
through films, talks, leaflets and advertising (CAB 134/355).  This Committee was the 
forerunner of the regular MIO, the Meeting of Information Officers, which ran 
throughout the Thatcher period, and has now been superseded by the monthly 
Director of Communications group led by the Executive Director, Government 
Communications, Alex Aiken.  
The dual accountability of the government communicator to both political and 
administrative masters, and the requirement to ensure that government information 
is disseminated without incurring the charge of propaganda, was established from the 
start. This was later enshrined within propriety guidance that called on government 
communicators to ensure that the boundary, or the line between party-political and 
public information was maintained. Here, then, was the shape and culture of a 
government communications structure which in broad outline still exists: the 
differentiation between central and departmental control of information; a separate 
cadre of in-house communications specialists who are distinct from the rest of the 
                                                          
39 A House of Commons debate took place on 7 March 1946, approving the change, and the 
COI was launched in April.  On 24 September that year, the Daily Express “referred to 
Morrison as the head of the Government’s ‘propaganda machine’ and called the COI an 
‘odious’ new instrument of government” (Grant, 1999: 66). 
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civil service; a dual administrative and political leadership, with ultimate oversight 
resting with the minister; and the concept of ‘the line’, however blurred, that divides 
public information from party political communication.  The abstract notion of ‘the 
line’ is referred to frequently in the interviews, while government documents 
generally refer to ‘boundaries’ (National Archives: Cabinet Papers CAB 78/37, 1945) 
(Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2012; Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2002). A concern with appearances, which runs through existing 
propriety guidance, presents civil service communicators with difficult dilemmas that 
they may be ill-equipped to handle, as we shall see in the next chapter, Resistance.   
A concern that certain sorts of government communication may lead to charges of 
party political bias emerged much later during the Thatcher administration, when, on 
19 July 1982, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Leon Brittan, proposed to members 
of the top secret Liaison Committee40 that they change the rules in relation to party 
political ministerial speeches.  The Questions of Procedures for Ministers (QPM), the 
forerunner to the Ministerial Code, permitted these to be circulated only through the 
party. Brittan proposed instead that they be circulated through the official 
Government machine, in order to secure “far more coverage” (National Archives: 
PREM 19/720).  Bernard Ingham wrote to the Prime Minister the same day insisting 
that she should “resolutely refuse” to change the rules since these were “well-founded” 
and had served successive governments well by “protecting Ministers from charges of 
misusing Government resources for Party ends and the GIS from the charge of party 
political bias”.  Two days later, the Liaison Committee agreed that “it would be 
presentationally unwise for this Government to be seen to be tinkering with the rules” 
and the idea was dropped.   
This principle is still in operation as part of the Ministerial Code and expressed in 
practical terms in the GCS Propriety Code (2014b; 2010).  Very little has been written 
about the Liaison Committee but it has been claimed that Ingham’s participation in 
the Committee was in itself, improper.  In his biography of Margaret Thatcher, Hugo 
Young argued that Ingham’s presence was “a testimony to the intimate linkage even 
                                                          
40  The Liaison Committee on the presentation of government policy aimed to provide a 
coherent approach to presentation between ministers and the Party.  A long standing but 
intermittent post-war body, it was revived in 1981 and attended by selected Cabinet ministers, 
the Party Chairman, and staff from the Conservative Research Department and selected civil 
servants including Bernard Ingham.  Possibly due to the continuing sensitivities relating to 
government communication, its existence was not shared with the Cabinet until March 1982. 
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beyond the bounds of Whitehall propriety, between party and government machines” 
– a charge which foreshadows later criticism of Alastair Campbell (Young, 1989, p. 
299). 
The 1980 Official Handbook for Information Officers devotes a section, ‘The Political 
Factor’ to  managing politicians, and contains a nugget of advice which illustrates how 
appearances may be allowed to deceive.  Information officers are advised that “the 
arranged Parliamentary Question is an invaluable method of putting right ill-
informed criticism.  It is not immediately obvious that the occasion has been 
‘arranged’, and the reply is likely to receive general coverage”, cited in (Scammell, 
1991, p. 16). The issue of appearances was raised again in 2002 when the then Director 
General for Government Communications, Mike Granatt (until 2003), reiterated 
their  importance in relation to trust when he gave evidence to the Public 
Administration Committee (2002):  
If any government wanted to go down the route of having overtly politically driven 
management of its services they would have to think very carefully indeed about 
whether the audiences concerned, media or public, were actually going to invest those 
operations with the sort of trust that the current system does.   
He appears to be implying that although not overtly political, the GIS in its various 
incarnations, was covertly politically-driven.  The later controversies relating to the 
Iraq dossier of September 2002 and the subsequent Hutton, Butler and Chilcot 
inquiries, should be seen in this context.   
The self-regulating nature of the Government Information Service, and the concern 
with appearances, were flaws built into the structure from the start, according to 
Moore.  In his archival analysis of the 1945-51 Labour government’s approach to 
communication, he  concludes that although the government  instituted a 
comprehensive and efficient method of communicating with the public, it did not 
provide adequate controls and so entirely failed to make it accountable, perhaps 
because to do so would make it harder to control.   
There were no guidelines set up for how the State should, and should not, 
communicate. There were no constraints put on the way in which the government 
produced communication or worked with the independent media (over and above the 
insufficient civil service code of neutrality).  There was no way to ensure the 
government was giving the news media sufficient or equal access, and no way to 
ensure any consistent representation of information (Moore, 2006, p. 216). 
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The extent to which the UK government communications service defines and fulfills 
public purposes and democratic norms  is still very much open to question, as the 
ensuing chapters, and especially Chapter 7, will show. 
4.2.2   A ‘narrative of disdain’: the institutional weakness of government 
communications 
The resilience of the government communications service is related to its reputation 
among its core clients, politicians, journalists and non-communications civil servants.  
If it is held in high esteem it is likely to be given more autonomy to deliver a service 
in accordance with its own purposes.  In line with the development of promotional 
culture and the mediatization of politics, we might have expected the reputation, 
standing and resourcing of the government PR function and its operatives to have 
increased markedly overall from the 1980s onwards (Aronczyk & Powers, 2010; 
Corner, 2007; Davis, 2013; Sanders, 2011; Strömbäck, 2008; Sussman, 2011; 
Wernick, 1991).   
In fact, during that time, as we saw in Chapter 2, the service was subjected to repeated 
criticism by politicians, senior civil servants and even its own leadership.  Bernard 
Ingham fought to promote and defend the work of the GIS under his leadership from 
what he saw as the scapegoating tendencies of ministers, but in his interview for this 
study he describes the quality of the service that he inherited as “very mixed”.  Two 
weeks before officially taking up the post of Chief Press Secretary on 1 November 1979, 
he sent the Minister in charge of presentation, Angus Maude41, an 11-page paper on 
presentation, arguing that the challenge of radically reforming “the post-war national 
ethos” would be tough and painful but worth it, and would probably take at least three 
years.  He warned that “too much should not be expected of” public relations.  Instead, 
he suggested, attention needed to be paid to coordinated economic presentation by 
three parties: backbenchers, ministers working with administrative civil servants, and 
the GIS, whose performance and morale he agreed needed to be improved.  In his 
memo to Maude, on 15 October, he outlined his aspirations for the future of the 
service: 
We need to introduce some of the disciplines of a newspaper office into Government 
Information work…we need to formalize the practice of telephoning into No. 10 press 
office by 5pm a news list for the following 24 hours (…) I shall shortly have met the 
Information heads of all the main Departments.  I am clearly indicating to them…that 
                                                          
41 His son, Francis, held the same position between 2010 and 2015. 
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I am anxious to raise the reputation and status of the Government Information 
Service, but that it can only be done by a collective demonstration of effort and 
competence. Memo 15/10/1979 (Ingham Archive, Margaret Thatcher Foundation: 
May 1979-April 1985). 
On 5 December he presented the Prime Minister with an eight-page paper on 
economic presentation with “proposals for injecting purpose and drive into the 
presentation of economic policy”.  In it he argued that the government was too 
reactive, and that there needed to be “a broad and consistent view of Government 
policy (through) a series of mutually supportive campaigns aimed at different sections 
of the public”.   To improve the resilience of the press office, and its ability to continue 
to think long term while dealing with short-lived frenzies (such as the public 
unmasking of the former spy, Anthony Blunt42), he argued that a distinction should 
be made between its handling of emergencies, and the need for longer term 
communications planning.    
Again and again in the archives, we see examples where Ingham deflected the 
criticism of ministers by blaming poor presentation on their failure to pull together, 
while trying to raise standards and gain greater central control over government 
messaging. When the Chancellor Geoffrey Howe expressed doubts in the run up to 
the 1982 Budget as to “whether Whitehall’s information forces (GIS) are ideally 
deployed for the proper presentation of the overall economic message,” Ingham 
dismissed the Chancellor’s comment as “gratuitous, so long as Ministers of the 
Government cut the Government to pieces.”  He insisted on being included in 
meetings about the matter and offered to prepare a paper (PREM 19/720).   In a 
confidential note to the Prime Minister on 19/1/82 entitled Getting the government's 
economic message across, he argued that “all the slick presentation in the world 
counts for little or nothing if the Government is seen to be divided among itself or 
unhappy with its own policies”.  The basic responsibility for the presentation of 
economic policy "must rest with the Treasury" but he was critical of his own 
profession, stating:  
I regard the Treasury Information Division as one of the less effective and desperately 
in need of some dynamic professionalism.  Too much emphasis is apparently put upon 
                                                          
42 Known as the ‘Blunt Affair’, a media storm was unleashed when his betrayal, and 
subsequent confession and immunity from prosecution, were revealed by Margaret Thatcher 
in the House of Commons in November 1979. 
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economic expertise, and far too little on a robust ability – and enthusiasm – to 
communicate simply (MIO 1982: National Archives: CAB 134/4382).   
Respondents interviewed for this study praised the “dramatic changes” implemented 
by Bernard Ingham.  Jonathan Haslam, John Major’s Chief Press Secretary until 1997, 
claims that Ingham’s incumbency heralded “a big step change”: 
Bernard brought together a great understanding of the totality of government, the 
journalists’ nous about what makes a story, and how to have proper effective 
relationships with journalists (…) there was a higher degree of professionalism and a 
higher degree of importance placed on the role (…) He was massively good on 
understanding the bigger picture, understanding the parts that the departments 
played, boosting their own morale within the civil service, boosting their own standing 
(C07). 
Yet despite Ingham’s achievements, and the typically close working relationships 
between ministerial teams and even quite junior press officers, many respondents 
reveal a steady narrative of disdain, largely from fellow civil servants.  They refer to 
being seen as ‘minister’s narks’ or ‘toys for the ministers’; as being ‘below the salt’ and 
‘treated with a certain amount of contempt’.  Their role was considered to be a ‘soft 
option’, and yet there was envy at their privileged access to ministers.   Government 
PR was felt to be “inherently dishonest (…) something that you use to sell dog food”.   
More broadly “there was the slight feeling that you are not proper civil servants” and 
were looked down on “not exactly as a necessary evil but certainly not to be taken 
quite as seriously”.  Colleagues “tended to look down on (the service), especially the 
fast streamers”. 
The isolated position of the government information service without a professional 
champion of the calibre of Bernard Ingham after 1990, led to stagnation and a failure 
to recognise and adapt to changes in the media.   As we saw in Chapter 1, John Major 
has admitted himself that he was suspicious of ‘political spin’, and did not prioritise 
media relations sufficiently, even at No.10 (Bale & Sanders, 2001; Hogg, 1995; 
Leveson, 2012).  Jonathan Haslam refers to this as ‘hair shirtism’; a reluctance to 
spend money on providing services for journalists.  He remembers the struggle to 
provide toilets for female lobby members, like Elinor Goodman (C4 News 1988-
2005), and to change the arrangements whereby each morning, lobby correspondents 
had to pass through the Chief Press Secretary’s office in order to get to the lobby room 
where 40 people would squeeze into a room for 10.  He admits that, prior to 1997: 
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It was behind its time and there were things that I think we should have done with the 
benefit of hindsight that we didn’t do but were done elsewhere (…). The media was 
growing like Topsy in front of us.  We were running like fury to try and keep up, 
particularly when I was in Downing Street.  It was a tiny office.  It was absolutely 
ridiculous when you think about it. I did get No.10 wired. So that when we were doing 
broadcasts in Downing Street, rather than the incredibly amateurish point of view of 
having a van parked outside and wires trailing through windows, that actually had the 
place wired upstairs, but it took forever to do  (C07). 
Despite the increased status and resourcing devoted to government media relations 
after 1997, the sense of ‘them and us’ within the civil service extended to the most 
senior levels, and persisted even when, following the Phillis Report of 2004, the head 
of profession was elevated to Permanent Secretary level for the first time with Howell 
James as the first incumbent.  Siobhan Kenny, an experienced Director of 
Communications (1994-2005) who had previously had a successful career at No.10 
during the Major and Blair governments, recalls that: 
Howell suffered from that when he was in name the Permanent Secretary but I think 
they made it pretty clear that he wasn’t a proper Permanent Secretary.  It’s a ludicrous 
thing but that’s the way the civil service operates. Every other Permanent Secretary 
becomes de facto knight, dame or whatever, and Howell was appointed CBE when he 
left.  You’d have to be in the know to know that that is really cutting but that is how 
they do it (C03). 
This apparently dismissive attitude on the part of Permanent Secretaries suggests that 
little had changed in the 20 years since Peter Hennessy of the Times wrote of them 
that “on one issue they stand united: the inadequacy of the Government Information 
Service”(Hennessy, 1980).  The reputation of the GIS was so bad, he claimed, that the 
government’s “specialist press officers came within sight of disbandment as long ago 
as the late 1940s” and “as some of its members believe, its days may be numbered”.  
The article admitted, however, that such a change would meet “the resistance of 
ministers,” a point which links back to the politically-inspired origins of the service 
back in 1945. 
Several respondents in this study felt that press officers were more attuned to the 
needs of ministers and journalists than other civil servants.  This long-serving senior 
manager within the GIS and later the GICS, recalls that: 
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There was quite a well entrenched view that communicators should not have a role in 
formulating policy whereas quite often ministers would feel that communicators had 
a valuable role to play in advising ministers as to how a particular policy might play 
with the public (C10). 
Illustrating this point, Nadine Smith, a former Chief Press Officer at the Cabinet 
Office with experience as a departmental press secretary  (1998-2009) explained how, 
in meetings, she would cause discomfort among policy civil servants by making 
common cause with the Minister of State, in effect becoming a ‘troubleshooter’ on her 
behalf: 
I used to watch the civil servants in a way that I didn’t think that I was one of them 
(…)  I would watch them worming their way out of things and I was astonished by how 
they wouldn’t give the information that I knew was out there or they’d try and put a 
gloss on it (…) I was shocked and I thought ‘my god, these ministers have got nowhere 
to turn’. I did try and make it my job to get her the information and the right people 
round the table for her to talk about press linkages and media handling lines and 
defensive lines and her plans for her visits that week, and who’s she seeing and why 
she’s seeing them and not somebody else, and you ….you feel like you’re their trouble-
shooter (C09). 
A Head of News (until 2014) noticed resentment from policy officials because the 
communications team was often asked to sign off proposals before they went to the 
minister for final clearance, or because she challenged the claims of policy officials in 
meetings: 
I’d be in the same room as them and they’re telling you about how great the policy is 
and you are going ‘hang on a second, that doesn’t make any sense’, and you get evil 
eyes from everyone, and the Secretary of State would be ‘yeah, she’s right.  What’s the 
answer?’  Lots of times I’d be told to shut up (C14). 
Policy officials were also resentful because they felt that “the complexity of their area 
was never properly represented”, and that “press offices (…) would be so close to 
ministers and sometimes give advice without policy people being there because of the 
nature of the fast moving working towards the next days’ headlines”(C10). This came 
from a rare survivor of the 1997 ‘cull’, who had experienced life under four 
governments.  One long-serving Director of Communications (1991-2011) agreed that 
communications staff were often more aware of the perceptions of the public and the 
concerns of ministers because as a whole, most civil servants: 
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tend to have quite a narrow social demographic, so there were lots of presumptions 
about the wider public (…) and quite often therefore it was your job to be Cassandra, 
and say to them ‘actually our problem is not that people understand and are doing 
nothing, the problem is people don’t care because they’re trying to get the kids to 
school, pay their mortgages, keep their jobs’ (C11). 
This sense of the government communicator as an ‘outsider’, is also seen in the 
various reviews and enquiries that took place between 1997 and 2004.  The 1997 
Mountfield Report noted “something approaching disdain for media and 
communications matters”, while the 2004 Phillis Report was critical of a ‘them and 
us’ mentality within the civil service:  
Compared with other specialist professional groups in the Civil Service such as 
lawyers, statisticians and economists, those working within the GICS often feel like 
the poor relations with little recognition given to the skills, competencies and 
professional standards they uphold. 
We found a culture in which communication is not seen as a core function of the 
mainstream Civil Service.  In theory, communications staff are a part of the Civil 
Service like any other.  But we too often found a ‘them and us’ attitude between policy 
civil servants and communications staff. 
As a whole, the Civil Service has not grasped the potential of modern communications 
as a service provided for citizens.   
The Phillis Report called for a radical rethink of what government communications 
should be, with a focus on a “continuous dialogue” with the general public:   
Our central recommendation is that communications should be redefined across 
government to mean a continuous dialogue with all interested parties, encompassing 
a broader range of skills and techniques than those associated with media relations.  
The focus of attention should be the general public (Phillis, 2004, p.3). 
The idea that governments should consider the information needs of the public above 
the communications needs of the government was revolutionary.   We consider the 
extent to which these aspirations were and continue to be met in government 
communications in Chapter 7. 
In response to the pressures of mediatization it appears that the civil service as a 
whole failed to prioritise the resourcing and management of government 
communications, or to respond to ministers’ increasing  desire to manage the risks 
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and possibilities of what they saw as an increasingly influential power resource.  This 
widened the gulf between communications specialists and the rest of the civil service.  
In the absence of strong and well-connected professional leadership, this left the field 
relatively open to a determined group of politicians to devote their considerable 
political capital  to instigating the kind of modernisation of the information service 
which suited them.   This is precisely what happened after 1997, as the next section 
will demonstrate.  
 
4.3   The role of politicians in instigating change  
In Chapters 1 and 2, I argued that, far from being an activity confined to aggressive 
political publicists, “spin”, or strategic political communication, is the pursuit of 
political goals using the latest communications tools.  Politicians and political parties 
exploit media power as a form of capital within a battlefield context (Lee, 1999; 
Pitcher, 2003).  This battlefield was traditionally identified as the arena in which 
elections are fought, but with the rise of the permanent campaign (Blumenthal, 1982; 
Norris, 2000a), the field of battle expanded deeper into the executive.  In the struggle 
to survive and prevail, politicians demanded that all available tools in the media 
armoury be deployed in their interest, both as individuals and as representatives of 
political parties. Developments in government communications post-1997 were 
mainly driven by politicians and their aides, but as we saw in the previous section, a 
more strategic approach had already been developing during the early 1980s. Going 
back further, the very structure of postwar government communications had been 
determined by ministers, building on foundations developed during the command 
and control era of wartime.   
Taking up his new post after the 1979 election, Bernard Ingham immediately faced 
pressure from incoming ministers for a more proactive and promotional approach to 
communication.  The archives show him repeatedly anticipating and then pre-
empting ministerial interference by driving through a more coordinated and 
disciplined approach on the part of the service.   This may have suited his political 
mistress, Margaret Thatcher, who was engaged in a struggle against the so-called 
‘wets’ in her cabinet, but it was also consistent with his own values as a civil servant. 
What happened to the GIS after 1997, however, was more than evolutionary; it was 
radical - so much so, that former government press officers employed at the time or a 
few years later  still recall the savagery of the changes, even though some accept that 
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they were a means to a necessary end.  A further trauma was in wait after 2010, as the 
Conservative-led coalition used a draconian approach to government 
communications to illustrate their determination to cut spending.  In the next section, 
I examine recollections of what happened after the elections of 1997 and 2010, and 
ask how these changes impacted on the resilience of the service.   
4.3.1 Job losses after 1997:  pushing out the “dead meat” 
From a vantage point of 36 years in the civil service, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Robin 
Butler, describes the arrival of New Labour as “quite a climacteric really, a 
watershed”.  The changes were profound, he says, for three reasons: firstly,  
“departmental ministers and their special advisers were very much less satisfied with 
the operations of their departmental press offices”; secondly, “it was politicized in the 
sense that special advisers (…) were very much more active in dealing with press 
relations than their predecessors had been”; and thirdly, “they had a very 
sophisticated media operation.  Very rapid response geared to being 24/7” (C02).   Ed 
Balls’ recollection of his early days at the Treasury as Gordon Brown’s press officer 
illustrates some of the contempt Labour felt for the government’s media operation in 
1997, as this quote from his memoirs reveals: 
We all had mobile phones and pagers and were used to being in constant touch, but 
the Treasury’s head of communications and her team had no pagers, and one mobile 
phone which was passed to whichever press officer was on duty. It was the opposite 
of the ‘rapid rebuttal’ approach we’d been used to in opposition. Charlie Whelan, 
Gordon’s press officer, couldn’t hide his disdain (Balls, 2016, p128). 
For Jonathan Haslam, John Major’s press secretary, who moved to the Department 
of Education after the 1997 election before leaving for the private sector in 1998, the 
experiences of his colleagues “reinforced for me the political sensitivity of the comms 
function” in that, for ministers, “the Permanent Secretary, the Personal Private 
Secretary and the Comms director are the three people that the minister has most to 
do with personally and directly” (C07).  This makes them vulnerable, particularly 
where, as we saw in the previous section, they are viewed by colleagues as ‘outsiders’, 
or even worse, distrusted as ‘ministers narks’.   For Bernard Ingham the arrival of the 
New Labour government was a “watershed”.   
Standards….went to pot very rapidly after 1997.  Within a week.  After 2 May 1997 
when all the heads of information were called together by Mandelson and Campbell 
and told they’d better up their game or else and to play it their way (C01). 
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In May 1997, Siobhan Kenny, who later became Director of Communications at the 
Department for Culture, Media and Sport, was then a press officer at No.10.   The 
small, close-knit team of civil servants around the Prime Minister had bonded after 
years of “fighting in a bunker” on behalf of the Major government, but the arrival of 
the new government was exciting and refreshing.  “It was amazing” she says.  “As a 
civil servant it doesn’t get much better than that”.   It required considerable 
confidence and resilience though, to pass the “little tests” set by Alastair Campbell 
during his first week: 
You’d be sitting in the press office and, say we’d briefed him for lobby that morning, 
(…) he would phone up and say, ‘you know that thing you told me this morning, can 
you come round and tell me again’, and you’d suddenly find yourself standing in front 
of him and Tony Blair and Tony Blair would be looking a bit bemused and he’d say 
‘can you go through this little bit again’, so I think he was just putting you through 
little tests to make sure you could do it (C03). 
She recalls that none of her immediate colleagues was “got rid of” but it was a different 
story in many of the departments, where “you had the special advisers whispering 
into the minister’s ears saying ‘this lot are not really supporting you’, that made for 
an uncomfortable couple of years”.   Rather than blame Campbell, she suggests that 
ministers were responding to a form of ‘Campbell envy’:  “I’m a big fan of Alastair and 
I think he’s brilliant but what happened was that he spawned a lot of people who were 
kind of sub-Alastair Campbell”.    
To illustrate the brutality of the working environment post-1997, Steve Reardon, who 
lost his job as Director of Information at the Department of Social Security, was  
referred to as ‘dead meat’ by the special adviser to the Secretary of State, Harriet 
Harman, a comment which found its way into the Daily Mirror and Daily Mail (Public 
Administration Select Committee, 1998).   An article in the Times on 2 October 199743, 
quoted from a leaked letter from Alastair Campbell to all Whitehall press officers, 
calling on the service to “raise its game”.  The article mentioned the behaviour of 
dissatisfied ministers like Health Secretary Frank Dobson “who has bawled out his 
team”, and George Robertson, Defence Secretary, who “fears he has become the 
forgotten man of British politics”.     
                                                          
43 Whitehall press officers get lesson in spin. The Times. 2/10/1997. 
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This atmosphere of rivalry, suspicion and job losses caused widespread disquiet 
within the informal government communications network which lasted for years, as 
the interviews show.   One former close associate of Bernard Ingham’s who was one 
of the few to stay on in a senior direct communications role well into the Blair era, 
says that although she didn’t feel threatened herself, “I knew every one of the Heads 
of Information that lost their jobs, so it’s not pleasant.”  She remembers how Mike 
Granatt, then Director of Communications at the Home Office, provided a home for 
“a string of people (…) quite a few heads of information who’d been pushed out who 
actually came and worked on a temporary basis doing consultancy work (C10).   A 
departmental press officer (1999-2004) refers sorrowfully to the heads of 
communication being “shuffled out”: 
I don’t know how long it took but slowly they were shuffled out and certainly, in my 
department, there was a head of news that had been there for quite a while, a lovely 
woman, but somehow she was shuffled out against her will and they brought in a 
journalist who’d worked for a left wing newspaper to replace her (C05). 
The six journalists interviewed for this study were also well aware of the vulnerability 
of government press officers after 1997, but placed far more emphasis than civil 
servants on the role of special advisers in news management.  Nick Timmins, a 
specialist correspondent for The Times, Independent and FT (1981-2012) described 
the change as “a takeover by special advisers (that) happened in most departments” 
(J19).  Another specialist journalist on broadsheet newspapers (1991-date) sensed 
that resistance would have been futile, since: “if you weren’t quite New Labour enough 
then you  probably didn’t last very long” (J18). The veteran political journalist Chris 
Moncrieff, of the Press Association (1962-date), who retired from the lobby in 1994 
but continued as a political commentator, relied mostly  on unofficial sources since 
he considered press officers to be too “inhibited” for his purposes, but also felt that 
the job losses were unfair: “They dismissed lots of very senior experienced, seasoned 
press officers who’d worked loyally for years for Labour or Conservative, and put their 
own Labour party stooges into press offices.” (J17).    
Jon Silverman, who spent 27 years in BBC news, 13 as home affairs correspondent, 
described the departure of most Directors of Information as “a complete clear-out” 
with a few notable exceptions. One of these was Mike Granatt, who had previously 
forged a good relationship with the reforming and media-minded Home Secretary, 
Michael Howard, and, according to Silverman, had already introduced “the grid 
system which Mandelson and New Labour always claim as their invention” (J22). 
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The significance of the ‘cull’ was not just that it replaced a layer of managers, but that 
it brought about a permanent change in how government news was managed.  David 
Brindle, a long-serving specialist journalist at The Guardian (1988-date), remembers 
the change happening “almost immediately” (…). Suddenly you had this new tier of 
semi-political operators working with chosen journalists, using the lobby, not 
specialists, to place stories, to influence the way a running story was being reported”.   
As a specialist in health and social policy, he had worked more closely with 
departmental press officers than many journalists, and considers himself to be “more 
understanding of (their) position and the complexity of their role than perhaps my 
colleagues.”(J21) 
He recalls especially the humiliating experience of Romola Christopherson, the 
highly-regarded Director of Communications at the Department of Health (1986-
1999),  and one of the few to survive the ‘cull’ of 1997. 44  Despite nearly 40 years as a 
government press officer, she was “given a dressing down by Health Secretary Frank 
Dobson” (Pulse: 4 April, 1998) after briefing a journalist using an agreed government 
narrative that “surgeons will be called off the golf course to carry out more operations” 
(Daily Telegraph. 19 March 1998):  
This caused a huge row with the BMA, and (Frank) Dobson, the Secretary of State 
then wrote this letter to the Times (sic) basically dumping on her and saying ‘I’ve 
identified the career civil servant concerned and made clear that I repudiate her for 
making this claim against the hard working doctors on which this country depends’, 
so she was hung out to dry (J21). 
In his letter, Frank Dobson stated that: “I share the anger of the profession at this 
insulting remark and dissociate myself from it” (Golf course remark ‘wrong’. The 
Daily Telegraph, 24 March 1998).  Brindle sees this as “an example of a career civil 
servant press officer who was trying to play the special adviser game, and was then 
dumped on from a great height”.   Before 1997, putting together a complex policy news 
story in a way that made it accessible to the public was a “collaborative role” between 
the journalist and the government press officer, a perspective reminiscent of Cook’s 
conclusions in relation to US government-source relations (Cook, 1998).  After 1997, 
                                                          
44 When she died in 2003, The Times said she was “one of the most forthright official voices 
in Whitehall but was also one of the most popular.” (The Times. Government press officer 
who instinctively mistrusted journalists. 20/1/2003).  In her obituary in The Independent 
(25/1/2003), the journalist Nicholas Jones said that “journalists appreciated her practice of 
playing it straight” and that she survived in post after 1997 “due in large measure to her 
philosophical acceptance of changes wrought in her department” (J20). 
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and continuing to this day, he argues, news priorities for government were 
determined by the grid: anything that didn’t support the government’s narrative 
didn’t make the grid, and therefore was of lesser status.  In his interview for this study, 
Nicholas Jones, the former BBC industrial editor who has specialized in explaining 
the underlying mechanics of government ‘spin’, claims that the grid is “a political tool; 
the special advisers’ bible”.  Although it “has the civil service stamp” and has been 
“accommodated within the civil service structure” it is driven by a political agenda 
(J20). 
4.3.2 After 2010: “We don’t think you’re very good at your job and there’s 
too many of you” 
Frequent changes in government were common during the 1970s, but as a result of 
the more stable, long-serving administrations from 1979 onwards, most press officers 
interviewed for this study had served, at most, just one or two governments.  Five of 
the 16 civil servants interviewed for this study experienced the change of government 
after 2010, and of these, one had also seen the changes after 1997. This departmental 
Director of Communications (1991-2011), identified three factors that applied in both 
1997 and 2010: firstly, the “year zero approach to understanding where they are 
coming from”; secondly, the fact that “they will be suspicious of us because they beat 
us and we worked for the other people”; and thirdly, negative briefing about civil 
servants both in person and through the media.   Overall though, he felt that, in 2010, 
the “level of day to day hostility was much higher”: 
People were completely taken aback by the level of hostility to public servants in 
general, the civil service and communications people because they had beaten us; 
because we had been bad at our jobs (…)  The clear out has been at least as big, and I 
think a bit bigger, than it was in 1997.  The problem was austerity so the first thing 
they wanted to do was produce the austerity package and that included 
communications being affected, so you were dealing with lots of fearful and weeping 
colleagues (C11). 
In 1997 the attitude was, ‘you’re all a bit rubbish and you’re going to have to improve 
and modernise quickly because we know how to do things’ – not entirely welcome but 
not completely unrealistic.  In 2010, it’s ‘civil servants are useless otherwise you’d 
have a proper job, and the public sector has almost bankrupted the country and now 
it’s payback time’ (C11). 
This tallies with the claim made by one civil servant informant in Yong and Hazell’s 
study of Whitehall special advisers.  He said that, following the 2010 election “too 
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many special advisers see themselves engaged in Jihad against the public 
sector”(Yong & Hazell, 2014, p. 178).  Our interviewee also observed that, as in 1997, 
some senior vacancies were filled by those who were more politically and personally 
sympathetic to ministers: 
Michael Gove got rid of the communications director in Education when he arrived.  
She [Caroline Wright]  went rather quickly and was replaced by [James Frayne]  who 
was the campaigns director for the Taxpayers alliance (…).  He could have been 
brought in purely because he has a robust view on public finances but when he left he 
went to work on the Mitt Romney campaign45 (C11).  
A Deputy Director of Communications and Head of News (2001-2014) felt that the 
communications team suffered more from cuts than other parts of the department, 
describing it as: 
An absolute bloodbath.  What was difficult is (…) the general impression given by 
ministers was ‘we don’t like you, we don’t trust you’ – this was the civil service in 
general but it was applicable to the press office as well – ‘we don’t think you’re very 
good at your job and there’s too many of you’ (…). They cut everything.  Everything 
went.  Biscuits in meetings.  Plant pots had to be removed and we didn’t have any 
pens…but because they’d come in on such an austerity drive, particularly as the 
Secretary of State was the figurehead of that, we had to be made an example of.  It was 
horrible.  Really horrible (C14). 
The idea that civil servants in general were ‘blockers’ was a recurring theme among 
those who experienced the 2010 change of government.  A Director of 
Communication (2001-2014) who developed good working relationships with her 
Secretary of State and special advisers, thinks this interpretation is fundamentally 
mistaken: 
                                                          
45 Caroline Wright was replaced by James Frayne, who worked at the Department for 
Education between 2011 and 2012 before moving to the US.  In 2014 he became Director of 
Policy and Strategy at the right-leaning think tank, Policy Exchange.  Department for 
Education hires James Frayne as comms chief. PR Week. 24/2/2011. Accessed: 18/11/2015. 
http://www.prweek.com/article/1056837/department-education-hires-james-frayne-
comms-chief 
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I think the Conservatives or a lot of them feel that, and you get a lot of this briefing in 
the media, Labour did it as well, the sense that the civil service is this unwieldy 
bureaucracy, they’re blockers, they’re not there to enable, to facilitate, to provide fresh 
thinking, they’re there to just say no and are a barrier to good government and to 
actually getting things done, because ministers are there to get things done.  And I just 
really deeply disagree with that because I think there needs to be an appropriate check 
to what ministers want to do (C16). 
The level of hostility from incoming ministerial teams in 2010 depended on the extent 
to which civil servants were perceived as ‘blockers’, according to a departmental press 
officer (2010-2013) who started just before the 2010 election: 
Some understood where ministers were coming from and the agenda they were trying 
to promote and were much more news savvy, and others were more, if you like, 
traditional civil servants and were very ‘straight bat’, and didn’t really get on board 
with that agenda, and I think suffered because of it.  They were disliked by ministers 
and special advisers and would be cut out of the loop on occasions to try and 
circumvent them (C13). 
Despite the cuts, he noticed no fundamental change in communication priorities and 
practices because “politicians of all colours are after the same thing, which is positive 
news coverage for whatever it is they are deciding to announce that week”.   He also 
had no doubt as to who he needed to please to be seen to be doing his job well - 
“Ultimately, success was ‘are ministers happy?’  You weren’t really working for the 
department as such, you were absolutely working for ministers.”  
There was some evidence in the interviews with government press officers and in 
evidence sessions to various inquiries, that the reputation of government 
communicators improved after 1997 but this was limited.  Matt Tee told the Public 
Administration Select Committee in 2010 that “although I think communications has 
made considerable progress from a point where it was seen as a sort of service 
industry, we are still not at the point where communicators generally are seen as peers 
around a policy making or delivery table”(Tee, 2010).   
One Director of Communications who left government in 2011 after 20 years, felt that 
the downgrading of the Head of Profession post was a retrograde step: “What you lose 
with the Permanent Secretary is to have someone at the Wednesday morning table 
who can raise the profile of the profession and also at that meeting a level of 
presentational advice.”  Further down the chain, though, he acknowledged that there 
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had been improvements.  Even though communications specialists “endlessly 
complain that officials don’t understand their work or how important it is”,  and policy 
officials feel that press officers “trivialise things and are far too eager to jump to a 
minister’s tune rather than thinking things through (…) it is nothing like as bad as it 
was”.   An important turning point came after 2010 when it became common practice 
to include Communications Directors on the Departmental Boards:  
I think they are seen as more useful than they were and more an integral part of the 
team. (…) There came some downsides that you were just awash with corporate 
responsibilities that we could probably have done without but it did at the same time 
mean that at that level communications was seen as like finance or HR, it wasn’t the 
kind of Rolls Royce policy making machine, but you couldn’t do without it, and it 
wasn’t just people who barged into your office and said the minister wants this done 
by Friday’ (C11). 
As noted in Chapter 2, there was significantly less public and media interest in the 
issue of ‘churn’ following the 2010 election, but my own analysis of changes within 
the small group of Communications Directors in ministerial departments suggests 
that there has been a similar turnover (see Appendix 8).  By March 2014, of the 20 
Directors in post in 2010, just two remained.  However, within this group, several 
long-serving officials were moved within the GCS, for example, Simon Wren from the 
Ministry of Defence to the Home Office, and Pam Teare from the Crown Prosecution 
Service (and prior to that the Ministry of Defence) to the newly-formed Ministry of 
Justice, where they both remain (as at July 2016).  Other post-holders in 2010 were 
reported as having been “head hunted” by other employers: for example, Yasmin 
Diamond at the Home Office was “poached” by the InterContinental Hotels group in 
January 2012 (Cartmel, 2012). Nonetheless, it appears that a significant level of churn 
amounting to an almost complete clear-out following both the 1997 and 2010 
elections took place at senior levels of the Government Communications Service.  This 
is indicative of at least some degree of party politicization and is worthy of closer 
academic attention, although this is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
4.4 Making explicit the public purposes of government 
communications 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Labour’s approach to government communications was 
frequently challenged, and led directly to a series of government and parliamentary 
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reviews culminating in the House of Lords report on government communications in 
2008 (House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2008).  The role of 
special advisers was followed up by the Public Administration Select Committee’s 
review of the work of special advisers in 2012 (Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2012). The efforts of Bernard Ingham to improve discipline and 
coordination in civil service communications, the ‘modernisation’ programme led by 
Alastair Campbell, and Alex Aiken’s drive to introduce strategic campaign planning,  
are all in their different ways, a response to the centrifugal and politically-driven 
tendencies of the structure inherited from the 1945-51 Labour government (Moore, 
2006).  
What is surprising though, is that from its inception the government information 
service has never made explicit or in any detail what its public principles and purposes 
should be, beyond the general need to inform the public. In the absence of agreed 
purposes, successive government and parliamentary committees attempted to 
articulate this but only in the briefest terms.  In 2002 the Public Administration 
Committee stated that government communicators “have a vital role in serving the 
public interest”(p3), while the House of Lords Communications Committee (2008) 
agreed that: “One of the most important tasks of Government is to provide clear, 
truthful and factual information to citizens (2008; 2002).   In as far as a set of 
consistent public purposes can be discerned at all through the public statements of 
politicians, government and parliamentary reviews and successive Heads of Service, 
UK government communications has, over the years, been expected to fulfil the basic 
criteria as outlined in Table 4.1.  There is no recognition of the specific requirements 
and potential risks of media communication, and no commitment on the part of the 
government to give news media “sufficient or equal access” to information (Moore, 
2006).  This deficit becomes increasingly significant as government communication 
becomes more focused on media communications.   
 
Table 4.1: Public purposes of government communications  
To inform citizens about government policy to help them reach informed 
judgements on public affairs 
To use specialist technical and professional skills to conduct publicity 
without incurring charges of propaganda 
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To provide clear, truthful and factual information   
To maintain the dividing line between party political and public 
information 
To plan centrally in order to provide a unified and coherent public 
information service 
To provide information in a way that serves the public interest 
To ensure both administrative management and political oversight 
Sources: (The Future of Public Service Communications: Report and Findings, 2015; Government 
Communications Service, 2014b; Government Information and Communications Service, 2000; House 
of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2008; Mountfield, 1997; Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2002), see also (National Archives: Cabinet Papers CAB 78/37). 
 
The fullest exposition of the public purposes of government communications 
appeared in the Phillis Report of 2004.  This key document was the first to propose a 
comprehensive set of founding principles for government communications, and as 
such, formed the starting point for Engage, a three year programme launched in 2007 
which aimed to provide a “common framework for strategic communication” (HM 
Government, 2007). It is striking that the government communications plans issued 
after 2012 make no reference to foundation documents like the Phillis Review or 
earlier work such as the Engage programme (Ramsey, 2014).  In fact, there is now no 
official way to access the Phillis Report, or its predecessor, the Mountfield Report, or 
information about the Engage programme, except through a tortuous process of trial 
and error using the highly selective and incomplete UK Government Web Archive46.   
This ‘year zero’ approach to government was referred to by one of the respondents 
earlier in this chapter, and, it appears is now being applied to the recent history of 
government communications.  To illustrate this, I have listed the seven Phillis 
principles alongside the list of the six primary functions outlined by the UK 
Government’s Communications Plan of 2013/4, as  Table 4.2 shows). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 Chapter 2 of the House of Lords Communication Committee Report (2008) contains 
evidence given by Sir Robert Phillis together with a summary of the reports’ findings and 
recommendations (see 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldcomuni/7/704.htm) 
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Table 4.2: Principles of good government communications  
 
Seven principles of good 
government communications 
(Phillis, 2004) 
 
Six primary functions of 
government communications 
(Government Communications 
Service, 2013) 
1. Openness, not secrecy 
2. More direct, unmediated 
communications to the public 
3. Genuine agreement with the 
public 
4. Positive presentation of 
government policies and 
achievements, not misleading 
spin 
5. Use of all relevant channels of 
communication, not excessive 
emphasis on national press 
and broadcasters 
6. Coordinated communication 
of issues that cut across 
departments 
7. Political neutrality, rather 
than a blurring of government 
and party communications 
 
1. To provide information in 
order to fulfil specific legal or 
statutory requirements 
2. Help the public understand 
the government’s programme 
3. Influence attitudes and 
behaviours 
4. Enable the effective operation 
of services 
5. Inform and support the public 
in times of crisis 
6. Enhance the reputation of the 
UK 
 
There are clear differences between the seven principles and the six primary 
functions, which tell us something about the positioning and autonomy of the 
communications service at different points in time.  The Phillis principles represent a 
high point for public-facing values in government communications, coming as they 
did at a time when the Labour government had faced a series of public and media 
scandals relating to its approach to public communication.  The principles present an 
ideal for open and democratic communication in the public interest, which tries to 
rebuild public trust by offsetting some of the communication biases resulting from 
excessive concern with media coverage.  These principles are universal and therefore 
would apply to any government, and in all circumstances. In a speech in 2005, the 
new (and first) Permanent Secretary for Government Communications, Howell 
James, described his aim “in line with Phillis’s recommendations” as being “to adopt 
a strategic approach, to better inform and respond to the requirements of citizens and 
people who use and work in public services” (James, 2005a).  
In contrast to the Phillis principles, the primary functions in the 2013-4 plan set out 
the ways in which the main objectives of the government can be operationalised 
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through the communications function, but without reference to abstract values and 
principles.  There is no logical connection between the principles and the primary 
functions.  The task of the government communicator is seen not as serving the 
information needs of citizens, but as delivering the kind of messaging which can 
successfully deliver a particular political narrative; the narrative created by an 
incumbent government.    
The 2015-16 GCS Communications Plan, published just after the 2015 election, is 
quite explicit about this in its summary of “core themes” and priorities for government 
communications:  
At the heart of the plan is the Government’s One Nation narrative, which gives us a 
clear focus for the year ahead. As communicators, we need to demonstrate how our 
work furthers the four main themes within the narrative: helping working people, 
spreading hope and opportunity, bringing the country together and Britain in the 
world. (2015b, p. 4). 
Rather than being a public declaration of its wider purposes, the plan is a professional 
document aimed at government communicators and stakeholders.  Its symbolic 
function is to construct a particular collective identity among the dispersed 
communications teams, not only in government departments, but in the many 
executive agencies that report to departments.  Its second, more substantive function 
is to demonstrate how the latest strategic communications techniques can and should 
be used to construct a single coherent government narrative.  A third, less visible 
purpose, is to raise the profile and reputation of the Government Communications 
Service among both politicians and other civil servants.  In this sense its 
professionalising and centralising objectives are similar to those of Bernard Ingham 
and Alastair Campbell. However, in contrast to the Ingham approach to coordinating 
the presentation of government policy, and Campbell’s concern after 1997 to build 
and defend the government’s reputation through a strategic and proactive approach 
to the mass media, the plan calls on communications specialists to utilise the latest 
customer insight techniques to “understand the audience’s attitudes, habits and 
preferences” so that “our communications are suitable, relevant and meaningful”.  It 
asks them to apply the following set of techniques as recommended by the Cabinet 
Office’s Customer Insight Team47: 
                                                          
47 Insights produced as part of the GCS 7 Trends in Leading-edge Communications report, 
produced with Ipsos MORI and Google, April 2015. Accessed at 
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 Use “the power of storytelling to create an engaging, emotional connection with 
audiences”  
 Ensure “that content is relevant, personalised and delivered at the right time to 
maximise interest” 
 Create “shareable, ‘snackable’ content to encourage audiences to re-transmit” 
 Harness “the influence of digital influencers, such as online vloggers, to build trust 
and reach” 
 Build “emotional connections with our audiences to maximise the impact of our 
campaigns” 
 Communicate “a clear social purpose in our Government messaging for audiences to 
identify with”. 
 
In her critique of the structural changes in government communications since 2010, 
Anne Gregory48 highlights two major changes as a cause for concern: the redundancy 
of the post of the Permanent Secretary, Government Communications in January 
2011, and its replacement by the less senior position of Executive Director; and the 
closure of the COI in April 2012 and the reallocation of its core functions into the 
Cabinet Office under the direction of a politically-led system of governance.  The body 
which determines communications priorities, the Government Communications 
Service Delivery Board, is chaired by the Minister for the Cabinet Office, and because 
it “has strong political representation”, she argues, “there is clearly the potential for 
political pressure on civil servant communicators akin to and possibly even stronger 
than that exerted by special advisers, in which case government communications will 
not only have come full circle but also come under a tighter political grip” (Gregory, 
2012, p. 374).  She predicts that the communications service will become “a much 
more purposeful and focused service prioritised on delivering government objectives 
(…) a function that can help drive its political agenda forward by heavily directed 
communication activity”.   For the political communications theorist, John Corner, 
this approach to government communications relates to the further embedding 
within government institutions of the ‘permanent campaign’.   
One dimension of the problem of deception in many countries has been the extension 
of this competitive, interparty framework for discourse to a much wider range of 
                                                          
https://gcn.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/7-trends-in-leading-edge-
communications.pdf on 18/11/2015. 
48  Anne Gregory is Professor of Corporate Communications, Strategy, Marketing and 
Economics at the University of Huddersfield and worked on and off as an adviser and on 
attachment to government communications from the mid-1990s. 
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government-public communications outside of electoral period and its increasing 
naturalization across this range” (Corner, 2010, p. 59). 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
RQ: Resilience - to what extent did government communications express, plan 
and deliver in relation to its public purposes and objectives, and what were its 
strengths and weaknesses over time? 
The structure of government communications has shown remarkable resilience in the 
face of not only the challenge of mediatization, but the political pressures arising from 
it, which led to the ‘cull’ of 1997.   Despite these changes, and the regular chorus of 
disapproval from politicians, the media, and (less vociferously) from fellow civil 
servants, the government communications service largely retains its postwar 
appearance.  The balance of power between the centre and the departments remains  
and  the service operates as part of a specialist hierarchy, retaining a civil service head 
of profession, albeit now based at the Cabinet Office as opposed to the COI.   Directors 
of Communication in the departments run professional teams that work closely with 
ministers and special advisers to contribute towards a coherent government 
narrative.  In the sense that the service has shown elasticity in response to change, 
and the toughness to resist challenges, it can be said to be structurally resilient.   
A major exception is the closure of the COI and the dispersal of its functions into the 
Cabinet Office that took place suddenly in 2012, on the advice of the outgoing 
Permanent Secretary, Government Communications, but without external 
consultation, and with little apparent criticism, either from the media, civil servants, 
the public or parliamentarians (Horton & Gay, 2011)49.   The change also represents 
an intensification of a process which had already been taking place over time: the 
tendency for government presentation to move “from a common service agency”, to a 
“pattern of ‘spinners’ clustered in central agencies and around ministers in 
departments” (Hood & Dixon, 2015, p. 174).    In 1945, as we saw earlier, politicians 
expressed the need for “a body of technically expert staff which knew how to conduct 
                                                          
49 It is puzzling that a House of Commons Library Standard Note (SN/PC/06050) Abolition 
of the COI (2011), which is mildly critical of some of the processes (or possibly the lack of them) 
behind the closure, has been removed from circulation and is no longer available – with no 
reason given.  My query to the Library went unanswered. 
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publicity without incurring the charge of propaganda” (National Archives: Cabinet 
Papers CAB 78/37).   As the concerns of Anne Gregory demonstrate, it is difficult to 
claim that, as in 1945,  the body of communications professionals currently known as 
the Government Communications Service, has a degree of autonomy under a civil 
service director (Gregory, 2012).   
The structure of the service may be resilient, but what about its culture?  As Table 
4.3 below shows, an apparently superficial name change may be unimportant, but 
could there be significance in the substitution over time of the word ‘information’ by 
the word ‘communication’?     
 
Table 4.3:   What’s in a name? 
1946       1997  2005             2013  
Government            Government   Government            Government               
Information             Communications  Communications         Communications 
Service (GIS)           and Information Network (GCN)           Service (GCS) 
     Service (GICS)                       
  
 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that, beneath the surface, significant 
changes have taken place since the 1980s, accelerating after 1997, which call into 
question the capacity of government communications to deliver an impartial, trusted 
and credible public information service.  Above all, the obvious vulnerability of the 
head of profession and the directors of communication in response to political change 
threatens the autonomy of the leadership and hence of the members of the network 
itself, but the vulnerability was present before 1997.  The subtle rules of engagement 
and proprieties that had ensured that the service functioned without being seen to be 
unduly propagandist before 1997 were placed under threat after 1997, when the need 
to feed the increasingly hungry media beast combined forces with the demand from 
Labour to use any means possible to turn their media deficit into an electoral asset 
(Campbell & Stott, 2007; Rhodes, 2011).  The mainstream civil service could do little 
to resist the attack on a part of the service that it undervalued, distrusted and barely 
understood, as we shall see in the next chapter.   
The one effort to shore up the service by introducing a set of explicit public values, the 
Phillis Report, has been put into reverse and the report abandoned in a ‘year zero’ 
approach to history which solely serves the needs of the government of the day.  
Without widely-understood and shared public values, there can be no public 
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accountability, because to what ends can the public, parliament and the media hold 
the service accountable?  The service was founded in 1945 at the behest of politicians 
and with no built-in accountability mechanism.    Changes that have taken place since 
then such as the abolition of the COI, the introduction of special advisers, and the de 
facto introduction of politicized leadership within government communications have 
served to strengthen what Gregory refers to as the ‘political grip’ over government 
communications (Gregory, 2012).  
And yet the commitment to political neutrality on the part of civil servants in general 
and government communicators in particular is regularly re-stated by politicians and 
in propriety guidance, and is depicted as a vital ingredient in maintaining impartiality 
and hence public trust.  Policing the line between party political propaganda and 
public information is a bureaucratic function which is at odds with politicians’ desire 
to act, and to act quickly.   Returning to March and Olsen, to resist these demands, 
bureaucrats must draw on “the institutionalized capability for acting appropriately”. 
Far from being negative and constraining, they argue, “some of the major capabilities 
of modern institutions come from their effectiveness in substituting rule-bound 
behavior for individually autonomous behavior”(March & Olsen, 2009, p. 10).   The 
Phillis Report, and those which followed, were an attempt to make explicit a set of 
generally accepted and applicable rules by which a genuinely citizen-focused 
government communications service could be evaluated. 
Impartiality is more than a value; it is a form of practice.  According to the Phillis 
Report, there are three minimum requirements if impartiality is to be realised:  
 
1. Directors of Communication must feel able to stand back and object if Ministers’ 
personal agendas ever lead them to press for communications that would be politically 
biased or misleading.   
2. We would not expect to see senior communications staff changing simply as a 
consequence of a ministerial change.   
3. The interests of the general public should be paramount in any programme to 
modernise government communications.  
 
The connection between impartiality and the interests of the public is explored more 
fully in Chapter 7.  The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the autonomy 
available to government communicators to behave appropriately in relation to their 
own codes of propriety, and their own public purposes, minimal as they are, has been 
significantly depleted in a process of mediatization and politicization which 
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accelerated after 1997 and is continuing.  In this sense, despite appearances, there are 
serious concerns about the resilience of government communications.    
 
In the next three chapters I look at the evidence in more detail.  In Chapter 5, I ask 
what kinds of resistance government press officers offered in relation to media and 
political change and challenge, despite the loss of resilience. In Chapter 6, I consider 
the issue of responsiveness, asking in what way the civil service responded to the new 
and tougher demands of media and political actors, and what the outcomes of this 
were for the media management of government announcements.  Finally, in Chapter 
7, I examine the more normative issue of representing the public. Is it possible for a 
public servant to represent the public, and if so, how does this form of representation 
relate to formal electoral representation?  How does this relate to claims that the 
media are increasingly used by politicians as a form of accountability?  
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Chapter 5: Resistance 
"It is absolutely necessary to pursue today's policy with energy; it is almost equally 
necessary, in order to survive, to withhold from it the last ounce of 
commitment….and to invest that commitment in our particular institution, the Civil 
Service itself, with all its manifest imperfections". Richard Wilding, Deputy 
Secretary, Civil Service Department, Whitehall, November 197950 
“The media can create its own dynamic, but sometimes you have to be quite resistant 
to that”, Director of Communication, Government Department, 2014 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapter 2, we saw how resistance, or challenge, has traditionally been seen as 
integral to the role of the impartial civil servant, and how government communicators 
in particular have been depicted by high ranking former civil servants as bulwarks 
against “a blurring of the distinction between party political and government 
communications” (Future of the Civil Service, 2013; 2008; Public Administration 
Select Committee, 2013a). A former Cabinet Office minister, Oliver Letwin (2010-
2016), referred in a speech to civil servants as “one of the great bulwarks against 
tyranny” because they provided a “continuing safeguard that ministers of any 
persuasion will not be able to use the machinery of the state to personal or party 
political advantage”(Letwin, 2012).  From its earliest post-war origins, the 
Government Information Service was structured in order to protect the government 
from charges of propaganda; a responsibility enshrined in successive iterations of 
propriety guidance.  
We also saw earlier how Hepp et al. argued that studies of the influence of media over 
time within other social and cultural domains (such as government, in our case), must 
consider resistance as well as response (Hepp et al., 2015).  This is logical: any process 
of change – in this case, mediatization – will encounter resistance as well as response, 
often concurrently, and frequently unevenly, as the Swedish and Norwegian  
ethnographic studies based in government departments have suggested (Figenschou 
& Thorbjornsrud, 2015; Pallas & Fredriksson, 2014).  We have also seen how the 
                                                          
50 Cited p115, The Ponting Affair, Richard Norton-Taylor (1985).  Mrs Thatcher abolished the 
Civil Service Department in 1981 and Wilding’s post was discontinued. 
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terms responsiveness and resistance when used with reference to ministers, carry 
cultural force within the civil service as an institution because they refer to the 
responsibility of civil servants to both serve, and hence respond to, ministers, while 
also offering resistance, or challenge, as a way of stress-testing policy ideas and 
ensuring continuity and propriety in government.  Resistance and response are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive since some forms of resistance may serve the purposes 
of responsiveness, for example, when a senior civil servant questions the legality of a 
particular form of action, or advises that certain policy decisions contravene collective 
cabinet responsibility.   As we see in Chapter 7, there is also the issue of public 
responsiveness: do civil servants have the right to challenge ministerial actions and 
decisions when they feel that to do so is to recognise certain public interests? 
There may be subtle differences between the two interpretations of resistance as 
applied in the quotes that open this chapter but both were civil servants speaking 
pragmatically.  Wilding is recognising that civil servants have a loyalty that reaches 
beyond the government of the day which requires them to withhold a measure of 
obedience to ministers; the Director of Communication is explaining that 
governments should resist the dynamics of media pressure, however powerful.  In 
this chapter, we apply the concept of resistance in relation to both media and political 
dynamics, as observed within the “cross-field” where the fields of politics, 
bureaucracy and media intersect (Lingard et al., 2005; Rawolle, 2005).  A loss of 
resistance to ministers or the media (either directly through media pressure, or 
indirectly through the media sensitivities of ministers), can be seen as an indicator of 
politicization and mediatization. In the previous chapter we saw how the 
undermining of resilience as a result of job losses after the 1997 and 2010 elections 
made it harder for government press officers to resist ministers’ demands in relation 
to media, despite a normative framework which makes such resistance an inherent 
part of the role.  This supports Bourbeau’s idea that resistance to “one of the most 
powerful organizations in the history of human kind (i.e. the state)” is especially 
difficult, even from within (Bourbeau, 2015, p. 388).   
The idea that even senior civil servants might engage in resistance introduces the idea 
of differentiation within the governing elite. Indeed, as we observed in chapter 2, the 
doctrine of speaking truth to power implies discomfort and risk on the part of the 
individual with less power – the servant.  But what form does resistance take in 
practice?  In their analysis of “disobedient civil servants”, Barker and Wilson point 
out that “British civil servants have a clear constitutional duty to obey their ministers. 
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Yet civil servants may be confronted with situations in which they believe, on the basis 
of their knowledge or expertise that the course of action a minister favours would have 
sharply damaging consequences for the government or the country”.  They 
interviewed 49 senior civil servants in 1989-90, and a further 56 in 1993-94, and 
found “various forms of non-compliance with ministerial requests or instructions” 
(Barker & Wilson, 1997, pp. 223, 227).  Most said they would refuse to undertake 
inappropriate tasks and would appeal to their departmental seniors if asked to carry 
out tasks which were unethical or ‘sharply damaging’ to the department.  Yet virtually 
all claimed that the option of leaking was unacceptable, even contemptible51.  They 
remained critical of the disgraced civil servant, Clive Ponting, who was acquitted by a 
jury when he cited public interest in support of his decision to leak secrets about the 
sinking of the Argentinian ship the Belgrano during the Falklands War in July 1984.  
However, there were limits to their readiness to resist, which, the authors argue, 
reflect the weakness of the UK’s central governing bureaucracy as a restraint on 
ministerial power.  Firstly, none was prepared to take an issue of concern beyond 
departmental boundaries.  Secondly, resistance related almost exclusively to issues of 
legality, propriety or ethics rather than substantive policy or public interest issues.   
There are other, less covert, institutional arrangements that enable both the 
bureaucracy and parliament to delay and scrutinise possible abuses of power within 
the executive which can be seen as institutional forms of resistance, such as the 
commissioning of reviews, inquiries and other forms of scrutiny.  As a last resort, 
where civil servants disagree with the propriety or wisdom of a decision, particularly 
in relation to public expenditure on government projects, the Permanent Secretary 
may request a formal ‘written direction’ from ministers, as occurred on 26 June 2015 
in connection with the charity Kids Company52.  This form of resistance is rarely used.  
In February 2016 the government’s own watchdog, the National Audit Office (NAO), 
expressed concern that the power to request a ‘ministerial direction’ was not being 
used effectively.  The  incentives for permanent secretaries to stand up to ministers in 
relation to their role as departmental accounting officers were found to be “weak 
compared with those associated with the day-to-day job of satisfying ministers”.   The 
                                                          
51 This is not to say that leaks don’t occur.  One journalist interviewed here relied heavily on 
leaks from what he referred to as “unofficial sources” (J17), although another insisted that 
most civil servants “behaved properly” (J19).  A former head of the civil service has claimed 
that special advisers leaked regularly (M. Foster, 2015).   
52  For more information about this story see http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
33787201. For a graphic showing the numbers of ‘ministerial directions’ between 1991 and 
2011, see Appendix 9. 
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NAO Director, Amyas Morse, said that “the ever-increasing influence of special 
advisers and ministers’ greater involvement in policy implementation and civil 
service appointments, is pressing down on the ‘ministerial’ end of the see-saw further 
and further, while considerations of value for money and public value rise steadily 
into the air” (National Audit Office, 2016).   
In relation to the concerns of this study, then, how do these and other patterns of 
resistance relate to the practices of government press officers, who, as we have seen, 
are exposed to the media needs and demands of ministers?  In Wilding’s 
interpretation of civil service values, to attain political neutrality, uphold impartiality 
and speak truth to power, the civil servant must withhold “the last ounce of 
commitment” from the government of the day 53 . This cannot be assured if civil 
servants fear losing their jobs if they speak out.  The former head of the No.10 policy 
unit (2003-06), Matthew Taylor, witnessed self-censorship by civil servants in the 
face of ministerial enthusiasms: 
One of the more uncomfortable experiences I had as a government adviser came in 
meetings when it was clear that well informed and well paid civil servants were self-
censoring in the face of political determination. As the minister (or prime minister) 
described the policy they wanted to unveil, or the commitment they wanted to make, 
you could see the officials wrestling with the need to provide a reality check – but all 
too often deciding it was better to nod sagely than look career-threateningly unhelpful 
(Taylor, 2015). 
For the Director of Communication also quoted at the beginning of this chapter, 
battling on two fronts, serving both media clients and political masters, it is essential, 
at times, to resist not only ministerial enthusiasms but also the dynamic of the media 
– and often both pressures working simultaneously.  
In chapters 1 and 2, I identified a series of contradictory pressures on government 
press officers to (a) act as a bulwark against the political ambitions and actions of 
ministers and their aides, while responding to their needs (b) to facilitate and yet 
control lines of communication between departments and the media, and (c) to act as 
advocates within their departments for the needs of journalists, while protecting the 
department’s reputation.  Within the cross-field where government press officers 
operate, the process of resistance can have a range of sanctioned manifestations: 
                                                          
53 The Armstrong Declaration of 1985 and the more recent comments of Francis Maude (see 
Chapter 7) are at odds with this interpretation. 
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resisting time pressures set by the news media, seeking to set the agenda rather than 
following it, applying propriety codes that limit certain actions, challenging the news-
led demands of No.10, saying ‘no’ to departmental ministers and their aides, or 
making use of the machinery of government to delay or scrutinize controversial 
decisions. Unsanctioned manifestations of resistance include leaking information to 
journalists or political rivals, off the record briefing or leaking, passive resistance such 
as failing to return calls or carry out assigned tasks, or using official and unofficial 
channels and networks to isolate and undermine a powerful source, whether a 
minister, special adviser or external adversary. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the extent to which an individual can perform acts of 
resistance, and the form that this resistance takes, is related to the extent of their 
power to resist, which is itself contingent on the resilience of the institution of which 
they are a part.  The leadership, autonomy, and ethical and professional framework 
within which government press officers operate has undergone both cyclical and long 
term evolutionary change during the period under consideration here.  In this chapter 
we ask what the interview and documentary data tell us about any change in the 
degree and the nature of resistance to both media and political pressure manifested 
over time.  We look at what respondents have to say about resistance, and relate this 
to the documentary and archival evidence examined as part of this study, in the light 
of the literature review and some of the most salient themes to emerge from the NVivo 
analysis (see Table 3.5), namely:  impartiality, changes of government, ministers’ 
perceptions of media and the role of No.10.  Together, these themes are examined 
under the following headings:  
1. Managing the expectations of incoming governments 
2. Challenging ministers  
3. Policing the ‘line’ between impartial and partisan communication 
4. Resisting news media deadlines and demands 
5. Resisting news management by No.10. 
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5.2 Managing the expectations of incoming governments  
“There’s a great maelstrom of emotions – your own little carefully ordered world is upset”. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the party political changes of government in 
1997 and 2010 were times of vulnerability for government press officers, especially 
Directors of Communication and Heads of Profession.  This remained the case in 2010 
despite the huge difference in political mandate: in 1997 the government had a 179-
seat overall majority; in 2010, the Prime Minister governed as the head of a Coalition.  
What is also quite marked is the extent of the impact on government communications 
of both incoming governments in 1997 and 2010, which suggests the tendency on the 
part of new governments to deploy rhetorical devices and even structural reform to 
the communications function in particular, as a means of demonstrating and 
signifying their arrival.  Over and above that cyclical tendency, is the longer term 
trend after 1997 of increasing responsiveness to ministers on the part of the civil 
servants closest to them (see Chapter 6), and through ministers, to the news media, 
which relates to the growing dominance of media in government and politics as 
outlined in Chapter 2. 
5.2.1  After 1997 
Almost immediately after the May 1997 election, two interviewees faced the issue of 
how to respond to the arrival of a New Labour government that was determined to 
impose from the start its own view of what good government communications should 
be: the Cabinet Secretary, Robin Butler, and the outgoing Chief Press Secretary, 
Jonathan Haslam.   
In his interview, Lord Butler described 1997 as “quite a climacteric really, a 
watershed”; an election which led to particular difficulties for government 
communications:  
I was concerned.  These were troubling times for the Government Information Service 
and for the Head of the Government Information Service on their behalf and, yes; he 
did come to talk to me54 (C02). 
                                                          
54 This was probably Mike Granatt, who made way for Howell James, the first Permanent 
Secretary, Communications, from 2004, following the Phillis Report.  It is interesting to 
compare Lord Butler’s recollection of his concern of “troubling times”, with Alastair 
Campbell’s recent claim that, as Cabinet Secretary, Butler gave him the go ahead to “shake 
things up a bit”(Campbell, 2015).  
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Butler emphasised that although he wasn’t directly involved in dealing with the 
difficulties facing departmental press offices, for example, having to make Heads of 
Information (as they were then called) redundant, he did refer elliptically to his role 
in seeking to take the heat out of the controversy as it developed during the first few 
months after the election: 
Alastair Campbell and Robin Mountfield, who was my deputy in the Cabinet Office, 
had a working group to discuss precisely these issues: how the government 
information service could be made more effective, what were the limits on the things 
they could do politically and where the boundary line lay and what needed to be done 
politically, so that was an issue that was addressed then, and I think it was addressed 
successfully (C02). 
The civil servant given the task of chairing the review, Robin Mountfield, made clear 
later that Butler was the driving force behind setting up the review:  
As the autumn wore on this issue became more tense; on the one hand Ministerial 
dissatisfaction with the GIS, on the other concern about politicization of 
appointments and of the things the GIS was expected to do. I was asked (not by 
Ministers, but by Sir Robin Butler) to chair a small working group to review the whole 
thing (Mountfield, 2002). 
For Jonathan Haslam, who made the decision to leave government in 1998, the 1997 
election “had more profound, very profound implications for the relationship between 
government and the media” but it was also a personal upheaval: 
There’s a great maelstrom of emotions.  Your own little carefully ordered world is 
upset.  I make no bones about this.  I am personally very fond of John Major. I know 
his wife very well and we remain in contact (C07).  
The combination of culture shock at the change of administration after 18 years of 
Conservative government, and the loss of fellowship and friendship at No.10, made 
resistance more difficult.  Eighteen years later, remembering the first crucial meeting 
with Labour’s communications leadership a few days after the election55, Haslam still 
                                                          
55 Another attendee, Stephen Reardon, Press Secretary at the Department for Social Security, 
recalls that the meeting took place in the White Dining Room at No 10: “Mandelson did 
virtually all the talking, while Campbell watched us.  There were no chairs and we all stood 
like a Privy Council audience of the Queen”. (Daily Mail: 16/6/2007).  Accessed 5/8/2015 at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-462464/If-media-feral-Tony-Blair-craven-
manipulation-Civil-Service-blame.html. 
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wonders whether he and the rest of the senior team in the government information 
service could have done more to protect the incoming government from its own 
excesses: 
We weren’t sufficiently forceful with them, to say to Alastair Campbell and Peter 
Mandelson on the first Monday after the election, ‘you can carry on the same way in 
government that you did in opposition, you can play desperately and almost all the 
time the exclusive card, you can play one title off against another, but ultimately you 
manage to piss off everybody and this will come and bite you in the bum and in the 
process of doing that you destroy quite a lot of public confidence in central 
government’ (C07). 
As Haslam was suggesting, the ripple effect of the post-election changes in 
government communications went beyond 1997.  Far from being the last word, the 
Mountfield Review (Mountfield, 1997) turned out to be the first of a linked series of 
government and parliamentary-sponsored reviews of the Government Information 
Service56 .  Taken together, these reviews, often critical of government actions in 
relation to the media, can be seen as a form of institutional resistance on the part of 
the civil service and parliament, to moves by governing politicians from New Labour 
onwards to introduce radical changes to the service.    The findings of the Mountfield 
Review led directly to the most influential review of all, the Independent Review of 
Government Communications (Phillis, 2004), which was set up in response to a 
recommendation of the Public Administration Select Committee’s review into the Jo 
Moore controversy of 2002 (2002).  In its turn, the Phillis Review formed the starting 
point for the House of Lords’ own review into Government Communications in 2008 
(2008).   
Howell James, who sat on the Phillis Committee and became the first Permanent 
Secretary, Government Communications, in 2004, following one of its 
recommendations, recognises that caution, on the part of government 
communicators, can be interpreted by incoming ministers as resistance: 
I think there’s often a lot of misunderstanding when a new government comes in. It’s 
back to the slight tendency for communications functions to be a little bit of a 
                                                          
56 See Appendix 2 for the full list. 
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handbrake, to caution, and if you come in with a great majority after a great election 
victory it’s quite hard to hear those cautionary voices initially (C08). 
Among the 16 of the 17 Heads of Information who lost their posts within two and a 
half years of the 1997 Election, two demonstrated their resistance publicly after 
leaving government, by giving evidence to the Public Administration Select 
Committee’s 1998 Inquiry into The Government Information and Communication 
Service (Public Administration Select Committee, 1998). This looked at the service’s 
response to the huge expansion of news coverage, and the rise in expectations from 
New Labour.  The aforementioned Steve Reardon, who lost his job in 1997 after 30 
years in government, lamented the fact that so many heads of department were 
“summarily driven from their posts ‘for a variety of reasons’ so soon after the election, 
in a way that was undeservedly and publicly humiliating”(Reardon, 1998).   He told 
MPs that communications officials were more vulnerable than other civil servants:   
The security of tenure of Heads of Information still remains dependant very much on 
the pleasure of Ministers and in a way that would seem to apply to few if any 
mainstream policy officials…volatile pressures remain on heads of information, which 
transmit down through the GICS, that do not apply to anything like the same extent 
to other civil servants. 
He added a warning that:  
The capricious nature of pressure like this will detract from the ability of a head of 
information to provide the objective service to ministers, as enshrined in the 
(Mountfield) report… I would expect that there are a number of senior members of 
the GICS who feel that they are very much on trial with Ministers and who will be 
concerned that giving unpalatable advice may result in them losing their jobs. I regard 
living under pressure of this kind as being "politicised", albeit not "party politicised". 
The former Director of the Northern Ireland Information Service, Andy Wood, told 
the Committee that, in July 1997, after 23 years in the GIS, he was “sent on ‘gardening 
leave’ on the orders of the Secretary of State”57 (Wood, 1998).  He had served under a 
Labour administration for five years before they lost to the Conservatives in 1979, and 
observed that: “the Conservatives did not clear out their press offices in the way and 
                                                          
57 Mo Mowlem, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (1997-1999) complained of a ‘lack of 
personal chemistry’ between them. Wood was replaced by a former BBC Belfast news editor, 
Tom Kelly, who later became Tony Blair’s official spokesman.  In 2003 Kelly faced calls for 
dismissal when it was revealed that he had described the weapons inspector Dr David Kelly 
as “a Walter Mitty character”.  http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3124677.stm  
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to the extent that has happened since last May.”   He contended that Labour’s belief 
that it was effective media management that enabled them to win the election of 1997 
so decisively, was not only erroneous, but “catapulted them into an attack on the 
Government Information Service”, and sent the civil service into a defensive reaction 
that threatened its impartiality:  
The Civil Service as a whole—particularly the very top echelons— were nervous about 
what changes a new government might bring. If that is the case, then I believe the Civil 
Service, fearing what some commentators have called the ‘Washingtonisation’ of the 
British Civil Service—the replacement in key positions of professional civil servants 
by ‘politically acceptable’ temporary bureaucrats—took advantage of the ‘culling’ of 
my GIS colleagues to prepare its defences against further encroachments on its 
neutrality and professionalism. What they did NOT DO publicly was to take a stand 
and decry these removals and refuse to sanction them. Apart from a reference in a 
valedictory interview with The Times in which Sir Robin (now Lord) Butler spoke of 
his unease58, the top of the Civil Service has been conspicuously silent about these 
removals. 
Wood’s veiled warning that although they might be safe for now, the ‘very top 
echelons’ of the civil service might face trouble further down the line, appears to have 
been borne out following the 2010 election, where disquiet focused not on 
communications specialists, but on fundamental disagreements about the 
relationship between ministers and ‘departmental accounting officers’, the 
Permanent Secretaries, as we saw in Chapter 2 (Allaby, 2012; Blick, 2012; Bogdanor, 
2012; Brecknell, 2013; Diamond, 2014a; Foster, 2014; Riddell, 2012).   
5.2.2 After 2010 
It is hard to find evidence of resistance or open criticism, however muted, on the part 
of government communications specialists to the changes implemented following the 
arrival of the Conservative-led Coalition government of 2010.  This is despite (or 
perhaps because of) a 50% cut in government spending on communications between 
2010 and 2013 59 , and the decision to abolish the COI.  On the contrary, at the 
instigation of the Cabinet Office minister, Francis Maude, the then Permanent 
Secretary for Communications, Matt Tee, wrote a paper recommending the closure 
                                                          
58 ‘Keeper of the skeleton closet – interview – Sir Robin Butler’. Sunday Times (4/1/1998) 
59 Louise Ridley. ‘The government plans to extend relationships with agencies and rigorously 
evaluate campaign spending under the new centralized Government Communications 
Service’. Campaign. 15/10/2013. 
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and outlining “very significant savings in departmental communications”.  By the 
time the paper was published, he had already announced that he was leaving and his 
post was closing (Cartmel, 2010; Cartmell, 2011; Tee, 2011).   
Arriving just after the May 2010 election, Nick Hillman, Conservative Special Adviser 
(2010-13) to the Minister for Universities in the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills (BIS), David Willetts (2010-14), felt largely welcomed, but met some 
resistance from top officials in the department who deployed what he considered to 
be “a stupid strategy”, because its only impact could be to weaken the department: 
We were told, me and the two Lib Dems, ’don’t get above yourselves.  You cannot go 
round Whitehall acting as a powerful figure the way those Labour SPADS did’. That 
was the message we got …the sense of bringing SPADs down to earth (S23). 
Much of the reaction to the challenge of the incoming Coalition government, was met 
by responsiveness rather than resistance 60  on the part of government 
communications staff, as we shall see in Chapter 7, but there was some comfort in 
withholding ‘the last ounce of commitment’ (Norton-Taylor, 1985). A Director of 
Communication who left government in 2011 after a 20 year career, was critical of 
“the level of hostility through media briefings or in person from new ministers” 
following the 2010 election, and explained how he advised junior members of his 
team who had only ever worked under one government, to accept, adapt to and 
internalise the mind-set of the new government:  
The kind of change you have to do is understand their mind-set, change it, but not 
swallow it whole, because it’s not your job to believe the political imperatives that the 
new government believe.  You just have to understand where they are coming from 
(C11). 
 
5.3 Challenging Ministers 
“Our advice from Comms is that it should be removed and these are the reasons why” 
As we have seen, resistance on the part of the GIS leadership to the incoming 
government’s attack on the shortcomings of the service after May 1997 was muted, 
                                                          
60 Where there has been criticism of media relations in government since 2010 this has focused 
on controversies relating to the media activities of special advisers – a continuing concern of 
the Public Administration Select Committee (2012). 
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and failed to slow down the pace of change.  What effective resistance there was came 
largely from media and parliamentary sources. The experiences of Bernard Ingham 
in challenging ministers after 1979 suggest, firstly, that he felt secure enough to 
challenge ministers, and secondly, that although political concerns about media 
scrutiny were growing, they were nothing like as powerful as they became after 1997.  
Recently released archive material dating from the 1980s displays what might appear 
today to be an astonishingly frank approach by Ingham, not only towards ministers, 
but with the Prime Minister herself. At one point he even scolded Mrs Thatcher for 
failing to challenge dissenting ministers, telling her in a memo that “this is no way to 
run a railway”(9/11/1981: MT/BI Archives).  He used alliances with senior figures and 
his own government information network to resist what he saw as the scapegoating 
tendencies of ministers in relation to the GIS and to pre-empt moves by ministers to 
‘interfere’ in publicity matters. From the moment of his arrival as the Prime Minister’s 
press secretary on 1 November 1979, Ingham enlisted the support of the No 10 Policy 
Unit director John Vereker, and his own Heads of Information economics group61 
(MIO(E)) to make clear in forceful terms that the cabinet needed to work together to 
sell the economic message at difficult times.   
In 1983 he conducted a successful ‘coup’ against proposals by political advisers at 
No.10 to promote the new and relatively inexperienced Party Chairman John 
Gummer as minister in charge of government presentation, joining forces with the 
Cabinet Secretary Robin Butler to put the case for the more emollient Lord Whitelaw, 
but without being seen to criticize the current incumbent, John Biffen. A delicately-
phrased memo from Butler drafted jointly with Ingham, dated 30 November, 
supported the case for Whitelaw, working in tandem with Ingham, who would 
continue to chair the weekly meetings of Chief Information Officers, previously a 
ministerial responsibility.  Later that day, Butler confirmed in a ‘note for the record’ 
copied to Ingham and the political advisers that the Prime Minister had agreed not to 
appoint Mr Gummer.  Lord Whitelaw would take on the task, and “would rely on the 
Prime Minister’s Chief Press Secretary for support”.  Ingham had no qualms about 
using semi-political means to get his own way but it is likely that both he and Butler 
were in tune with the Prime Minister’s preferences, even if she hadn’t actually had to 
state them.  In this sense, while resisting party pressure, he was also being responsive 
                                                          
61 Known as MIO (E), as an echo of the economics Cabinet Committee, known as E. 
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to his ultimate boss.  This illustrates the intricate relationship between what at first 
appear to be contrasting dynamics – resistance and responsiveness. 
In his interview for this study, Ingham explained his views on the role of ministers in 
government presentation, implying that he preferred to work with people who left the 
important decisions to him, and providing some insight into his preference for Lord 
Whitelaw: 
Ministers have their agendas (…).  If you could keep ministers, well a certain sort of 
minister, out of government information is probably a plus point for information; for 
objective information.  A plus point for more objectivity and less propaganda (C01). 
He used the example of a request by a minister to produce a government leaflet about 
the poll tax for distribution through local party offices to illustrate his ability to resist 
ministers’ attempts to blur the distinction between government and party political 
information:  
Cecil Parkinson was in the Department of the Environment and wanted an 
interpretation of the rules on producing a popular…exposition of the poll tax, with the 
clear idea that you produce this and it would go out to local parties for distribution.  I 
said, “I don’t think you can justify this at all. I said I think you can justify a general 
leaflet a popular version if you like of the legislation you’re bringing forward and you 
can most certainly let any interested constituency have copies, probably up to 20 
copies to inform the Committee but you certainly can’t send it out wholesale.  And I 
wasn’t fired for being obstructive.  It was accepted (C01). 
Contemporary papers relating to the governments of 1997 and 2010 have not yet been 
released, so it is impossible to compare like with like when addressing the issue of 
resistance to ministers on the part of government press officers after 1997.  However, 
there is nothing in my interviews or documents that comes close to Bernard Ingham’s 
plain-speaking.  That does not mean though, that government press officers were not 
prepared to stand up to ministers; many consider this as an essential part of their role, 
but it was done individually, rather than collectively, and concerned largely  day-to-
day operational rather than strategic matters.  Campbell’s assertiveness with Tony 
Blair is well-known, but the difference is that although technically a temporary civil 
servant, he did not work in the interests of the civil service, but of the party, and 
specifically the party leader.   We have seen how Ingham protected Margaret Thatcher 
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from both internal and external enemies but he was also dedicated to the GIS and 
consistently fought for its interests62. 
A departmental press officer working for the Coalition government (2010-14) 
provides a fairly typical example of how potential problems with ministerial lines are 
spotted and challenged in practice: 
We were doing a press release and one of the special advisers wanted to insert a text 
about the Somali community - and it just sat uncomfortably with me as a reputational 
issue, because it was going to go out in the name of the minister, and I thought, ‘really 
you’re overstepping the line here and it’s going to cause issues for us as a department’, 
and so I checked it with senior colleagues and my head of news and they agreed and 
we put a submission in to the ministers’ office, saying, ‘this is what you are being given 
by your special advisers, but our advice from comms is that it should be removed and 
these are the reasons why’. And the ministers agreed. Relations were a touch frosty 
between the two offices for a couple of days but it was fine after that (C13). 
Siobhan Kenny, a former Director of Communications and No 10 press officer (until 
2005), remembers Heads of News removing ministers’ quotes from press releases, 
and leaving it up to those with the closest relationships with ministers, usually senior 
information officers, to negotiate new quotes: 
If you’ve got a good relationship you just negotiate the words that will work and if the 
minister concerned really wants to issue something else that’s a bit more crunchy then 
that can go through Conservative Central Office or his special adviser or whatever it is 
so you can kind of work out a deal like that (C03). 
She remembers how passive resistance at No 10 put paid to the Deputy Prime 
Minister, Michael Heseltine’s request in 1995 that, with the growth of 24-hour media, 
the government should have “at least as good an outfit as the Labour party in 
Opposition” by introducing 24 hour media monitoring: 
The civil service spent two years trying to prove how difficult it would be and how it 
wasn’t possible.  I don’t think that was one of their finest hours actually. The media 
monitoring is a good sort of microcosm about how the machine had been slightly 
                                                          
62   Bernard Ingham has also been accused of becoming too close to Margaret Thatcher.  
Scammell has argued that although his “neutrality was maintained formally”, as time went on 
he “became less concerned about breaches of the rules” (Scammell, 1991, pp. 281, 283).    
145 
 
‘that’s too difficult’ when actually it wasn’t too difficult, they just didn’t want to do it 
(C03). 
For those who didn’t feel able or in a strong enough position to challenge ministers 
personally, being unhelpful to special advisers was a way of achieving the same thing 
by stealth. The Liberal Democrat special adviser, Katie Waring (2010-2013), became 
close to the Director of Communication in her Department, describing her, and the 
Head of News as “critical to me, to how I was able to perform in the role”.  However, 
for her, the worst part of the job was the “obstruction” she experienced from other 
civil servants who “disagreed and thought they knew better”: 
Civil servants not replying to your emails; not giving you advice; not providing the 
data you want; going behind your back briefing people; saying things that are 
supposed to be internal, part of a departmental negotiating position, to other 
departments, undermining negotiations (S24). 
 
5.4 Policing the ‘line’ between impartial and partisan 
communication   
“It’s the old elephant – you know it when you see it” 
The most controversial area of government communications is how to promote the 
policy objectives of the ministerial team without engaging in party political publicity, 
a balancing act that is frequently depicted by respondents as a dividing line between 
proper and improper public communication.  The idea of the ‘line’ is also used in 
propriety guidance and parliamentary and government reviews which often blame 
impropriety in government communications on a failure to observe appropriate 
boundaries between objective and party political communication.  
The wording of propriety guidance on government communications was almost 
identical in 1997 and 2014, as Table 5.1 shows.  The need to resist ministers’ 
tendency to engage in personal image-making or cross ‘the border of propriety’ is also 
consistently enshrined in propriety guidance over the years, although changes in 
wording can be seen which may reflect the many controversies that have arisen since 
1997 regarding  ministerial approaches to media management (See Table 5.2 
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overleaf)63.  The onus is on the press officer to ensure that ministers do not undermine 
their impartiality, not by saying ‘no’ but, if necessary, giving a “polite refusal”. 
Table 5.1: Propriety guidance on objectivity - 1997 and 2014 
Government Communications 
Propriety Guidance (2014) 
Guidance on the Work of the 
Government Information Service 
(1997) 
“The following basic criteria have been 
applied to government 
communications by successive 
administrations.  The communication 
should be relevant to government 
responsibilities, should be objective 
and explanatory, not biased or 
polemical, should not be, or liable to 
be, misrepresented as being party 
political, and should be able to justify 
the costs as expenditure of public 
funds.”  
“The basic conventions, which successive 
Governments have applied to Government 
Information Services, require that these 
activities should be relevant to government 
responsibilities, should be objective and 
explanatory, not tendentious or polemical, 
should not be, or be liable to misrepresentation 
as being party political, and should be 
conducted in an economic and appropriate way, 
having regard to the need to be able to justify 
the costs as expenditure of public funds.” 
 
Table 5.2: Propriety guidance on resisting ministerial pressure – 
1997 and 2014 
Government Communications Propriety 
Guidance (2014) 
Guidance on the Work of the 
Government Information 
Service (1997) 
“Ministers don’t always acknowledge the 
distinction between government communicators 
and their own party political spokespeople.  
Consequently, ministers may sometimes ask the 
Press Office to issue…through departmental 
channels speeches or statements that cross the 
border of propriety.  In such cases…if no 
compromise can be found, then it will be 
necessary to give a polite refusal which, if 
necessary, will be supported by the department’s 
Permanent Secretary”. 
“While such information will 
acknowledge the part played by 
individual Ministers of the 
Government, personalization of issues 
or personal image-making should be 
avoided.  Government information or 
publicity activities should always be 
directed at informing the public.” 
                                                          
63 Haslam recounts an early disagreement with the minister at the Department of Education, 
Stephen Byers, who asked a press officer to issue a press release that was openly critical of the 
previous government.  Haslam “pushed back,” arguing that this was party political. Byers 
complained to the Permanent Secretary, Haslam was interviewed and his stance vindicated. 
He saw the incident as “a test about how far civil servants could be pushed” which “towards 
the end of my time in the civil service those sort of pressures became more apparent.”  
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In practice, most respondents felt confident about policing the boundary, or the line, 
between impartial and partisan communication, with comments such as “it’s in the 
DNA”, “anyone who’s in there knows what it is”, “I never had any difficulty”, and “I 
don’t remember that ever being a problem”.   All the civil servants interviewed said 
they knew where the line was and how to operate within it.  If the line was put under 
pressure it was almost always by ministers or special advisers.   
Jonathan Haslam described the line as: 
the old elephant, you know it when you see it…I don’t ever feel I was asked to do 
anything which strayed beyond what I understood to be the boundaries of the civil 
service role…you certainly had the strength of the civil service to stand up for you if 
you were asked by politicians to do the wrong thing (C07). 
According to Robin Butler, maintaining impartiality is “part of the job; it’s in the 
genes; there are professional lines which you know you shouldn’t cross”: 
The civil service press officer of course puts over the Minister’s side of the case, as 
indeed a permanent Secretary appearing before a Select Committee will do, so they 
are acting for the Government but they act objectively and truthfully and not party 
politically (C02). 
He acknowledges, however, that maintaining ‘the line’ has become harder:  
Because the political battle is conducted through the media on a 24/7 basis, then 
ministers and politicians obviously give more attention to that battle and they put 
pressure on civil servants to support them in that, and it’s more difficult therefore for 
all civil servants but perhaps particularly media frontline civil servants not to cross 
the line.  
The Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (2004), which Butler 
chaired, identified such “dividing lines” as the key to winning public trust, concluding 
that: 
If intelligence is to be used more widely by governments in public debate in future, 
those doing so must be careful to explain its uses and limitations.  It will be essential 
that clearer and more effective dividing lines between assessment and advocacy are 
established when doing so. 
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Changes in departmental leadership of the Government Information Service after 
1997 made it difficult for those newly-recruited into these roles from journalism, such 
as Martin Sixsmith and John Williams, to spot the pitfalls in what was expected of 
them, let alone resist them.  As we saw in the Prologue, as part of the struggle between 
No.10 and the Foreign Office to determine policy in relation to Iraq after 9.11, 
Williams, the newly-appointed Director of Communications at the Foreign Office, was 
asked to produce an early draft of the dossier, something he didn’t feel was especially 
significant at the time but which he now regrets (Herring & Robinson, 2014; John 
Williams: Statement for the Iraq Inquiry, 2010).  
Similarly, the Public Administration Select Committee’s report on an earlier 
controversy, the so-called Jo Moore affair at the Department of Transport (2002) saw 
the department’s failure to recognise and maintain boundaries as part of the problem: 
In the absence of a clearer lead from the top, and of any training, Ms Moore crossed 
over a number of boundaries, but they were not clearly drawn boundaries and the 
signposting was poor.  
 A departmental press officer (1999-2004), who watched the controversy unfolding 
from another department, said that press officers needed to know where the 
boundaries were and that there would be senior backup in case of improper demands: 
It shouldn’t be a problem; they should be able to resist special advisers’ demands if 
they are inappropriate and also resist demands from other civil servants, and know 
that someone down the line will back them up for it (C05). 
A Director of Communications (1991-2011) who had plenty of experience advising 
junior colleagues on propriety issues, used the notion of ‘discomfort’ as an indication 
of when a line was in danger of being crossed: 
It is a deliberately grey area.  Actually, in the vast majority of cases, you know when a 
line is crossed and you know what to do about it.  It does involve you taking a deep 
breath and having a difficult conversation, but everyone knows when their level of 
discomfort has moved from ‘I haven’t done this before’ to ‘actually, I’m not doing this’ 
(C11). 
A departmental press officer (2010-2014) saw “a clear dividing line between what you 
should and shouldn’t be doing as a government press officer” and yet felt it was also 
“quite a grey area because of the nature of the job being slightly political, presenting 
149 
 
the agenda of the government of the day”.  It was up to the team leader to maintain 
the balance: 
We had a very good head of news and deputy director of communications that were 
always very good at that balancing act of making sure that ministers were content and 
not running roughshod over propriety guidelines (C13). 
Far from being a weapon in a power battle with ministers and special advisers, 
propriety codes and norms relating to ‘the line’ have a profound public purpose. One 
of the Cabinet Office communications officials specialising in communications 
propriety issues, now retired after more than two decades in the service, saw propriety 
as a means whereby government communications could “communicate for the 
government, not for the advancement of individual ministers” (C15). 
For Nadine Smith, a Chief Press Secretary based in the Cabinet Office who worked for 
“seven or eight” ministers during the New Labour period, maintaining impartiality 
required the individual press officer, to ‘push back’ on day to day issues: 
There were times when I had to say to a minister ’that’s putting me in a very difficult 
situation now.  That’s something that you are going to have to get your special advisers 
to do’. 
It was a daily judgement as to how much of this is supporting the minister and how 
much do I have to push back on the minister because we are in a situation that’s 
untenable, that the public now had the right to know or they are going to make sure 
they know, one way or another, isn’t it better that we put this out there?  So actually it 
was a daily kind of judgement call and I think most ministers relied on your own radar 
and your judgement on a day to day basis often about what was the right thing to do 
and they relied on our advice (C09). 
This is consistent with propriety advice in use at the time, that “press officers have 
individually to establish a position with the media whereby it is understood that they 
stand apart from the party-political battle” (Government Information and 
Communications Service, 2000). 
Although most civil servants did not see policing the line as a problem, many felt that 
it had become more difficult over time as ministers became more anxious about the 
potentially career-defining role played by media coverage.  According to a  
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Departmental media manager with 12 years’ experience, who left a year after the 2010 
Election: 
A lot of pressure was exerted on Directors of Communication to just do what ministers 
wanted, some of which was pushed back against more effectively and some of which 
not, but I do feel that over the course of the time that I was in government there was 
an erosion of those standards (C04). 
A Director with experience of strategy and communications across five departments 
during the Blair/Brown years, and who left government in 2010, had the same feeling: 
I remember Cabinet Office civil servants changing stuff that couldn’t go out – press 
releases, speeches, saying ‘as a government minister you can’t say that’…I don’t know 
where that is now.  I just feel a little bit that that sense of the line has shifted a bit in 
the last couple of years (C06). 
When asked to give examples, he referred to media coverage of stories which, to his 
practised eye, had clearly originated from within government and which showed an 
increasingly casual approach to the facts: 
I’m surprised now, outside of government, with some of the things that are said now, 
that would never have been tolerated when I was a civil servant. I mean, I look at my 
old department (name withheld), and I see statistical briefings going out from comms 
staff into newspapers that are not true and I know they’re not true and that would not 
have been tolerated when I was a civil servant.  It would not, whatever the kind of spin 
and what was going on in pubs and all the handling of journalists under the table, you 
didn’t brief incorrect statistics; you told the true story. 
These concerns are echoed from an unexpected quarter – journalists.   Nicholas 
Jones, the former BBC industrial correspondent who became a critic of government 
‘spin’, has noticed an increasing number of stories about ‘benefit scroungers’, which 
he believes cannot have come from reporters: 
There aren’t the journalists in the courts - we’re not calling the shots any more.  To me 
it’s the government machine that is feeding the stories.  Perhaps I’m wrong but the 
more I look at it …they’ve got the story about this latest benefit thing, they’ve put a 
picture out and now all the papers have got it, it must have been given to PA or 
something (J20).  
A business journalist with 22 years’ experience explains how the ‘line’ should and 
usually does, operate:   
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We just accept that sometimes there will be an official line that a civil servant will 
deliver quite competently and some of them will push it a bit more than the others but 
on the whole they are going to give you the line, and if it gets a bit too political they’ll 
say ‘you must talk to the minister’s adviser as I can’t give you the political line’ (J18). 
He believes that journalists feel that there is now “more spin”, especially from the 
Treasury: 
Under Gordon Brown the Treasury had the reputation for re-announcing things.  For 
presenting things as news that weren’t. One of those questions journalists always have 
to ask ministers is ‘is this new money?   Is this money that was already in the budget 
and you are just representing it putting a new ribbon round it and saying it’s a new 
investment but it’s not new money?’ The Government has always done that to some 
extent but I think there’s a general feeling that it has got worse and under both the last 
two governments.  
David Brindle, a specialist correspondent with 36 years’ experience on broadsheet 
newspapers, who is now public services editor at The Guardian, also senses that “the 
day to day boundary has become a bit more blurred”: 
I sometimes see comments from Whitehall press officers which I query and say, ‘that 
must have come from a special adviser’ because it seems so political, and on checking 
I’ve found that in fact it has come from a press officer.  There was one recently.  In 
respect of Treasury, something to do with Labour spending plans and there was a very 
on the record damning comment from a Treasury spokesman and I was sure this 
couldn’t have come from a Whitehall press officer but it turned out that it did…a 
department like the Treasury ought to be impartial on, for example, the credibility of 
Labour spending plans and it would not be for them to comment. I do think it is an 
important line to hold and one that we seem to be losing (J21).  
Some journalists have even taken to policing the propriety boundaries themselves, as 
this departmental press officer (2010-2014) recalls: 
Journalists would phone up and say, ‘look some of the stuff you are putting out as a 
department is pretty close to Tory party propaganda’ and our Head of News would 
always look at it and take it on board and there’d be discussions as to whether this 
would be appropriate to go on civil service documents and you win some and you lose 
some; sometimes it would stay in and sometimes it would be amended (C13). 
The ultimate constraint on government communications, whether on the part of 
ministers, civil servants or special advisers, is a concern with “fact and reality” as the 
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key ingredient of “credibility”, as Bernard Ingham told the Public Administration 
Select Committee in 2003: 
The constraint upon the civil servant, certainly I would argue, and actually it is also a 
constraint on the political adviser if you are going to carry credibility, is that it must 
always be that his gloss must not lose touch with fact and reality because if he does he 
ceases to become a credible informer (Witness evidence session, 2003). 
Issues relating to trust, truth and credibility are discussed further in Chapter 7: 
Representing the Public. 
 
5.5 Resisting news media deadlines and demands  
“Don’t just respond to every bit of tittle tattle that appears in the newspapers” 
In Chapter 4, I outlined the role of government communications planning, objective-
setting and monitoring in presenting a coherent, robust and long-term public face 
across all forms of media, and attempts by the communications leadership to resist 
ministerial preoccupation with the next day’s headlines. The quote at the head of this 
chapter, from a serving Director of Communication -  “The media can create its own 
dynamic, but sometimes you have to be quite resistant to that” – encapsulates the 
task that has faced government press officers at least since the days of Bernard 
Ingham.  How should government press officers respond to the daily demands of the 
news media, while maintaining effectiveness, where effectiveness means long term 
credibility and the commitment to serving the information needs of the public?   
This former Cabinet Office official, who had also worked both in the COI and in 
departments, sees effective government communication as a product of specialist 
knowledge about the communication process: 
 It's about knowing what you are trying to do, knowing who you want to influence, and 
how you are going to do it.  It was all based on insight, that detailed understanding of 
your audience and what might persuade them to change their behaviour (C15). 
The corollary of this is that a preoccupation with short term communication 
advantage, achieved through a single medium and targeted towards the perceived 
needs of ministers rather than citizens, is de facto, in-effective communication.  In 
their 2008 review of the implementation of the Phillis Report, the House of Lords 
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Communications Committee felt that too little progress had been made on one of the 
seven main principles underpinning government communications:  “Use of all 
relevant channels of communication, not excessive emphasis on national press and 
broadcasters” (2008).  They concluded that:  
Although the term ‘Government communications’ embraces both media handling and 
direct communication with the public, the Review was concerned that the 
Government had concentrated its time and resources too much on the national media. 
Similarly, the government’s own recent independent capability reviews of the 
communications function64 reveal a continuing preoccupation with short term media 
handling at the expense of “audience driven” communications and evaluation.  For 
example, a review of Cabinet Office communications conducted in March 2013, 
praised some of the integrated campaigns such as GREAT Britain, but concluded that: 
At leadership level, there is an understandable focus on the daily and weekly news 
cycle. This means that the focus is on managing the grid and the Lobby. These vital 
tasks, reportedly performed well…would benefit from more direction setting…Many 
of the professional communicators interviewed were from a media handling 
background. As a group their natural focus is short‐term reputation‐management. 
This has resulted in a modus‐operandi which is focused on the day to day (para.1.13, 
1.14). 
There is insufficient systematically‐planned communication of the kind intended to 
have a lasting, cumulative, impact over time. As a result the government’s key 
messages do not land effectively. Associated with this is insufficient outcome‐based 
communication objective setting, use of insight and evaluation. The limited number 
of communication metrics used, tend to measure outputs (such as media coverage, re‐
tweets and web hits) rather than more meaningful communication out‐takes and 
outcomes (i.e. changes in how audience groups think, feel and act). Also largely absent 
is communication which has been developed in an audience‐driven way (para.1.10) 
(Government Communications Network, 2013, pp. 4, 3). 
The BBC’s former home affairs correspondent (until 2002), Jon Silverman, now an 
academic, questions the tendency in government over the past 20 years or so to take 
action in “reaction to media hysteria about certain issues”.  This goes against the grain 
                                                          
64 The Capability Review programme was launched in 2005 by the Cabinet Secretary Gus 
O’Donnell as part of the wider Civil Service Reform Agenda. The reviews assess 
departmental capability and identify progress and next steps. 
http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/about/improving/capability.  
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for policy civil servants who “in it for the long haul, they don’t think it’s their job to be 
working on something that is, today’s headline or yesterday’s headline, and in 18 
months’ time is going to be forgotten”: 
 The whole agenda has speeded up, creates more pressure, and my impression is that 
the civil service do not necessarily like (that)…I think today’s civil servants are 
probably more attuned to working on things at shorter notice on things that are less 
well-formed, than the previous generation (J22). 
Bernard Ingham agrees: 
We’ve got information overload and policy continuity under load and if I were back in 
No.10 I’d say ‘for Christ’s sake let’s stop it; let us decide what we’re going to do, let us 
work out how to do it properly and then announce it but don’t for heaven’s sake just 
respond to every bit of tittle tattle that appears in the newspapers and feel you have to 
do something’ (C01). 
A Director of Communication who left government in 2011 agrees that the intensity 
of the pressure which government press officers face in the struggle to ‘land the 
government’s key messages’ arises from a combination of media demand and 
ministerial response: 
The level of scrutiny and the speed with which problems are created for you that 
distract ministers from their day job is huge, so actually the centrality of the print 
media even as the population move away from it, which it is doing, they are still in 
kind of Whitehall and Westminster terms, overwhelmingly more important than 
anything else.  They are the people who make or break individual careers and can 
guide policy decisions just by sheer muscle (C11). 
He adds that the increasing importance within the civil service of Directors of 
Communication led to closer integration into the upper echelons of the department65: 
Communications directors started being on the boards of government 
departments66.  And there came some downsides that you were just awash with 
corporate responsibilities that we could probably have done without but it did at the 
same time mean that at that level communications was seen as like finance or HR, 
you couldn’t do without it, and it wasn’t just people who barged into your office and 
                                                          
65 This is seen (by Strömbäck and others) as an example of mediatization. 
66 Since 2010, Directors of Communication have been invited to sit on Departmental boards. 
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said ‘the minister wants this done by Friday’, and I think that was quite a big turning 
point. 
Permanent officials are not the only ones who, in principle, prefer to work for long-
term and sustainable goals rather than short term political advantage even if it is 
difficult to achieve in practice.  It is striking how the special advisers interviewed here 
acknowledged the pressure to react quickly to media demands, but felt strongly that 
it was their role to resist this pressure, and had the confidence to do this.   
According to Katie Waring, media special adviser to the Business Secretary (2010-
13): 
Some advisers were very much ‘give the media what they want’.  I was not like that.  
Frankly I was really happy to block all the time and only speak to them if I had 
something constructive to say.  If they wanted a story I’d be like ‘you’re not drawing 
me on this’.  Quite often just not give them anything (S24). 
Nick Hillman, Katie’s opposite number in the same department, working to the 
Conservative Minister of State for Universities (2010-13), noticed that, overall, 
departmental press officers were more cautious with journalists than he or his 
minister, and that they had their own priorities:  
The interests of the communications department are different to the interests of the 
individual minister.  The minister wants to get as much press coverage as possible so 
long as it’s not negative.  The interest of the department, certainly my sense, is to 
have a more controlled approach.  You know, turn down.  There were moments 
when my minister would be asked to do an interview, and the firm advice from the 
press office would be ‘don’t do this interview’ and we would think that was overly 
cautious (S23). 
Bill Bush, Labour special adviser to the Secretary of State at the Department of 
Communications, Media and Sport (2001-05), argues that “the danger always is that 
the reactive, because it’s urgent and unexpected, takes over from the important”.  But 
although this ‘space’ must be managed, a balance can and must be achieved, however 
difficult: 
You cannot be Olympian and Utopian and not police this space.  It is very very 
dangerous because at some point the chief whip or the Prime Minister or very senior 
advisers at No.10 will just say ‘I’m sorry we can take three or four of these hits under 
the waterline, but this is the sixth or seventh or eighth.’  They may all be explainable 
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and unfair, but it doesn’t matter.  Because each hit takes away a lump of credibility, 
and there’s a limit to how much credibility you can chip off.  So ministers are 
absolutely right to be concerned but they shouldn’t let it take over their lives, and some 
do.  Some do. (S25). 
 
5.6 Resisting news management by No.10   
“No. 10 are always those irritating people who interfere and don’t understand” 
Much of the criticism directed at New Labour’s approach to government 
communications focused on the supposed centralization and control through Alastair 
Campbell at No 10.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the centralization of power within a 
departmentalised system like Whitehall is an expendable ‘leadership resource’ which 
is related to the leadership style, political capital and personal qualities of the Prime 
Minister (Heffernan, 2006).  As accounts of Gordon Brown’s oppositional approach 
to media management while Chancellor reveal, this resource is open to challenge by 
powerful ministers operating within their departmental ‘fiefdoms’ who make use of 
their own departmental news management resources to influence public narratives 
(Bower, 2005; M. Foley, 2009; Heffernan, 2006; Karvonen, 2010; Langer, 2011; 
McBride, 2013; Norton, 2000; Rhodes, 2011).  What kinds of resistance to the news 
management role of No 10 and the Cabinet Office can be observed, and how has this 
changed over time? 
Bernard Ingham complained constantly about ministers’ “malicious leaking”67 and 
their inability to work with No 10 on coordinating messaging on government policy, 
especially on the economy, eventually taking his complaint straight to Margaret 
Thatcher, as we saw above.  As Private Secretary to five Prime Ministers and Cabinet 
Secretary to three, Robin Butler agrees that ministerial resistance to and envy of the 
media management resources at the disposal of No 10 is almost inevitable: 
There were certainly occasions when ministers, secretaries of state, felt things were 
being driven too much from No 10 and that their story was being told from No. 10 
when they would have preferred to tell it themselves (C02). 
                                                          
67 See Bernard Ingham note to the Prime Minister’s Private Secretary 16/12/1981 – 
Presentation: where we are failing. Ingham Archive/Margaret Thatcher Foundation. 
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Special advisers working personally to departmental ministers could and did present 
alternative narratives through selective briefing: 
They may not just act on behalf of the government or even the party but on behalf of 
their minister individually and that can lead to their briefing against other ministers. 
Witness Damian McBride.  And this may help their ministers but damage the 
government because it causes the government to be divided against itself.  And it gives 
an opportunity to shrewd media correspondents to play off special advisers against 
each other (C02). 
A weakened Prime Minister becomes more susceptible to ministerial intrigue via the 
media.  As political secretary to John Major between 1994 and 1997, Howell James 
remembers that:  
Because of the fragile political ecology of the time, ministers and others had their own 
different agendas and they used their special advisers very actively to brief the 
media…every Friday you could guarantee that John Redwood would stand up and say 
something unhelpful about Europe (C08). 
Vince Cable’s special adviser, Katie Waring (2010-2013) was initially surprised at “the 
subtleties of playing the Whitehall game.  I probably wasn’t as sensitive to which 
department you were being briefed against or which department was being briefed 
and built up by the No. 10 general machine”.  Eventually, she did a bit of negative 
briefing herself: 
I’ve briefed a couple of times against other departments on regulation.  I got a really 
good page two big story spread in the FT once.  I was just sick of all the other 
departments briefing against BIS…and I thought, ‘right, I’ve had enough of this.  I’ve 
had enough of the Tories making out the Lib Dems are stopping this and that’, so I 
just pointed the finger at other departments that BIS was frustrated with.  It put the 
department in a bit of a firing line (S24). 
It is not just ministers and their aides who create a narrative that might not suit that 
of the government as a whole.  In Katie Waring’s view, the press office at BIS 
consistently worked to position the department against the cuts and in favour of 
business – a long-term stance held by the department, whichever minister was at the 
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helm68.   One Director of Communication argues that the default position for officials 
in Whitehall departments is one of suspicion of the Centre: 
There will always be suspicion of No. 10, quite rightly because of the departmental 
mind-set for want of a better expression.  No. 10 are always those irritating people 
who interfere and don’t understand (C11). 
However irritating, when No.10 chooses to get involved, in practice there is little that 
press officers can do to resist unless they have the support of their Secretary of State.  
A departmental press officer (1999-2004) says that although No. 10 had no formal 
power to instruct departmental press officers, “If the minister wanted it done then 
probably you had to go with it”.  Conversely, a minister could support a press officer 
in resisting inappropriate instructions: 
The government was really desperate to make a big thing of its winter fuel payments 
to pensioners every winter and we had to get a story in the paper of a happy 
pensioner who was going to get this £200. It came around the second or third time 
while I was in charge of that policy area from a press relations point of view and we 
were told by No. 10 that we had to find a couple or an individual that was going to 
benefit and get a jolly big cheque and have somebody handing it over (C05). 
Her minister thought the idea was “ridiculous”, and offered to call Alastair Campbell 
to “tell him to back off”, but in the end, against their better judgement, they organised 
the “silly photo call”.  She recalls another request from No. 10 that was seen to be 
“news generation for the sake of news generation”: 
 We got a call from Lance Price69 at No. 10 saying ‘right it’s the UEFA Cup – how are 
we going to compete with it in terms of generating news?  We’ve had this idea that you 
should maybe say that people who are claiming Job Seekers Allowance who knock 
over to Bulgaria or whatever it was if we find that they’ve not signed on because they’ve 
gone to the footie we’ll get them for benefit fraud’.  
                                                          
68  This is consistent with the press release announcing Fiona Cookson’s appointment as 
Director of External Affairs at the BFI (10/9/2014), which said that she “had helped to position 
the Department as an advocate for business and enhanced its reputation with leading business 
organisations and companies large and small”. 
69 Lance Price, Alastair Campbell’s deputy from 1998-2000, has written an account of his 
period at No. 10 (Price, 2005) 
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This blatant attempt at what she referred to as “cooking up the story” about “clamping 
down on benefit cheats” that would never be actually implemented was thought by 
civil servants to be “appalling and wrong,” yet they still felt obliged to comply.   
Where resistance on the part of civil servants did occur, it was, again, of the more 
passive variety and associated with what they saw as a definite crossing of the line 
into party politics.  Nadine Smith, then Chief Press Secretary at the Cabinet Office, 
describes a “really tricky” situation when she was asked to set up meetings with 
departmental civil servants in connection with Tony Blair’s policy review leading up 
to the 2005 election.  Because this could have been construed as involving civil 
servants in electioneering, “a lot of civil servants disengaged a bit with me and the 
press office because they felt that we were getting too close to politics” (C09). 
A strategic communications adviser working closely with ministers at the 
Department of Health and Home Office (2008-10) found that that intervention from 
No. 10 was minimal when departments were thought to be well run: 
If you’re in a department where there’s quite a lot of confidence in the ministers and 
the team, and the direction, and it’s quite steady state, then No. 10, in my 
experience, they’re quite relaxed in letting you get on with it (C12). 
If there were problems, No. 10 would step in, as David Cameron did in 2010 when 
Andrew Lansley encountered difficulties in Parliament and the media with the NHS 
reforms70.   Conversely, if No. 10 was felt to be strategically weak, departmental teams 
could withdraw cooperation, as this Head of News recalls: 
Back in 2000, No. 10 were incredibly powerful. They set really clear agendas about 
what their expectations were… Under the Tories (sic) it’s a car crash...it’s a constant 
sense of panic and difficulty so in the end you just stop listening to them.  It was 
ridiculous, really naïve, really stupid, really short-termist, and really just irritating 
actually… Even SPADs and ministers would kind of be like ‘look, we’ll let them win 
that one but we’re going to go to war on the next three’. You’d end up not sharing 
information with them, or you’d wait and give it to them at the last minute (C14). 
                                                          
70 See http://www.totalpolitics.com/print/158227/lansley-pushed-aside-on-the-nhs-
reforms.thtml. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
Resistance by government press officers and their leaders to both mediatization and 
politicization appears in various forms, from passive resistance and obstruction, to 
day to day ‘push back’ and administrative interventions like reviews and enquiries.  
Overall, however, resistance appears to be lessening, especially when comparing 
reactions to the 1997 and 2010 elections, and the actions of the various heads of 
profession.  Bernard Ingham’s confidence in criticizing ministers, in which he pits the 
Government Information Service against ministerial rivalry and political intrigue, are 
not replicated by other leaders; indeed, the last Permanent Secretary, Matt Tee, 
appeared to acquiesce in his own loss of position.  He recently told an interviewer 
that, given that 35-40% of professional communicators in government left or changed 
job after the 2010 election, “It was quite difficult for me to justify doing this 
permanent secretary job when the budget I was overseeing for advertising was 15% of 
what it had been, and the number of staff that came under me professionally was also 
significantly lower” ("Interview with Matt Tee - press regulator," 2016).   
Where resistance does take place, it is more likely to be tactical than strategic, with 
the onus on the individual press officer to identify issues and stand up to ministers 
and their aides, if necessary invoking support from senior colleagues.  However, as 
the guidance states, it is not a case of saying ‘no’ to ministers: discussion takes the 
form of ‘negotiation’, ‘compromise’, ‘finding a deal’ or at most ‘polite refusal’.   A 
former senior official at the Cabinet Office explains how a press officer is expected to 
communicate with ministers:  
You can't turn round and say ‘don't’ but you can say ‘ok minister, we can do that, but 
that might not help and actually the Daily Mail's been on to that and they will run this 
story’.  ‘Ah’.  ‘Ok, what are you trying to do minister? Can I suggest an alternative way 
of doing it?’ There are ways of saying ‘no’ that doesn't get you into trouble.  The current 
guidance on Government Communications talks about compromise to reach an end 
(C15). 
The notion of the dividing line between party political and impartial communication, 
or between the promotion of government policy and ministerial ‘image making,’ 
appears frequently in parliamentary and government documents and in the 
recollections of civil servants.  The propriety guidance is vague and yet consistent, 
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even repetitive, over the years; requiring government communicators to be objective 
and explanatory not biased or polemical (Government Communications Service, 
2014b, 2015a; Government Information and Communications Service, 2000), as if to 
state it is to bring it into being.  Interviewees describe the ‘the line’ as being obvious 
to those in the know, and yet refer to it as a ‘deliberately grey area’, which seems 
logically inconsistent: how can a line be a deliberately grey area?  This illustrates the 
ambiguity and contingency of the concept of ‘crossing the line’ which is described in 
these interviews a sense of ‘discomfort’ or ‘unease’ when ‘tricky’ or ‘crunchy’ media 
issues arise, requiring them to have ‘difficult conversations’, and possibly refer higher 
up the command chain.  Decision-making takes place quickly and is based on 
individual sensibility and implicit internal collective wisdom around what is 
acceptable or appropriate.   
This pragmatic application of judgement within fluid and fast-moving situations can 
be characterised as a particular characteristic of the cross-field, and therefore as a 
cross-field effect. In other words, under the pressure of increasingly intense political 
and media scrutiny in response to, first, 24 hour news and, more recently, constant 
news through digital media, judgements about what is proper or appropriate are 
taken in seconds, and on instinct.  Career survival may depend on it, but without 
clearly expressed and externally validated criteria, established forms of challenge and 
redress, or sanctions for misconduct, the process of applying propriety within this 
setting seems fragile.  What is to stop the line from moving imperceptibly over time 
to the extent that what was once unacceptable, becomes commonplace, as some of the 
interviewees seemed to be suggesting?   
Enforcing obedience to the line is ultimately laid at the door of the departmental 
Permanent Secretary, and in more extreme cases, the Cabinet Secretary, on behalf of 
the Prime Minister, who investigates breaches of the Ministerial Code of Conduct.  In 
1997, outgoing Directors of Communication spoke of feeling abandoned by the senior 
civil service, although Robin Butler was mentioned as one civil service leader to 
publicly express disquiet at the loss of so many politically sensitive posts.  By 
commissioning the Mountfield Review the year before his retirement in 1998, Butler 
facilitated a pause in a situation that seemed to be running out of control, and 
prompted a dialogue between the ambitions of ministers and the values of the 
Government Communications Service that could still be observed through interviews 
with former press officers employed during the Coalition period (2010-2015).  
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In his own interview for this study, Butler acknowledged that the growing importance 
of media in politics exposed government press officers to more pressure to ‘cross the 
line’.  Later, the so-called Butler Review of 2004 examined the difficulties facing 
officials who resisted the dominant political narrative, in this case over Iraq’s WMDs, 
and recommended that, in future, the Chair of the Joint Intelligence Committee 
should be “someone with experience of dealing with Ministers in a very senior role, 
and who is demonstrably beyond influence, and thus probably in his last post”; in 
other words, someone who was not afraid to speak truth to power (Butler, 2004).  This 
acknowledges the extreme sensitivity of government communications, and the 
career-threatening risk of challenging a ministerial narrative.  And yet, on day to day 
reputational matters which could be of existential significance to ministers, it is the 
more junior members of the communications team – press officers – who are 
expected to challenge them.  In this unequal relationship they face pressure from 
“democratic politicians (who) are engaged in a ruthless zero-sum competition for 
power and, while in office, face constant incentives to cut legal and ethical corners in 
order to main their hold on power”.  This means that “politicians cannot be relied on 
to refrain from corrupt behaviour” (Mulgan, 2008, p. 350). Under these conditions, 
how realistic is it to expect press officers to fulfil the ethical and political obligations 
expected of them? 
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Chapter 6: Responsiveness 
“The bureaucracy is supposed to be both neutral and responsive – a delicate task 
under the best of circumstances and an almost impossible one when those who 
oversee administration have different views about what policy should be.”  (Aberbach, 
2000) 
6.1 Introduction 
Responsiveness as a trait, or a value, is directly linked to democratic ideals in that 
elected politicians are required to be responsive to the preferences of the people, a 
requirement on which the legitimacy of Parliament and the party in government rests 
(Dahl, 1971; E. Page, 2012).  Unlike the concepts explored in the previous two 
chapters, resilience and resistance, responsiveness is an established term that is 
commonly used by public administration and politics scholars to describe relations 
between actors and agencies within democratic political systems, whether between 
ministers and bureaucrats, or politicians and the public.  Our concern here is 
specifically with changes over time in the way that the government communications 
service and those working within it, respond to ministers’ media needs, and the 
demands of the media.  As we observed in the introduction to the previous chapter, 
resistance and responsiveness are not necessarily mutually exclusive concepts:  an act 
of resistance against the demands of a particular minister for example, may be an act 
of responsiveness in favour of the Prime Minister or the government as a whole, as 
we have seen with the actions of Bernard Ingham in criticising ministers who 
threatened Mrs Thatcher’s hegemony.  
In their studies of Swedish public service communicators, Pallas and Fredriksson 
identified responsiveness to the media concerns of ministers as an indicator of 
‘politicization through indirect mediatization’ (Pallas, Fredriksson, & Schillemans, 
2014).  As a means of pleasing politicians, and trying to reduce their interference in 
media relations, officials became more proactive in raising the media profile of their 
organisation, a practice observed in relation to Bernard Ingham in the previous 
chapter.  Mediatization is therefore doubly determined: firstly, since it acts directly 
on government officials through increased media scrutiny, and secondly through the 
responsiveness of officials to ministers’ preoccupations with media.  Whitehall 
officials are already primed to respond and display loyalty to ministers through the 
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Haldane doctrine71 which holds that civil servants are accountable only to ministers, 
who are, themselves, accountable to Parliament.  
 Within the corridors of power, however, officials are expected to balance loyalty with 
the need to uphold rule-based administration (Mulgan, 2008), a “delicate task” and 
even an “impossible one” (Aberbach, 2000).  Being tied down to process and 
procedure, colloquially known as ‘red tape’, on the face of it seems to contradict the 
idea of ‘responsiveness’, especially in relation to the voracious demands of 24-hour 
media.  This argument is challenged by Aberbach and Rockman, who interviewed 476 
senior US federal civil servants and sub-cabinet level political appointees between 
1970 and 1992 (Aberbach, 2000).   They argue that within liberal democracies, good 
government requires a balance of politics and policy, responsiveness and restraint, 
because “an exclusive premium on the value of responsiveness may clash with other 
ways in which we want the bureaucracy to perform – with equity and respect for 
precedent” (p88).   They describe this as the “yin and yang” of government, where 
“politicians tend to provide the dynamics and bureaucrats the ballast.  Leadership, 
drive and vision are essential to government, but continuity, connections to the past, 
and an appreciation of policy practicality and political feasibility are equally 
important”, (p91).   
Unlike the UK’s system of unitary government, the US system of divided powers 
enables public servants to put space between themselves and the political governing 
class which allows them to establish a balance between the two sources of power, if 
necessary by enlisting the support of the legislature in battles with Presidential 
officials, and vice versa.  Lee contends that the outcome is a constrained system of 
government communication which serves the public by applying standards: 
information not advocacy, truthfulness and accuracy, and, above all, a fair, reasonable 
and explicit definition of what government should be (Lee, 2011). 
This statement from the 1968 Fulton Committee which conducted the most recent 
parliamentary review into the fundamental structure, recruitment and management 
of the Civil Service, described Whitehall as providing:  
                                                          
71  The doctrine of ministerial accountability established in 1918 by the Machinery of 
Government Committee, known as the Haldane report, is still in operation although the Public 
Administration Select Committee called for it to be reviewed in the light of the greater level of 
scrutiny from 24/7 media, Parliament, FOI and public demands for more openness and 
transparency (Machinery of Government Committee, 1918; Public Administration Select 
Committee, 2013c). 
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A permanent civil service occupying a position duly subordinate to that of the 
ministers who are directly responsible to the Crown and to parliament, yet possessing 
sufficient independence, character, ability and experience to be able to advise, assist, 
and to some extent, influence, those who are from time to time set over them.  (Fulton 
Report on the Civil Service, 1968, pp. Appendix B, 108). 
The extent to which central bureaucracies respond to or resist the will of “those who 
are from time to time set over them,” is central to the debate about political spin in 
government communications.  Mulgan defines responsiveness as: “the readiness of 
public servants to do what government ministers want” (Mulgan, 2008, p. 346), and 
considers it to be a core democratic value since it is ultimately a form of 
responsiveness to the electorate.  But what happens when government ministers want 
public servants to not only explain but actively promote and justify government 
policy?  Like Butler, whose interview was cited earlier (p.140), Grube argues that the 
demands of modern media management put government press officers under greater 
pressure to engage in “partisan advocacy.” He questions whether communications 
officials can or should be held to the same “public standards of constrained 
partisanship” as other public servants (Grube, 2014, p. 350).   
This chapter uses the experiences and perceptions of government press officers, 
augmented with those of journalists and special advisers, to examine their everyday 
struggle to balance responsiveness with their own professional ethics, norms and 
values.  We have seen how, with the transformation of the media landscape since the 
1980s, the UK government communications service faced increasing demands by 
ministers for more control over media messaging.  Government press officers are 
doubly exposed to ministerial scrutiny, firstly because of the inherent political 
sensitivity of media relations, and secondly due to their somewhat marginalised 
position within the civil service as a separate profession working in close temporal 
and spatial proximity to the ministerial team.  This exposure is likely to incentivise 
professional traits associated with ‘political responsiveness’ (Sausman & Locke, 
2004), such as deference, personal loyalty, empathy, and a commitment to corporate 
goals, such as government narratives.   
As we saw in Chapter 2, it has been argued that the drive by politicians in recent 
decades to increase control over central state bureaucracies has been targeted most 
powerfully at communications functions (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010).  A comparative 
study of democratic responsiveness in Denmark, the UK and the US found that 
politicians operating within the ‘executive dominance’ model (UK) were more likely 
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than those in consensus (Denmark) or divided governance systems (US) to “prioritize 
pivotal voters over the general public”, suggesting that they may be less 
democratically responsive (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008, p. 330).  In this sense, a 
greater responsiveness to ministers’ media agendas may actually conflict with rather 
than support, responsiveness to the wider public, a question this chapter touches on 
and the next will consider in more detail.  As we saw in Chapter 4, government press 
officers bore the brunt of anti-bureaucratic sentiment on the part of incoming 
ministers after both the 1997 and 2010 elections.   
This chapter will examine responsiveness in relation to both politicization and 
mediatization, asking how resistance and responsiveness on the part of government 
communicators has changed since 1997, and examining the links between political 
responsiveness and media responsiveness.  Has the UK government communications 
service become more concerned with advocacy and persuasion over time?  Have 
government press officers become more responsive to political pressure to deliver 
partial messages?   What impact has the media role of special advisers had on the role 
of government press officers?  These questions will be examined under the following 
three themes: 
1. Advocacy as an outcome of responsiveness 
2. The responsive press officer 
3. Special advisers as “a direct manifestation of responsiveness” (Greer, 2008) 
 
6.2 Advocacy as an outcome of responsiveness 
Successive propriety guidance on UK government communications emphasizes the 
need to uphold impartiality while explaining the government’s programme and 
priorities, and accepts that, in explaining policy, some promotional advantage will 
inevitably accrue to the government of the day.  As we saw in Chapter 5, ever since the 
service was conceived in 1945, ministers understood that “the boundaries between 
information, explanation and advocacy were tenuous” (National Archives: Cabinet 
Papers CAB 78/37, 1945).  This doesn’t mean that the boundary doesn’t exist, and that 
it can’t be seen to change over time, as this chapter will show.  The latest version of 
the GCS code, however, asks government press officers to go beyond simple 
explanation or advocacy, to promote and justify government policy, however 
controversial: 
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It is the duty of press officers to present the policies of their department to the public 
through the media…the press officer must always reflect the ministerial line 
clearly…the Government has the right to expect the department to further its policies 
and objectives, regardless of how politically controversial they might be.  
Press officers should:  Present, describe and justify the thinking behind the policies of 
the minister; be ready to promote the policies of the department and the government 
as a whole; make as positive a case as the facts warrant (Government Communications 
Service, 2014b). 
Grube is critical of this most recent guidance, claiming that: “It would be hard to think 
of a clearer definition of spin in modern politics,” since the need to justify the thinking 
of the minister is self-evidently not an impartial activity.  The responsibility to make 
as positive a case as the facts warrant is, he argues, the institutionalisation of the 
responsibility to ‘spin’ (Grube, 2015, p. 314).   In practice, there is no clear dividing 
line between explanation and promotion but these terms describe different forms of 
representational speech along a spectrum:  to explain is to provide enough detail and 
clarity so that something may be understood by someone else; to advocate is to 
provide active support for a cause or position; to justify is to provide a credible reason 
why something is being done; and to promote is to publicise something so that 
someone else will buy (or buy in to) it, as illustrated below: 
Explain - › Advocate - › Justify - › Promote 
The pressure on civil servants to actively promote ministerial priorities is not new, 
especially when governments perceive themselves to be in crisis72.  For example, 
government archives from the 1980s show how, at a low point in its popularity in 
December 1981, the Thatcher government increased the pressure on government 
press officers to push its controversial economic policy more forcefully.  This was a 
point of maximum crisis, as the government faced high inflation, unemployment 
above three million, a backbench rebellion that threatened to split the party over 
economic policy, and the lowest poll ratings for any government since the war. A 
memo from the Chancellor, Geoffrey Howe, complained that government press 
material was not sufficiently clear or persuasive, and questioned “whether Whitehall’s 
                                                          
72 In a celebrated case, the Cabinet Secretary Sir Robert Armstrong even appeared in the 
Supreme Court, Sydney, Australia, in June 1988 to defend the Thatcher government’s ban on 
the publication of Spycatcher, a revealing memoir by the former M16 officer, Peter Wright. 
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information forces are ideally deployed for the proper presentation of the overall 
economic message” (Howe, 1981).    
As we saw in the previous chapter, Bernard Ingham resisted this critique and 
defended the GIS wherever he could.  In practice, he encouraged his staff to become 
more proactive, more coordinated and thereby more responsive to ministers, pushing 
departmental Heads of Information to work harder to put over the government’s 
policy and legislative programme, and using the weekly meetings with them as a 
means of co-ordinating the overall government narrative. In his interview for this 
study, he described his first responsibility as being “not to get her into trouble, to keep 
her out of trouble.”  This meant protecting the Prime Minister not only from the 
media, but from political enemies within her own party.  The fact that he managed 
this task for 11 years to her satisfaction, while leaving the lobby on good terms in 1990, 
is a remarkable achievement after an estimated 5,000 lobby briefings, but the 
question remains as to whether he crossed the line into personal advocacy, and paved 
the way for an entirely partisan Director of Government communications in the shape 
of Alastair Campbell (Seymour-Ure, 2003; Watts, 1997).  This question has been 
covered widely elsewhere, and is not the main focus of this chapter, but Scammell 
concludes, from her analysis of government news management during the Thatcher 
years, that, given the complexities of the role, Ingham maintained his impartiality 
almost until the end (Scammell, 1991).  The fact that the three-headed role formerly 
held by Ingham and Campbell as Chief Press Secretary, namely, Prime Minister’s 
official spokesman, Head of the Press Office at No.10, and Director of Government 
Communications, have been split into three separate posts since the 2004 Phillis 
Review, is an acknowledgement of the impossibility of the task given modern media 
pressures.    
The obligation on the part of government press officers to actively promote, or 
advocate on behalf of, ministerial priorities was almost universally and 
unquestioningly accepted by my civil service interviewees.  Robin Butler regarded 
them as having: 
The same professional relation to the Minister as a barrister is to the client.  The Civil 
Service press officer of course puts over the Minister’s side of the case, as indeed a 
Permanent Secretary appearing before a Select Committee will do, so they are acting 
for the Government, but they act objectively and truthfully. (C02). 
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Bernard Ingham also saw advocacy, up to a point, as inevitable when briefing 
journalists but felt that the precise form of words was important: 
Well, you’re advocating it if you’re explaining it, you could argue.  What you don’t do 
is indulge in, some would say, the hyperbole in the propagandist way of the politician.  
Let me give you an example.  After 1984/85 you could argue that Margaret Thatcher 
had been the best thing since sliced bread for strikes, I mean they fell, they tumbled.  
I couldn’t say that (…). All that I could say is ‘well, you’d better look at the figures’ 
(C01). 
He saw limits to advocacy, though.  As a government spokesperson, he said, “you 
serve the government of the day. You don’t join in party political polemic, and you 
distance yourself from the party of the government of the day” and “you don’t 
knowingly lie”.    
The arrival of the 1997 Labour government, and the wholesale departure of nearly all 
Heads of Information, provided a further ratcheting up of the degree of 
responsiveness expected of the GIS, reflected in its almost immediate re-labelling as 
the Government Information and Communication Service (GICS).  The Mountfield 
Review of 1997 tried to take some heat out of the internal disruption caused by the 
departure of the so many Heads of Information by providing time for both civil 
servants and ministers to reflect on the core values of the service.  The review’s report 
reiterated the importance of impartiality but stated that this was entirely compatible 
with a service that “vigorously” advocated on behalf of ministers:  
These rules do not constrain information officers from providing the kind of service 
Ministers can properly expect.  Vigorous exposition of Ministers policies and of the 
reasons Ministers themselves use as justification for those policies are properly 
functions of effective GIS staff (Mountfield, 1997). 
According to a Strategy Director (1999-2010) who worked with more than eight 
ministers under Blair and Brown: 
It is the one thing that divides being a civil servant from being a politician.  Ultimately 
your duty and your position is that you must stick to the facts.  You can’t make facts 
up. Fine, if you’ve got it wrong, go back and correct it and say ‘sorry I’ve got it wrong’ 
(C06). 
It is unclear where this leaves special advisers, but the implication here is that their 
political masters do not have the same obligation as civil servants to “stick to the 
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facts”.   This raises questions in relation to special advisers’ growing role as official or 
semi-official sources, which will be dealt with later in this chapter.  As we saw in the 
previous chapter, a Director with experience of strategy and communications across 
five departments during the Blair/Brown years felt that even this basic founding 
principle was now coming under attack (C06).   
This civil servant who was brought into a government department in 2008 as a 
strategic communications adviser, after a long career in journalism, identified almost 
seamlessly with her Secretary of State, whether briefing externally or internally.  
Externally, she explains: 
You are there to convey the minister’s view and the ministers’ priorities, so you are 
giving the briefing (…) from a ministerial perspective. (C12). 
While internally: 
It was to help strengthen and improve the communications in the department in such 
a way that it would support his (the minister’s) priorities.  You are there as an adviser 
partly to explain to officials and others the ministerial need and how they see things.  
Nadine Smith, who worked as press secretary to the Minister for Public Health, also 
found herself advocating on behalf of her minister, sometimes against her own civil 
service colleagues: 
It was a very exciting time because Yvette Cooper was on the up as a junior minister.   
She was bright and hungry to get on.   I really liked her, as did her whole press team, 
because she was the most plain-speaking, frank person I could ever have asked to 
work with.  I was always grateful that I worked with somebody, especially a woman, 
who was very no nonsense with the civil service… She would invite me to sit next to 
her as her press secretary when she was dealing with issues like Sure Start Centres 
opening and asking ‘why are we not going to get the money for this, and why are we 
not tackling teenage pregnancy and where’s that sexual health strategy?’  (C09). 
There were certain points, she acknowledges, when, as press secretary, she became 
little more than “a bag carrier”, the person who was “literally just trying to make sure 
that they looked and sounded okay (…) turning up to the right place at the right time.”   
Unlike the Strategic Communications Adviser cited above, however, her identification 
extended beyond her minister at key moments when her professional commitment to 
public service trumped service to an individual minister: 
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When your minister was dropping down the pecking order and you were a civil servant 
dealing with a crisis on national security or a public enquiry where now your loyalty 
has changed.  You can suddenly switch to you know, public interest, public safety 
number one, ‘sorry minister, you’re now out of this, this is a civil service matter’.  It’s 
quite interesting how the civil service can suddenly take control of a situation. (C09). 
The display of personal loyalty that was demanded by incoming ministers after the 
2010 election meant paying close attention to the finest detail of language, as this 
press officer (2010-2013) recalls: 
We were given, via our head of news who had personal one-on-one meetings with 
ministers and special advisers right at the start, what their general approach was that 
they wanted to media handling, right down to minutiae about how they liked the use 
of plain English: acronyms being banned, certain words weren’t allowed anymore, so 
‘stakeholder’ was a banned word in our comms environment post-Labour 
government.  Stakeholder engagement was never something we did any more. We 
spoke to partners. (C13). 
He found that the more ambitious, ‘media savvy’ junior ministers had high 
expectations of government press officers, requiring them to come up with “three or 
four things every week, news releases that they would feature in, even if there wasn’t 
the policy to back it up”.   More seriously, and linking back to the core requirement of 
the civil servant to “stick to the facts” and “not knowingly lie”, he was asked to release 
information to friendly media outlets which, while not untrue, was selective, and 
intended to challenge the austerity claims of other public sector bodies by criticizing 
their management.   As he explained: “You wanted to limit the damage from the 
(austerity) narrative and at the same time promote your own”.   
He was in no doubt that, whatever indicators were used to assess his own 
performance, he had to keep ministers happy. A bad headline in the Guardian didn’t 
matter, as government voters were unlikely to read it, but a bad headline in the Daily 
Telegraph, which might put at risk the support of potential Conservative voters, was 
serious.  More time would therefore be spent on serving the needs of Telegraph 
journalists.  This would appear to be explicitly against the current GCS code, which 
states that “to work effectively, media officers must establish their impartiality and 
neutrality with the news media, and ensure that they deal with all news media even-
handedly”(Government Communications Service, 2014b).  To have challenged 
ministers’ concern to influence the Daily Telegraph would have been an act of 
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resistance which, in failing to make ministers happy, would have been considered a 
form of professional failure. 
As we have seen, the Fulton Report required that civil servants maintain “sufficient 
independence” to “advise, assist, and to some extent, influence, those who are from 
time to time set over them”(Fulton Report on the Civil Service, 1968).  An experienced 
Director of Communication (1991-2011), who had previously been a Head of News, 
argues that a measure of distance is essential for the conduct of good government, but 
believes that it is easier now for ministers to surround themselves with “the pure in 
thought”.  He considers it reasonable for incoming ministers to expect immediate 
loyalty on the part of civil servants to the government’s “mind-set”, whatever their 
own beliefs, but this does not mean becoming a “believer” or “fellow-traveller”.  The 
seasoned civil servant knows how to engage “the professional scepticism part of their 
brain alongside the mind-set” (C11). 
In the next section, I examine how ministers’ valorisation of the national news media, 
combined with the acceleration of time-scales in government media relations, has led 
to a premium being placed on officials who can manage media/political crises, leading 
to a change in the type of official most likely to succeed.  And to return to the case of 
the Iraq dossier of September 2002, were some civil servants too responsive in 
relation to its production and promotion?   
 
6.3 The responsive government press officer 
“Today, the road to the top is populated by those who can sense a political crisis or 
problem and who can help in managing it” (Peters & Savoie, 2012). 
In chapters 1 and 2 we showed how politicians feel driven to respond quickly to 
mediatized controversies which could arise from anywhere, at any time, and to 
anticipate them and be prepared to go on the attack themselves, deploying blame 
before it is directed against them.  With the expansion of media outlets since the 
1980s, and the 24/7 exposure governments now face, media crisis handling has 
become increasingly important, even institutionalized, within the public sector and 
other high profile organisations.   As the secret deliberations of the Liaison Committee 
on Government Presentation during the 1980s show, politicians were quick to spot 
the dangers and exploit the opportunities arising from the expansion of media; a 
process which intensified after 1997, and which applied to both governing parties. In 
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this section I ask to what extent the largely hidden organizational changes in 
government communications which arose from these media and political pressures 
privileged those who thrive in a crisis, and who could adapt to the speeding up of the 
policy and news cycle. 
Crisis narratives have long provided a rallying cry for change – right wing 
Conservatives during the 1970s appealed to a sense of crisis to justify their radical 
policies calling for the transformation of what they saw as the over-extended state 
(Richards, 2014; Richards, Smith, & Hay, 2014). The Blair government used claims 
about the 45-minute threat of Saddam Hussain’s WMDs to win support for the 
invasion of Iraq (Herring & Robinson, 2014).  It has been argued that in contemporary 
politics, we see a cheapening or devaluation of the language of crisis (Hay, 2014); 
crisis, or imminent crisis, is now an accepted part of political life.  To manage the 
risks, whether real or perceived, politicians want the freedom to select people around 
them that they can trust to foresee, and manage, a political crisis or problem (Peters 
& Savoie, 2012).   The incentive is not to sustain an informed public, or even inform 
the media, but to protect the personal and political reputation of the minister. 
For those interviewed for this study, taken together with impressions from numerous 
contemporary accounts and memoirs, politicians exist in a perpetual state of 
potential extinction, or, as Lee has put it in the American context, as a political system 
which is “always teetering” (Lee, 2011, p. 231).  Somewhere over the horizon, a largely 
unknowable public can, at any point, withdraw its consent, either at the ballot box or 
on the street.  Similarly, traditional mainstream media outlets, like the national 
broadcast and print media, live in fear that their readers or advertisers will disappear.  
This is the context within which the mediatization scholars, Kunelius and Reunanen, 
developed their concept of ‘attention’ as a shared currency within both the political 
and media fields, and how Lingard and Rawolle conceived the notion of the ‘cross-
field’, an area subject to particular rules, customs and practices where media and 
politics interact (Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012; Rawolle, 2005).   This area, the 
interface between government and media, is where beat reporters and press officers 
engage in a power struggle, as discussed by Cook in relation to US federal government 
communications, to define problems and solutions, and determine what is or isn’t a 
crisis (Cook, 1998).  Politicians draw readily on a narrative of crisis both to express 
their own subliminal fears, and to wrong-foot opponents, while journalists reach for 
crisis narratives to attract the flickering attention of their readers.  As the testimony 
from both government press officers and special advisers will show, this cross-field is 
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turbulent, unstable, often uncomfortable – but exciting.  
It is clear from the interviews that even the most junior of press officers from the New 
Labour years onwards, spent a lot of time interacting directly or indirectly with 
ministers and their teams.  A press officer (2010-13) says that: “For the ministerial 
team media was extremely high on their agenda.  Their office or their special advisers 
were in touch multiple times every day”.   A former Director of Communication who 
joined as a press officer at the Home Office in July 2001 had an extraordinary 
induction: 
The big thing that happened when I was still very new was 9/11 in September 2001.  
In the Home Office, that was immense (…) It just changed everything and obviously 
the volume of the work, and the pitch of what we were doing, we were just in the eye 
of a storm.  It was a fascinating time.  (C16). 
It wasn’t just the events unfolding that was exciting; it was the challenge of presenting 
to the public the proposed controversial legislation that followed: 
David Blunkett brought in lots of what some people would see as anti-liberal measures 
to protect our national security so there were huge political issues around anti-
terrorist legislation.  It just meant that the Home Office ratcheted up to a whole new 
level of importance so it was a very fascinating time (C16).  
‘Fascinating’ was a word that recurred.  As a junior press officer arriving in London 
from a reporting job in the West country to work on the BSE Inquiry in 1998, Nadine 
Smith described the new role as “fascinating, because it was like being part of a 
continual political thriller watching the story unfold and watching the public’s 
reaction to all the information we were putting out there”.  For her it was a human 
story, and one of failure on the part of the government to communicate the science; a 
failure that ended with the preventable loss of young lives (C09).  
Jonathan Haslam vividly remembers the thrill of being a press officer at the centre of 
events during the Major years: 
It’s very exciting and I think I must have a personality that thrives on deadlines; 
having to make judgments quickly, working hard getting to grips with briefs very 
quickly, understanding the ways of the media, understanding the message that your 
client, in this case, the government, wants to get across (C07). 
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Even as a self-confessed “bit player” he felt an “enormous satisfaction from being at 
the centre of events”, which was denied to most civil servants: 
Within press offices, or media offices as they would properly be called these days, 
within these sort of offices you have, for your grade in the civil service an absolutely 
privileged position.  When I worked at the Department of Industry, my first outing, as 
a secondee, I worked with the Secretary of State.  Now you’re not going to find another 
civil servant who has that kind of access.  
This suits those who can absorb lots of complex information quickly, remain calm 
under pressure, and thrive on stimulation.    This press officer (2010-2013) enjoyed: 
“the constantly changing nature of it.  No two days were the same so you never got 
bored, and I get bored quite easily, so a 24-hour rolling news agenda suits me quite 
well” (C13).  A Head of News (2001-14) recalls the media frenzy surrounding her 
minister when her house was surrounded for days by a media scrum, leading 
eventually to her resignation and departure from politics.  This was one of “the really 
fun times when the adrenalin’s pumping and anything you say can make or break a 
career and the pressure is immense given that you are in your 20s but actually it’s 
amazing” (C14).   The ‘fun’ comes from the feeling of being at the centre of events, 
when the civil service ‘takes over’, and the government press officer plays a career-
defining role at a moment of national high visibility. 
A former Head of News and Director of Communication (1991-2011) recalls the 
special intensity of the relationship with ministers.  Senior members of the media 
team “see ministers every single day, all day.  They spend weekends with them.  They 
are the last person they speak to; they are the first person they speak to in the 
morning.” (C11). It was not just the constant contact but ministers’ interest in and 
familiarity with, the detail of media relations that facilitated this closeness.  As this 
Strategy Director (1998-2010) explains: “I don’t know any minister, certainly not any 
minister that wanted to be around for any length of time that would not want to be all 
over the way that their messages would be handled in the press” (C06).   
Only one respondent, who had served two Conservative and three Labour 
administrations, referred to right-wing press partisanship, identifying it as a factor 
that compounded the insecurity of Labour ministers: 
There is a very clear difference I think between working for a Labour government and 
working for a Conservative government. Which is the attitude of the bulk of the print 
media, and it explains a huge amount… Labour governments, even if they have 
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reached an uneasy truce with a newspaper, with the exception of, I don’t know, the 
Guardian, FT and the Mirror, they know that the next assault is only round the corner 
and when those other papers decide to go after an individual or the policy, the full 
frontal assault you get out of it is completely overwhelming.  It’s like having a wave 
break over you.  There’s not very much you can do and I think Labour ministers live 
in fear of that (C11). 
Some ministers’ attention to detail was seen as excessive.  Nadine Smith became press 
secretary to one Cabinet Office minister in 2004, and found that he wanted her to take 
charge of the press office as he had doubts about its efficacy (C09): 
As the minister who is responsible for everything that comes out of the department, I 
thought it was fair enough.  Some say he had too much control and the ‘clearing of 
lines’ was holding up effective communications.  Perhaps he did have too much 
control but ultimately he was accountable for his words and they were in his name, 
but it can come across as a lack of trust that can undermine the team and their morale, 
and frustrate the hell out of the media too, who don’t have all day to wait for an answer, 
and won’t.  There was always this tension between how much control is too much?  
The Prologue to this thesis highlighted the role of John Williams, Director of 
Communications at the Foreign Office, who produced the first draft of the dossier on 
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction.  His submission to the Chilcot Inquiry 73 
portrays his sense of powerlessness.  Despite being “instinctively against the idea of a 
dossier” because the exercise “seemed to me to rest on uncertainties,” he accepted the 
government’s decision to place intelligence information in the public domain.  The 
idea of challenging the Prime Minister, even indirectly through his own Secretary of 
State, Jack Straw, or Alastair Campbell, seemed inconceivable: 
I returned from my own holiday just as the Prime Minister publicly announced that 
there would be a dossier (…)74 I followed the policy laid down by the elected Prime 
Minister, and had no objection to it other than my own instincts, which I felt were 
outweighed by his (John Williams: Statement for the Iraq Inquiry, 2010).  
Is this sense, Williams was being responsive to his political masters.  However, 
according to Mulgan’s definition of responsiveness, whereby civil servants anticipate 
their ministers’ needs and help them to avoid bear-traps, with hindsight it might have 
                                                          
73  The full statement is available at www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/50500/JohnWilliams-
witness-statement.pdf.   
74 Tony Blair made the announcement at a speech in his constituency on 3 September 2016. 
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been more responsive of Williams to have followed his instincts and more actively 
resisted the drive to publish a dossier.  This might have protected the longer-term 
interests of the government, and indeed the reputation of the Prime Minister himself 
(Mulgan, 2008). 
6.4   Special advisers as “a direct manifestation of 
responsiveness” 
“A single media scandal may put an end to a lifelong career in just a few days.  
(Politicians) must create a deep backstage…in which they can trust their closest allies 
and friends in private” (Hjarvard, 2013) 
The drive by politicians to protect themselves from disgrace or failure might explain 
at least part of the general tendency for state bureaucracies in liberal democracies to 
become more responsive to the will of ministers over time (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010; 
Meer, 2011; Page, 2007; Page et al., 2012).  In the UK this has been most manifest in 
the inexorable rise of special advisers in the civil service who can manage both politics 
and the media (Greer, 2008). The number of special advisers has nearly tripled since 
just before the 1997 election, and it is claimed that, far from being mere bag carriers, 
or the demonized ‘spin doctors’ of popular legend, they are significant media and 
political operators in their own right who together form a ‘political civil service’ (Hood 
& Dixon, 2015).  This has led some to argue that the UK now has a “dual government 
communication system” (Sanders, Crespo, & Holtz-Bacha, 2011).  
The media relations practices of special advisers are little researched, although, as we 
saw in Chapter 2, former advisers are starting to explain and reflect on their work, 
and recent research has tried to place them in historical context and systematically 
audit their activities (Blick, 2004; Blick & Jones, 2013; Gay, 2013; Hazell et al., 2012; 
Hillman, 2014; Wilkes, 2014; Yong & Hazell, 2014).  In their in-depth ethnographic 
study from within a UK government department, Rhodes and Bevir “were struck with 
the centrality of the SPADs” who they felt were “too focused on spin” (Bevir, 2010).  
Like other political science commentators, they don’t develop this theme, and the 
notion of ‘spin’ is neither theorised nor operationalized.  Most recently, the former 
Head of the Civil Service, Sir Bob (now Lord) Kerslake, told the trade magazine CSW 
that, “information is routinely leaked by special advisers and ministers.  There is a 
double standard going on (that) we should just acknowledge.  The public see this and 
feel that information is controlled".  He defends FOI, saying that it "tips the balance 
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towards openness and that is absolutely fundamental”, given the "yawning gap 
between the governing and the governed in this country"(Foster, 2015).    
This damning view of the media relations activities of ministers and their special 
advisers is supported by this senior information officer at the Department of Health 
during the early Blair years, who told the author Nicholas Jones that special advisers 
were: 
Obsessed with what stories would be appearing in the Sunday papers.  They would 
spend real time deciding which exclusive should be leaked to which newspaper and 
then which minister should get the chance to do follow-up interviews on television 
and radio.  As professional information officers we all thought this was terribly 
wasteful of ministerial effort (Jones, 2006, p. 162). 
6.4.1 Post-1997 change in the ‘rules of engagement’ 
The civil servants interviewed for this study criticized some special advisers but felt 
they were essential in helping ministers to manage their workloads.  The journalists, 
however, experienced special advisers as having had a major impact on their own 
work after 1997. The charge is significant because the media relations activities of 
special advisers are not transparent, and indeed, are deniable by ministers, as we saw 
with the resignations of Damian McBride in 200975, Adam Smith in 2012, and Fiona 
Cunningham in 2014.  Special advisers are temporary civil servants, whose salaries 
are paid for by the taxpayer, yet they are accountable to no one but the minister who 
appointed them and, ultimately, the Prime Minister.  As we shall see later, the 
interview evidence shows that it is not always clear on whose behalf special advisers 
are speaking to the media, for example, whether it is the minister, the department, or 
both, or whether their statements are official, semi-official or unofficial.   
Traditionally, the departmental line was the attributable, official statement delivered 
by the official departmental spokesman, the Director of Communication or Head of 
News, or a member of the media team delegated by them.  The official statement 
combined the agreed positions of the administrative and political leadership of the 
department, and was brokered, cleared and placed on the record by the departmental 
press office.  The advantage for ministers of allowing their aides to place government 
                                                          
75 Gordon Brown’s letter of 13 April 2009 to the Cabinet Secretary, Gus O’Donnell, following 
the departure of McBride, said that “no Minister and no political adviser other than the person 
involved had any knowledge of or involvement in these private emails”.  He said he had taken 
full responsibility for the matter “by accepting Mr McBride's resignation”. 
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news on the record semi-officially is that it is their version of the story which is 
presented and placed with a particular media outlet at a time that suits them, while 
as a government announcement it carries more credibility than a ministerial 
statement.  Alastair Campbell’s insistence at the Hutton inquiry that "the credibility 
of this document (the 2002 dossier) depended fundamentally on being the work of 
the Joint Intelligence Committee,” is an example of this (Hutton, 2004)76. 
When the responsibility for drafting and presenting the official line passes from the 
departmental media team to the minister’s own office, and is delivered selectively 
and/or off the record, the scope for bias and misinformation becomes greater. 
Privileged government information becomes a resource to be traded with selected 
journalists in return for favoured coverage, not a means to inform the public through 
the media, as the former civil service head Douglas Wass warned in his 1984 Reith 
lectures (Wass, 1984). Within this growing, unregulated space where ministerial aides 
brief the media, there is scope for activities that are not strictly consistent with 
propriety codes, which are vague in any case.  Government communications therefore 
becomes less an administrative function aimed at informing the public, and more a 
channel for political and personal advocacy.   
Media engagement has emerged in this study as an important part of the role of 
special advisers, even for those who are policy rather than media advisers. The 
journalists interviewed here explained how the arrival of this ‘new breed’ of political 
operative offered rich pickings for them in the form of a steady stream of newsworthy, 
story-led, crisis-rich understandings of the game of politics. As specialist 
correspondents they had a responsibility to report on and analyze government news 
and, more importantly, to break their own stories.  The government line was never 
more than a starting point for a wider and more complicated and nuanced story.  Chris 
Moncrieff (Press Association 1962-present), who retired from the lobby in 1998, 
before special advisers became entrenched within the civil service, but continues to 
report on politics, saw a clear distinction between the official line and unofficial 
sources.  The official line came from the department; the unofficial story was derived 
                                                          
76  ‘Campbell: I did not add 45-min claim’, The Guardian. 19/8/2016. 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/aug/19/davidkelly.uk 
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from leaks or personal briefings, mainly from civil servants and ministers or their 
aides: 
They (unofficial sources) used to be uninhibited and you got a huge amount of 
information from them; more than from the official line.  They were chalk and cheese, 
the proper press officers and unofficial sources.  I mean, you used to get, still do I 
expect, get masses of information and you could trust them as well (J17). 
He recalls how, until the arrival of Alastair Campbell, it was easy to meet and speak 
to MPs, even ministers, simply by hanging around at Westminster, where “you used 
to pick up an enormous amount of stuff.  There were always ministers dodging in and 
out of the lobby and they were as keen to see us as we were to see them”.  He holds 
Campbell responsible for ensuring that “there were no bloody ministers coming 
through….when they voted (he) made them go round the back behind the speakers’ 
chair where we are not allowed, so he kept us apart”. 
David Brindle of The Guardian (1988-date) agreed that civil service press officers 
might be the “genesis of a story” but then “the idea would be to take that version and 
play if off other sources to synthesize a version for the reader which in one’s own 
judgment was the best assessment of the situation”.   Before 1997 senior Whitehall 
press officers like Romola Christopherson at the Department of Health, “had the ear 
of the minister” and could provide further information ‘off the record’ for background 
use.   
If you had a big story pre-97 you would go to Romola and say ‘Romola, we are going 
to run with this tomorrow, I’ve talked to the press office who aren’t as forthcoming as 
they might have been, can you give me anything further?’  Nowadays the default is to 
go to the special adviser (J21). 
Similarly, Nick Timmins, who reported on politics and policy for The Times, 
Independent and FT (1987-2012), had “relatively few great sources in the civil service 
because most civil servants behaved properly” but his trick was “to sit there a bit like 
a spider in the web working out who they’d have talked to in developing policy and 
then you go and talk to them (…).  By and large you watched the waves once they 
dropped something into the pond”.  This more considered approach to reporting a 
government story was “entirely possible” then in the age of traditional press 
deadlines.    
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Timmins also singles out Romola Christopherson as someone who had both the ear 
and trust of the minister, and could be relied on to tell the truth, if not the whole truth: 
Someone like Romola, you know, she was excellent at holding her minister’s hand for 
the media.  She was just a perfect bridge between the two.  She’d make judgments.  I 
remember going wrong with some story I’d got and I’d got two thirds of it right but 
the third I hadn’t got right was probably quite damaging and she made a judgment 
(…) If Rom said to me ‘I wouldn’t write that if I were you’, I’d think very hard before 
writing it.  She wouldn’t tell you why you shouldn’t write it.  So that’s a relationship of 
trust (J19). 
Jon Silverman, home affairs correspondent for the BBC between 1989 and 2002, 
recalls how, at departmental press conferences, there was a “complete divide between 
the civil servants and the politicos”, where “you were not able to speak to the civil 
servants” (J22).  Occasionally, experts were allowed to brief journalists, but only with 
the prior agreement of ministers. Professor Paul Wiles, for example, who was in 
charge of compiling crime statistics, was allowed to brief journalists once the minister 
had left the room and was “extremely helpful”.   What ministers didn’t like were 
specialist opinions which clashed with political and media imperatives, for example 
over drugs policy. Silverman recalls how Professors Michael Rawlins and David Nutt, 
successive Chairs of the Advisory Council for the Misuse of Drugs, both got into 
trouble when they expressed opinions concerning the de-criminalisation of certain 
drugs.   
Silverman was in regular touch with the Home Office press office, as well as special 
advisers, sometimes as often as two or three times a day.  He noticed a change after 
1995 when the new Home Secretary, Michael Howard, demanded a “more aggressive, 
more adversarial” approach to crime and “began to try and shake things up”.  The 
Head of Information at the Home Office, Mike Granatt, responded by creating a 
“much sharper operation,” complete with the daily coordination of stories through a 
news grid, although this had nothing like “the ruthless efficiency” it had after 1997.  
Howard himself was hands-on as far as media was concerned, phoning the BBC Radio 
4 Today programme, for example, to challenge their take on stories, but neither of his 
special advisers, Tessa Keswick or David Ruffley, took much interest in media 
engagement and both later became MPs.  In actively trying to meet the media 
ambitions of the Home Secretary, Granatt was seen as an ‘outsider’ in comparison by 
the more traditional Home Office ‘mandarins’, with whom Howard had a “really 
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fractious relationship”.  Along with Romola Christopherson, Granatt was one of only 
two senior survivors of the “clear-out” of 1997. 
Like the other journalists interviewed for this study, Silverman cited two 
developments which had a major impact on his work: the arrival of 24/7 media, and 
the rise of special advisers as primary government sources.  Journalists now had to 
file stories at any time of the day or night, across a range of platforms, giving them 
less time to develop complexity and nuance.  At the same time, the arrival of this new, 
proactive, informed and well-connected network of government media 
intermediaries helped journalists to ‘feed the beast’ by providing not only a news 
subsidy but an authoritative comment and narrative subsidy as well.  By the time he 
left the BBC in 2002, correspondents were expected to: 
File across a whole range of platforms and with 24 hour news and everything else you 
were under pressure to be on air an awful lot of the time and if you are actually on air, 
you can’t really do reporting.  You can’t find out what’s going on with a story if you’re 
actually on a programme spouting off about it.   
He found that he could ring the Home Secretary Jack Straw’s special adviser, Ed 
Owen, as late as midnight to pick up a story for the 6.30am ‘two-way’ on the next 
morning’s Today programme,  
I found that I could get 90% of what I wanted out of Ed Owen after the 97 election 
rather than the press office.  I mean, the press office was very useful for the mechanics 
of how a story was going to be issued, when a minister was going to be available for 
interview, so the logistics, but if you really wanted the sort of thrust of it, especially to 
get it the day before so you could put it out in the morning and help set the agenda, 
then the special adviser became the main conduit.  
It was in Ed Owen’s interest to get the angle he wanted on the story, even when 
“sometimes that would not be exactly what the official news machine wanted or 
thought was appropriate”.   The political background to this, says Silverman, was that 
No.10 was putting pressure on the Home Office to crack down on asylum; even to the 
extent of Blair making public announcements off his own bat that were against official 
Home Office policy; Owen’s activities were part of the Home Office ministerial 
fightback.  
One freelance business journalist who works with a number of editors says that they 
see the official line as “relatively limited because it’s the official line.  There’s no colour 
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in it.  The official quotes would be flat because they have to be”.  Editors prefer either 
an interview with the minister or a briefing from the special adviser who knows “what 
this is really about” and can provide “added value”.  He cited Damian McBride, as 
someone who, even as a civil servant “felt the need to push a line that is perhaps more 
forceful, muscular, more coloured than would be appropriate” (J18). 
The downside, he says, is that as a group, special advisers are “very, very hierarchical 
(…).  They have their pecking order in terms of who they’d really want to take a call 
from and get on to”.  In practice, this was usually the political lobby.  For David 
Brindle, as for Nicholas Jones, this selectivity “changed fundamentally the rules of 
engagement and continues to do so.”  According to Brindle, special advisers 
administered the grid, and would take responsibility for the story of the day: 
in some cases working with the civil service press people, but typically around them, 
over them, dealing with handpicked journalists who were being fed the story and the 
rest of us on the press side, the journalists who were not favoured, and on the 
Whitehall side, the press officers who were left out of the loop, would be trailing in the 
wake of this (J21). 
He remembers the change starting “almost immediately” after the 1997 election “after 
Campbell cleared out all but two of the directors of communication in Whitehall”.   
Once press officers accepted that they too were obliged to follow the grid, even those 
with whom he had a good relationship were less responsive to him: 
The main media business was being transacted in a quite different sphere altogether, 
between my lobby correspondent colleagues and the SPADs, and where they were 
trying to collaborate with that, the Whitehall press officers.  As a specialist I felt 
increasingly marginalized and ill-served; poorly served, compared to what it had been 
before (J21). 
The mechanics of this “different sphere”, where special advisers traded exclusive 
nuggets of information for targeted coverage are described in detail by Nicholas 
Jones, the BBC’s industrial correspondent during the miners’ strike (1984-85), who 
then worked for many years as weekend duty editor.  The author of a series of books 
about New Labour’s political spin, Jones characterises the relationship as “collusion”, 
which, although it served both partners in the deal, was fundamentally undemocratic 
because it lacked transparency.  His job on Saturday nights was to collate news stories 
which had been trailed ahead in the Sunday papers and contact government 
departments to “find out which one had legs, which one was actually the imagination 
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of the journalist, and which one was a real one from a briefing.”  He too noticed a 
fundamental change after 1997: 
In the 80s into the 90s when you tried to get hold of someone from one of the 
government information offices that was in one of the Sunday papers, they would then 
play it with a straight bat and say ‘we don’t know where that story came from.  There’s 
an announcement coming on Wednesday and obviously we can’t pre-empt what the 
minister is going to say in the Commons’. 
Post 1997, there’s a much greater willingness on the part of the government 
information officers (…) when you said the magic words ‘well, I’ve spoken to special 
adviser X, Y or Z’, suddenly you’ve unlocked the door and you would get them 
coughing up the information (J20). 
Now, he argues, everything is trailed ahead.   In this “change in the balance of power” 
it’s “the special advisers calling the shots increasingly”.   This is symbolized by the 
grid, a ‘political tool”, which: 
 has the civil service stamp, this is up to civil service standards, this can be 
accommodated within the civil service structure, but what has driven it has been a 
political agenda in my opinion.  
With their hunger for news, journalists are put into “an invidious position” in which 
they collude with the source in “only giving one side of the story”, without explaining 
to the reader the provenance of the source.   Since 1997, he argues, there has been a 
blurring of the boundary between ministerial and departmental sources.  As an 
example of the change he cites the behaviour of Peter Walker, Energy Secretary 
during the 1984 miners’ strike, who secretly met selected correspondents in his room 
at the department to brief them on the political view of the story.  Observing 
proprieties, the civil service press officers would leave the room.  Today, he argues: 
Even if the civil servant isn’t in the room, the special adviser is, and that is now the 
conduit that will ensure that the civil service is in tandem with what the whole lot is 
saying, so they are all singing from the same hymn sheet (J20). 
David Brindle does not see a problem in special advisers “pushing their own agendas” 
so long as “that information that comes from them, and lines that come from them, 
are clearly seen as such”.  Departments, on the other hand, “ought to be impartial”.  
Increasingly, he argues, the civil service is failing to hold the line between official and 
unofficial news, and risks losing credibility (J21).  A former Director of 
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Communications (1991-2011) agrees that a blurring of boundaries between political 
and civil service operations in media management has taken place.  This has led to an 
uneasy “hybrid system” where “we’ve effectively taken the Northcote Trevelyan kind 
of system” and “overlaid on it the European cabinet system” (C11). 
6.4.2  Confusion over who represents the official line 
The issue of sources, and specifically the designation of who is or is not an official 
government source, while not the explicit focus of this study, emerged during the 
interviews as an area where lines of accountability were becoming blurred.  Successive 
inquiries have tried to establish and codify how different voices within government 
should be cited but propriety guidance and codes of conduct barely mention it. The 
GCS propriety guidance simply advises press officers, as far as possible, to speak on 
the record rather than non-attributively.   The Special Advisers’ Code of Conduct does 
not refer to the issue of attribution at all except to say that they can “represent the 
views of their minister”.  A succession of official reports recognized the sensitivity of 
this issue and by and large recommended that the government press officer should be 
designated as official spokesman: 
• Mountfield Review 1997: “We recommend that Heads of Information be identified 
as ‘the official spokesman’ for their departments…Any special adviser who briefs the 
press should be described as ‘a political adviser to’ the Minister”. 
• Public Administration Select Committee 2002: “The difficulties that have 
emerged from time to time with special advisers since 1997 have arisen in large part 
with media briefing that has gone wrong.” 
• Phillis Review 2004: “Wherever possible, (government) press officers should 
speak on the record as ‘the department’s spokesperson’”. 
The three special advisers interviewed for this study all had regular contact with 
journalists, often bearing the brunt of a media storm, but were not always clear how 
to designate their positions as sources.  The relationship with the departmental press 
office varied.  Bill Bush, policy adviser to Tessa Jowell at the Department of Culture, 
Sport and the Media (2001-2005), had previously held senior roles at No.10 and the 
BBC.  He and the minister:   
…decided that there was a very good press office.  I had worked in the media and I’d 
been used to working with journalists for a long time so I didn’t mind turning my hand 
to it, although I’d concentrate primarily on policy issues.  She was a very proper 
minister who felt that the vast bulk of the press queries should go through the press 
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office.  So there were a few things where she’d want me to handle it, but it was the 
exception rather than the rule (S25). 
This division of labour allowed the two special advisers to concentrate on policy but 
he still had intensive contact with the press office, talking “pretty well every day”: 
When things were quiet and there was no particular need, then we might not speak to 
each other for two or three days, whatever.  When stories were running, particularly 
when two or three stories were running at once, we might speak eight or nine times a 
day, three face to face, two phone calls, five texts, that sort of organic relationship 
(S25). 
He was also in frequent regular contact with journalists, some of whom knew his 
number and called him direct: 
Having said that we didn’t deal with them that much, on a quiet day, it would be two 
or three a day and on a busy day ten or a dozen.  You’d write off two hours and you’d 
just sit and churn the calls through.  Three minutes, four minutes, five minutes – make 
the call, make the call, make the call (S25). 
He described Tessa Jowell as “old fashioned” in her respect for propriety and due 
process, and a willingness to make use of “the formal machinery”, contrasting this 
with the more confrontational “high energy, hairy chested machismo approach” of 
some ministers.  The use of the term ‘old fashioned’ hints at a culture change in what 
ministers considered to be an appropriate relationship with their civil servants.  
Within the high-pressure environment of mediatized politics, a government 
department may appear obstructive because it “quite rightly, puts more weight on 
accuracy than speed” while “most government ministers and the outside world want 
speed.  They say they want accuracy but what they really want is speed.  Keep the story 
alive.”   Attribution at DCMS was usually to the official spokesperson, but where a 
briefing was given by a minister or special adviser this would be cited as “sources close 
to”.  Bush’s approach illustrates the dangers of simply assuming that politically-
appointed special advisers’ approach to media relations is solely partisan when in 
practice they may also be acting according to impartial or professional values in order 
to build credibility and trust, a factor noted in one of the only empirical examinations 
of partisan commitment in special advisers, Fisher’s interview study of MPs’ media 
advisers in the Australian parliament (Fisher, 2016).  
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Katie Waring, special adviser to Vince Cable (2010-2013), came into government with 
little experience of reactive media relations.  She too worked closely with the press 
office, describing their contribution as “critical”.  It was agreed that while they would 
handle the specialist press she would deal with the political lobby, an experience she 
described as “like having a pack of wolves at you all the time”. She spoke to political 
journalists every day, estimating that dealing with the media took up 40% of her time.  
She “would never be quoted as a spokesperson” but sometimes became a 
“spokesperson for Vince Cable” or even “a liberal democrat source”.  On one occasion, 
she briefed a departmental story about executive pay to the Independent, Sunday 
Times and The Guardian, and when it appeared, there was no way of knowing 
whether it had come from her as special adviser, or from the department.   She agrees 
that the source of much government news is “not clear, no.  I don’t think it’s clear to 
the reader.  Not to the uninitiated” (S24). 
Nick Hillman, special adviser to David Willetts (2010-2013), explains that “no-one 
trains you to be a SPAD, so you approach the job how you and your minister want you 
to approach it.”  If asked for a quote by a journalist, he would usually email it over in 
the name of David Willetts.  He worked on the assumption that the special adviser 
should “never really be quoted on the record” but could be cited in various ways, for 
example as ‘a spokesman’, or as ‘the BIS view’ (S23).  
The issue of source attribution was not especially stressed by former civil service 
respondents although, as we saw in the previous chapter, some felt uneasy about the 
role of currently serving civil servants in issuing what appeared to be partisan 
statements during the Coalition period.  One Director of Communication (2001-2014) 
agreed that there was a lack of clarity about the source of government statements 
which presents an accountability gap: 
It’s certainly not clear to the public.  And, I think its opaqueness allows - is the gap 
through which - off the record briefing meets because quotes would appear and it 
wouldn’t always be clear whether they were advisers, officials leaking, possibly No.10, 
possibly Treasury (…). It would be clear when there was an on the record 
spokesperson, but it would be a civil servant, outside of that, probably not. (C16). 
Conventions about how various spokespeople should be attributed were subject to 
implicit understandings within the department but despite concerns over the lack of 
clarity, she was not aware of any official guidance on this.  Bernard Ingham argues 
that ministers want the “flexibility” to make use of an official government voice when 
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it suits them, rather than being tied down by process and procedure: 
They want the flexibility of a Head of Information who can move effortlessly from 
information to propaganda and back again but you can’t do that and regain credibility.  
And the question is, do they want a credible information service or don’t they?  All the 
evidence is that they don’t want a credible information service; they want a 
propaganda service (C01).  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The former journalists and civil servants interviewed for this study provide witness 
accounts of significant change in the way UK governments manage the media, most 
particularly after 1997, but also continuing at least into the later years of the Coalition 
government.  As reflected in the most recent GCS propriety guidance, government 
press officers have been encouraged, indeed expected, to move further along the 
spectrum from simple explanation to active promotion of government policy.  A 
combined process of politicization and mediatization has been observed whereby 
government press officers are required to align their priorities more closely with those 
of ministers, further reinforcing the gulf between them and the wider civil service. In 
addition, since 1997 there has been a rapid injection of a small but steadily growing 
and increasingly coordinated team of media special advisers, ultimately reporting to 
the Prime Minister, but immediately answerable to the departmental Secretary of 
State, and operating largely under the radar. 
The journalists interviewed here valued the fact that special advisers could provide a 
steady supply of ready-digested news but spoke regretfully of the loss of  informal 
direct contact with politicians, and the development during the Labour years and 
beyond of a selective and partial approach to briefing journalists.  One-to-one 
briefings from special advisers provided ‘colour’ but did not give them the time or the 
scope to gather a broad enough range of information to enlighten their readers.  It 
also excluded those considered to be low priority, including those who had previously 
had good, if critical, relationships with government departments.  The ideal of 
impartiality towards journalists, as in Bernard Ingham’s claim that, “you don’t have 
favourites; you are there to serve all equally” (C01) gave way to selective briefing in 
the interests of particular ministers. 
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Many of these changes relate to ministers perceptions of the increasing risks and 
opportunities afforded by media scrutiny, and their demands for more protection and 
access to and control over the ways in which government manages the media.  Sanders 
referred to the Whitehall communications structure as being a politico-administrative 
dual service; in fact, the working practices described here more closely resemble an 
integrated service, where both political and non-political operatives dovetail their 
working arrangements in line with ministerial priorities (Sanders et al., 2011).   Even 
policy special advisers spend a significant amount of time on media-related activities, 
and appear to have taken over much of the news-led agenda-setting and strategic 
communications work that was previously the domain of the Director of 
Communication.  Similar developments towards what has been referred to as 
‘cabinetization’ have also been noted in other Westminster systems such as Australia 
and Canada (Faulkner & Everett, 2015; Gouglas & Brans, 2016; Hughes, 2015).   
As media scrutiny intensifies, we can observe through the interviews that government 
press officers are increasingly drawn into the drama of day-to-day news management, 
a testing experience which many have found exhilarating.  Indeed, the experience of 
observing a minister ‘hanging by a thread’, and finally falling, was described by one 
respondent as one of “the really fun times” (C14).  This appears counter-intuitive, 
even callous, but this comment is an honest reflection of the professional satisfaction 
of playing a key role at the heart of a fast-moving political story.  The experience of 
exhilaration in response to a high profile political media frenzy is so specific to the 
mediatized realm of the cross-field that it could even be described as a specific cross-
field effect.  The excitement of having a ringside seat at the heart of public affairs, and 
observing the rise and fall of power, is one which animates the working lives of 
journalists just as much as it does those of media intermediaries such as press officers.  
Drawing on my own experience working with VIPs (mainly celebrities), there may 
also be an element of schadenfreude at the vulnerability of a once-powerful and 
demanding individual that provides a contrast to your own less exposed and exalted 
position as a permanent official.   
Dowding sees impartiality as being less about maintaining boundaries, than about 
who wields power within the executive, and this depends on the institutional 
arrangements of which the civil service is a part.  He regards “supposed neutrality or 
impartiality” as a form of “constitutional double speak.  Ministers want and have 
always wanted, partiality” (Dowding, 1995), and within the UK’s system of executive 
dominance, they appear to have the power to achieve this.  In a parliamentary debate 
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on civil service reform in April 2014, Francis Maude, the main architect of the EMO, 
defined “the essence of impartiality” as “a passionate commitment to delivering the 
Government of the day’s priorities” (Maude, 2014).  Implicit in this definition is the 
assumption that, since politicians are elected, they alone embody the principle of 
representativeness, and hence democratic values, within the executive.  According to 
this logic, responsiveness to ministers, must, by definition, equate to public 
responsiveness since the will of ministers is the will of the public.   
An alternative definition of public responsiveness sees a responsive government as 
one that seeks to enlighten all citizens, served by an independent and pluralistic 
media, and resulting in an informed public that can hold its representatives to account 
(Buhlmann & Kriesi, 2013).  For the former No. 10 political adviser Matthew Taylor, 
the balance of power in favour of ministers and away from senior Whitehall civil 
servants has become a “critical fault line damaging departmental effectiveness” (M. 
Taylor, 2015).  Mulgan believes that the sort of responsiveness that enables public 
servants to act in accordance with what they perceive to be the wishes of their political 
masters, and to act on their own assessment of the longer term needs of the 
government as a whole, comes into conflict with the “partisan advocacy” required to 
sell the government’s narrative through the media, which has become a “core function 
of government” (Mulgan, 2008, p. 350).  Rather than questioning partisan advocacy, 
he questions whether, given the pressures against it, government media specialists 
should be held to the same constraints of impartiality as other public servants.  
However, the danger is that, within a majoritarian system of executive dominance 
such as that of the UK, granting ministers the freedom to appoint their own director 
of communications to an enhanced team of special advisers would remove one of the 
few checks and balances within the system – the obligation to speak truth to power.   
The former Home Office permanent secretary Helen Ghosh argued in a recent 
interview with the Civil Servants’ magazine, Civil Service World, that since 2010, civil 
servants had been too responsive to a “confrontational” civil service minister and had 
collectively failed to influence the reform agenda:  
I do think the civil service, from the coalition government onwards, lost self-
confidence. We had a very confrontational civil service minister in Francis Maude. I 
regret the fact that we didn’t, as an organisation, as an institution, grab the reform 
agenda ourselves and run with it more than we did. We allowed ourselves to be kind 
of responsive rather than come forward as collectively as we could well have done. We 
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lost the agenda, we gave it up, and I think that disillusioned some people (McCrory, 
2016). 
These tantalisingly vague comments beg more questions: on what grounds could and 
should civil servants have challenged Francis Maude’s reform programme, why did 
they not do so, and what have the consequences been as a result?  Who are the 
“people” who have become disillusioned?  Yet despite Ghosh’s slightly veiled 
criticism, there are similarities in her critique to the comments made by Jonathan 
Haslam in relation to Campbell’s demands for change in May 1997 which appeared in 
Chapter 4: Resilience.  He regretted that the leadership of the Government 
Information Service had not been “sufficiently forceful” to warn the incoming team 
that their approach to media briefing would ultimately threaten the government’s 
integrity and “destroy quite a lot of public confidence in central government”.  While 
not being explicit about this, both Ghosh and Haslam appear to be suggesting that 
civil servants owe a duty of care to the public beyond the immediate political 
requirements of the government of the day.   
 
In the next chapter, Representing the Public, we examine how civil servants see their 
public service role and purpose, through their perceptions of what public 
representativeness means to them.  What is, and should be, the particular 
contribution of government communications to the public accountabilities of 
government? 
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Chapter 7: Representing the Public 
”In our system you can get to run a government on 42 per cent of the vote77.  That 
means there’s a chunk of people out there who did not necessarily vote for the 
government of the day but are impacted by and are owed a professional comms 
function about what’s going on.  I think the civil service communications function 
fulfils that in a rather honourable way.”   
Howell James, Permanent Secretary, Government Communications (2004-2008)  
 
7.1 Introduction 
The ideal of the well-informed citizen, facilitated by the watchdog role of the media, 
is almost universally considered to be a pre-requisite and safeguard of representative 
democracy, but it is also one which is considered by many political communications 
scholars to be in trouble (Blumler, 2001; Blumler & Coleman, 2010; Dahlgren, 2009; 
Hallin, 2004; Kellner, 2005; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999; T. Meyer & Hinchman, 2002; 
Zaller, 1999).  National government and its web of associated executive agencies and 
arms-length bodies plays a dominant role as a prolific source of news (Graber, 2003) 
but, as we have seen, a quickening cycle of blame, and a suspicion of what is popularly 
known as ‘political spin’, is thought to be responsible for undermining public trust in 
what governments say and how they say it (Allen & Birch, 2015; Hansson, 2015; Hood, 
2011).   
Indeed, long-term opinion surveys such as the 31st British Social Attitudes Survey 
(2014) found a marked increase over 27 years in the proportion of citizens who think 
that governments ‘almost never’ “place the needs of the nation above the interests of 
their own political party”, from 11% in 1986 to 32% in 2013 (Park, Bryson, & Curtice, 
2014).  The annual Ipsos MORI Veracity Index that asks people which professions 
they trust to tell the truth, has identified a growing gulf in trust scores between 
politicians and civil servants between 1983 and 2016. In 2016, the survey recorded a 
positive net rating78 for civil servants of 27%, lower than doctors, teachers and the 
                                                          
77 Since 1979 no UK government has been elected on more than 43.9% of the vote, with the 
exception of the 2010 Coalition government, which received a total of 57.5% of the national 
vote.  The Conservative government of 2015 was elected on 36.9% of those who voted, which 
equates to about 25% of the potential parliamentary electorate. See 
http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/uktable.htm.   
78 The proportion of respondents who trusted a profession to tell the truth minus those who 
didn’t. 
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police but higher than estate agents, journalists, and, at the bottom, at minus 53%, 
politicians (IpsosMORI, 2016) (See Figure 7.1).  This increase in trust scores in civil 
servants suggests that claims that the public has become increasingly anti-
establishment rather than simply anti-politics may be simplistic (Barr, 2009; M. 
Flinders, 2015; Serazio, 2016). 
Figure 7.1: Politicians and civil servants - who is trusted to tell the 
truth? 
 
The main question of this thesis, whether the government’s response to mediatization 
after 1997 challenged the capacity of the UK government communications service to 
deliver a public communications function consistent with its own stated purposes, 
has so far been addressed through the non-normative concepts of resilience, 
resistance and responsiveness.  In this chapter we examine more normative 
questions, such as: what are the stated values and purposes of government 
communications, how robust are they, and how have they changed over time?   What 
kind of representative claim is implied by these values, and what makes good public 
communication in a democracy? 
Taking the central governing executive as not just a servant of government, but as an 
institution with both administrative and political dimensions, this chapter will 
examine some theoretical approaches that try to explain the dual nature of 
government within a democracy and the role of impartiality within it.  The earlier 
findings chapters showed how the process of mediatization, interacting with 
politicization, undermined the autonomy and resilience of government 
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communications, challenging the capacity of the service to resist political demands, 
and bypassing or even contradicting any role beyond that to serve the government of 
the day.  Since 1997 there have been consistent attempts through the use of propriety 
codes and a succession of critical inquiries - most notably the Independent Review of 
Government Communications (the Phillis Review) of 2004 - to protect the 
government communication service from ‘political contagion’ and, through the 
increasing deployment of politically appointed special advisers, to manage the 
increasingly mediated reputational fears and ambitions of ministers and governing 
parties. 
However, this attempt to hermetically seal the impartial role of the government 
communication service from ‘party political contagion’ has been only partially 
successful.  Indeed, the promises made following the Iraq WMD fiasco and the 
ensuing Phillis Review appear to have been erased from the public record and are not 
included as part of the stated aspirations of the current Government Communications 
Service (Government Communications Service, 2015a).  As we saw in Chapter 6, 
government press officers have become more responsive to ministers, while special 
advisers have occupied and transformed the domain that constitutes official news – 
an area where senior government press officers formerly held sway.  At the same time, 
a lack of transparency about the source of government news has led to a blurring of 
the line between the official and unofficial, and between government and party 
political information.   
Without clear signposting, the consumers of news, the public, do not, and indeed, 
cannot be expected to easily distinguish between forms of communication deriving 
from the GCS or directly from ministers and their aides.  When considering the extent 
to which the citizen is being adequately served, the totality of government 
communications needs to be taken into account, not just the activities and outputs of 
the GCS.  What is at stake here is more than simply the performance or 
professionalism of government communications, but the extent to which the 
government as a whole, through ministers, special advisers and civil servants, serves 
the communications needs of the public.  The information exchange between 
government and the public can be seen as part of the ‘chain of delegation’, which 
incorporates the idea of responsiveness: voters designate representatives who 
instruct executives, who activate bureaucracies (Saward, 2010). One of the links in 
the chain between citizens’ preferences and policy decision-making is a pluralistic 
media which enables the circulation of diverse and reliable sources of information, 
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and facilitates an enlightened public (Buhlmann & Kriesi, 2013) but it is not the only 
one.  The UK government’s increasing prioritising of news management as opposed 
to direct communications (advertising and marketing) has narrowed the range of 
channels through which public communication takes place (Hood & Dixon, 2015).  
It is not easy to define the public purposes of UK communications since they are 
rarely, if ever, explicitly stated except in the most general terms, as we saw in Chapter 
4, Table 4.2 which is shown again below. 
Table 4.2: Public purposes of government communications 
To inform citizens about government policy to help them reach informed 
judgements on public affairs 
To use specialist technical skills to conduct publicity without incurring 
charges of propaganda 
To provide clear, truthful and factual information   
To maintain the dividing line between party political and public 
information 
To plan centrally in order to provide a unified and coherent public 
information service 
To provide information in a way that serves the public interest 
To ensure both administrative management and political oversight 
Sources: (Cho & Benoit, 2006; Government Communications Service, 2014b; Government Information 
and Communications Service, 2000; House of Lords Select Committee on Communications, 2008; 
Mountfield, 1997; Public Administration Select Committee, 2002), see also (National Archives: Cabinet 
Papers CAB 78/37). 
As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, Resilience and Resistance, although outwardly 
stable since its inception in 1945, in practice, the GIS (later the GICS, GCN and now 
GCS) has been weakened and marginalized since 1997, lacks accountability and stated 
purposes, and has contradictory and even unachievable objectives.  Where public 
purposes have been explicitly stated, for example, through the Phillis Review, these 
have been disregarded in practice since 2010.  The most important contribution of 
the service is ostensibly to ensure impartial government communications, as stated 
so confidently by Sir Robert Armstrong when he described “the professional civil 
service communicator” as a “bulwark” against threats to impartiality (2008).  
Through interviews with government press officers, special advisers and journalists, 
this chapter examines the extent to which these respondents share Armstrong’s 
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perception, how far this idea is being realized in practice, and how impartiality relates 
to ‘good’ public communication.  What can and does government communication in 
its current form contribute to the ideal of the informed citizen?  Finally, if the ideals 
of an informed public are to be more fully realized, what should happen to 
government communications to make this more achievable? 
This chapter will examine how civil servants, and particularly government 
communicators, consider their role in relation to the public, and to what extent this 
has changed under the pressures of mediatization and politicization.   In the first 
section, I examine the views of the respondents interviewed for this study about how 
they perceive their roles as public communicators, and compare these with stated 
purposes as declared in official documents.  In the second section I critically relate 
these to theories and observations about the role of public bureaucracies within 
representative democracy in relation to mediatization.  Finally, I examine what might 
constitute good democratic government communication and evaluate current 
practice in relation to this.   
 
7.2 How government press officers’ perceive their public role 
The quote from Howell James which opened this chapter implies that there are 
considerations which government communicators must abide by that go beyond the 
needs of ministers and the government of the day, and the agendas set by the media, 
to a notional wider public.  This public includes the numerical majority which did not 
vote for the incumbent government.  In a speech in 2005, James re-stated the Phillis 
principles of good government communication and declared that the new 
Government Communications Network would “put the public at the centre of 
government communication activity”, so that its future would be “one driven by the 
views and needs of the public” (James, 2005b).  Giving evidence to the Public 
Administration Committee in 2006, James contrasted the rights of “individual 
ministers (…) about whom they choose to do business with”, with the need for 
government departments to “ensure we are offering a fair service to all players”.    
Government departments, he stated, represent the “wider public interest” and must 
“provide information in a fair and balanced way to all people who come to us whether 
the public or the media”(Public Administration Select Committee, 2006).  This would 
call into question many of the activities outlined in the previous chapter, where 
197 
 
specific journalists were targeted by both special advisers and press officers, 
according to the party political gain accrued by coverage in particular media outlets.  
James’ concept of the public role of government communications acknowledges the 
possibility of a space within the public bureaucracy that is autonomous from 
politicians, where strategic communication priorities are not determined by the 
partiality of political or media actors, but derived from a notion, albeit ill-defined, of 
an impartial ‘public good’.  At its simplest, a public good can be defined as “a 
commodity or service provided without profit to all members of a society” (Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2016), while the public good is something which serves the benefit 
or wellbeing of the public as a whole. In this sense, James’ conception is derived from 
the same notion of impartiality as that outlined by his fellow senior civil servant 
Martin Donnelly, who saw the independence of the official as the starting point for 
impartiality and good government (Donnelly, 2014), and see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1.  
Given what came before Phillis, and indeed, brought it about – the controversy over 
the WMD dossier, the row with the BBC and the death of Dr David Kelly – the 
suggestion is that the post 1997 Labour government had erred by occupying the space 
accorded to the practice of impartial judgement, in pursuit of party political goals.  
Within this space ethical and normative considerations relating to ‘public good’ apply, 
such as equity, fairness, impartiality, accountability and, as a precondition for these, 
due process (Du Gay, 2005; Mendus, 2008).  In turn, these considerations inevitably 
place limits on the extent of responsiveness to ministers. If this is the case, the 
question arises: what has become of this space post-Phillis, and what is the current 
direction of travel?  And if civil servants require some measure of autonomy to 
exercise judgement within this space, what theoretical justification can there be for 
non-elected officials to act apart from, or even in conflict with, elected officials? 
In his foreword to the 2015 GCS document The Future of Public Communications, 
the current Head of Profession, the Executive Director of Government 
Communications, Alex Aiken, explains that, in response to rapid social, economic and 
technological change, the purpose of the GCS is clear: “We are here to deliver world-
class communications that support the government’s priorities and helps deliver its 
programmes”.   In contrast to James, this deliberately functional definition places 
government communications firmly within the parameters set by the government of 
the day.  The report refers to “developing new relationships with our audiences”, and 
“building trust through two-way and open engagement with key audiences” – both 
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elements of the classic “two way symmetrical model” of public relations which could 
just as equally apply to business or consumer PR (Grunig, 1984).  It should be noted, 
however, that these comments appear in the foreword to what is a strategic document 
aimed at explaining and promoting the work of the GCS, so it should not be seen as a 
fully-explicated examination of Aiken’s vision for the service.  What is not evident in 
the document are specific references to the additional ethical and constitutional 
accountabilities required of government communications, beyond a stated 
recognition of the “core duty to enable people to make informed choices”.   
The ideal of the informed citizen is one that frequently appears in official 
pronouncements about the democratic purposes of government communications, but 
with little or no explanation or recognition of the difficulties and challenges of 
achieving this. In 1998, the Cabinet Secretary Richard Wilson told the Public 
Administration Committee that it was the duty of every government to “communicate 
its policies and its themes effectively to the public so that they understand it and so 
that the electoral process, the democratic process, can take place” (Public 
Administration Select Committee, 1998). In its review of the Jo Moore fiasco, the 
Public Administration Committee similarly referred to “the need for the Government 
to provide honest, reliable, accurate information at all times” (Public Administration 
Select Committee, 2002). The House of Lords Communications Committee 
concluded that “one of the most important tasks of government is to provide clear, 
truthful and factual information to citizens”, describing “accurate and impartial 
communication of information” as “critical to the democratic process” (House of 
Lords, 2008).   The report added that if government communications were to be truly 
‘citizen-focused’, it had to provide a “continuous dialogue with all interested parties”.  
This aspiration for a seamless, two-way communication with all audiences contrasts 
with the reality of the selective, top-down, news-led approach to media management 
that has emerged from the findings of this thesis, with its episodic discontinuity 
following changes of government. For ‘continuous’, we can also read ‘permanent’ or 
‘impartial’ – again, a subtle turn of phrase deployed by the Committee - since it is only 
continuity of service and the application of enduring values that can ensure a 
“continuous dialogue”. 
The most senior of my respondents, the former Cabinet Secretary Robin (Lord) Butler 
(C02), similarly described the public role of the government press officer as being “to 
inform the public through the media”, a task which sounds straightforward but in 
practice is fraught with difficulty, since the media do not merely transmit government 
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information but are active and sometimes disruptive participants in the process of 
public communication.  For Bernard Ingham, the public duty of the government 
communicator required that, among journalists, “you don’t have favourites; you are 
there to serve all equally”.  Jonathan Haslam agreed that “all the media ought to be 
treated equally” and added that journalists should expect something unique from the 
civil service press officer, namely “a non-party political steer on things – more factual 
– making the minister’s case but making it in a way that is balanced and objective” 
(C07). Siobhan Kenny, who had served the Major government but reached seniority 
during the Blair era, both at No.10 and leading a departmental communications team, 
added a further obligation of clarity and accessibility, so that “my mum and her mates 
would be very clear about what it was that the government was trying to do”.  There 
was “a duty to the public (…) because you are working for the taxpayer after all” (C03).  
A former Director of Communication who joined in 1991 and continued into the early 
years of the 2010 Coalition, saw the role as one that serves and tries to reconcile two 
powerful and sometimes conflicting client groups – ministers and ‘the department’.  
Officials:  
… have to be wholly loyal to the whole department and wholly loyal to what an 
individual minister of Secretary of State wants, which is rarely the same thing 79. 
Coming to an accommodation where everybody gets what they want, requires a degree 
of diplomatic skills that both have to learn (C11). 
Given a conflict between the two, many respondents expressed a primary 
responsibility to the general public, rather than solely to ministers, albeit a distant 
public whose needs, whether stated or unstated, were best met through the 
administration of ‘good government’: 
It’s about the role of government communications to communicate for the 
government, not for individual ministers, not to play party politics, and also to be a 
reasonable use of government money (C15). 
The administration of ‘good government’ required a form of public guardianship in 
order to provide “an appropriate check on what ministers want to do”.  A Director of 
Communication for the Coalition government (2001-2014) warned of the dangers of 
                                                          
79 This immediately sets up a dichotomy between what the department wants, and what the 
minister wants – one that is obscured but not obliterated by the notion of ministerial loyalty.  
How can you be “wholly loyal” to two masters, especially when they come into conflict? 
200 
 
giving in to ministers coming into government with no experience, determined to 
push their own untested and un-costed policy ideas:  
Having a partisan civil service that is essentially there to do exactly the minister’s 
bidding, who are politically sympathetic to that minister, you would not get that 
scrutiny, you wouldn’t get that challenge and that’s where, still, bad decisions get 
made (…) wasteful things happen (C16). 
A press officer during the Blair years agreed that ministers “need to be challenged, 
they need to have it pointed out to them when they may not be doing the best thing, 
from the government point of view, not the party political point of view” (C05).   
Another press officer, who left government in 2011 after 12 years’ service, saw the role 
as trying to balance the needs of at least four client groups simultaneously – the 
department’s policy makers, ministers, the public and journalists: 
You want to do justice to the policies that are being developed in the department and 
by extension the people who are developing them; you want to do justice to the 
ministers’ vision of how he or she wants to deliver on the part of his or her department.  
You want to ensure that you are informing the public of the information that they need 
in order to be equipped to make decisions.  You also need to deal with the journalists 
fairly and honestly and openly and professionally (C04). 
Loyalty to the minister was important but you also had a public duty in that: “in your 
heart, you enter the career because you want to do the best job you can to explain 
what the government is doing to the public”.   A former Director of Communication 
who left government for a leadership role in an executive agency in 2014 felt that the 
public role of government communicators, and the trust and credibility this required, 
were threatened by a combination of “noisy media” applying blame, and frightened 
ministers. This potent mix had become so overwhelming, she felt, and politicians so 
frightened of media criticism that “it just spirals into this huge gulf between the public 
and government and ministers”, leading the public to “disengage from politics” and 
conclude that “you can’t trust anything they say”.   The notion of the civil service 
communicator as a guardian of honesty, truth and “sticking to the facts”, is seen by 
both the government press officers and journalists interviewed for this study as 
essential to the role but there was “a constant tension”, as this press officer  (1999-
2004) explained: 
Researchers might have been commissioned to go away and review a 
policy…something that the minister really likes, and actually the policy is found to be 
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ineffective or not very effective or it’s not as effective as they thought and of course 
ministers didn’t necessarily want the information out there (C05). 
Decisions about how and when to place ‘inconvenient’ information within the public 
domain is not straightforward.  In one of a series of Reith Lectures on Opening Up 
Government, given in 1983, the former joint Head of the Civil Service, Sir Douglas 
Wass, argued that governments should strive “on a systematic basis to publish the 
information that they possess that will contribute to public understanding on those 
issues”.  Such decisions should not be left to ministers as this would make them 
“judges in their own court” (Wass, 1984).  
One respondent remembers an unusual decision taken during the Blair years not to 
publish the findings of a report commissioned into public attitudes towards 
immigration, describing it as a “time bomb”: 
We financed some research amongst the general public and the research showed that 
virtually everybody in the country whether they were ABC1C2DE or they were 
Guardian readers, Mail or Express, had concerns about the level of immigration, 
whether they were immigrants themselves – that’s long standing immigrants – all had 
concerns about it.  Now the government had a policy which was pro-immigration and 
they had lots of reasons why they felt it was a benefit but they didn’t go out there and 
promote it… that research was put under lock and key.  It was never used (C10). 
The decision not to make these findings public was unprecedented in this 
interviewee’s experience, since custom and practice at the time held that information 
funded by the taxpayer should always be made available in some form.  In her view, 
it also led to policy failures because, without acknowledging the fact that a significant 
majority of the population had concerns about immigration, it was harder to address 
or challenge them.  
The question as to whether, over time, decisions not to publish publicly funded 
research have become more common, is beyond the scope of this study, but news 
stories have occasionally surfaced about similar omissions, for example, in 1994, 
when it was claimed that eight Home Office research projects were “being 
systematically shelved by ministers” because their findings contradicted the Home 
Secretary Michael Howard’s policy agenda (Travis, 1994, p. 1).  In 2014, two stories 
appeared accusing Downing Street of suppressing a report that fewer jobs were taken 
by immigrants than had been claimed by the then Home Secretary, Theresa May 
(Cook, 2014; Perry, 2014).  In a recent report, the independent campaigning charity, 
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Sense about Science, uncovered evidence of delays in the publication of government-
funded research, and called on the government to comply with its own protocols that 
ensure that the public has the chance to see the product of external research.  There 
were several examples of delay due to findings which contradicted previously stated 
government policy: 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) explained delay in 
the publication of food banks research in 2013 as resulting from the peer review 
process.   However, the authors of the study said that the initial peer review was 
positive and that concerns were raised subsequently about how the findings would 
impact on policy.  
 
In the case of research into immigration and the labour market it appears that 
government was happy to publish previous research that supported what ministers 
had been saying, but held back analysis that challenged it. In the case of a study into 
drugs policy in other countries, this inquiry was unable to find any reasons other 
than political ones for why publication was delayed. 
 
The report concludes that without a comprehensive register of such research, delays 
or even suppression, are more likely since the process is not publicly transparent 
(Sedley, 2016, p. 16).  Although beyond the scope of this study, this issue would be 
worth further research in order to see whether delays or omissions are becoming more 
common.  One would expect this to be the case in an environment where ministers 
are more exposed to media scrutiny.  As ministers become more sensitive to the 
potential risks of mediated reputational damage, they increase their control over 
what, when and how information is placed in the public domain. 
Given the sheer difficulties of devising, drafting and delivering complex policy and 
introducing contentious and difficult legislation within an adversarial media and 
political context, respondents felt that it was important that ministers trusted the 
media team to protect them.  According to Howell James, this was a subtle process 
which required “an understanding of the tone and the manner in which to operate in 
order to support (them)” (C08).  This protective role goes beyond that of the ‘bag 
carrier’ as referenced in the previous chapter and owes more to the origin of the civil 
servant as courtier or counsellor, than as a guardian of the public good.  Supporting 
ministers sensitively at difficult times is to uphold ‘good government’ by providing a 
negotiated ethical and procedural framework within which politicians can apply 
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political judgement.  The idea that ‘the line’ between partisan and impartial 
communication is subject to compromise or negotiation is enshrined in government 
communications guidance with this advice to government press officers that “it is 
right to explore whether a compromise can be reached that will not breach propriety. 
If no such compromise can be found, then it will be necessary to give a polite refusal” 
(Government Communications Service, 2014b).  In the heat of the moment, with the 
risk of reputational damage ever-present in the ‘cross-field’, the whole truth, or even 
a partial truth, may be a fragile beast in this environment.  
Journalists interviewed for this study identified government press officers as aligning 
themselves more closely to the truth than special advisers or ministers.  However, this 
former Director of Communication who left government in 2014 argues that 
government media relations specialists have both “huge responsibility and some 
culpability in being a contributor to that breakdown in trust because of the lies that 
get spun”, implying that culpability lies in preventing untruths from others, as 
opposed to uttering them personally (C16).   One journalist went off the record to state 
that he had dealt with special advisers who “I knew for a fact would lie to me, so I 
would stop talking to them.  It’s pointless if they are going to lie to you.”  In contrast, 
he recalled, “I’ve never had a press officer lie to me (…) and it’s kind of crucial.  
Because what do you believe?”    
Journalists too, are perceived as having an attachment to the truth, however flimsy. 
Bernard Ingham found that they “stretch things; they reach heroic conclusions on the 
basis of the flimsiest evidence (…) but in the end they do not make it up” (C01). Bill 
Bush, special adviser to Tessa Jowell at the DCMS (2001-2005), agrees that outright 
invention by journalists was rare but felt that this was almost beside the point.  He 
frequently dealt with stories that had “a kernel of truth but it’s basically so 
overwrought and de-contextualized that it’s as good as a lie”.   Much time, effort and 
psychic energy was taken up with “dealing with distortions, and exaggerations; so 
distorted that it has the effect of being dishonest”.  What mattered to journalists was 
a story, albeit based on truth that could entertain: “lots of journalists, they don’t care 
about the truth very much.  What they care about is impact, they care about bums on 
seats, eyeballs attracted” (S25). 
As discussed in chapter 3, the mediatization scholars Kunelius and Reunanen would 
argue that this preoccupation with claiming public  ‘attention’ applies equally to 
politicians (and their aides) as to journalists (Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012).   Yet, far 
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from claiming a watchdog role in relation to government, when asked how they saw 
their public role, the journalists interviewed for this study all expressed a pragmatic 
and rather prosaic view about what they were there to do.  Their responses were brief 
and to the point, shown in full below: 
Table 7.2: How journalists saw their role 
Bringing stories back to base. Explaining to people what was going on and not 
being frightened to report what was embarrassing. J20. 
A reporter is there to go out and get facts and report from an event, a disaster, 
war or whatever it is, and send back news that is as accurate as you can possibly 
get, and as balanced as you can possibly get. J22. 
The guts of journalism remains being an eye witness really.  What’s happened 
factually, and why…the very basic questions that you should answer for readers 
or listeners, and that hasn’t fundamentally changed at all. J18. 
Just to get big stories all the time. J17. 
It’s about finding things out and telling people about it.  Simple as that. J19. 
It is telling a story, pleasing an audience.  It is a sort of performance journalism.  
Journalism in a way is a sort of branch of show business.  It’s certainly a business. 
J18. 
You are fighting every week for space against the other journalists, it’s a very 
individualistic culture.  C12. 
One gets a huge adrenalin rush from a scoop, in defiance of agencies that don’t 
want you to make that revelation but I think that’s a bit overstated…the analysis 
and explanation can be almost as satisfying professionally J21. 
 
This discrepancy between the idealised role of the journalist as ‘watchdog’, or Fourth 
Estate, and actual practice, has been widely observed in the literature (Barnett & 
Gaber, 2001a; Hampton, 2010; Lewis, Williams, & Franklin, 2008; Mellado & Van 
Dalen, 2014; Tambini, 2013), and it could be that the experienced group of journalists 
interviewed for this study is more realistic, reflexive and self-critical than average.  
However, we would have expected these interviewees to have been particularly well-
oriented towards the watchdog role.  As specialist beat journalists they were relatively 
autonomous, as long serving professionals they ‘came of age’ during the ‘high 
modernist’ period of journalism (1960s-90s), and, working for quality newspapers or 
broadcasters, they were expected to get close to power but to question it (Eriksson & 
Ostman, 2013).   
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Given the difficulties and pressures to “bring stories back to base” (J20), and although 
vital in uncovering information essential to an honest democracy, it has been argued 
that journalism cannot be guaranteed to provide consistent checks and balances 
against the powerful (Dahlgren, 2009).  Graber argues that journalists are “miscast” 
as watchdogs since their powers are too limited to match politicians’ powers to 
conceal or exaggerate (Graber, 2003).  The role of media outlets as businesses which 
must attract readers, users or audiences to survive, also means that they cannot 
operate purely or even predominantly in the public interest, even supposing that they 
could ever be informed enough about internal government processes to do so.   
Petley argues that the freedom of the press is just one side of the equation, and that 
democratic public communication requires more than simply journalists’ freedom 
from law and regulation.  From the point of view of the public, and democratic society, 
readers need the freedom “to access the kinds of information which they need to 
function effectively as citizens of a democracy”.  This requirement is not well served 
by a media that routinely “impoverishes public debates” and “gives rise to a 
particularly poisonous form of anti-political populism” (Petley, 2012, p. 537).  Getting 
the story, and helping audiences to understand complex policy and political matters 
may be a prerequisite for an “informal accountability” but it does not replace “formal 
democratic accountability” (Bovens, 2007).  For Graber, what is crucial is “the spirit 
in which political elites conduct the affairs of government” (p156); a conclusion also 
reached by Leveson who placed the responsibility for improving the relationship with 
between politicians and the press with politicians rather than journalists (Graber, 
2003, p. 156; Leveson, 2012).    
As we saw with the case of the UK’s WMD dossier of September 2002, within the 
context of a powerful government’s influence on not just the news agenda, but on the 
narratives that influence what is defined as news, journalists alone cannot prevent the 
abuse of communicative power at the centre, and indeed, may become accomplices in 
it, albeit inadvertently or reluctantly (Herring & Robinson, 2014). As we saw in the 
previous chapter, the selective briefing of exclusives by government insiders increases 
the dependence of journalists on certain privileged sources (Barnett & Gaber, 2001a; 
Franklin, 2004).   To simply accuse politicians and governments of ‘political spin’ is 
to misunderstand the depth of the problem, as touched on in Chapter 1.  If the 
government’s commitment to providing citizens with enough of the right kind of 
information about government policy to help them reach informed judgements on 
public affairs is compromised, weakened and subject to inadequate forms of 
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accountability and redress, journalists will struggle to see the whole picture, let alone 
report it.   
 
7.3 Public bureaucracy, representative democracy and 
mediatization 
“Part of democratic theory’s crisis right now has to do with the seeming incapacity, 
unwillingness, or outright refusal of contemporary democracies to embrace, 
promote, and invest in public or shared things. A perfect storm of privatization and 
austerity politics (the latter arguably a consequence of the former and its 
deregulation policies) undermined an earlier nineteenth and twentieth century 
commitment to democratic governance as a generator of public goods.” Bonnie 
Honig (Honig, 2015) 
 
We have already considered the public good as a concept that applies to the public as 
a whole, not just the electorate, or those who voted for or are expected to vote for, a 
particular party.  This concept accepts the government of the majority according to 
shared and understood electoral rules, operating accountably under a transparent 
form of due process.  It is clear that the former government press officers interviewed 
for this study believe that they are ultimately working for this conception of the public 
as citizens, not just voters, and that they have a responsibility, in theory at least, to do 
more than simply “the minister’s bidding” (C16).  Indeed, Howell James, who has 
performed both partisan and impartial roles in Whitehall, considers the public service 
obligation to serve all citizens equally as an “honourable” fulfilment of the role of the 
government communicator.  
More specifically, the interviewees believe that the demands of ethics, equity and 
propriety require that they can and should intervene as professionals to provide a 
check on ministerial activity, not only to serve the public in an abstract sense but to 
ensure the proper administration of tax-payers’ money.  The last resort of leaking 
government information however is rare among communications officials 80 , 
according to the journalists interviewed here, and, as we saw earlier, was described in 
one interview study with senior civil servants as totally unacceptable, even  
“contemptible” (Barker & Wilson, 1997).  The public appeared to disagree. In the 
celebrated 1985 trial of Clive Ponting, the senior civil servant who leaked the truth 
                                                          
80 The former civil servant-turned-special-adviser to Gordon Brown, Damian McBride, is 
referred to by many interviewees as a rare exception which proves the rule.   
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about the sinking of the Argentinian cruise ship, the Belgrano, to an opposition MP, 
the jury found him not guilty on grounds of public interest.  This was in spite of the 
judge, Sir Anthony Cowan, indicating that the jury should convict him and that “the 
interests of the state” can only be “the policies of the government then in power” 
(Norton-Taylor, 1985, p. 110).  Although it is rare for civil servants to publicly disagree 
with ministers, the former Cabinet Secretary, Lord (Gus) O’Donnell, described 
challenge as a core part of the job, when he told a Select Committee that: “The vital 
function of the civil service is to implement the programme of the democratically 
elected government but it is also our job along the way to challenge that” (Public 
Administration Select Committee, 2013b).    
In this section we consider what the notion of the public might mean in the context of 
government communications, and ask on what basis public bureaucracies in general, 
and the communications function in particular, can and should claim a degree of 
autonomy to act in the public interest.   At the heart of this discussion are two key 
concepts: firstly, the meaning of public opinion, and secondly, the notion of 
impartiality, an idea which is valorised throughout the political domain, even as the 
conditions for its successful implementation are placed under threat.  Dahlgren has 
claimed that the aim of all parties within a democracy should be “to engender a more 
democratic, equitable, and accountable power balance for citizens” (Dahlgren, 2013, 
p. 168), but where should this balance lie?  On what grounds can government 
communicators in general, and press officers in particular, as civil servants, claim to 
represent the public? 
7.3.1 The meaning of public opinion 
It has been claimed that politicians misrecognise media coverage as a proxy for public 
opinion, while the public misrecognises news coverage as an accurate reflection of the 
world of politics (Hjarvard, 2013). Couldry, following Champagne, describes a 
‘circular logic’ whereby “journalists and politicians ‘react’ to a version of public 
opinion which they have largely constructed” (Couldry, 2014, p. 233).  For Graber, the 
idea that the media give voice to public opinion is a myth, since they do not have the 
capacity to systematically survey it.  Most news stories are sourced from ‘media beats’ 
covering selected elite public and private institutions, and certainly not the general 
public (Graber, 2003).  The former Conservative government minister, Ann 
Widdecombe (1992-97), for example, had no hesitation in conflating media coverage 
with public opinion, as she revealed in this interview in 2007:   
208 
 
We never discussed a policy without discussing the media impact, ever, because you 
would be very blind if you just launched policy and didn’t work out exactly what people 
were likely to make of it. (Davis, 2007a, p. 188).    
A similarly revealing comment comes from the former Liberal Democrat Business 
Secretary, Vince Cable (2010-2015), who recently told an interviewer that, as an 
overworked cabinet minister:  
I have to say we got quite remote from Parliament – that was one of the slightly 
surprising things about the job (…).  It was much, much, much more about the media. 
Every day I would be having three or four conversations with my special adviser about 
radio, television, and what we were trying to say. I was quite active in the media and 
that was how I communicated rather than through Parliament (Cable, 2015). 
Ministers’ sensitivity to news coverage, and their fear of media scrutiny, has been 
widely noted elsewhere in this thesis, as has their frustration with the spiral of distrust 
that it generates (Blair, 2013; Leveson, 2012).  The attempt to distance themselves by 
delegating to special advisers the task of the daily battle over the news agenda runs 
the risk of rebounding on them.  Journalists react to what they see as the collusion 
and manipulation inherent in non-attributable selective briefing by accusing 
politicians of political spin, and maintaining a steady narrative of the untrustworthy 
politician.  At the core of this distrust is the popular assumption that politicians 
always act in self-interest or in the interests of their party, rather than the interests of 
the public, an erroneous assumption that leads to Cappella and Jamieson’s corrosive 
‘spiral of cynicism’ (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Dahlgren, 2013).  In their own 
accounts and those of observers, politicians appear to be caught in an “autonomous 
dynamic” of a media and political arms-race that is beyond their control, from which 
they cannot escape and in which they are always in the wrong, whether they seek 
media attention or avoid it (Farrell & Schmitt-Back, 2002; Norris, 2000b).   
In recognition of its self-sustaining nature, scholars depict the lure of media attention 
for politicians in almost sexual terms as a form of ‘temptation’; a powerful force that 
they are unable to ‘resist’.  Yeung, for example, in her otherwise cogent and sober 
analysis of the regulation of UK government communications, refers to “the 
irresistible pressure on ministers to clothe their policy choices in the most attractive 
media-receptive wrapping”, adding that: “the temptation to engage in spin becomes 
almost irresistible” (Yeung, 2006, pp. 55-56).  Where politicians do resist the 
temptation, it seems unusual, even quirky. The former special adviser Bill Bush had 
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this to say about his minister Tessa Jowell’s distinctively ‘proper’ approach to 
government communication: 
I’m not saying that other ministers were, but she’s not the kind of person who wanted 
to us to spin night and day, talking to the press, guiding stories, getting her name in 
when she wanted it, getting her name out when she wanted it. She was slightly old 
fashioned (S25). 
Much has been written about the decline in democratic participation and public 
distrust of politicians and political institutions, and it is not my purpose here to 
summarise this or offer a definitive account of the concept of public opinion.   
However, it is worth identifying some long term trends that try to explain where 
public disquiet lies.  As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the trend during the 
last 30 years has been for a large and growing gulf between the public trust accorded 
to civil servants and politicians to tell the truth (See Figure 7.1).  It is not clear why 
but possibly partiality, or the political process itself, are increasingly negatively 
associated in the public mind with the likelihood of truth-telling.   
Such distrust is not necessarily translated into a lack of trust in democracy.  The 2012-
13 European Social Survey looked at public perceptions about how successfully 
governments engage with the public, and found that rather than being disillusioned 
with the idea of democracy, British respondents showed widespread support for its 
main tenets, namely: free and fair elections and equal treatment by the courts.  There 
was agreement among people from across the political spectrum and all levels of 
education that government should explain its decisions to voters but that public 
information provision is also the area where respondents perceive the greatest deficit.  
Nearly a quarter thought it very important that the government explains its decisions 
to voters but that the government was fulfilling their expectations in this respect (Park 
et al., 2014).   Interestingly, a recent academic survey conducted through the pollster, 
YouGov, found that support for direct democracy was associated with a perception of 
dishonesty and lack of empathy on the part of politicians rather than dissatisfaction 
with policy (Allen & Birch, 2015).  The authors suggest that “strengthening existing 
representative practices and protecting them from abuse would have a more positive 
impact on public opinion than expanding the use of referenda” (p407).  They are not 
clear about what they mean by “representative practices” but I would argue that 
government communications could be considered to be just such a practice. 
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What, then, are we to make of the contradiction that, as ministers and their aides 
strive ever harder to deliver government messages through the prism of an 
increasingly fragmenting and unpredictable media, the public tell pollsters that they 
are not kept informed and yet are over-exposed to what they consider to be self-
serving and partial information?  One obvious answer is that the public feels it is being 
given too much of the wrong information.  If so, this has been going on for some time.   
Whiteley et al. analyzed answers to the same question asked every week during the 16 
years between 1997 and 2013: do you think the (British) government is honest? 
(Whiteley et al., 2016).   As Figure 7.3 (overleaf) reveals, the results show regular 
variations in perceptions of honesty (as displayed in the small peaks and troughs) but 
a definite and overwhelming long-term decline in assessments of honesty related to 
key events such as the Iraq War and the MPs expenses scandal. The changes of 
administration in 1997 and 2010 provided a short term boost to the perceived 
trustworthiness of governments but over the long term this was followed by even 
steeper declines.   
Ingelhart analyzed the rise and fall of democratic systems globally in the light of a 
range of variables and argues that the stability of democratic systems has been shown 
to depend on “what ordinary people think and feel”. If these opinion surveys represent 
genuine long term change in the “cultural orientations of citizens” away from support 
for democratic institutions, we could be entering a new era of democratic instability 
(Inglehart, 1999, pp. 119, 101).  A cross-national study found that citizens’ perceptions 
of electoral misconduct reduced citizens’ voting propensities, while perceptions of 
MPs’ integrity were found to have influenced turnout in the British election of 1997 
(Allen & Birch, 2015).   
From the point of view of the claims of civil servants to represent the public, it is 
notable that, over time, they are perceived as being increasing trusted to tell the truth.  
Saward has argued that, where such claims can be credibly sustained by a reasonable 
number of constituents over time, there is a strong case for assuming that the claim 
has some democratic legitimacy (Saward, 2010).  According to this argument, and 
supporting Howell James’ notion of the public role of civil servants, some “non-
elective representational claims” are possible, even desirable.  It is not only politicians 
who can claim some form of democratic legitimacy within government (Alonso, 
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Figure 7.3:  Perceptions that the British government is honest and 
trustworthy (1997-2013) 
Source: (Whiteley et al., 2016). 
Keane, & Merkel, 2011).  The Fourth Estate ideal of journalism, albeit tarnished in 
practice, and frequently challenged, has allowed journalists to claim some 
independent legitimacy in public life.  Could the same claim be made of civil servants? 
7.3.2 The two faces of democracy 
We referred in chapter 2 to the dual nature of government as a simultaneously 
administrative and political entity.  My intention here is not to explore the vast 
literatures on representative democracy but to look at those aspects of democratic 
theory that relate to claims by public administrators they that they serve a public 
interest beyond that of the government of the day.  Such claims go back to the origins 
of the modern state bureaucracy in the later 19th century but to what extent are they 
being challenged by the process of mediatization? As we saw in Chapter 2, Aucoin has 
argued that modern administrations have become increasingly mediatized and 
politically aligned; giving rise to the “promiscuous partisan”, an official who 
enthusiastically serves the needs of ministers at all times and, most crucially, actively 
promotes the government agenda to external stakeholders (Aucoin, 2012).  For 
Aucoin, the government’s communications function is one that most risks becoming 
“the black hole of public service impartiality” (p183), especially when explicitly 
required to promote the government’s message by advancing and defending its 
merits.  Grube argues that, with the latest Propriety Guidance from the GCS requiring 
just this, that point has been reached, and there is now “little room for civil servants 
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to resist pressure to actively justify government policy” (Government 
Communications Service, 2014b; Grube, 2015). 
These conclusions rest on an understanding of executive government in liberal 
democracies as a dual form of legitimacy where two dimensions – the administrative 
and the political – are held to be in a form of “dynamic equilibrium”(Bovens, 2007, p. 
463).  Within representative democracy both arms of government claim to represent 
the citizen, but each claim is partial, and both are assumed to be capable of abuse.  
The key to public representation is a balance between the two claims, but this balance 
is historically contingent and subject to periodic crisis, often in response to external 
social change (Manin, 1997). The democratic theorist, Rosanvallon, argues that there 
is a further gap in representation because majority rule rests on a “dual fiction”, 
firstly, that the election process, whatever form it takes, stands for a mandate; and, 
secondly, that the dominant (or winning) faction, stands for society as a whole 
(Rosanvallon, 2011) (my emphasis).  More complete public representation therefore, 
is achieved when partisan rule by democratic mandate is countered by “non-partisan, 
bureaucratic rationality” (p45). With the arrival of universal suffrage and mass 
democracy in Britain between 1867 and 1918, a partnership between party democracy 
and an increasingly powerful public bureaucracy, allowed for the institutionalisation 
of conflict and its resolution. In the older liberal democracies in Europe and the US,  
the public bureaucracy became a “countervailing institution” which checked and 
moderated the powers of political patronage and majority rule, while parliament 
became “an instrument that measures and registers the relative forces of clashing 
social interests”(Lee, 2011; Manin, 1997, pp. 231, 198).   
These assumptions came under threat from the 1980s onwards, as New Public 
Management (NPM), and the rhetoric surrounding it, undermined the status and 
legitimacy of public administration. With the rise of the mass media, and challenges 
to both political and administrative legitimacy, Manin argues that the balance of 
public accountability, albeit informal rather than formal, has shifted away from 
parliament and towards the media, while executive responsibility, and hence blame, 
is shared between central government and the welter of regulators and executive 
agencies that characterise modern systems of “divided governance” (Schillemans, 
2012).  Party democracy has given way to audience democracy, where “the electorate 
appears above all, as an audience which responds to the terms that have been 
presented on the political stage” (Manin, 1997, p. 16).  For Rosanvallon, in this new 
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era of ‘reflexive democracy’ the demands of “round the clock news and generalized 
transparency” make it harder to be impartial because: 
To be impartial is to avoid being swayed by public opinion, to avoid compromise and 
to pay attention to everyone’s needs by treating all issues according to the dictates of 
law and reason….   
Today’s politicians may appear to be affable communicators and skilled performers 
but (…) their accomplished performances may in fact conceal the revival of old and 
terrifying perversions of democratic rule”.  (Rosanvallon, 2011, pp. 98, 177, 202). 
This appears over-dramatic but in essence, Rosanvallon’s argument is that 
democratic rule itself is put under threat by politicians’ acceptance of media logic, or, 
to use a term more consistent with the ‘embedded media’ approach taken in this 
study, their participation in a “culture of mediatization” (Hepp, 2013b).  The diffusion 
of media-related norms within public bureaucracies is a growing area of interest for 
northern European mediatization scholars, who are using observational methods to 
penetrate the discreet corridors of power and ask how, in everyday practice, officials 
reconcile the ethical norms of impartiality and due process, with politicians’ growing 
appetite for media attention (Couldry, 2003; Figenschou & Thorbjornsrud, 2015; 
Fredriksson et al., 2015; Pallas & Fredriksson, 2014).  
In their ethnographic study from within a PR team in a Norwegian government 
department, as cited in Chapter 2, Thorbjornsrud et al observed a struggle between 
“legitimate bureaucratic governance” and “arbitrary rule”, concluding that media 
norms are driving civil servants towards the latter through a “diffuse, porous and 
informal” infiltrating rationale (Thorbjornsrud et al., 2014, p. 7).  The authors argue 
that the traditional norm that “bureaucrats have a rationale of their own”, is being 
challenged by the more recent notion that public bureaucracies are simply an 
“extension of politics.” Echoing some of the findings in this study, their interview with 
a senior communications official suggests, at the very least, a decline in autonomy for 
the information function: 
Today, in contrast to previous years, one puts way more emphasis on the fact that the 
ministry is a secretariat of the political leadership.  Earlier one claimed to be a general 
information and communication umbrella, independent of the political executives 
(Figenschou & Thorbjornsrud, 2015, pp. 1955-1956). 
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In their observational study of a Swedish executive agency, Pallas et al similarly noted 
a change in the practices of public officials as media logic competed with bureaucratic 
logic, leading to a speeding up of the policy cycle, attempts on the part of officials to 
anticipate media reaction, and a simplification of policy presentation, which appear 
to be driving a wedge between public-facing and backstage officials.  Their finding 
that communication officials “struggle to strike the right balance between providing 
correct, neutral and comprehensive information, and promoting what political 
leaders need and journalists want” is borne out in the interviews carried out for this 
study (Pallas, Strannegard, & Jonsson, 2014, p. 4).   
Esser sees the process of mediatization as the intrusion of media logic within non-
media domains.  This poses a challenge for democracy where the dominant mass 
media come to see themselves, and are seen as, “the (better) representative of the 
public will” (p169). He cites the warning from Mazzoleni and Schulz that, the “absence 
of accountability” on the part of the media “violates the classic rule of balances of 
power in the democratic game, making the media (the fourth branch of government) 
an influential and uncontrollable force that is protected from the sanction of public 
will”  (Esser, 2013; Mazzoleni & Schulz, 1999, p. 248).  As the comments from the 
journalists interviewed for this study suggest, the idea of the media as ‘fourth estate’ 
is one which they may be happy to utilise in their struggle to get the story, but it is not 
a role they claim, or one which they feel obliged to account for.   
To return to one of the questions posed at the start of this section, what is the 
particular contribution of civil servants working within government communications 
in realizing the ideal of the informed citizen?   Ultimately, as we saw in chapter 6, 
Resistance, challenging a ministerial mandate involves risk because it takes place 
within the context of an asymmetric relationship. If, as we have seen, politicians are 
driven to seek legitimacy and protect their reputations by engaging with media, any 
challenge by officials is likely to require a battle on two fronts: against the ministerial 
mandate itself and against the minister’s drive to engage with media.  Yet there is a 
long tradition of challenge on the part of public servants.  Paul’s insight into 16th 
century thought in relation to the role of the princely adviser identifies the Greek 
concept of parrhesia - a truthful speech act within an unequal power relation, where 
the courtier is obliged to give advice that would benefit the public, even at risk to 
himself (Paul, 2015).  Here, service is distinguished from servitude.  The question is, 
to what extent do given institutional arrangements make it feasible for such challenge 
to take place? 
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The concept of parrhesia is relevant today, not because the ruler has absolute power 
and needs to be protected from him/herself, but because the ruler is overburdened 
with responsibility, exposed to career limiting public blame, and constantly struggling 
to ensure his or her short term electoral survival.  The Weberian ideal of ‘the bureau’ 
facilitates democratic governance through two ostensibly opposing activities: 
bureaucratic ‘rule’ to ensure “the collective control which makes democracy possible”, 
and electoral ‘response’ to enable regular “adjustments to that order (Goodsell, 2005, 
p. 19).  ‘Rule’ requires that “discretion is not abused, that due process is the norm and 
not the exception, and that undue risks are not taken that undermine the integrity of 
the political system” (Du Gay, 2005, p. 4).  Both the Chilcot and Butler enquiries 
conclude that such safeguards were not in place during the months leading up to the 
publication of the September 2002 dossier Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(Butler, 2004; Chilcot, 2016a).  I would argue that they are not upheld,  either by the 
most recent Propriety Guidance (2014), or the latest Code of Conduct for Special 
Advisers (2015), because these fail to acknowledge that civil servants have 
fundamental obligations that go beyond simply the government of the day. 
 
7.4 What makes good government communications? 
We saw earlier that the Secretary of State Tessa Jowell’s approach to government 
communication was described by her former special adviser as “old-fashioned” 
because it heeded the division of labour between administrative and political civil 
servants and paid attention to due process.   The fact that such considerations are 
considered to be old fashioned supports claims that during the Blair years at least, 
ministers had become less constrained over time by ideas of ‘due process’ (Chilcot, 
2016a; Foster, 2016).  Earlier we examined the arguments of Aucoin, Manin and 
Rosanvallon that a more complete realisation of public representation in government 
is achieved when both administrative and political dimensions are brought into play.  
This is especially critical where the communications function is concerned because of 
the potential for public misinformation and deceit, and the link between public trust 
and the stability of democratic systems.  The Phillis Review of 2004 was one attempt, 
albeit abortively as it turned out, to achieve a more effective synergy between the 
public responsibilities of politicians and civil servants by aligning government 
communications more explicitly to the needs of the public.   
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In the light of these arguments, it is worth looking again at recent contrasting 
statements about civil service impartiality from two rival Conservative politicians that 
were first cited in Chapter 1, Bernard Jenkin and Francis Maude.  Both speak from a 
position of ‘situated agency’:  Jenkin as chair of the parliamentary scrutiny body 
which holds departments and ministers to account; and Maude as minister for the 
Cabinet Office (2010-2015), the sprawling department which, among other tasks, has 
jurisdiction over government-wide communications, propriety and ethics. Maude 
was responsible for chairing the Government Communications Service Board, a 
committee described in the GCS Handbook as “the most important decision-making 
body in the GCS”, which “governs the activity of the GCS” (2015a).  These two 
politicians’ interpretations of the meaning of civil service impartiality must be seen in 
relation to their roles as incumbent politician and parliamentary scrutinizer 
respectively: 
Governments come and go, and, in the absence of a codified constitution or formal 
separation of powers, it is this body of permanent officials that underpins the 
constitutional stability of our country.  That is why a permanent and impartial civil 
service was established. Bernard Jenkin (April 2014) 
The essence of impartiality is not indifference to the Government of the day but the 
ability to be equally passionate and committed to implementing a future 
Government’s priorities and programme…It must be a passionate commitment to 
delivering the Government of the day’s priorities. Francis Maude (April 2014) 
Jenkin’s is the classic view of the UK civil service as a public-minded body of officials 
that has obligations within the constitution that are upheld through the practice of 
impartiality from a position of job security and permanence and go beyond the 
government of the day.  Maude equates lack of passion with indifference, and seeks 
to bind civil servants to the priorities of the government of the day, painting a picture 
that looks much like Aucoin’s notion of ‘promiscuous partisanship’.  It is the latter 
perspective, which appears to drive much reform in government, including the New 
Labour approach to government communications after 1997, and Maude’s own, albeit 
aborted, proposals for Extended Ministerial Offices after 2010 (Civil Service Reform 
Plan, 2012).   This begs the question as to what safeguards are or should be in place 
to ensure that the public interest is not undermined by partisan reform posing as 
‘modernization’, or the law of unintended consequences; a subject dealt with in the 
final chapter.  
217 
 
7.4.1 Models of good government communication 
It is not difficult to find criticism about what makes bad government communication, 
but there are few models for what makes good communication between a government 
and its publics.  For Bernard Ingham, government information must above all be 
credible, but this is only possible by “upholding standards” at the highest level, 
something which he believes is not popular with some ministers because “they want 
the flexibility of a head of information who can move effortlessly from information to 
propaganda and back again” (C01). As we saw in Chapter 6, ministers have resisted 
setting clear standards in relation to the media role of special advisers, probably for 
the same reason.   
An extensive study looking at PR excellence in government communications in 15 
liberal democracies examined performance according to attributes such as training, 
recruitment, propriety conventions, transparency and e-government. Examining 
administrative documents relating to the staffing and operation of each government 
communication service, the audit found that, together with Australia and the US, the 
UK was relatively transparent and citizen-focused as opposed to party-oriented, and 
was among the least partisan.  The authors conclude, somewhat surprisingly in view 
of the evidence presented here, that “only civil servants are spokespeople,” a situation 
they regard as unique to the UK.  They concede, however, that “an informal system of 
political government spokespeople functions through the network of special advisers” 
(Canel & Sanders, 2013, pp.296, 303).   It is this informal  special advisers’ network 
which this study has shown has had a crucial impact on the process by which 
government news is mediated; a finding that, as stated earlier, suggests that any 
consideration of government communications, and especially media relations, must 
include the activities of this network, both within departments and centrally at 
Number 10. Canel and Sanders’ conclusions are interesting, and heartening, but they 
represent a snapshot rather than a period of change, are based largely on evidence 
relating to the period between 2008 and 2011, before the closure of the COI.  They 
also rest on available documentary evidence such as propriety guidance and official 
staffing figures, which as we have seen, cannot be relied on to accurately reflect the 
actual everyday processes of the Government Communications Service.   I would 
argue that this approach, although valuable, does not sufficiently address the political, 
ethical and media constraints within which government communicators have to 
operate, and which have a bearing on issues of public trust.  The authors characterise 
the ‘spin debate’ as “a healthy indicator of a press sector prepared to hold politicians 
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to account” (p309) but this does not take into account the complicity of journalists in 
the process of spin, as discussed in Chapter 1.  It also  does not take account of more 
substantive critiques of UK government communications since 1997, such as the one 
presented in this thesis, which go well beyond debates about ‘political spin’.  These 
include the shift away from citizen-focused communication such as direct 
communication and towards more mediated communication; the reconfiguring of 
government news management through the prism of special advisers; the blurring of 
the distinction between official and non-attributable sources within government; and 
the increasing use of media as a channel for public accountability as an alternative to 
parliament.    
Informed by broader considerations of how members of the public engage with 
politics and policy decision-making, Blumler and Coleman recently proposed three 
founding principles of democratic communication which recognise the power 
asymmetries between governments and citizens and seek to build in genuine 
accountability: 
1. Everyone is equally entitled to be well informed and taken into account when 
decisions are made  
2. Holders of significant power must account for the way they exercise it and ensure 
that "a public interest is being served”  
3. Effective channels of exchange and dialogue between citizens and decision makers 
are required (Blumler & Coleman, 2015). 
The idea that citizens are entitled to receive information about policy decisions, to be 
consulted about them, and to question the holders of ‘significant power’ (presumably 
ministers and senior civil servants) about how they exercise it in the public interest, 
is a long way from the cloistered, self-regulating world of media management in 
Whitehall.  This would require a machinery for accountability, with externally 
validated criteria for what represents the ‘public interest’, and the power to apply 
sanctions where breaches occur.  Yeung’s review of government communications 
regulation from a legal standpoint argues that the current system of internal self-
regulation on the basis of propriety conventions does not protect the system from its 
greatest threat, namely, “ministerial overreaching”, leading to pressure on civil 
servants to “stray beyond legitimate policy exposition into the territory of illegitimate 
party propaganda”(Yeung, 2006, p. 89).   The exercise of discretion in deciding what 
and how to communicate and when, is a politically-sensitive process, and if the public 
interest is to be served, Yeung concludes, “Parliament is the only institution that has 
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the democratic legitimacy to exercise this judgment” (p91).   This recommendation is 
considered further in the next chapter. 
The idea of externally-validated criteria for evaluating public communications by 
governments brings us back to the seven principles of good communications which 
the Phillis Review outlined in 2004, which, as we have seen, were wholly endorsed by 
the UK government after 2004 but disappeared from view after 2010.  The review 
stated that the seven principles should underlie all government communication: 
1. Openness, not secrecy. 
2. More direct, unmediated communications with the public. 
3. Genuine engagement with the public as part of policy formation and delivery, 
not communication as an afterthought. 
4. Positive presentation of government policies and achievements, not misleading 
spin. 
5. Use of all relevant channels of communication, not excessive emphasis on 
national press and broadcasters. 
6. Co-ordinated communication of issues that cut across departments, not 
conflicting or duplicated departmental messages. 
7. Reinforcement of the civil service's political neutrality, rather than a blurring of 
government and party communications. 
 
On the basis of the findings presented in this and earlier chapters, UK government 
communications falls short on many of these principles, including the 
recommendation that they should underpin all government communications.  For 
this to apply, the media and communications activity conducted by special advisers 
would have to be subject to the same levels of quality control and accountability as 
civil service communications, although its very different function would have to be 
acknowledged and understood.  The capability reviews and annual communications 
plans produced by the GCS since 2011 support an audience-based approach and are 
critical of an over-reliance on reactive approaches to the news agenda.  However, 
principle 2, calling for more ‘direct, unmediated communications’ is contradicted by 
the decision post-2010 to dramatically cut expenditure on advertising and direct 
communications following the closure of the COI, and to focus instead on ‘earned 
media’: that is, obtaining free publicity through promotional efforts in mass media 
outlets (Government Communications Service, 2015b).    
As discussed in Chapter 4, Resilience, Hood & Dixon identified a move which began 
in the 1970s away from a common service agency running public campaigns towards 
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what they refer to as “a pattern of ‘spinners’ clustered in central agencies and around 
ministers in departments”, which brought government communications more closely 
under ministerial control and created a new government profession, communications 
and marketing (Hood & Dixon, 2015, p. 174) (See Tables 7.4 and 7.5 below).  Corner 
concurs, concluding that “the pitch to the media has started to become of greater 
importance than the push to the public directly”, although “the web may be 
marginally changing this situation” (Corner, 2010, p. 65).  The management of 
government communications via the web is fast-developing and beyond the scope of 
this study but would be a fruitful area of research, see (Mickoleit, 2014). 
 
Table 7.4: Government communicators in post: 1980-2013 
 
 
Taken from: Figure 8.7. Civil Service Staff in Communications Roles 1970–2013. Sources: Civil 
Service Statistics and IPO Directories (Hood & Dixon, p173) 
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Table 7.5: Staff employed by the COI (1980-2012) 
 
 
Taken from: Figure 8.8. Central Office of Information Staff Numbers 1970–2013. Sources: Civil Service 
Statistics, IPO Directories, and COI Annual Reports (Hood & Dixon, 2015, p, 174) 
 
In any case, the current GCS plans and capability reviews, impressive though they are 
as statements of professional intent, are largely functional rather than ethical, and are 
primarily concerned with the integration, delivery and evaluation of messaging in line 
with the government’s programme, admittedly a difficult enough task in itself.  What 
they do not provide is an approach to communication based on the concept of public 
accountability. Even supposing the Phillis principles had been adopted wholesale 
within government communications, and the media activities of special advisers had 
been included within their remit, the problem remains that the principles displayed 
in these documents are institutionally-oriented, rather than value-oriented.    
 
7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to answer the question: what are the stated public values of 
government communicators, how have they changed over time, and what kind of 
representative claim is implied by these values?  To answer this question I have 
attempted a difficult synthesis between ideas of mediatization, theoretical approaches 
to representative democracy, and the theory and practice of government 
communication.  Through this synthesis, I have tried to establish some parameters 
for what makes good, democratic public communication within the context of the 
particular culture and history of the British civil service in recent decades.  I argued 
222 
 
that the intensification of mediatized politics within the ‘cross-field’ where media, 
politics and bureaucracy intersect, has narrowed the scope for public representation, 
marginalising the citizen, and posing challenges for the stated and democratic 
purposes of government communications.    
The civil service communicators interviewed for this study delineated an area of 
responsibility that was unique to them: communication in the public interest which 
they deemed to be separate, and sometimes in conflict with, their role serving the 
government of the day.  These perceptions appear to be increasingly at odds with 
governing politicians from all ruling parties, who insist that the civil servants closest 
to them demonstrate an enthusiastic commitment to any ideas espoused by ministers, 
however controversial.  These perceptions are consistent with the findings of 
mediatization scholars who have carried out observations within public bureaucracies 
and found that the bureaucratic ideals held by public servants are under challenge 
both from ministers and the media.  
Gus O’Donnell’s insistence that challenge is an essential part of the civil servants’ 
repertoire (2013b) rings slightly hollow in the context of Matthew Taylor’s 
observation of senior civil servants during the Blair era as “self-censoring in the face 
of political determination”,  even when they felt ministers needed “a reality check” 
(M. Taylor, 2015). If the civil service is to live up to its aspirations to provide a check 
on the role of the political party and the politician within government 
communications, they must, firstly, provide and uphold a long-term vision of what 
government communications should be which goes beyond the narratives developed 
by individual ministers or particular governments.  Secondly, they must ensure that 
a range of communications tools, techniques and approaches aimed at reaching all 
citizens are deployed. 
The journalists interviewed chose not to adopt the mantle of ‘watchdog,’ preferring 
instead the perhaps more modest aim of ‘getting the story’.  In doing this, they may 
or may not be serving the public interest.  Indeed, no public interest can be served 
without the kinds of information that news outlets provide, but this cannot be relied 
upon and this type of informal accountability is no substitute for formal 
accountability.  Bernard Ingham claimed in his interview that “when they formed the 
GIS in 1945 they didn’t give it a code of practice, it was to behave as good civil servants 
behave”.  In his archival history of post-war government communications, Moore 
argues that, over and above the insufficient civil service code of neutrality: “the 
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government entirely failed to make its communication accountable” (Moore, 2006, p. 
216).   
I have argued that to work in practice, and therefore to serve the public interest, the 
exercise of impartiality requires some autonomy on the part of public servants to 
decide when it is most appropriate to challenge ministers.  This autonomy cannot be 
taken for granted; indeed, the direction of travel appears to be against this, both in 
the experiences recounted by government press officers, and in the changes in 
governance that have been taking place steadily since at least 1997.   I have examined 
the implicit representative claim made by government communicators that, as civil 
servants, they operate according to principles which go beyond the government of the 
day to a wider public, in order to ensure ‘good government’ in the long term.  The 
increasing public trust in civil servants to tell the truth, and the public demand for 
impartial information, as revealed in public opinion surveys, would support, albeit 
provisionally, the representative claim of non-elected officials such as civil servants, 
according to criteria proposed by Saward (Saward, 2010).  The question remains 
though, as to how this unelected, anonymous body of officials could be held to 
account. 
What might public accountability in government communications look like?  Bovens, 
a legal scholar, defines accountability as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, 
in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the 
forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face 
consequences”(Bovens, 2007, p. 450).  Ultimately, the only incentive to those in 
public office to refrain from an “inherent tendency’ to hoard and abuse power, is to 
provide “a visible, tangible and powerful” forum of accountability (p465) through an 
official and publicly recognised forum.  This forum cannot be one in which ministers 
or civil servants are both judge and jury in their own court, or one in which the 
government accounts for itself largely through the media.  Indeed, honesty and 
impartiality are considered to be almost synonymous in the public mind insofar as 
this can be divined through surveys.  The danger for politicians, and political parties, 
is that partial, or partisan, information is seen as the opposite.   
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In the Prologue I used the example of the ongoing controversy over the UK 
government’s 2002 dossier Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction to argue that a 
government with a huge unassailable majority, in charge of a powerful narrative, in 
control of the official tools through which to disseminate the narrative, and without 
sufficient challenge, is capable of delivering a form of public information which is, at 
best, partial, and at worst, deceptive (Herring & Robinson, 2014; P. Taylor, 2013).   I 
raised the question as to whether this had any bearing on the routine workings of 
government communications after 1997, and whether the narrative of ‘political spin’ 
provided a credible explanation for changes in the way the UK government 
communicated with the public through the media. The activities of PR intermediaries 
within government in routine times are little studied, especially in the UK, where 
‘political spin’ has come to symbolise much that is corrupted and untrustworthy about 
modern mediated politics.  The continuing use of the term ‘spin’ is an indicator of the 
extent of public disquiet with mediated political and government communication but 
I have argued that, rather than analyzing or challenging the underlying process, this 
narrative apportions individual blame on particular agents, typically politicians and 
their supposedly all-powerful ‘spin doctors’.  
This thesis set out to open up the black box of government communications to provide 
an in-depth, empirically grounded study of the practices and principles of 
government media management, and to assess the significance of changes in the 
structure and culture of government communications after the Labour landslide 
election victory of 1997.  To do this, the study aimed to explore what lay behind 
widespread charges of political spin, and to consider what the long term implications 
might be for public trust and the democratic process.   It applied the non-normative 
sensitising concept of ‘mediatization’, together with four subsidiary concepts - 
resilience, resistance, responsiveness, and representing the public - to conduct a 
critical and fine-grained analysis of the institutional dynamics that operate at the 
interface between government and the media, theorised as the ‘cross-field’. This 
approach challenges as simplistic the common assumption that government 
communications is either a relatively neutral professional function, or an inherently 
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unethical form of distorted communication, and argues for a more critical, nuanced 
approach.  The debate about government communications can be reframed as an 
interaction between party politics and the public bureaucracy, and their relations with 
media.  In this sense, government communications presents two contradictory faces, 
firstly, as a public good and, secondly, as a tool for obtaining and sustaining political 
power. 
The main research question of this thesis asked whether the government’s response 
to mediatization after 1997 challenged the capacity of the UK government 
communications service to deliver a public communications function consistent with 
its own stated purposes.   Since mediatization is a meta-process that takes place over 
time, the research methodology required a historical approach that could examine 
changing contexts, multiple levels of causation, and sequences and differences 
between one period of time and another (Szreter, 2015).  This was achieved by using 
witness testimony dating back from the 1960s to 2014, combined with documentary 
and archive sources.  
In this chapter I start by examining the research findings in relation to the main 
research question and the four sub questions.  This is followed by an examination and 
critique of the research design and methodology.  In the third section, I consider the 
contribution made by the specific theoretical approach taken here. Finally, to 
conclude, I present recommendations for a more publicly accountable government 
communications settlement based on the findings of this study. 
 
8.2 Research findings 
I start by summarising the key findings which relate to the four sub-questions 
outlined below, and then present the main findings in response to the overall research 
question.   
 Chapter 4: Resilience - to what extent did government communications 
express, plan and deliver in relation to its public purposes and objectives, 
and what were its strengths and weaknesses over time? 
 Chapter 5: Resistance – how and when did government officials responsible 
for dealing with the media resist or challenge what they saw as media and/or 
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political obstacles to their public purposes and objectives?  Did such 
resistance increase or decline over time? 
 Chapter 6: Responsiveness – how and when did government officials 
responsible for dealing with the media respond to the needs and demands of 
media and political actors?  What impact did such response have on its 
public purposes and objectives?   What is the relationship between political 
and media responsiveness? 
 Chapter 7: Representing the public - what are the stated public values of 
government communicators, how have they changed over time, and what 
kind of representative claim is implied by these values? 
Overall question: In response to the pressures of mediatization after 1997, did the 
UK government communications service have sufficient resilience to deliver a public 
communications function consistent with its own stated purposes?    
8.2.1 Resilience 
The archival evidence showed that politicians during the Thatcher era were quick to 
appreciate the implications of the rise of 24/7 media during the 1980s, and responded 
by demanding that the government information service work more proactively to 
manage the news agenda.   The powerful position of Bernard Ingham as Margaret 
Thatcher’s media protector, and as defender of the Government Information Service, 
belied the institutional weakness of the GIS as established in 1945.  As a network 
distributed throughout the central governing executive, it had few if any explicit 
public purposes, no external system of accountability, and was isolated from the 
mainstream civil service.  As the accounts of former government press officers in this 
study have shown, this cadre of specialists was consistently under-valued and 
marginalised by the rest of the service.  This deprived the senior civil service of 
significant strategic involvement in the direction of the service and by default, as 
mediatization progressed, the GIS was driven further into the political domain; a 
process which accelerated after 1997 and is continuing. 
In opposition after 1992, Labour tested the shortcomings of the service to the full 
through attacks on the government through the media, and, on achieving power in 
1997, transferred many of the elements of its proactive, adversarial, news-led 
approach into government.  Reforms to the service since 1997, have been led by 
politicians from both main ruling parties, who largely overcame both local resistance 
and criticism from a series of government and parliamentary reviews to mould it in a 
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way that suited them.  In return, they have largely publicly upheld the principle of 
impartiality, and maintained much of the outward form of the service as created after 
1945.  The first and only independent review of government communications, the so-
called Phillis Review, was commissioned by the government on the recommendations 
of the Public Administration Select Committee in July 2002 which had raised 
concerns about  a “breakdown in the level of trust in, and credibility of, government 
communications” following a series of media-related government scandals (Public 
Administration Select Committee, 2002).   Work on the review began in February 
2003 under the chairmanship of Sir Robert Phillis and the final report was published 
in 2004 (Phillis, 2004). The recommendations of the Phillis Review were accepted in 
full by all parties and it became the main foundation document for government 
communications, under the leadership of the first Permanent Secretary, Government 
Communications.   
However, less well-known, and not sufficiently addressed, was the Review’s implied 
criticism of the Labour government’s undermining of impartiality in government 
communications.  Phillis outlined three minimum requirements for achieving 
impartiality: (1) Directors of Communication must be able to stand back and object 
to politically-biased or misleading communications; (2) senior communications staff 
should not change simply because of a ministerial change; and (3) the interests of the 
general public should be paramount in any programme to modernise government 
communications.  Both the documentary evidence examined here, and the testimony 
of the civil servants, journalists and special advisers interviewed, point to the same 
conclusion; that the changes in governance after 1997, the involvement of special 
advisers in managing the news media, and a perception of job insecurity following 
elections, have made it harder to fulfil these three requirements, thereby undermining 
the practice of impartiality. 
The government’s response to the Phillis Review in 2004 represented the high point 
of parliamentary and civil service intervention into the otherwise closed world of 
government communications.  The post 2010 government quietly shelved the Phillis 
review, discontinued the Permanent Secretary, Communications, post and closed the 
Central Office of Information (COI) in 2012.  Planning and priority-setting is now 
conducted from within the Cabinet Office and is politically led (Gregory, 2012).  A 
GCS Board chaired by the Cabinet Office Minister acts as the ultimate coordinating 
and decision-making authority for government communication;  identifying and 
agreeing high level objectives, and approving the annual government communication 
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plan.  Its deliberations are less transparent than the COI, which was obliged to publish 
an annual report.   
Despite such changes, which challenge the paradigm of government communications 
as conceived in 1945, as a network of specialists whose regard for propriety and 
professional values can protect ministers against charges of propaganda, there is still 
almost universal support in principle for the impartial model of government 
communications.   It is still possible to claim that the government communications 
service has some autonomy to set priorities and plan strategically under a 
professional head of service, but this has been seriously and progressively curtailed 
by successive changes introduced since 1997 and this direction of travel continues.   
8.2.2 Resistance 
Resistance by government press officers and their leaders to both mediatization and 
politicization appears in various forms, from passive resistance and obstruction, to 
day to day ‘push back’ and administrative interventions like reviews and enquiries.  
Overall, however, resistance appears to have lessened, especially when comparing 
reactions after the 1997 and 2010 elections, and the actions of successive heads of 
profession.  Communications professionals believe that a preoccupation with short 
term communication advantage, achieved through one main channel, the mass 
media, and targeted towards the perceived needs of ministers rather than citizens, is 
de facto, ineffective communication.  This view was also highlighted in the Phillis 
Review and more recently in at least one internal capability review (Cabinet Office 
Communication capability review, 2013a). 
Nearly all press officer interviewees felt confident about policing the boundary 
between impartial and partisan communications and used their own sense of 
‘discomfort’ as an indicator of transgression, mainly, although not exclusively, on the 
part of ministers and special advisers, yet several felt that currently serving civil 
servants were demonstrably less able to do so.  Decisions about how and when to 
resist demands from departmental ministers, No.10, or the media, are taken quickly, 
and based on individual sensibility and implicit internal collective wisdom about what 
is acceptable or appropriate.   There are no clearly expressed or externally validated 
criteria for raising objections, no established and understood forms of redress, and 
no consistently applied sanctions for misconduct.   
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Where resistance does take place it is more likely to be tactical than strategic, with the 
onus on the individual press officer to identify issues and stand up to ministers and 
their aides, if necessary invoking support from senior colleagues.  However, as the 
propriety guidance states, ministers must be placated through a process of 
‘negotiating’, ‘compromising’, ‘finding a deal’ or at most offering a ‘polite refusal’ 
(Government Communications Service, 2014b).   In one recent example from the 
Coalition period, an objection by the press office to the wording of a press release 
which could have been construed as ethnically insensitive, caused relations with the 
ministerial team to become “a touch frosty” for a couple of days (C13).   The same 
respondent reported that journalists had challenged some departmental 
communication as partisan after 2010, some of which were accepted and some not.  
It was not clear on what basis or who adjudicated but there is no obvious or consistent 
mechanism for public challenge or redress. 
These findings raise questions in relation to the exercise of impartiality.  Who defines 
the boundary between what is and is not acceptable communication, and in the 
absence of clear criteria for this, what is to stop the boundary from moving 
imperceptibly over time to the extent that what was once unacceptable, becomes 
commonplace?  If we accept that the pressures of mediatization increasingly 
incentivise governing politicians to engage in self-advantaging forms of strategic 
communication, how realistic is it to expect press officers to fulfil the ethical and 
political obligations expected of them? 
8.2.3 Responsiveness 
During the early 1980s, in recognition of a more demanding media environment, and 
the unpopularity of the economic policies of the government, Bernard Ingham 
encouraged his staff to become more proactive, coordinated and responsive to the 
concerns of ministers, pushing departmental Heads of Information to work harder to 
put over and explain the government’s policy and legislative programme.  
Responsiveness to the media concerns of ministers has been described as an indicator 
of ‘politicization through indirect mediatization’ (Pallas et al., 2014), as press officers 
react to ministers’ own increasing responsiveness to media.  However, a greater 
responsiveness to ministers’ media agendas may actually conflict with rather than 
support responsiveness to the wider public, especially in majoritarian systems 
(Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008) because it incentivises forms of communication that 
target the relatively small group of swing voters. 
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The obligation to advocate on behalf of ministerial priorities was almost universally 
accepted by the civil service respondents because, as Ingham put it, “if you are 
explaining it, you are advocating it”.   Indeed, “advocacy for interests” has been 
defined as the goal of the PR practitioner (Moloney, 2006, p. 162), who is employed 
for his or her professional and technical skills, yet is loyal and responsible to their 
employer (Fisher, 2016).   The requirement to go beyond advocacy and to promote 
and justify government policy, however controversial, has been seen as a further 
encroachment into civil service impartiality although it is unclear where the dividing 
line lies (Grube, 2015).  Some press officers reported being asked by ministers to 
engage in what could be construed as party political communication. One experienced 
passive resistance from departmental civil servants when she was asked to set up 
meetings with them to discuss Tony Blair’s policy review leading up to the 2005 
election.  Another, after 2010, followed instructions by ministers to release 
information to friendly media outlets which, while not untrue, was selective, and 
aimed at challenging the austerity claims of rival public sector bodies by criticizing 
their financial management.   Government press officers felt that they had borne the 
brunt of anti-bureaucratic sentiment on the part of incoming ministers and their aides 
after both the 1997 and 2010 elections. Some felt they were an easy target since attacks 
on government communications in the name of ‘political spin’ was a symbolic and 
visible way of demonstrating decisiveness and political control in government. 
Media engagement has emerged as a significant part of the role of special advisers, 
even those who specialise in policy rather than media, although this is not reflected 
in their Code of Conduct (Cabinet Office, 2015a).  The three special advisers 
interviewed had regular, intensive contact with journalists, often bearing the brunt of 
a media storm, but were not always clear about how to designate their role as sources: 
were they speaking for the minister personally, for the department, or for the 
government as a whole.  When faced with conflicting priorities and interests, their 
loyalties were most likely to lie with the minister personally.   
Government press officers acknowledged that special advisers did on occasion 
instruct civil servants, and did talk to journalists under the radar, but played down 
special advisers’ news management role.  In contrast, all the journalists interviewed 
agreed that there had been an immediate, radical and permanent change after 1997 
in the way the government managed news announcements.  This provided journalists 
with topical, story-rich, and exclusive nuggets of news which helped them to navigate 
the growing demands of 24/7 media but the downside was that special advisers 
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provided the news selectively, and mainly to the political lobby.  This change took 
place immediately after the election victory in May 1997, and led to a transformation 
in the rules of engagement between government and the news media which continued 
at least until the later years of the Coalition government. Special advisers 
administered the news grid, and took responsibility for the story of the day, typically 
working around civil service press officers and “dealing with handpicked journalists 
who were being fed the story” while journalists who were not favoured, and the 
Whitehall press officers, were “left out of the loop”(J21).   
There appears to be a de facto reorientation of government communications around 
the needs of ministers (Hood & Dixon, 2015) firstly, through a greater responsiveness 
expected of civil servants, and secondly, through the changing media role of special 
advisers.  What then, should be the particular contribution of government 
communicators, to its public accountabilities?  To take the specific case of the 2002 
Iraq WMD dossier, would it have been more responsive of civil servants at the Foreign 
Office and No.10, in the sense of the term as it is used by Mulgan to have actively 
resisted the drive to break with precedent and publish intelligence information 
(Mulgan, 2008)?   This would have led to short-term friction but might have protected 
the longer-term interests of the UK government, and indeed, the reputation of Tony 
Blair and the Office of Prime Minister.  
8.2.4 Representing the public 
Government communicators believe that there are considerations that go beyond the 
needs of ministers and the government of the day, and the agendas set by the media, 
to a notional wider public.  This includes the numerical majority which did not vote 
for the ruling party.  This opens up the possibility of a space within the public 
bureaucracy where there is some autonomy from politicians, and hence the electoral 
principle, and where strategic communication priorities can be determined not just 
by political or media actors but derived from a notion of the public good.  However, it 
is difficult to discern the public purposes of UK communications and therefore to 
publicly hold the service to account since such purposes are, rarely if ever, explicitly 
stated except in the most general terms (See Table 4.1).   Successive government 
and parliamentary enquiries have consistently reiterated the importance of informing 
citizens, providing clear, truthful and factual information and maintaining the line 
between party political and public information but it is not clear where this line lies 
and how transgressions should be identified, judged and redressed.   
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The safeguards that ensure impartiality have been weakened in the most recent 
iterations of GCS Propriety Guidance (2014) and the latest Code of Conduct for 
Special Advisers (2015), because they fail to acknowledge that civil servants may have 
obligations that go beyond the government of the day, or that special advisers play an 
important role in news management.  What is missing from GCS statements since 
2010 are references to the particular ethical and constitutional accountabilities 
required of government communications, beyond a stated recognition of the “core 
duty to enable people to make informed choices”(The Future of Public Service 
Communications: Report and Findings, 2015). 
The greater involvement of ministers in priority setting and in shaping the 
government news narrative since 1997 is linked with the increasing prioritisation of 
news management over more direct or interactive forms of communication such as 
advertising or direct marketing.   There is evidence that ministers in the Blair 
government prevented the publication of research findings about immigration which 
could have had a negative impact on media and public opinion.  This decision may 
have contributed to later policy failures because, without acknowledging that a 
significant majority of the population had concerns about immigration, it was harder 
to address the problem.  What little is known about public opinion in relation to trust 
suggests that while few trust politicians,  civil servants are increasingly trusted to tell 
the truth.   I have argued that this could be because partiality or perhaps the political 
process itself, are increasingly negatively associated in the public mind with the 
likelihood of truth-telling (IpsosMORI, 2016).   
There is evidence from the statements of some politicians, and in the literature, to 
suggest that they feel that the balance of public accountability, albeit informal rather 
than formal, has shifted towards the media and away from parliament (Manin, 1997).   
Even the highly regarded, specialist journalists interviewed for this study downplayed 
their role as ‘watchdogs’, and emphasised the importance of ‘getting the story’.  
Reporting the facts and helping audiences to understand complex policy and political 
matters is a vital prerequisite for ‘informal accountability’, but it does not replace 
‘formal democratic accountability’ which must be “visible, tangible and powerful” 
(Bovens, 2007, p. 465). 
Blumler and Coleman recently proposed three founding principles for good 
democratic communication, which recognise the power asymmetries between 
governments and citizens and seek to build in genuine accountability.  These are that 
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everyone is equally entitled to be well informed and taken into account when 
decisions are made; holders of significant power must account for the way they 
exercise it and ensure that the public interest is served; and effective channels of 
exchange and dialogue between citizens and decision makers are needed (Blumler & 
Coleman, 2015).  It is not clear who would be responsible for upholding these 
principles but if civil servants are to continue to be entrusted with the task of policing 
the propriety of government communications, in what way can and should this 
unelected, anonymous body of officials be held to account, and by whom?   
8.2.5 Summary of main findings  
The main finding of this thesis is that the process of mediatization, interacting with 
politicization, did indeed undermine the autonomy and resilience of government 
communications after 1997, challenging the capacity of the service to resist political 
demands, and bypassing or even contradicting, any role beyond that to serve the 
government of the day.   As discussed in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1, the limited definition 
of impartiality as mere neutrality is a narrow interpretation of a concept which has 
traditionally been linked with equality, challenge and governing in the public interest.  
The answer to the main research question: 
In response to the pressures of mediatization after 1997, did the UK government 
communications service have sufficient resilience to deliver a public communications 
function consistent with its own stated purposes?  
…is therefore no, but a qualified one.    
A problem arising from one of the key premises of this question is the difficulty in 
identifying a sustained public commitment on the part of the communications service 
to any consistent, explicit and clearly stated public purposes for UK government 
communications, beyond the general need to inform the public and ensure that 
information provided is objective and explanatory.   As Moore argues, this difficulty 
relates back to the failure of the post-war government to establish guidelines, 
constraints, objectives or public purposes for the new service after 1945 (Moore, 
2006).  However, in spite of this qualification, the findings of this study suggest that 
even in its own limited terms, the government communications service, which is now 
a de facto integrated service that includes the news management role of special 
advisers, has not, during a period of intense mediatization, demonstrated “sufficient 
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resilience to deliver a public communications function consistent with its own stated 
purposes”. 
The argument of some academics that ‘political spin’ was a feature of Labour after 
1997, and that a rebalancing process has taken place since, partly in response to a 
media and public backlash, and developments in the “digital public sphere” is not 
supported by these findings  (Gaber, 2016, p. 636; McNair, 2007b). The 
‘politicization’ of government communications after 1997 did not go into reverse after 
the arrival of the new Conservative-led coalition government in 2010.   Indeed, the 
most robust attempt to place government communications on a firmer and more 
accountable footing, the Phillis Review of 2004, was completely side-lined after 2010.  
Phillis tried to introduce safeguards to protect the Government Information Service 
from excessive political interference while advocating a more effective 
communications function that would recognise the needs of ministers.  At the same 
time it introduced the idea of the public as an important stakeholder in government 
communications, albeit in very general terms.  The considerable momentum behind 
the report appears to have ceased after 2010; the report has never been explicitly 
challenged but several of its recommendations have been bypassed, and the 
document itself has been removed from the public domain.  None of its 
recommendations or principles is referred to in GCS documents post-2010.   
The Phillis Review was one of a series of critical government and parliamentary 
inquiries after 1997, which tried to improve the credibility of the government 
communications service by protecting it from the risk of contagion through ‘political 
spin’.  Attempts were made to ‘hermetically seal’ government communications from 
such contagion through the deployment of politically appointed special advisers to 
manage the more controversial political dimension and serve the increasingly 
mediated reputational fears and ambitions of ministers and their parties.  This 
attempt has been only partially successful; special advisers have been integrated into 
the workings of the civil service communications function, but this appears to be at a 
cost to both credibility and public trust. 
With the exception of the sudden closure of the COI in 2012, the structure of the 
government information service has shown remarkable resilience in retaining its 
post-war shape.  However, this disguises the significant underlying changes in 
personnel, practices and priorities as a consequence of ministerially-led reforms after 
both 1997 and 2010.  The findings from this study suggest that government’s 
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communications with the media, taken as a whole and including the contribution of 
special advisers, now over-serves the needs of ministers, and under-serves the needs 
of the public.  Government press officers have become more responsive to ministers, 
while special advisers have occupied and transformed the domain that constitutes 
official government news, an area where senior government press officers formerly 
held sway.  At the same time, a lack of transparency about the sources of government 
news has led to a blurring of the line between the official and unofficial, and between 
government and party political information.   
The government’s official news announcement function has become increasingly 
selective and is now jointly managed by a small but well-connected team of special 
advisers working closely with departmental civil servants.   The government news 
selection process is determined by special advisers acting on ministerial priorities at 
two points: firstly, during the selection of news stories via the No.10 news grid, and 
secondly, through the selection of media outlet or individual journalist, according to 
the extent to which the announcement is thought to serve electoral priorities.  The 
convention that Parliament is the first to hear major announcements, and that all 
media outlets are informed soon after, either directly or through agencies such as the 
Press Association, has been progressively by-passed since 1997.   This increasing 
selectivity is compounded by the failure to clarify the provenance of government and 
ministerial spokespeople, despite the recommendations of three government 
committees.  This has led to both internal and external confusion about the source 
and credibility of supposedly official government announcements (House of Lords 
Select Committee on Communications, 2008; Mountfield, 1997; Phillis, 2004).  The 
transformation since 1997 in the rules of engagement that determine government 
news management has not been reflected in the propriety guidance of either 
government communicators who deal with the media or special advisers.  In fact, the 
media relations role of special advisers is conducted largely under the radar. 
In spite of these substantive and sustained changes in both principle and practice, the 
core value of impartiality is still widely upheld, even valorised, throughout the 
political domain, and in government propriety guidance, even as the conditions for 
its successful implementation are diminished.   There are at least two key conditions 
for the exercise of impartiality: firstly, the confidence and the autonomy to speak truth 
to power; and secondly, the commitment to public values such as equity, fairness, 
impartiality, accountability and, as a precondition for these, due process (Mendus, 
2008).  These considerations, of necessity, place limits on the extent to which civil 
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servants can expect to be responsive to ministers, but with the speeding up of the news 
cycle, and the media/political ‘arms race’ that sustains it, it becomes ever harder to 
operate within these limits81.  The critique presented by this thesis goes well beyond 
debates about ‘political spin’, to deeper structural and cultural changes such as the 
shift from direct communication to mediated communication; the reconfiguring of 
government news management through the prism of special advisers; the blurring of 
the distinction between official and non-attributable sources within government; and 
the increasing use of media as a channel for public accountability as an alternative to 
parliament.    
Some disquiet among the public about more partisan forms of public communication 
has been picked up by long-term opinion surveys, although these are difficult to 
interpret.  Could there be a connection between mediatization, seen as a meta-process 
that is capable of “reshaping relations not just among media organisations and their 
publics but among all social institutions” (Livingstone, 2009), and the blurring of 
distinctions that this study has observed within the cross-field between media, 
politics and bureaucracy?  The 31st British Social Attitudes Survey (2014), for 
example, found a marked increase over 27 years in those who thought that 
governments ‘almost never’ “place the needs of the nation above the interests of their 
own political party”, from 11% in 1986 to 32% in 2013 (Park et al., 2014).  The annual 
Ipsos MORI Veracity Index which asks people which professions they trust to tell the 
truth, found a growing gulf in trust scores between politicians and civil servants 
between 1983 and 2015, coinciding with the rise in perceptions of ‘political spin’.  In 
2016, the survey recorded a positive net rating82 for civil servants of 27%, compared 
with a net rating for politicians of minus 53% (IpsosMORI, 2016).  Whiteley et al. 
found a definite overall long-term decline between 1997 and 2013 in public 
assessments of the honesty of the British government related to key events such as 
the Iraq War and the MP’s expenses scandal (Whiteley et al., 2016).    
Howell James’ testimony articulated most fully the sense among the government 
communicators interviewed for this study that they had an important public duty that 
went beyond the obligation to serve ministers and the government of the day.  This 
claim to represent the public, however understated, has some support in the literature 
                                                          
81 This was the point by Lord (Robin) Butler in his interview. 
82 The proportion of respondents who trusted a profession to tell the truth, minus those who 
didn’t. 
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from public administration and political theorists (Aucoin, 2012; Foote, 1969; Grube, 
2014; James, 2005b; Manin, 1997; Rosanvallon, 2011; Saward, 2010).   
8.3 A critical look at research design and methodology 
As an exploration of government media relations in the UK since 1997 this was a case 
study which used in-depth interviews with three types of elite actor, together with 
archival and documentary analysis, to present a rounded and empirically grounded 
insider view of customs and practices over time within a particular site.  This site was 
theorised as the cross-field between the three fields of media, politics and 
bureaucracy.  As a case study, it provided a UK test of how a mediatization approach 
can inform the study of public relations within national state bureaucracies, and 
followed other such studies conducted in northern Europe (Fredriksson et al., 2015; 
Pallas & Fredriksson, 2014; Schillemans, 2012; Thorbjornsrud, Ihlen, & Figenschou, 
2014).  These studies used a combination of documentary analysis, interviews and 
ethnography but were synchronic rather than diachronic.  Many of the findings here 
are consistent with these studies, despite the differing political systems, suggesting 
that the case study approach is generalizable, at least to other liberal democracies.  
This study also replicates in part some of the much more thorough archival analysis 
carried out by Moore in his historical case study of UK government communications 
between 1945-51, which provided some useful precursors to some of the issues raised 
by this study, such as political sensitivity to news media, and the role of impartiality 
in protecting governments from charges of propaganda.  In this section I consider the 
role of mixed methods in offering a more complete view of institutional and cultural 
change. 
8.3.1 Interviews 
As expected, the civil servant interviews provided a rich and detailed testament to the 
changes in relations between media and government up to and beyond 1997 and there 
was consistency in their recollections of events of public record such impact of the 
changes of government in 1997 and 2010 and of the Jo Moore and McBride scandals.  
Their experience in government service ranged from the 1960s to 2014, and five of 
the eight who had been in post before 1997 remained in post three years later.  Only 
one experienced both the 1997 and 2010 elections.  Their topographical position as 
‘boundary spanners’ (Williams, 2010), their disposition as “outsiders-within” 
(Edwards, 2015, p. 99), and their professional status as government spokespeople, 
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required them to be reflexive about both their organisation and their role within it, 
concerned as they were to represent (albeit selectively) its goals, objectives and 
achievements in a coherent fashion to the outside world.  As participants in the 
process of refining and explaining the narratives of others, they observe and negotiate 
the gap between what is said internally, what is done, how things are presented and 
how things are seen by the world outside.  This uncomfortable institutional 
positioning gives them a sense of critical distance that augments the distancing 
already inherent in the impartial role of the civil servant.   
How successfully were some of the risks of the civil servant interviews mitigated 
during the data gathering and analysis phases, as discussed in Chapter 3?  One risk 
was that, as advocates for their organisation, and in the light of their contested 
position within it, the civil servants would overplay the importance of their role, 
underplay some of the difficulties, and deflect blame on to others.  In fact, as the 
analysis of NVivo references in Table 3.5 showed, they were open about the negative 
view of their role held by fellow civil servants, while those who were in post in 1997 
were openly critical of the quality of the information service offered to both journalists 
and politicians at that time.  Special advisers were frequently mentioned but although 
there was some resentment about their growing media involvement after 1997 and 
doubts about the calibre and modus operandi of some of them, in general the 
contribution of special advisers was described as beneficial.    
Another risk was that their continuing loyalty to ministers would mute their criticism.  
This was observed but the significant traction in the interviews given to problems 
arising immediately after the general elections of both 1997 and 2010 suggests that 
some perceptions of ministerial interference might have been deflected in this 
direction.  Interviewees were by and large rational and discursive in their responses, 
but where emotion was expressed, this is the point where it was focused.  Jonathan 
Haslam referred with some anger to the drive by ministers after 1997 to “get yourself 
a director of communications and hang a head on your belt” (C07).   A press officer 
sadly noted how an experienced senior colleague, “a lovely woman” was “slowly 
shuffled out” and replaced by a journalist from a left-wing newspaper (C05).   A 
Director of Communication with 20 years’ experience who left government in 2011 
talked about high levels of hostility from incoming ministers and the difficulties of 
“dealing with lots of fearful and weeping colleagues” after 2010 but declined to 
elaborate on incidents that had affected him personally and which might have led to 
his decision to leave (C11). 
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There were some issues that, surprisingly, carried little weight during the interviews, 
despite questions being asked about them as part of the topic guide, such as digital or 
web communications, civil service recruitment, and the concept of spin.  These are all 
issues which attract significant attention from external commentators and yet seemed 
relatively unimportant to the interviewees.  The lack of interest in discussing ‘spin’ is 
hard to interpret but could imply that as a negatively-charged colloquial term 
generally used to attach blame, it carries little explanatory power within a 
professional context.  Regarding questions related to the politicization of civil service 
recruitment, with a few anecdotal exceptions, most respondents could not identify 
problems in the way the process was handled and didn’t consider it to be a matter of 
interest.  This doesn’t mean that the issue is not worth covering but other methods 
may be required.   
What is significant is the lack of salience of issues relating to digital and web 
communications.  This may be due to the continuing importance of the print and 
broadcast mainstream news to ministers that was highlighted by both journalists and 
civil servants, as this response exemplifies: 
Actually the centrality of the print media even as the population move away from it, 
which it is doing, they are still in kind of Whitehall and Westminster terms, 
overwhelmingly more important than anything else.  They are the people who make 
or break individual careers and can guide policy decisions just by sheer muscle (C11).  
This suggests that ministerial preoccupations with mainstream media, as observed 
through their statements to Leveson, are being allowed to excessively influence the 
priority-setting of government press officers; echoing concerns raised by both the 
Phillis Review and the government’s own departmental capability reviews, that there 
is too much focus on communication through the mass media.  It is notable that only 
one respondent (C11) raised the issue of national newspaper partisanship as a 
determining factor in ministers’ attitudes towards media relations.  Generally, the 
witness accounts suggest that ministers from all parties are highly sensitive to the risk 
of media attack. 
As a marker of loyalty, civil servants may have been reluctant to express overt 
criticism of ministers’ excessive concern with daily news headlines, excusing this on 
the grounds that ministers’ reputation, even survival, depended on being ‘media 
savvy’.  Overt criticism of particular ministers was usually done off the record.  
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Alastair Campbell was the individual most often cited in the interview texts and was 
generally depicted as charismatic, professional, competent and trustworthy, if 
demanding.  Many felt that the changes introduced after 1997 were professionally 
justified but could have been introduced more judiciously and sensitively. There was 
some suggestion of a bullying culture in government generally, an environment 
described euphemistically by one respondent as “a rufty tufty kind of world” (C03), 
and by another as scoring high in “the shoutiness stakes” (C11).  This finding, and the 
long-hours culture which made it hard for some parents, especially new mothers, to 
continue in the job, were beyond the scope of this study but this would be a valuable 
point of interest for future research. 
The interviews with journalists brought the civil servants’ accounts into perspective 
and suggest that the latter had understated the issue of politicization, perhaps because 
it reflected negatively on their own professional autonomy and credibility.  Civil 
servants expressed general satisfaction with the exercise of impartiality through their 
capacity to monitor of ‘the line’ between objective and party political communication 
although many felt that practice since their departure from the service was less 
thorough than it had been.  This is one indication of a substantive change over time. 
It also suggests that ‘gut feeling’ as an indication of impropriety is no protection 
against what some scholars have described as a “seeping politicization” (Foster, 2005; 
Hennessy, 1999).  There could be an element of golden-ageism in some of their 
recollections but the rich anecdotal detail and its conformity with the findings of the 
various official reviews into the state of government communications after 1997 
suggests that these findings are credible.  
One surprise from the journalists’ interviews was the extent and immediacy of their 
perceptions of special advisers’ dominant role in news management after 1997.  As we 
saw in Chapter 6, all the journalists referred to the change as sudden, dramatic and 
ongoing.  They felt that negotiations about daily news took place in a “different 
sphere” (J21) where special advisers traded exclusive nuggets of information with 
particular journalists to achieve targeted coverage. As part of this wholesale 
transformation in the rules of engagement, Directors of Communication whose faces 
didn’t fit were hounded out of their jobs, while government press officers were 
marginalized and sometimes displaced by special advisers.  It is interesting that the 
former Director of Communications in the Department of Health, Romola 
Christopherson, was mentioned by two of the journalists in almost heroic terms, yet 
she was not referred to in any of the civil servants’ interviews. 
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The special adviser interviews were a later addition to the study and too few to reliably 
generalise from, but it is clear that media relations was an important part of their 
work, and that they had the autonomy to devote time to this.   They accepted the need 
to work closely with civil service press officers but the determining factor in how the 
partnership operated was the attitude of their minister. As an indication of their more 
adversarial and contingent relationship with journalists, special advisers were more 
likely than press officers to describe journalists negatively, for example as “a pack of 
wolves” (S24) that “don’t care about the truth very much”(S25).  Press officers 
accepted the demands of journalists as natural, even desirable in a democratic society.  
Journalists felt that special advisers were less likely than government press officers to 
tell the truth: one insisted, off the record, that he had been lied to by a special adviser.  
The average interview response rate was well over 50%.  Of the 27 former civil 
servants approached, 16 (59%) replied and were interviewed, three declined and six 
(22%) did not reply.  The interview sample provided the intended diversity in terms 
of age, gender, period of service, position and seniority, with a particular focus on 
middle ranking officials with departmental experience. The interviews with 
journalists and special advisers were designed to provide a context, or check, on the 
interviews with the core respondents, civil servants.  Of the nine journalists 
approached, six (67%) agreed to be interviewed.   The sampling frame for journalists 
was quite specific – those who had served for long enough to experience changes post 
1997, and who had had regular, ongoing contact with civil service departments.  In 
this sense they were not representative of journalists as a whole since they were 
significantly older and worked mainly for broadsheet newspapers or the BBC.   For a 
future study it would be interesting to interview younger serving journalists on a 
wider range of media outlets.  Regarding special advisers, three of the six approached 
were interviewed, one from each mainstream political party.  Two had served under 
the Coalition and one under Labour.   
Given the discrepancies between the three interview groups in how they perceived 
change since 1997, as highlighted above, the tactic of interviewing three different 
actors who share a professional space but work to very different objectives, 
strengthened the empirical reach and validity of the study.  It would have been useful 
to have interviewed more special advisers, and a more in-depth interview study with 
this group about their media role would be highly recommended.  The topic guide was 
used successfully for all interviews, and remained broadly similar across all three 
types of interview.  This suggests that the three types of actor share many experiences 
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and perceptions, and that the notion of a ‘cross-field’ where different institutions and 
cultures operate together according to shared sets of rules, is a pertinent one.   
However, as ‘quasi-colleagues’ who occupy differing but complementary 
intermediary roles within a shared environment, one might expect the interview texts 
to be mutually reinforcing in at least some respects; especially in the significance 
accorded to government’s relations with media.  The analysis of documentary and 
archival tests was supposed to provide a check on this.  Did it work? 
8.3.2 Documentary and archival analysis 
The analysis of documentary and archival texts provided alternative insights into 
changes in custom and practice over time as seen by parliament, politicians and 
officials not concerned directly with media management. These data helped to 
identify discrepancies between practices and ideals, and established a clear 
chronology which might not have been possible from interviews alone.  In particular, 
the immersion in archival documents dating from the first three years of the Thatcher 
government, combined with the reading of memoirs and biographies from 
participants at the time, and the interview with Bernard Ingham, provided an almost 
‘ethnographic’ picture of how the government at a particular moment responded to 
dramatic change, not only in the media landscape but in what was believed to be 
politically and ethically possible.  I am using the term ‘ethnographic’ in the sense that 
the approach here attempted to provide what Geertz referred to as  thick description, 
namely “a detailed, in-depth description of everyday life and practice”, as seen from 
a range of viewpoints (Geertz, 1975; Hoey, 2014, p. 1). 
Documentary analysis also provided a check on assumptions about the novelty of so-
called ‘political spin’ after 1997. The briefing materials for the 1980 Budget, for 
example, showed how administratively-led and, to our eyes, minimal, the process was 
in comparison with the elaborate pattern of announcements and pre-announcements 
that characterises the presentation of the modern Budget, as detailed in McBride’s 
memoirs of his time as a Treasury press officer (McBride, 2013).  Yet the deliberations 
of the secret Liaison Committee in the early 1980s show how concerned ministers 
were with presenting a coherent and powerful political narrative as a way of 
engineering consent for a radical and controversial economic programme.   There 
were several weaknesses in the archival dataset however.  Firstly, it was not 
continuous, since internal government information is subject to the 30 year rule 
(currently reducing gradually to 20 years).  This meant that information relating to 
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the late Thatcher and John Major period is not yet available.  Secondly, the archive is 
partial: information relating to PR practices, such as press releases, minutes of 
meetings, memos and media plans, is often considered to be ephemeral and is 
therefore only partially recorded or quickly discarded.  
The documentary evidence from government and parliamentary reviews was rich and 
voluminous. The personal testimony presented at parliamentary inquiries from a 
range of political and media actors, including journalists, government 
communications leaders, special advisers and politicians, augmented the original 
interview material.  Politicians’ statements to Leveson, for example, provided a 
powerful backdrop to civil servants’ assessments of minister’s concerns with media 
management, and the important media role of special advisers.  Of consistent 
relevance were the findings of the various inquiries conducted over the years by the 
Public Administration Select Committee.  For a future study, in-depth research into 
the operations of this committee would shed valuable light on such issues as the 
struggle between government and parliamentary actors to define and operationalise 
the notion of impartiality, and the possible influence of mediatization on the workings 
of the Committee itself.   
Together with the internal propriety guidance and the codes of conduct, the 
documentary evidence provided an ongoing and evolving narrative about the role of 
the impartial civil service at a time of mediatization.  In many ways, the apparent 
consistency in the way impartiality, and hence the role of the civil servant, were 
officially stated over time, and the gradual tweaks in terminology that belied 
significant underlying shifts, echoed the findings in relation to the resilience of the 
Government Information Service itself.  Its outward form remained recognisable but 
what was considered to be appropriate in practice changed radically, from a more 
public-oriented model of impartiality, towards the more limited notion of neutrality, 
described by Aucoin as “promiscuous partisanship” (Aucoin, 2012).  This supports 
claims by such proponents of the ‘end of Whitehall thesis’ as the former civil servant 
Christopher Foster, that substantial change in what was deemed proper within the 
civil service has taken place gradually and largely by stealth (Diamond, 2014b; Foster, 
2005).   
The documents, archival and interview texts were all analyzed as one corpus through 
NVivo, using the four concepts of resilience, resistance, responsiveness and 
representing the public.  Despite some overlap between the first three concepts, they 
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proved valuable as a way of sorting the evidence without undue bias, and as a way of 
bringing together, or juxtaposing, publicly stated understandings and unseen 
practices.   Less immediately obvious was the role of these concepts in helping to build 
a more grounded and robust theoretical framework through which to understand 
government communications.   
 
8.4 A field approach to mediatization: a valid conceptual 
framework? 
“Ministers are just terrified of the U-turn, of being pilloried by the media for making 
errors, or for changing their mind, and they lose sight of the folk out there who are not 
in the Westminster bubble, who are not journalists who can see through some of the 
rubbish in the papers.  There would be so much more to be gained by just fronting it 
out and saying ‘I’m going to level with you’” (C16). 
This respondent, a former Director of Communication who left government in 2014, 
argued that the public role of government communicators who deal with the media, 
and the trust and credibility this required, were threatened by a combination of “noisy 
media” applying blame, and frightened ministers. This potent mix had become so 
overwhelming, she felt, and politicians so lacking in confidence that “it just spirals 
into this huge gulf between the public and government and ministers”, leading the 
public to “disengage from politics” and conclude that “you can’t trust anything they 
say”. As ministers become more sensitive to the potential risks of mediated 
reputational damage, they try to increase their control over what, when and how 
information is placed in the public domain.  It is this selectivity, which arouses the 
suspicion of journalists, is derided as political spin and exploited through the media 
by the opposition and others that ultimately damages the credibility of information 
released from government.   
This respondent’s observation, and others like it cited in this study, illustrates the 
validity of the mediatization field approach at the very least as a reflection of a 
complex reality.  The site of interest is theorised as the cross-field between politics, 
bureaucracy and the media; where distinct social fields collide and interact to produce 
a unique set of patterns in response to a range of processes, but dominated by the 
meta-process of mediatization (Lingard et al., 2005).  ‘Cross-field effects’ are defined 
by Lingard and Rawolle as specific effects generated by interference within a 
mediatized political arena such as the launch of a new government policy.  Such 
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effects would include the policy texts, speeches and media-friendly documentation 
produced by government agencies during the lifetime of a ‘hot topic’, the decisions 
made during the media frenzy surrounding it, and the internal negotiations that take 
place between officials to manage a media crisis.   
I have already highlighted two particular findings from this study as possible cross-
field effects.  One of these, from chapter 5, was the tendency of government press 
officers to use their instincts to apply pragmatic judgements about what is and is not 
appropriate when dealing with the fluid and fast-moving situations that typically 
occur in government media relations.  In chapter 6, I described the experience of 
exhilaration recounted by one former press officer in response to a high profile 
political resignation as being so specific to the mediatized realm of the cross-field that 
it could be described as a cross-field effect.  We can see that both these effects, the 
quick reaction to changing circumstances, and the thrill of breaking news in which 
the powerful ‘other’ becomes the victim, could equally apply to other actors in this 
particular cross-field, such as special advisers and journalists.   An advantage of the 
field approach is that it facilitates a cross-sectional perspective which cuts across 
institutional and professional boundaries to examine shared cultures within a 
particular domain, in this case, the cross-field.   
In Chapter 2, I drew on the work of Andreas Hepp to propose that we consider these 
actors’ natural habitat, and the culture of norms, customs and beliefs within which 
they work, as a ‘culture of mediatization’ which, over time, has developed its own 
distinctive ways of communicating, and where “life…is unimaginable without media”.   
I argued that, within this cross-field, the media are more than an afterthought; they 
“constitute and construct the centre” (Hepp, 2013b, pp. 70, 71).   In chapter 7, I argued 
that a ‘culture of mediatization’ had developed around government’s relations with 
media, leading to a range of cross-field effects, which have diluted the already weak 
accountability mechanisms for government communications.   These include the 
insidious growth in the news management role of politically appointed special 
advisers, and tweaks in propriety codes and governance structures for government 
communications taken without consultation.    
There are other findings too that could be considered as cross-field effects within a 
wider ‘culture of mediatization’ (Hepp, 2013b).  A ‘year zero’ approach to history 
allows a reinterpretation of the past in the light of the strategic needs of the present, 
leading to an expedient and pragmatic application of the ideal of impartiality which 
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suits ‘the government of the day’, or in other words, ministers.   Within an 
environment of mediatized insecurity and risk, and fears that 24/7 media scrutiny can 
bring political careers to a sudden end, office holders’ protect and surround 
themselves with enthusiastic, trusted and ‘media savvy’ confidantes and favour 
informal over formal kinds of public accountability.  A natural impatience on the part 
of politicians with due process, especially when it complicates the delivery of already 
difficult political goals, makes internal resistance to compromised, self-advantaging 
and hence untrustworthy public statements less likely.  As a corollary of this, such a 
‘culture of mediatization’ devalues caution and favours robust individuals who can 
demonstrate to power-holders that they are both “pure in thought” (C11) and can 
handle “the huge media pressures” (Cameron, 2012).   
The application of the idea of cross-field effects as contributing towards a ‘culture of 
mediatization’ can be applied to the evidence that emerged during the Chilcot 
enquiry.  By backing the Bush administration’s decision to invade Iraq as early as 
April 2002, despite his and the foreign secretary Jack Straw’s awareness that it would 
be difficult to convince the Cabinet of its necessity, let alone the public, Blair 
committed himself to “a public information campaign…to explain the nature of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime and the threat he posed” (Chilcot Report, 2016: Executive 
Summary, pp14).  His ability to convince the public through the media that this was 
the right thing to do became linked to his credibility and even survival as Labour Party 
leader and Prime Minister.  According to evidence presented by Chilcot, throughout 
the decision-making process he favoured informal over formal accountability and 
relied on a small close-knit group of enthusiastic, trusted and ‘media savvy’ 
confidantes.  He led the public communications process himself, prioritising 
persuasive, self-advantaging terminology over sober assessment.  He announced the 
publication of the dossier himself at a press conference on 3 September 2002, stating 
that Saddam was “without any question, still trying to develop that chemical, 
biological, potentially nuclear capability” (p17).   During the House of Commons 
debate on 24 September, in a speech he wrote himself, he declared that Saddam’s 
“weapons of mass destruction programme is active, detailed and growing”.  In March 
2003, during the debate over the decision to invade Iraq, he described the “coming 
together” of terrorist groups in possession of WMDs, and the repressive dictatorship 
of Saddam Hussein as “a real and present danger to Britain” (p42).    
The Chilcot report concludes that this approach to public communication produced a 
“damaging legacy” that undermined “trust and confidence in government statements” 
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and would “make it more difficult to secure support for Government policy (Chilcot, 
2016a) (paras. 807, 838).  The report drew a sharp distinction between the political 
need to argue for a certain outcome, and the need for the intelligence services (in this 
case) to present evidence.  The report argued in favour of “the need to be scrupulous 
in discriminating between facts and knowledge on the one hand and opinion, 
judgement or belief on the other” and “the need for vigilance to avoid unwittingly 
crossing the line from supposition to certainty including by constant repetition of 
received wisdom”(para 840).   Chilcot’s warnings against the failure to discriminate 
between political “opinion, judgement and belief” and “facts and knowledge” (para 
840) are familiar from the many official documents analyzed for this study.  The 
question remains as to whether such judgements are any more likely to deliver change 
in government communications practices than the similar conclusions reached by the 
many official enquiries conducted since 1997, especially the Butler Report (Butler, 
2004).  It is too early to say, but a perspective informed by the mediatization approach 
taken here would suggest that Blair’s style of communication is consistent with the 
direction of travel at least since 1997, and has become so institutionalised, self-
sustaining and mutually reinforcing within government, that it will take institutional 
change to prevent such a thing from happening again.   
Lundby’s definition of mediatization played a key role in the conceptual framework 
for this study, and his stricture that the empirical researcher must conduct 
“observations of moments and objects along the way that demonstrate the 
transformation of the socio-cultural practice or institution under study” (Lundby, 
2014a, p. 23), has been adhered to here.  He specifically cited interviews with former 
participants – in his case, retired legal professionals – as a legitimate means of 
identifying a “transforming direction or tendency”.  This has been successfully 
achieved by this study.  This study has also fulfilled the requirements of critical 
research which, according to Dahlgren “involves probing the discrepancies between 
surface appearances and underlying, deeper realities” (Dahlgren, 2013, p. 156).   
However, the mediatization approach is not without its critics, and is contested, even 
by some of its proponents. It has been criticized for being too “broad and inclusive” 
to deliver a “coherent and robust conceptual framework” (Jensen, 2013, p. 218).  Lunt 
and Livingstone question the idea that mediatization is a paradigm at all, and argue 
that although useful as a form of guidance for empirical research, casual use of the 
term leads to confusion (Lunt & Livingstone, 2016).  Mediatization scholars have been 
accused of being too media-centric, of overstating the role of media in society and 
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failing to clearly define their use of the term (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014).  A literature 
review of mediatization studies which conducted research into change over time 
concluded that many scholars failed to make explicit either their conception of time 
or their approach to history (Stanyer & Mihelj, 2016).  However, proponents of 
historical institutionalism have argued that “qualitative, longitudinal, deep case stud 
(ies)” can and should be successfully applied in communication studies in order to 
examine “informal routines and formal institutions over time, attending to path 
dependency, as well as to the fact that institutions contain conflicting forces that can 
be a source of instability” (Bannerman & Haggart, 2015, p. 15).  They argue that within 
the field of media and communications, mediatization scholars are among the few to 
deploy this type of approach. 
In answer to the charge of being media-centric, this is not the case here since this 
study does not examine media or media institutions as such (Hepp et al., 2015).  It is 
concerned, rather, with the institutionalisation of communicative habits, customs and 
norms arising from the increasing influence of media considerations within other 
domains. As such, this study could be accused of being media-centred – and hence of 
focusing too much on media influences at the expense of others.  However, the major 
reason for adopting a mediatization approach to government communications in the 
first place was to overcome the tendency among public administration and political 
science scholars to consider media as a mere ‘add on’, a ‘black box’; as inherently 
damaging to politics, and/or as just one among many social influences.  The 
mediatization approach also allowed the foregrounding of an important but under-
studied group of actors – government press officers – who have rarely been 
considered as distinctive participants in the process of political communication.  In 
this sense, these aims were achieved by this study. The charge that the mediatization 
approach risks downplaying other important factors that  influence the policy, 
administrative and even street level reaches of the civil service, is a real one.  There is 
enough in this study to suggest that an examination of the impact of mediatization 
within deeper levels of government, that is, on public servants who are not directly 
involved with media and PR, would be worthwhile. 
The role of history in this study has clearly been crucial, but this does not claim to be 
a work of history, or even oral history, although it shares some of its characteristics.  
By making the methodology transparent and drawing on some of the learning from 
historical institutionalism, the approach applied here provides an insightful pathway 
into the chronology of media management within a particular setting.  In this sense, 
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the concept of mediatization is deployed here not as a theory or paradigm but as a 
sensitising concept for an empirical study.  The empirical data are given maximum 
attention and are allowed to influence theory, which is why so much evidence is 
presented here in four detailed chapters. 
The aspect of this study which is conceptually novel is the application of the four 
concepts of resilience, resistance, responsiveness and representing the public, to the 
problem of government communications as a complex and interacting process of 
political, institutional and cultural change.  The four concepts have shown themselves 
to be a powerful means of accessing and organising a rich data-set, and for 
understanding and drawing conclusions about social change at the meso- and micro-
level.  These concepts arose during the early stage of the data-gathering process, and 
were developed as part of the relatively flexible conceptual framework of 
mediatization.  They would not have originated without such an open framework that 
facilitates ‘grounded’ or ‘adaptive’ ways of theorising and pays attention to complex 
interactions of dynamic processes.  Layder describes this as adaptive theory; an 
approach that adapts to, or is shaped by, incoming evidence.  He sees it as being 
particularly appropriate when examining dynamic 'lived experiences' within social 
and institutional contexts, as was the case here (Layder, 1998, p. 5). 
Further, the concept of mediatization enabled a non-normative approach to factors 
which are often considered as ‘either/or’ dualisms or categorical variables. The civil 
service is ‘politicised’ rather than impartial; government communications are 
‘professionalised’, and hence open to suspicions of ‘political spin’; and the office of 
Prime Minister is undermined through ‘personalization’ or ‘presidentialization’.  By 
and large, the non-normative approach taken to these concepts was successful in 
revealing complexity, avoiding simplistic dichotomies, highlighting contradictions 
and reducing the risk of implicit value judgements.  In this respect, by looking at 
everyday processes within Whitehall, the mediatization approach has helped to 
challenge the mystique of Whitehall as a particular institution with immutable values.  
The advantage of this approach in comparison to, say, a study of politicization within 
governing bureaucracies is that it allows a more open and critical approach to 
changing relationships and power asymmetries within the administrative and 
political ecology of government which could be  applied to other liberal democratic 
jurisdictions either comparatively or as case studies.   
Where the mediatization approach struggled to achieve clarity was in relation to the 
doctrine of impartiality in public service but this may be strength as well as a 
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weakness, since it leaves open the question as to whether impartiality is a value, ideal, 
belief, ideology or practice. Impartiality was depicted by participants in this study in 
all these ways:  as an instinctively understood yet almost impossible to define value, 
norm and practice which permeates all aspects of life in the public bureaucracy; 
sometimes appearing as resistance, and at other times, responsiveness.  It was shown 
to be persistent and resilient as well as fragile and contingent: persistent in that it 
maintained its rhetorical, legitimising force, and fragile in the sense that it could be 
progressively reinterpreted according to political expediency.  At one moment it was 
the key to the defence of the public interest against party political opportunism; at 
another it was a smokescreen for party political propaganda.  It was viewed by 
protagonists as “the line”, but one that applied to “a grey area” (C11, C13).  What is 
clear is that, however ambiguous, ill-defined or poorly understood,  civil servants 
consider impartiality as an ideal grounded in a commitment to equality and applied 
by agreement in the context of British liberal democratic public life and social justice 
(Mendus, 2008).   As such, it can be considered to be a public good (Honig, 2015).  
What is open to question is how the limits of impartiality are drawn and applied, by 
whom, and in whose interests and to what extent they can and should be both 
accountable to the public, whether directly or indirectly, and responsive to changing 
social circumstances and understandings?   
 
8.5 Conclusions and recommendations 
The narrative of political spin asserts that governments have become increasingly 
prone to self-advantaging and therefore untrustworthy forms of strategic political 
communication.  Even academics refer to those responsible for government 
communications as ‘spinners’ (Hood & Dixon, 2015).  The findings of this study do 
not disagree with this assertion, especially if one accepts that government 
communications now incorporates the news management practices of special 
advisers, but to place the blame on an ill-defined category such as spin or spinners is 
insufficient.  More substantive, and therefore troubling, underlying changes in UK 
government communications have taken place that affect not just what is said, how, 
when, and by whom, but to whom governments consider themselves accountable. The 
institutionalisation over time of the changes in media relations practice outlined in 
this thesis have demonstrated that political will and journalists’ need for a story can 
override civil servants trying to apply propriety codes, journalists upholding ‘fourth 
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estate’ responsibilities, and parliamentary committees reporting post hoc on 
political/media scandals.  In this sense, this thesis finds that the UK government 
communication service since 1997 has not been resilient enough to deliver a public 
communications function consistent with its own (albeit limited) stated purposes.   
The persuasive media campaign around the 2002 WMD dossier which led to such 
headlines as The Sun newspaper’s Brits 45 minutes from doom (25/9/2002), is one 
high profile example of how a mediatized style of decision-making can lead to long-
term reputational damage to governments and politicians, but there has been no 
substantive change in the internal self-regulation of government communications 
since then to suggest that this could not happen again.  On the contrary, the propriety 
codes for government communications have been re-written in a way which makes 
resistance more difficult.  The recommendations of the independent review of 
government communications (Phillis, 2004), which sought to improve the efficiency 
and credibility of government communications after 2004 were ignored and side-
lined after 2010.   This does not mean that the attempt to re-work a government 
communications service built on the principle of impartiality was not worthwhile or 
that the approach outlined by Phillis can be deemed to have failed.  If anything, the 
increasing demands of 24/7 media, and the development of Extended Ministerial 
Officers, suggest that public-oriented principles are more important than ever in 
sustaining public trust in government communications.  
What remains, though, is a growing gap in accountability and a significant decline in 
public support for democratic institutions, although not democracy itself. The 
undignified struggle for control over the public presentation and re-presentation of 
government actions and decisions has been increasingly dominated by political and 
media actors since 1997 but to blame individuals for engaging in an ill-defined process 
loosely termed ‘political spin’ is to deny the extent to which public information is 
compromised, weakened and subject to inadequate forms of accountability and 
redress. The narrative of political spin places much of the blame at the feet of 
politicians or their operatives, and we have demonstrated here that they have indeed 
played a decisive role in the transformation of the rules of engagement between 
governments and the media, but they are just part of the picture.  A ‘culture of 
mediatization’ has developed, leading to a range of ‘cross-field’ effects which 
challenge the resilience of the accountability mechanisms for government 
communications that were already weak in any case.  The news management role of 
politically appointed special advisers has been allowed to develop without proper 
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scrutiny or even recognition of what the role means in practice.  Propriety codes have 
been tweaked and governance structures changed without consultation or regard for 
long-term or unintended consequences.  There has been a failure to fulfil even the 
basic criteria for good public communications as recommended by Phillis or as 
suggested by scholars such as Blumler and Coleman.  
Yet despite this, the commitment to the doctrine of impartiality remains almost 
universal within the UK and is regularly re-stated by politicians, civil servants, 
parliament and the media.  As far as the public view is concerned, what little evidence 
we can glean from public opinion research suggests that they increasingly place value 
on the officials who appear to offer impartiality, such as civil servants.  Impartiality is 
part of a taken-for-granted and shared belief system that seeks to underpin the values 
of justice and equality within the elite political/administrative sphere.   But 
impartiality is not the only principle operating within government communications: 
special advisers who are explicitly exempt from impartiality have become integrated 
into many aspects of government, including the news management function.  This 
development acknowledges quite rightly that ministers have particular 
communications needs but these should not be allowed to routinely override the 
needs of the public.  To enable a thorough and transparent analysis of the problem of 
government communications, the needs of ministers, and the day-to-day role of 
special advisers in briefing the media should be publicly recognised and brought into 
the open, not condoned and conducted in secret. 
As a first step, the civil service must uphold a long-term and publicly-sourced and 
presented vision of what government communications should be which goes beyond 
the narratives developed for individual ministers or that pursued by No.10 or the 
Treasury.  This is essential if the civil service is to live up to its stated obligation to 
provide a check on the role of the political party and the politician within government 
communications.   The starting point for this vision is already available in the form of 
the 2004 Independent Review of Government Communications (the Phillis Review), 
which was accepted by the government of the day.  As the Phillis Review stated, at the 
very least, communications professionals  must be given the autonomy to ensure that 
they can use professional judgment to deploy the full range of communications tools, 
techniques and approaches aimed at reaching all citizens, not just the channels which 
seem expedient for short-term political survival.  Rather than using attacks on 
government communications as a political football in order to demonstrate a ‘get 
tough’ approach to public expenditure, there should be an honest acknowledgement 
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that the resources currently devoted to communicating with and hence accounting to 
citizens, are probably too small. Hood’s estimate put the numbers of communications 
staff at 3,000 in 2013 of whom about 750 are press officers (Hood & Dixon, 2015), 
representing an insignificant 0.7% of the civil service workforce.   
Most importantly, Parliament must be seen to publicly hold governments to account 
for their custodianship of this most politically-sensitive of public goods – the public 
communications function, as Yeung has already suggested (Yeung, 2006).  The Public 
Administration and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee is responsible for 
overseeing the work of the civil service, and has been vociferous in its concern in 
relation to government communications since its first report 18 years ago (Public 
Administration Select Committee, 1998).  It should be given the explicit task of firstly 
restating and updating a public framework for government communications along the 
lines of the Phillis recommendations which should incorporate and acknowledge the 
media and communications responsibilities of special advisers, especially if there 
were to be a revival of the idea of the Extended Ministerial Office.  This framework 
should establish clear and externally-validated criteria for assessing the propriety of 
government communications, as well as a transparent system for overseeing 
complaints, including public complaints, and providing redress, and, if necessary, 
sanctions. The Committee should be routinely held responsible for reviewing the 
deliberations and decisions of the GCS Board, approving and proposing changes to 
GCS propriety codes, commenting on and approving the annual communications 
plan, and scrutinising the appointment of the Head of Profession for Government 
Communications.   
Chilcot warned that lasting damage to public trust in government statements had 
resulted from “a widespread perception” that argument had been presented as fact.  
Changing times will bring new pressures, but the answer is surely not to abandon any 
notion of a place of common interests, or allow it to shrink and decay through 
cynicism or lack of attention, but to constantly refresh and replenish it.  This is not 
the task of public servants alone although they have a legitimate part to play.  It is one 
that must also be embraced by elected politicians on behalf of all citizens. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: The power of the media: politicians’ testimony to Leveson (in 
chronological order of service) 
Name Date of 
statement 
Selected quotes 
Kenneth Clarke 30.5.2012 “In recent years it’s got noisier and noisier, more and more professionalized 
on both sides, so modern politics is mass media dominated”. 
“….the power of  the press is now far greater than the power of 
Parliament…I think a lot of people are driven away from politics by the fact 
they don’t want to accept the level of exposure”. 
Chris Patten 23.1.2012 “I think politicians in office, or for that matter, some of them out of office, 
would sleep better at night and make better decisions if they weren’t quite 
as affected by the front pages of newspapers”. 
John Major 12.6.2012 “I was much too sensitive from time to time about what the press wrote.  
God knows, in retrospect, why I was, but I was…I was always struck, when I 
went away from the chattering circle of Whitehall and Westminster, how 
different was the attitude of people away from that”. 
Gus O’Donnell, 
cabinet 
secretary to 
three Prime 
Ministers. 
14.5.2012 “Certainly, Prime Ministers – and Sir John Major was no different in that 
respect – care a lot about what the media say about them and get very upset 
when there are inaccuracies reported.  He got particularly upset when they 
would be of a personal nature.” 
Tony Blair 28.5.2012 “I think actually we were guilty of ascribing to them a power that they 
ultimately don’t actually have and…have less today than I think back then.” 
Alastair 
Campbell 
30.11.2011 
14.5.2012 
“We have a press that has just become frankly putrid in many of its 
elements…There’s a sense of (politicians) still judging their success or failure 
far too much on what sort of press they are getting.” 
Peter Mandelson 21.5.2012 “The intensity of the relationship has grown as the 24/7 news cycle, with its 
rapacious demand for instant information and answers, has placed the 
political world under intolerable pressure.  This is magnified many times 
for government.” 
John Prescott 27.2.2012 “Politicians are very sensitive, I think, about what the papers think….that’s 
unfortunate.  It’s never troubled me, quite frankly, but it is the 
problem…Papers actually believe they win the elections, and so I think the 
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politicians get to think it’s best to have them on your side than against you.  
That’s proper political influence.” 
John Reid 23.5.2012 “The Sun ran an eight-week campaign to try and destroy me, describing me 
as the Ali G of the Labour Party, describing me as the man who’d lost his 
brain.  Attacking me for going away for a weekend”. 
Alan Johnson 22.5.2012 “The Government needs to get very important and sometimes quite 
complex information across, but, you know, the slightest slip, it turns into 
something personal against a minister rather than an issue about the actual 
policy”. 
“It’s the picking on the families.  It’s the nastiness, the real nastiness that 
you have to face.” 
Jack Straw 16.5.2012 “What The Sun was doing in the 1992 election was working over each senior 
member of the Labour front bench and this had an effect, and if you were 
on the receiving end of it, it felt like power”. 
“Mr. Kinnock…was mercilessly and unjustifiably treated by The Sun over 
quite a period.  It did contribute to our defeat.  I took that as power.” 
Lance Price, 
Labour Party 
Director of 
Communication 
12.4.2012 Labour’s fear of “losing control of (the news agenda) and allowing space for 
your opponents to advance their agenda at your expense….led to the heavy 
pre-announcement of policies, the granting of special access to favoured 
members of the media, the frequent re-announcement of news and a 
tendency to exaggerate the significance or likely impact of new policies.” 
David Cameron 30.5.2012 “I did progressively realize over 2006, 2007, that it’s very difficult if you are 
running a political party and you’re trying to swing over the public….if you 
don’t have what I would call bits of the conservative family behind you”. 
George Eustace, 
David 
Cameron’s 
Director of 
Communication 
before Andy 
Coulson 
24.7.2012 “Those who claim that it is the role of the press to hold politicians to 
account are implicitly conceding that the press are the highest authority in 
the land who hold all others to account but who are themselves accountable 
to no-one….often, when the owners of newspapers talk about ‘free speech’ 
they actually mean the unbridled power that they themselves possess to act 
as propagandists to mould public perceptions.” 
George Osborne 11.6.2012 “In a modern political party and for a government, you have to be on the 
news management cycle.  The pressure in government is to make sure you 
have answers to some of the tough questions that the media are throwing at 
you.” 
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Appendix 2: Government and parliamentary reviews – a summary 
Report Conclusions 
The Mountfield Report 1997 (Mountfield, 
1997) – This working group commissioned by 
the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Robin Butler, was 
carried out by his deputy Robin Mountfield, 
and included Alastair Campbell.  It 
investigated the workings of the Government 
Information Service (GIS) amid concerns at 
the departure of a number of Heads of 
Information. 
Upheld the non-political status of the 
Heads of Information but, “failed to 
address the power of 
Ministers”(Mountfield, 2002) 
Public Administration Select Committee  
2002 (2002) – a major disagreement at the 
Department of Transport in media handling 
between the Director of Communications and 
Jo Moore, special adviser to the Secretary of 
State, led to  the leaking of her 9/11 email (“it’s 
now a very good day to get out anything we 
want to bury”). 
Found “serious flaws” in the 
management and accountability of 
special advisers and called for a 
clearer distinction between their roles 
and that of government press officers. 
Called on the government to set up an 
independent review of government 
communications. 
Committee on Standards in Public Life: 
Defining the boundaries within the 
Executive: ministers, special advisers 
and the permanent civil service 2003 
(Wicks, 2003) – investigated the boundaries 
between special advisers and departmental 
press officers, taking oral evidence from 48 
witnesses over nine days. 
 
Recommended that special advisers 
be defined as a separate category to 
civil servants and that there should be 
clear written guidance on what they 
can and cannot do.  Upheld the 
impartiality of the GICS and 
recommended that the civil service be 
established in statute. An independent 
adviser on ministerial interests should 
be appointed. 
An Independent Review of Government 
Communications 2004 (Phillis, 2004) –
described the GIS as “a virtual and voluntary 
network which has neither the authority nor 
the capability to enforce standards in 
communication”,  and identified a “three-way 
breakdown of trust and credibility” over events 
at the Department of Transport and concerns 
at the behaviour of special advisers. 
Wide-ranging recommendations, 
including the creation of a Permanent 
Secretary, Government 
Communications, a broader and more 
professional service using more direct 
communications, and a ban on special 
advisers directing civil servants. 
Review of Intelligence on Weapons of 
Mass Destruction 2004 (Butler, 2004) – 
a review commissioned by the Prime Minister 
to examine intelligence leading to the Iraq 
War, following the row with the BBC over the 
“dodgy dosser” and the death of the weapons 
inspector Dr David Kelly. 
Criticized the informal nature of 
decision-making that “made it much 
more difficult for members of the 
cabinet outside the small circle 
directly involved to bring their 
political judgment and experience to 
bear on the major decisions for which 
the Cabinet as a whole must carry 
responsibility”.  The September 2002 
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dossier was misleading because "more 
weight was placed on the intelligence 
than it could bear". 
Hutton Report (Hutton, 2004) – an 
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding 
the death of Dr David Kelly, following the 
ongoing controversy in relation to claims 
about Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass 
destruction set out in the dossier of 24 
September 2002.  Examined the role of the 
BBC, the report by Andrew Gilligan, the 
preparation of the dossier, and the public 
naming and subsequent death of Dr Kelly. 
Exonerated the government of 
dishonourable or underhand 
behaviour in connection Dr David 
Kelly.  Accused the BBC of failing to 
adequately investigate shortcomings 
in the original report by Andrew 
Gilligan.  His allegation that the 
government “probably knew that the 
45 minutes claim was wrong before 
the Government decided to put it in 
the dossier” was “unfounded”. 
House of Lords Report on Government 
Communications 2008 (2008) – examined 
the extent to which the recommendations of 
the Phillis Review had been implemented in 
the light of continuing developments in media 
and communications. 
Ministers should take responsibility 
for respecting “the primacy of the 
house when making policy 
announcements” and that these 
“should always be provided on a fair 
and equal basis to all interested 
journalists”. 
Report into the culture and practices of 
the press 2012 (Leveson, 2012) – 
concluded that politicians’ conduct in relation 
to the press: “contributed to a lessening of 
public confidence…by giving rise to legitimate 
…concerns that politicians and the press have 
traded power and influence in ways which are 
contrary to the public interest and out of 
public sight” (III Press and Politicians, para 
120). 
Recommended the creation of a new 
independent press regulator 
accountable to a body made up not of 
newspaper appointees but with a 
statutory basis, with sanctions for 
those who do not participate. 
Chilcot Report (Chilcot, 2016a) – 
examined in detail decision-making in relation 
to policy and its delivery by the UK 
government from the period when military 
action became a possibility in 2001, to the final 
departure of British troops in 2009.  This 
included pre-conflict strategy and planning, 
the UK decision to support US military action, 
government decision-making, advice on the 
legal basis for military action, WMD 
assessments, and post-war planning. 
Judgements about the severity of the 
threat from Iraq were “presented with 
a certainty that was not justified”. The 
widespread perception that the 2002 
dossier had overstated the risks had 
“produced a damaging legacy” that 
could make it harder in future to 
secure support for government policy. 
Cabinet had not been adequately 
informed or involved, and there was 
too little separation between the 
responsibility for the analysis of 
evidence and the making of arguments 
for particular policy outcomes. 
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Appendix 3: Interviewee metadata 
Civil servants 
Name/code Date of IV 
Word 
length 
Started 
service 
Ended  
service 
Length of 
service 
(yrs.) 
Last position as civil servant 
Bernard Ingham/C01 14/11/2013 6780  1967 1990 23 PM’s press secretary/ 
Robin Butler/C02 12/11/2013  4259  1961 1998 37 Cabinet Secretary 
Siobhan Kenny/C03 18/11/2013 9208  1994 2005 8 Departmental Director of 
Communications 
C04 25/09/2013 7223 1999 2011 12 Departmental press officer 
C05 02/12/2013 8627  1999 2004 5 Departmental press officer 
C06 03/12/2013  3820  1998 2010 12 Strategy Director 
Jonathan Haslam/C07 06/12/2013  9529  1978 1998 20 PM’s press secretary 
Howell James/C08 06/01/2014  6599  1985 2008 9 Permanent Secretary 
Nadine Smith/C09 10/09/2014 7222  1998 2009 11 Chief Press Secretary, 
Cabinet Office 
C10 17/06/2014  8027  1975 2008 33 Senior leadership role 
C11 06/08/2014 9316  1991 2011 20 Director of Communications 
C12 10/09/2014  7700  2008 2010 2 Strategic Communications 
Adviser 
C13 06/11/2014  7738  2010 2014 4 Departmental press officer 
C14 02/02/2015  10224  2001 2014 13 Departmental Deputy 
Director and Head of News 
C15 03/02/2015 7444  1986 2008 22 Senior official, Cabinet Office 
C16 10/09/2015  4106 2001 2014 13 Departmental Director of 
Communication 
Average (total)  7754   15.2 (243)  
Journalists and special advisers 
Name/code Date of IV 
Word 
length 
Started 
Service 
Ended  
Service 
Length of 
service (yrs.) 
Journalists      
Chris Moncrieff/J17 27/01/2014 5666 1962 1994 32 
J18 9/04/2014 8045 1991 Cont. 24 
Nick Timmins/J19 14/04/2014 6200 1981 2012 31 
Nicholas Jones/J20 31/07/2014 11109 1968 2002 34 
David Brindle/J21 14/08/2014 6207 1978 Cont. 37 
Jon Silverman/J22 09/11/2014 7897 1972 2002 30 
Average (total)  7521   32 (192) 
Special advisers      
Nick Hillman 20/05/2015 8301 20006 2013 6 
Bill Bush 26/06/2015 6194 1999 2005 6 
Katie Waring 15/07/2015 4970 2010 2013 3 
Average (total)  6849   5 (15) 
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Appendix 4: Sample topic guide (civil servant) 
Heading Issues 
Your career When and why did you enter the civil service and how long did 
you spend in the service?  How did your career develop? 
 
Defining excellence 
and good and bad 
practice 
How did PR practice change during your time in the civil service. 
Can you provide an illustration of good and bad practice in 
government media relations? How did you see excellence in 
government media relations? 
     
What it was like 
doing the job: highs 
and lows 
 
Long hours?  Teamwork?  Excitement?  Stress?  How did the 
experience compare with other jobs you had done?  Bridging role 
and sense of exposure to both media and political masters? 
Reputation of GICS 
during your time in 
government  
 
What is/was the reputation or standing of PR in the civil service 
and how, if at all, did this change over time?   What was the 
general attitude towards the media and how did that change?  
 
Public service 
purpose and ethos of 
Govt comms 
If the purpose of the civil service is to serve the government of the 
day, what is the specific role of government media relations as 
regards the public?  Is it clearly understood within the civil 
service? 
The civil servant at 
the front line of 
media relations, 
especially at 
departmental level. 
Coping with patrolling and policing the boundary between 
government and party political PR.  What was it like and how did 
you handle some of the difficulties?  Role of the COI and heads of 
news concerning the policing of press releases?   
Impact of changes of 
government  
What is the impact of a change of government, especially at 
senior level in the information service?  Are press officers more at 
risk during a change of government?  If so, why?  
Government 
communications 
appointments 
Transparent, fair, open and impartial recruitment process?  Were 
there any times when you had to intervene on issues of 
recruitment or when ministers did not get on with their heads of 
information or wanted to appoint political sympathisers?    
 
Prime Minister’s 
office/No 10/Cabinet 
office 
Importance of the relationship between No 10 and the 
departments.  How did you observe this working in practice?  
Examples of when it went well and when it didn’t.   . 
Ministers at 
departmental level 
Ministers’ role in determining media priorities (timing and content 
of announcements, drafting of press releases).  How to reconcile 
Ministers’ interest in personal image making with government 
needs. Has their involvement in government media management 
changed over time?   
 
SPADS Their media responsibilities.  How these have changed over time 
or vary between departments.  How would you describe the role 
of the special adviser vis-à-vis the media – firstly, as it should be, 
and secondly, as it actually was in practice.   
 
Political control vis a 
vis communications 
and change since 
1997 
What do you think about claims that political control has increased 
since 1997?  How do you see the current government’s approach 
to government communications or indeed, the civil service?  The 
latest CS reform plan is to create larger ministerial support teams 
including a political head of communications.  What would be the 
impact of this?   
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Appendix 5: Invitation to interview 
 
From: R.garland@lse.ac.uk      
Sent: xx October 2013 17:00 
To: xxx xxxxxx 
Subject: Research into UK Government communications 
 
Dear Mx xxxxxx 
I am a postgraduate researcher in Media & Communications at the London School of Economics, and 
I am approaching a number of former and serving UK Government communications professionals 
from all levels to obtain first-hand accounts of life at the frontline of government media relations at 
departmental level, including both special advisers and permanent civil servants.     
As a former long-serving public sector communicator myself, I aim to examine how modern 
government media relations operates given the demands of 24 hour news media, and the 
constraints of government, since little empirical research has been done into this from a 
departmental perspective.  I am writing to invite you to take part in a one-hour, one-to-one 
interview, on the understanding that your contribution will remain anonymous and confidential.    
The kinds of areas we would be discussing include how you saw your role, what quality and 
excellence means in government communications, how you and your teams managed the boundary 
between government and party political communications, how effective and useful the conventions 
and codes of practice were, and what changes you observed over time, including periods of 
transition from one administration to the next.   My focus will be on the period from 1997. 
I will be conducting interviews from November 2013 onwards, mainly in London, and would be 
happy to meet you wherever and whenever is convenient for you.  If you have any questions or 
would like to discuss the interview process or the project further before coming to a decision, please 
feel free to call me on my mobile on 07764 391239 or email me at r.garland@lse.ac.uk.    
To tell you a bit more about myself, I worked in public sector media relations for more than 20 years, 
in public health, BBC television and publishing, and local government, although not the civil 
service.  My supervisor is Dr Nick Anstead and my academic adviser is Dr Damian Tambini.  You can 
see my LSE profile at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/WhosWho/PhdStudents/Ruth-
Garland.aspx.    
I would be delighted if you could take part in an interview, and if so, would be happy to share my 
general findings with you before submission.  I would be most grateful for your time and look 
forward to hearing from you. 
With kind regards 
Ruth Garland 
(Full contact details added). 
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Appendix 6: Sample interview transcript 
Transcript of interview with Howell James at Christie’s, Monday 6/1/2014. 
How did your career develop within the civil service - starting with the 1980s…? 
I came in to do a comms job candidly.  I wasn’t there to be an adviser on anything that David was 
doing.  When I first came to work in the cabinet office he was the minister without portfolio, mainly 
focused on job creation and that him into tourism and looking at training and that was interesting, it 
wasn’t an area of my expertise at all. I was a special adviser brought in because I had a comms 
background, and also because he had fallen out with the person who was had been looking after his 
communications.  The civil service, they’d given him a civil servant to be the allocation press media 
liaison for the, what was called the, re-deregulation unit, that he led and I think he found their model, 
he was a proactive, wanted to get out to evangelise his message and he was a bit kind of wary of the 
don’t talk to them I’ll brief them you’ve got to be more in the background, you know. So that seemed 
to me at the time was one of the issues for him.  So he brought in a special adviser who I think he 
wanted us to be more proactive.   
As a minister without portfolio, you were in the cabinet office, you haven’t got a department, you 
haven’t got big battalions, you haven’t got a big budget, and really a lot of your locus is around making 
sure that the few things that you do make the requisite amount of noise when you do them.   And so 
his report on tourism and his report on deregulating things were very central to him and how they 
were communicated to the lobby and how they were communicated to the wider media was 
something that he cared about.  I was there to be a press officer; I was in no confusion about that. 
And to work alongside the civil servants.   
It wasn’t such an issue in the Cabinet Office because I was only there for three or four months before 
we moved to Employment and you have more freedom in the Cabinet Office you weren’t tied down 
to a clear departmental structure. When he was promoted to be the Secretary of State for 
Employment immediately you are in a big department, there’s a big comms department, there’s a 
director of comms there as a special adviser you have to weave your path between serving the 
minister, helping the department, being collaborative and supportive of what the department is doing 
and how the minister can be properly positioned within in and you have to work your way through 
that which I think I did. 
Coming from a fairly proactive approach when you were at TV am what was your impression of the 
culture and practices of the civil service media teams when you arrived? 
Well all I could reference is what I found at the Department of Employment.  Very well led by an 
exceptionally good head of comms who absolutely knew the lobby, knew his way around the 
journalists, knew what they wanted to write.  I think this is an enduring tension between ministers 
coming into office and civil servants who are inside departments and have worked with ministers from 
previous administrations or ministers who have been there in current administration but moved on 
and a new minister arrives.  They’ve seen all the brickbats, they’ve watched all the pitfalls, they’ve 
seen all the dilemmas and...overpromising, getting out over your skis, being too available to the 
media, pursuing too much of a profile and then reaping the reward of that when something goes 
wrong.  Their natural default position is to be acautioned.  Do they put their foot on the accelerator 
or do they cautiously play on the clutch?  They have a propensity to cautiously play on the clutch.  
If you look at certain big things, I always smile wryly at Tony Blair’s memoirs where he says about the 
FOI, “Sir Humphrey, where were you when I needed you?”  The inevitable consequences of an FOI act 
which the media would use almost exclusively to constantly pursue certain kind of issues or certain 
kinds of statistics which inevitably anyone in a government department or civil servant would have 
perceived but you come in as a new administration, you’ve made promises in opposition, you want to 
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get them done, and you have to find a balancing act as a civil servant between counselling the caution 
but also being supportive of the energy and the excitement that new ministers have about wanting to 
do stuff and sometimes it lands slightly on the wrong side. I found them very knowledgeable, very 
thorough.  I thought they were good citizens who were trying to deliver well.  They had a lot to do and 
I think there is inevitably…if you’ve sat in a department and watched a lot of stuff come and go there 
can occasionally be an air of “we have seen this before and let’s see how this works out”, and to be 
more of an observer rather than a participant. 
What do you think the reputation of standing of media relations was from other civil servants or 
within the service? 
I think people had a number of different views about it.  I think there were more cautious civil servants 
who viewed communications as a sort of doorway to the media and therefore to be treated with great 
caution, keep everything away from them until the last minute, don’t let them know too much.  There 
were others who I think took the view that ministers need to treat with the media and the access 
point for that needs to be the comms function and a well informed and intelligently managed 
communications function can help you do that and serve your ministers and policy needs if you do it 
in a collaborative spirit.  So, some civil servants “steer clear of comms until the last minute” and so 
then, with them you found yourself working in an environment which is “here it is, we’ve decided 
what it is and now we want you to put it out”.  With others you were brought in much earlier and they 
would be toying with the upsides and the downsides of doing it this way or that you, and you will 
know this yourself, there are some programme makers who tell you everything all the way through 
and by the time the programme comes to air you feel more invested in it very vested in it, very 
knowledgeable about what they’re doing and others keep away from you until the last minute and 
you are running to keep up. And policy civil servants and some ministers are no different. 
What was the balance in the 1980s between cautious and more collaborative? 
I think in the 80s there was probably more of an air of caution. At the same time they harboured a 
tremendous admiration for Bernard Ingham at No.10.  Their view of the No.10 machine that it was 
very effective that Bernard knew and understood the lobby well, was tough minded, he had a very 
close and good working relationship with the Prime Minister, he knew her mind, he could sit in front 
of a group of journalists and be trusted by her and by them and by her to be an honest broker between 
the two and I think that worked very much to the benefit of the comms function but it also of course 
made ministers want. Ministers would look to No.10 with a degree of caution because Mrs Thatcher’s 
voice, the Prime Ministers’ voice could come over much more clearly on a policy issue or on an area 
of endeavour than perhaps a departmental one could because their machine was so effective, and her 
own electricity, the electricity around her as Prime Minister, .and the focus editors and writers around 
her it’s hard to capture it now in the last…one saw it a bit around Blair in the early period but it hasn’t 
worked as well for other Prime Ministers, but she carried all before her at that time as you will recall.  
There was…. people knew her mind, they knew what she wanted, she had a clarity of purpose, or 
there was a sense that she had a clarity of purpose, and that was very well and ably communicated by 
the comms function at No.10 and I think departments looked on in some…they knew that comms was 
important.  And by communications really this was the key Tory newspapers, so the focus 
predominantly  was on the broadsheets and the mid-markets, David English’s role at the Daily Mail, 
reigning supreme there, so a the management role was focused on managing the media, but not just 
the media but the print media.  You weren’t going to get much spin out of John Cole who was the 
political editor at the BBC… but placing and shaping stories…. and of course Mrs Thatcher ran a very 
effective communications function out of her Party headquarters as well and people knew that and 
she had close relationships with Gordon Reece with Tim Bell and others who were communicating her 
agenda as well. 
Moving on to your next period in government in the 1990s in the Prime Minister’s office how would 
you compare the media handling processes at No.10 with what you’d seen earlier, and at the BBC?  
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Everything lives in its era, and particularly politics.  I got there in summer 94 and the Major government 
had had two years of knocking since the 92 election so they ‘d been put under a lot of pressure by the 
media, the European issue was playing badly for them … the PM had supported qualified majority 
voting… that had provoked a backlash from some of the Tory newspapers and indeed you look at the 
current travails that David Cameron has with the back bench Tory MPs who are more to the right of 
the party very similar environment for John Major…. and a rapidly falling majority, he’d only got a 
majority in 92 of 21 seats.  So I think it’s impossible to talk about the comms function separate from 
that political environment and the difficulties that the government faced.  I thought the comms 
function was extremely ably managed, Christopher Meyer was a wonderful communications manager, 
he commanded huge support from his team, he had great charisma, he absolutely understood and 
has written himself his ten points...he went off to Harvard to do some work before he went to Berlin 
and one adage that I’ve always held fondly is his “if you haven’t got a story, coin a phrase”.  Although 
he was a diplomat by training he had a wonderful instinct for the media and how to handle them.  I 
found him an absolutely delightful colleague and he welcomed me.  
So although I came in with a comms background from Corporate Affairs at Cable and Wireless to do 
the job and the job at No.10 was not a comms job. I was the key liaison between the party and the 
Prime Minister, I was looking after John Major in his role as leader of the party while he was at No.10 
and there’s a long tradition of having a small political office at No.10 which looks after the Prime 
Minister in his other capacity and which brings the party machine and party activity into the diary 
planning and  timetabling of No.10’s arrangements, and when you think about the big high points of 
the Prime Ministers’ year big party events form a key part of that as much  as the big national 
government events, and therefore  having a political secretary there is a very very useful function but 
it’s not just a comms function.  You are there to make sure it all joins up.  You are there to be a liaison 
for the party chairman and other party officials and of course in our structure the role of fundraising 
and all of that, so I was not focused solely and only on comms, but when I dealt with the comms team 
and when we faced the 95 leadership election when John Major put up or shut up a lot of the comms  
function came back to the political office at that point because clearly if you are running to be leader 
of the Conservative party whilst you are prime minister it’s not appropriate for civil servants to look 
after your comms and it’s not appropriate for Conservative central office to look after your comms 
because there could be other candidates running against you so John Major’s own leadership team 
had to do that of which I was  a part. 
So it wasn’t a comms job.  That said, my observation of the way No.10 worked was extremely able.  
The dilemma we had was of course that because of the fragile political ecology of the time ministers 
and others had their own different agendas and they used their special advisers very actively to brief 
the media and you had lot of to-ing and fro-ing.  And you expected every Friday or Saturday weekend 
speeches and party political speeches of ministers to start picking up issues, which is exactly why we 
ended up in 95 with the leadership election because you’d had every Friday you could guarantee that 
John Redwood would stand up and say something unhelpful about Europe.  
Do you see any grounds for New Labour’s claim when it came into office that the government 
comms function was ineffective? 
Look.  I think.  I don’t feel able to judge the competence of departmental comms functions because I 
was so bogged down in my own little patch, my own little territory, so making  a sweeping statement 
about how the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign Office ran their comms under Malcolm Rifkind or 
Douglas Hurd.  I think there’s often a lot of misunderstanding when a new government comes in and 
it’s back to my the slight tendency for communications functions to be a little bit of a handbrake, to 
caution, and if you come in with a great majority after a great election victory it’s quite hard to hear 
those cautionary voices initially and sometimes… the Permanent Secretary, the Personal  Private 
Secretary and the Comms director are the three people that the minister has most to do with 
personally and directly and I think it reinforced for me the political sensitivity of the comms function 
which, fast forwarding to the Phillis Review, came out of the Phillis Review, which is the balance that 
you strike between the political communication and governmental communication and I think if a 
government comes in with a big majority on a big high having had a big success with a new agenda 
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with a huge amount of public support seeing the difference between your political agenda and your 
government agenda, it’s quite hard and if you bring in the director of comms from the Labour Party 
as the government’s senior communicator and you put civil servants and budgets under that person 
as well as political obligations around them, you change the terrain and a lot of special advisers in 
1997 decided they were mini Alastairs, and why wouldn’t they?  That was the sort of model that No.10 
set up and seemed to encourage, but it led down the line to difficulties, Jo Moore and others… 
You seem to be suggesting that 1997 was a turning point for government communications?  
It was interesting at the point where Christopher Meyer left No.10 to do go to Bonn, the opportunity 
was there for a political appointment. At the time Charles Lewington was the director of 
communications at the Central Office, political editor of the Sunday Express, very able, extremely 
smart, and the opportunity was there to bring a journalist in to do that job and indeed it wasn’t the 
first time this had been done.  You go back to Harold Wilson with Joe Haines, even Macmillan had a 
former Times journalist at No.10 who worked very closely with Bill Deedes who was made a Minister 
for Information, so you’d had a political appointment and all of these issues were often looked at but 
John Major fully rejected the notion of having a political appointee brought in to do that.  
So in the sense that in 1997 for the first time you had a very ….a political polemicist in Alastair a 
passionate fluent popular journalistic sense driving the comms agenda… it probably was a sea 
change…. Was it a sea change that would have happened anyway?  Because politicians as they 
campaign, as they go out there to make things work for them. I don’t think this is a party political issue 
it’s about how to get your message over in this world that is so noisy and is so difficult and one has to 
assume that David Cameron came to the same view which is why he wanted Andy Coulson to do that 
job.  One of them is sort of very helpful.  Having a journalist close by you in the modern age when 
stories break and move very very quickly, where will it go next what will they be looking for what do 
you say to stop it how do you stop it..The levels of confidence that a former practitioner an editor of 
a newspaper particularly a mid-market or a tabloid newspaper would have to do that; the confidence 
they would command from a politician is clear to see.  Does it mean that they give good advice in that 
environment is more open to question? 
How do you compare Bernard Ingham’s approach – he was also a journalist.  Was he the equivalent 
of Alastair Campbell? 
Patently not, because he was working for a Tory administration and I think he came in as I hope I did 
when I went in as a civil servant you sort of hang your political colours at the door.  You are not there 
to give political advice you are there to give practical pragmatic advice and actually I think Alastair was 
very very good at this for a period, very very good at this.  He is a very smart man and he delivered 
extremely effective advice to the Prime Minister and look how well Tony Blair’s premiership went for 
the whole of that first term, an extraordinary run of well managed announcements, well managed 
presentation issues, damage limitation very effectively handled in that period…more rocky in the 
second term.  But that sort of happens anyway.  Your permission to get away with stuff gets narrower 
and narrower the longer you’re there, as all Prime Minister’s careers will attest.   
So I think it was a change in 97. It was probably a change that was inevitably going to happen because 
of what was happening in the media, the way in which newspapers themselves were fighting for their 
own survival, as the digital revolution…, the BBC was already beginning to get up and running with its 
huge website in that period, you could see many more television channels, many more routes to 
market, how to manage that effectively, the clarity about getting your message over, control, the grip, 
making sure you’ve got a grip across Whitehall, a grip of what departments are up to, what ministers 
are up to, what the comms function was doing. There was always….It wouldn’t matter who was in 
power this was a natural evolution of managing the media in a very difficult world. And a high profile 
world.  A publicly accountable world.  The whole thing about government is that there is no hiding 
place.  You’ve got to be out there all the time. So at No.10 you’ve got to have somebody who’s got an 
appetite for that news machine to manage that news thing on and on and on.  It’s bloody tough work. 
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Coming to the 1990s when you became Permanent Secretary of government communications – this 
was a new role 
I thought the curse of the job was if you just ended up being a referee between special advisers and 
civil servant Comms function you’d end up having a pretty blighted life it seemed to me so I embraced 
a slightly wider agenda, which was, let’s think about the wider benefits of properly communicated 
government activity to the largest number of people which is the electorate in its broadest sense, the 
citizens, and how do you do that in the modern age.  Directgov.  Do you put more up on the website? 
We’d had the FOI.  How do you manage this stuff?  How do you get ahead of the curve?  How do you 
not find yourself constantly at the receiving end of tiresome questions but actually put more 
information out there so you pre-empt it, you put it out in your own terms in your own way, all the 
usual professional advice you’d give anybody whether they are running a company, a government or 
any enterprise. 
When it comes to this line between government and party political, I’m getting the impression from 
other interviews I’ve done that it’s not difficult and that you know it when it’s there? 
Oh yes, you absolutely know it.  I think the Cabinet Office guidance on this is really excellent.  We 
worked hard on it.  I doubt they’ve changed it very much.  
Party political work is clear.  Who is the press officer that’s going to accompany David Cameron to the 
Conservative Party Conference?  It’s a party problem.  Who accompanies him to the G8, it’s a 
government problem.  If he makes a speech at the G8 which then decides to take a pop at the Labour 
Party, that’s where the contention arises or when a minister decides that a government speech needs 
to have two or three paragraphs of knockabout in it about what the opposition has said.  And the 
closer you get to an election at any point the more ministers move away from delivering the set piece 
civil service speech and the more they get into wanting to deliver something broader.  The advantage 
of having the special adviser in the department is that they can navigate that space and working closely 
with a department press office they can divide up the work in a sensible and grown up way.  What I 
hoped to do in my role was create an environment where that dialogue could happen in an open and 
sensible way where everyone wasn’t always on tenterhooks and feeling  they were being beaten up. 
There was a tremendous spirit we found in Phillis that a lot of the civil servants just felt that they had 
no voice in departments and that that had precipitated a lot of resentment and a lot of tension 
between ministers, ministers expectations of what departments could do and relationships with 
special advisers.  Now of course some of this stuff is ad hominem.  It’s individuals who behave in a 
certain way and it exasperates and it exhausts people.  You can’t write rule books around that.  That 
will happen.  That happens in all organisations, large or small and it happens whether you are in a 
political environment or you are in a highly competitive commercial environment. 
I think what we tried to do was we tried to give some confidence to the civil servant cadre of 
communicators.  Give them the support of the training they needed, the skills they needed, the 
experience they needed.  What sort of… Make sure we brought in good communicators who knew 
and understood the terrain who could manage the departments intelligently so at the top of 
government communications departments we had people who had some commercial experience, 
political experience or governmental experience in proper balance.  We brought some people in from 
outside we promoted some people internally. But I felt it was a very important part of my role to try 
and help departments appoint somebody good to do the job, not just to say well we’ll take a policy 
civil servant to do it or we’ll bring in someone from the private sector but to take some time to search 
the job properly to think and ask…., one of my jobs was to spend time with senior civil servants and 
ministers asking them what do you think you really need here?  What are the skillsets that you need?  
What job do you really want this team to do?  What is the thing that is most important to you? How 
does your private office work?  How do your special advisers work?  And then helping them to 
appointment somebody who would be able to navigate that space. 
Do you think the process worked well while you were there? 
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I do actually.  Usha Prashar was the Civil Service Commissioner and she understood that I this was a 
sensitive area.  There are only three jobs where ministers have direct intervention, where they can 
veto appointments, Perm Sec, Principal Private Secretary and Director of Comms.  Those three roles 
are very particular roles.  
 
 
Appendix 7:  Coding frame: NVivo thematic codes  
Thematic codes (top 
level) 
References 
to top level 
codes 
References to most commonly 
cited 2nd level codes 
Case study/individual  126 Iraq: 44, Jo Moore: 24, Blair: 22, 
Thatcher: 11, Cameron: 8, Major: 7. 
Centralization) 65 No.10/PM: 42, Cabinet Office: 23 
Change of Government  118 1997: 72, 2010: 46 
Churn  36 Job losses: 16, vulnerability: 10, 
Suspicion: 5. 
Government 
communications 
leadership  
96 Campbell: 45; Ingham: 11, Directors 
of Communication: 8 
Journalists  183 Broadcasters: 33, relations with 
press office: 30, sources: 29, 
politicians: 16: print media: 16, 
SPADS: 16. 
Mediatization  53 Response to media change: 24, 
policy impacts: 10, social media: 10. 
Ministers 83 Perceptions of media: 42; 
relationships: 19, role in 
government communications: 14 
Perceptions of 
government 
communications  
77 Policy civil servants: 29, senior civil 
service: 22; special advisers: 15. 
Perceptions of the job 52 Positive evaluation: 38, negative: 21; 
intermediary role: 12. 
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Personalization  33 Ministers’ personal needs: 19, 
personal relationships with press 
officers: 10. 
Politicization  182 Crossing the line: 42, impartiality: 
39, propriety and codes: 33, political 
tribalism and rivalry: 17; 
responsiveness: 16. 
Professionalism  175 Principles and purposes: 42, role of 
press officer: 16, skills and 
competence levels: 15. 
Propaganda or spin  49 Propaganda/spin: 19, truth and lies: 
10 
Special advisers 134 Role: 38, problems: 34, working with 
them: 16, history: 13. 
State of the civil service  59 Restructuring and reform: 15, 
culture and mind set: 10. 
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Appendix 8: Changes since 2010 among Directors of Communication 
My own analysis of churn since 2010 within the small group of Directors of Government 
Communications in ministerial departments suggests that there has been a similar turnover 
to that in 1997 (see Figure 1 below).  Of the 20 Directors in post in 2010, just two remain: 
Russell Grossman, in the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (working to a Liberal 
Democrat Secretary of State), and Paul Geoghan at the Scotland Office, who have been in post 
respectively since 2008 and 2009 (highlighted in bold).   
Department Name Appointed In post May 
2010?* 
In post July 
2015? 
Cabinet Office Alex Aiken December 2012 No Yes 
Communities and Local 
Government 
David Hill January 2014 No Yes 
Culture Media and 
Sport 
Jon Zeff April 2011 No No (Sarah Healey) 
Education Gabriel Milland September 2011 No No (Paul Kissack) 
Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Emily Totfield September 2014 No No (Sean Larkins) 
International 
Development 
James Helm December 2010 No Yes 
Transport Vickie Sheriff January 2013 No No (Simon Baugh) 
Work and Pensions Richard Caseby January 2014 No Yes 
Business, Innovation 
and Skills 
Russell Grossman 2008 Yes Yes 
Energy and Climate 
Change 
Arthur Leathley August 2013 No No (Rae Stewart) 
Health Sam Lister October 2011 No Yes 
Foreign Office Hugh Elliott March 2013 No Yes 
HM Revenue and 
Customs 
Stephen 
Hardwick 
September 2011 No Yes 
HM Treasury Jonathan Black June 2011 No No (Conrad 
Smewing) 
Home Office Simon Wren April 2012 No Yes 
Defence Stephen Jolly April 2013 No No (Carl Newns) 
Justice Pam Teare April 2011 No Yes 
Northern Ireland office Una Flynn February 2013 No Yes 
Scotland office Paul Geoghan 2009 Yes Yes 
Wales office Stephen Hillcoat March 2013 No No (Fergus 
Sheppard) 
* As at March 2014 
Notes: several long-serving officials have circulated within the GCS, for example, Simon Wren 
from the Ministry of Defence to the Home Office, and Pam Teare from the Crown Prosecution 
Service to the newly-formed Ministry of Justice.   Other post-holders in 2010 were reported as 
having been “head hunted” by other employers. (Cartmel, 2012). 
269 
 
Appendix 9: Ministerial directions between 1990 and 2015 
 
Source: Freeguard, G. A Sense of Direction: When Permanent Secretaries Object to 
Ministerial Decisions.  Institute for Government. 6 July 2015. 
http://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/12084/a-sense-of-direction-when-
permanent-secretaries-object-to-ministerial-decisions/ Accessed 16/8/2016. 
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Esser, F., & Strömbäck, J. (2014). Mediatization of politics : understanding the 
transformation of Western democracies: Basingstoke, Hampshire : Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Fainstein, S. (2015). Resilience and Justice. International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 39(1), 157-167. doi: 10.1111/1468-2427.12186 
Farrell, D. M., & Schmitt-Back, R. d. (2002). Do political campaigns matter? : campaign 
effects in elections and referendums. London ; New York: European Consortium for 
Political Research/Routledge. 
Faulkner, E., & Everett, M. (2015). Special Advisers House of Commons Briefing Paper 
03813. 28 January. London: House of Commons. 
Fereday, J., & Muir-Cochrane, E. (2006). Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic Analysis: A 
Hybrid Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and Theme Development. 
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 5(1), 80-92.  
Figenschou, T. U., & Thorbjornsrud, K. (2015). Backstage Media-Government Negotiations: 
The Failures and Success of a Government Pitch. International Journal of 
Communication, 9, 1947-1965.  
Fisher, C. (2016). "True Believer," "Legal Advocate," or "Committed Expert": Parliamentary 
Media Advising and Practitioner Conceptions of Partisanship. Journalism & Mass 
Communication Quarterly(Available online), 1-18.  
Flinders, M. (2015). The General Rejection? Political Disengagement, Disaffected 
Democrats and ‘Doing Politics’ Differently. Parliamentary Affairs, 68(suppl1), 241-
254. doi: 10.1093/pa/gsv038 
Flinders, M. V. (2007). Analyzing Reform: The House of Commons 2001–5. Political Studies, 
55(1), 174-200.  
Foley, M. (2009). Gordon Brown and the role of compounded crisis in the pathology of 
leadership decline. British Politics, 4(4), 498-513. doi: 10.1057/bp.2009.19 
Foley, M. (2013) Evidence to the Political and Constitutional Committee on Roles and 
Powers of the Prime Minister,  London: House of Commons.. 
Foote, H. (1969). Pleasing the constituents. . In H. Pitkin (Ed.), Representative Democracy. 
New York: Atherton Press. 
Foster, C. D. (2001). The Civil Service Under Stress: The Fall in Civil Service Power and 
Authority. Public Administration, 79(3), 725-749. doi: 10.1111/1467-9299.00277 
Foster, C. D. (2005). British Government in Crisis, or, The third English revolution. Oxford: 
Hart. 
Foster, C. D. (2014). Constitutional responsibilities of the Civil Service: a personal view. 
Reports and papers: Better Government Initiative. 
276 
 
Foster, M. (2015, 15/12/2015). Lord Kerslake steps up defence of Freedom of Information – 
and rejects "chilling effect" claims. Civil Service World (CSW). 
Foster, M. (2016). Chilcot Fallout: ex-cabinet secretary Lord Butler scolds tony Blair over 
"irresponsible" attitude to Whitehall.  Retrieved from 
https://www.civilserviceworld.com/articles/news/chilcot-fallout-ex-cabinet-
secretary-lord-butler-scolds-tony-blair-over-irresponsible  
Fowler, N. (1991). Ministers decide : a personal memoir of the Thatcher years. London :: 
Chapmans. 
Franklin, B. (2004). Packaging Politics: political communications in Britain's media 
democracy. London: Arnold. 
Fredriksson, M., Schillemans, T., & Pallas, J. (2015). Determinants of organizational 
mediatization: An analysis of the adaptation of swedish government agencies to 
news media. Public administration, 93(4), 1049-1068. doi: 10.1111/padm.12184 
Fulton, Lord.  (1968).  Fulton Report on the Civil Service.  London: HM Government. 
The Future of Public Service Communications: Report and Findings. (2015).  London: HM 
Government  
The Future of the Civil Service (2013). Evidence from Bob Kerslake and Jeremy Heywood to 
the Public Administration Select Committee.  
Gaber, I. (2004). Alastair Campbell, exit stage left: Do the ‘Phillis’ recommendations 
represent a new chapter in political communications or is it ‘business as usual’? 
Journal of Public Affairs, 4(4), 365-373. doi: 10.1002/pa.199 
Gaber, I. (2016). Is there still a ‘crisis in public communication’ (if there ever was one)? The 
UK experience. Journalism, 17(5), 636-651. doi: 10.1177/1464884915576731 
Gains, F., & Stoker, G. (2011). Special advisers and the transmission of ideas from the policy 
primeval soup. Policy & Politics, 39(4), 485-498. doi: 10.1332/030557310X550169 
Garland, R. (2011). Measuring "spin" in Government communications: a content analysis of 
press releases from the Department of Communities and Local Government since 
the May 2010 General Election. Diploma in Public Affairs and Political 
Communications. CIPR/PR Academy.   
Garnett, M. (2010). New Labour's literary legacy: Institutions, individuals and ideology. 
British Politics, 5(3), 315-336. doi: 10.1057/bp.2010.9 
Garzia, D. (2011). The personalization of politics in Western democracies: Causes and 
consequences on leader– follower relationships. The Leadership Quarterly, 22(4), 
697-709. doi: 10.1016/j.leaqua.2011.05.010 
Gaskell, G. (2000). Individual and Group Interviewing. In M. Bauer & G. Gaskell (Eds.), 
Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: A Practical Handbook for 
Social Research London: Sage. 
Gay, O. (1992). The Ministerial Code (SN/PC/03750) House of Commons Standard Note. 
London: House of Commons Library. 
Gay, O. (2013). Special Advisers. (SN/PC/03813) House of Commons Standard Note. 
London: House of Commons Library. 
Geertz, C. (1975). The interpretation of cultures : selected essays. London :, [New York]: 
London :, New York : Hutchinson, Basic Books. 
Glor, E. D. (2015). Building theory of organizational innovation, change, fitness and survival. 
Innovation Journal, 20(2), 1-168.  
Goldstein, K. (2002). Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews. 
Political Science and Politics, 35(4), 669-672.  
Goodsell, C. (2005). The Bureau as a Unit of Governance. In P. du Gay (Ed.), The Values of 
Bureaucracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
277 
 
Gouglas, A., & Brans, M. (2016). UK Extended Ministerial Offices: on the road to 
cabinetisation.  London: The Constitution Unit. 
Gould, P. (1998). The unfinished revolution: how the modernisers saved the Labour Party. 
London: Little, Brown. 
Government Communications Network. (2013). Cabinet Office Capability Review. London: 
HM Government. https://gcs.civilservice.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Cabinet-Office.pdf  
Government Communications Service. (2013). Government Communications Plan 2013/14.  
London: HM Government  
Government Communications Service. (2014a). Government Communications Plan 
2014/15.  London: HM Government  
Government Communications Service. (2014b). Propriety Guidance.  London: Government 
Communication Service Government Communications Service. (2015a). GCS 
Handbook.  London: Cabinet Office. 
Government Communications Service. (2015b). Government Communications Plan 
1015/16.  London: Cabinet Office.  
Government Information and Communications Service. (2000). The GICS Handbook: A 
Working Guide for Government Information Officers.  London: Cabinet Office. 
Graber, D. (2003). The Media and Democracy: Beyond Myths and Stereotypes. Annual 
Review of Political Science, 6, 139-160. doi: 
10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085707 
Grant, M. (1999). Towards a Central Office of Information: Continuity and Change in British 
Government Information Policy, 1939-51. Journal of Contemporary History, 34(1), 
49-67.  
Gravengaard, G. (2012). The metaphors journalists live by: Journalists’ conceptualisation of 
newswork. Journalism, 13(8), 1064-1082. doi: 10.1177/1464884911433251 
Greer, S. (2008). Whitehall. In R. Hazell (Ed.), Constitutional futures revisited: Britain's 
constitution to 2020. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gregory, A. (2012). UK Government communications: Full circle in the 21st century? Public 
Relations Review, 38(3), 367-375. doi: 10.1016/j.pubrev.2012.01.002 
Grube, D. (2014). An Invidious Position? The public dance of the Promiscuous Partisan. The 
Political Quarterly, 85(4), 420-427.  
Grube, D. (2015). Responsibility to Be Enthusiastic? Public Servants and the Public Face of 
“Promiscuous Partisanship”. Governance, 28(3), 305-320. doi: 10.1111/gove.12088 
Gruhn, Z., & Slater, F. (2012). Special advisers and ministerial effectiveness. London: 
Institute for Government. 
Grunig, J. E. (1984). Managing public relations. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Habermas, J. (2008). Between facts and norms : contributions to a discourse theory of law 
and democracy. Cambridge: Polity. 
Hall, P. A., & Taylor, R. C. R. (1996). Political science and the three new institutionalisms. 
Political Studies, 44(5), 936-957. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x 
Hallin, D. C. (2004). Comparing media systems : three models of media and politics: 
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. 
Hampton, M. (2010). The Fourth Estate Ideal in Journalism History. In S. Allen (Ed.), The 
Routledge Compaion to News and Journalism (pp. 3-12). London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Hansson, S. (2015). Discursive strategies of blame avoidance in government: A framework 
for analysis. Discourse & Society, 26(3), 297-322. doi: 10.1177/0957926514564736 
Harris, R. (1990). Good and Faithful Servant. London: Faber and Faber. 
278 
 
Harrop, M. (2001). The Rise of Campaign Professionalism. In J. Bartle & D. Griffiths (Eds.), 
Political Communications Transformed (pp. 53-70). London: Palgrave. 
Harvey, W. S. (2011). Strategies for conducting elite interviews. Qualitative Research, 11(4), 
431-441. doi: 10.1177/1468794111404329 
Hay, C. (2014). A Crisis of Politics or the Politics of Crisis? In D. Richards (Ed.), Institutional 
Crisis in 21st Century Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hazell, R., Young, B., Waller, P., & Walker, B. (2012). Political Special Advisers: Inquiry by the 
Public Administration Select Committee. Submission from the UCL Constitution Unit.  
London: HMSO. 
Heffernan, R. (2006). The prime minister and the news media: Political communication as a 
leadership resource. Parliamentary Affairs, 59(4), 582-598. doi: 10.1093/pa/gsl019 
Heffernan, R., & Webb, P. (2005). The British Prime Minister: Much More Than 'First Among 
Equals'. In T. Poguntke & P. Webb (Eds.), The Presidentialization of Politics: A 
comparative study of Modern Democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hennessy, P. (1980, 30 September). Government information service finds staunch 
defender. The Times.  
Hennessy, P. (1999). Founder's Day Address. Hawarden Castle.  
Hennessy, P. (2000). The Prime Minister: the office and its holders since 1945. London: Allen 
Lane. 
Hennessy, P. (2001). Whitehall. London: Pimlico. 
Hennessy, P (2014, January 16). Opening the debate on the Future of the Civil Service,  
London: House of Lords. 
Hepp, A. (2013a). The communicative figurations of mediatized worlds: mediatization 
research in times of 'the mediation of everything'. European Journal of 
Communication, 28(6), 615-629.  
Hepp, A. (2013b). Cultures of Mediatization. Cambridge: Polity. 
Hepp, A., Hjarvard, S., & Lundby, K. (2015). Mediatization: theorizing the interplay between 
media, culture and society Media. Culture and Society, 37(2), 314-324.  
Herring, E., & Robinson, N. (2014). Report X Marks the Spot: The British Government's 
Deceptive Dossier on Iraq and WMD. . Political Science Quarterly, 129(4), 551-584.  
Hewitt, P., & Gould, P. (1993). Lessons from America. Renewal, 1, 45-51.  
Hillman, N. (2014). In Defence of Special Advisers: lessons from personal experience Inside 
Out. London: Institute for Government. 
Hjarvard, S. (2013). Mediatization of Culture and Society. London: Routledge. 
HM Government. (2002). Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the 
British Government.  London: The Stationery Office  
HM Government. (2007). Making Government Work Better.  London: TSO. 
HM Government. (2010). Ministerial Code. 
Hobolt, S., & Klemmensen, R. (2008). Government Responsiveness and Political 
Competition in Comparative Perspective. Comparative Political Studies, 41(3), 309-
337. doi: 10.1177/0010414006297169 
Hoey, B. A. (2014). A Simple Introduction to the Practice of Ethnography and Guide to 
Ethnographic Fieldnotes. Marshall University. Huntingdon, West Virginia, US. 
Retrieved from http://works.bepress.com/brian_hoey/12/  
Hogg, S. (1995). Too close to call : power and politics - John Major in No. 10. London: Little, 
Brown and Company. 
Hollingsworth, M. (1997). The Ultimate Spin Doctor: the Life and Fast Times of Tim Bell. 
London: Hodder & Stoughton. 
Holstein, J., & Gubrium, J. (1997). Active Interviewing. In J. G. Holstein, J (Ed.), Qualitative 
research: theory, method and practice. London: Sage. 
279 
 
Honig, B. (2015). Public Things: Jonathan Lear’s Radical Hope, Lars von Trier’s Melancholia, 
and the Democratic Need. Political Research Quarterly, 68(3), 623-636. doi: 
10.1177/1065912915594464 
Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons? Public administration, 69(1), 3-19. 
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.1991.tb00779.x 
Hood, C. (2011). The Blame Game: spin, bureaucracy, and self-preservation in government. 
Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
Hood, C., & Dixon, R. (2015). A government that worked better and cost less? : evaluating 
three decades of reform and change in UK central government: Oxford : Oxford 
University Press. 
Horton, L., & Gay, O. (2011). Abolition of the COI( SN/PC/06050). House of Commons 
Standard Note (pp. 1-7). London: House of Commons Library. 
Hoskins, A., & Loughlin, B. (2015). Arrested war: the third phase of mediatization. 
Information, Communication & Society, 18(11), 1320-1338. doi: 
10.1080/1369118X.2015.1068350 
House of Lords Select Committee on Communications. (2008). First Report: Session 2008-9. 
London: UK Parliament. 
Howe, G. (1981). Memo to the Liaison Committee.  London: Unpublished. 
Hughes, N. (2015). On Special Advisers Ministers Reflect. London: Institute for Government. 
Hustedt, T., & Salomonsen, H. H. (2014). Ensuring political responsiveness: politicization 
mechanisms in ministerial bureaucracies. International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, 80(4), 746-765. doi: 10.1177/0020852314533449 
Hughes, N. (2017). Is scrapping Extended Ministerial Offices a mistake?  London: Institute 
for Government. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/blog/scrapping-
extended-ministerial-offices-mistake 
Hutton, B. (2004). Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr 
David Kelly (Vol. HC 247). London: House of Commons. 
Hyman, P. (2012). Philip Gould and the art of political strategy. In D. Kavanagh (Ed.), Philip 
Gould: An Unfinished Life. London: Palgrave. 
Ingham, B. (1981). Paper on the presentation of economic policy.  London: Margaret 
Thatcher Archive/Churchill Archives Centre. 
Ingham, B. (2003). The Wages of Spin. London: John Murray. 
Ingham, F. (2010, January ). Shooting the messenger?  
Inglehart, R. (1999). Trust, well-being and democracy. In M. E. Warren (Ed.), Democracy 
and Trust (pp. 88-120). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Interview with Matt Tee - press regulator. (2016), Media Focus. London. 
IpsosMORI. (2016). Veracity Index 2015: Trust in Professions. London: IpsosMORI. 
James, H. (2005a,). The Age of Explanation Changing Times (pp. 163-176). London: Office of 
the Civil Service Commissioners. 
James, H. (2005b). Speech: What Future for Government Communications? Centre for 
Public Policy seminar. 20 January.  London: Centre for Public Policy. 
Jenkin, B. (2014). Accountability and leadership in 21st century Whitehall.  . Constitution 
Unit, London.  
Jensen, K. B. (2013). Definitive and Sensitizing Conceptualizations of Mediatization. 
Communication Theory, 23(3), 203-222. doi: 10.1111/comt.12014 
John Williams: Statement for the Iraq Inquiry,  (2010). Submitted to the Iraq Inquiry, 6 July. 
Jones, H. (2011). Uncomfortable Positions: How Policy Practitioners Negotiate Difficult 
Subjects. (PhD), Goldsmith's University of London, London.    
Jones, N. (2001). The Control Freaks: how New Labour gets its own way. London: Politico's. 
Jones, N. (2006). Trading Information. London: London : Politico's. 
280 
 
Jones, N. (2010). Campaign 2010: The Making of the Prime Minister. London: Biteback 
Publishing. 
Karpf, D., Kreiss, D., Nielsen, R., & Powers, M. (2015). Qualitative Political Communication| 
Introduction: The Role of Qualitative Methods in Political Communication 
Research: Past, Present, and Future. . International Journal of Communication, 
19(9), 1888–1906.  
Karvonen, L. (2010). The personalization of politics: a study of parliamentary democracies. 
Colchester: ECPR Press. 
Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (2009). The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement. Perspectives on 
Politics, 7(4), 753-766. doi: 10.1017/s1537592709991782 
Kellner, D. (2005). Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy : terrorism, war, and 
election battles. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm. 
Kerslake, B. (2014). Valedictory speech: reflections on reform. London: Institute for 
Government. 
King, A. (2003). Leaders personalities and the outcomes of democratic elections. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
King, A., & Crewe, I. (2013). The Blunders of our Governments. London: Oneworld. 
Knight, G. (2011). Dishonourable Insults: A Cantankerous Collection of Political Invective  
London: Biteback. 
Koch-Baumgarten, S., & Voltmer, K. (2010). The interplay of mass communication and 
political decision-making - policy matters! Oxford: Routledge. 
Krotz, F. (2009). Mediatization: a concept with which to grasp media and societal change. In 
K. Lundby (Ed.), Mediatization: Concepts, Changes, Consequences. New York: Peter 
Lang. 
Krotz, F. (2014). Mediatization as a mover in modernity: social and cultural change in the 
context of media change. In K. Lundby (Ed.), Mediatization of Communication. 
Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter. 
Kuhn, R. (2007). Politics and the media in Britain. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kuhn, R., & Neveu, E. (2002). Political Journalism: New Challenges, New Practices. New 
York: Routledge. 
Kunelius, R., & Reunanen, E. (2012). The Medium of the Media: journalism, politics and the 
theory of 'mediatisation'. JAVNOST-THE PUBLIC, 19(4), 5-24.  
Kunelius, R., & Reunanen, E. (2013). Research Proposal: The Challenge of Mediatization: 
understanding the role of the media in contemporary economic and environmental 
policy networks. Research Proposal. University of Tampere, Finland.   
L'Etang, J., & Pieczka, M. (2006). Public relations: critical debates and contemporary 
practice. Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Landerer, N. (2013). Rethinking the Logics: A Conceptual Framework for the Mediatization 
of Politics. Communication Theory, 23(3), 239-258. doi: 10.1111/comt.12013 
Langer, A. I. (2006). The politicization of private persona : the case of Tony Blair in historical 
perspective. (PhD), London School of Economics & Political Science, London.    
Langer, A. I. (2010). The Politicization of Private Persona: Exceptional Leaders or the New 
Rule? The Case of the United Kingdom and the Blair Effect. The International 
Journal of Press/Politics, 15(1), 60-76. doi: 10.1177/1940161209351003 
Langer, A. I. s. (2011). The personalization of politics in the UK: mediated leadership from 
Attlee to Cameron. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
Layder, D. (1998). Sociological practice : linking theory and social research. London ; 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. 
281 
 
Lee, M. (1999). Reporters and bureacracies: public relations counter strategies by public 
administrators in an era of media disinterest in government. Public Relations 
Review, 25(4), 451-463.  
Lee, M. (2011). Congress vs. the bureaucracy : muzzling agency public relations. Norman, 
Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. 
Letwin, O. (2012, September 17). Keynote speech: Why Mandarins Matter. Institute for 
Government, London. 
Leveson, B. (2012). An Inquiry into the Culture, Practices and Ethics of the Press (Leveson 
Report). (ISBN 9780102981063). London: The Stationary Office (TSO). 
Lewis, J., Williams, A., & Franklin, B. (2008). A Compromised Fourth Estate. Journalism 
Studies, 9(1), 1-20. doi: 10.1080/14616700701767974 
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of democracy: government forms and performance in thirty-six 
countries. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Lindquist, E., & Rasmussen, K. (2012). Deputy ministers and New Public Governance: from 
neutral competence to promiscuous partisans to a new balance? In H. Bakvis & M. 
Jarvis (Eds.), From new public management to new political governance. Canada: 
McGill-Queen's University Press. 
Lingard, B., Rawolle, S., & Taylor, S. (2005). Globalizing policy sociology in education: 
working with Bourdieu. Journal of Education Policy, 20(6), 759-777. doi: 
10.1080/02680930500238945 
Livingstone, S. (2005). Audiences and Publics : when cultural engagement matters for the 
public sphere. Bristol, England; Portland, Oregon: Intellect. 
Livingstone, S. (2009). Coming to terms with 'mediatization' In K. Lundby (Ed.), 
Mediatization: Concept, Changes, Consequences (pp. ix-x11). New York: Peter Lang. 
Lodge, G. (2007). Civil service reform: the missing piece in the public service reform jigsaw. 
London: Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Lodge, G., Kalitowski, S., Pearce, N., & Muir, R. (2013). Accountability and Responsiveness 
in the Senior Civil Service: Lessons from Overseas. London: Institute for Public 
Policy Research. 
Louw, P. E. (2005). The Media and Political Process. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage. 
Lundby, K. (2009a). Introduction. In K. Lundby (Ed.), Mediatization: concept, changes, 
consequences. New York: Peter Lang. 
Lundby, K. (2009b). Mediatization: concept, changes, consequences. New York: Peter Lang. 
Lundby, K. (2014a). Introduction: Mediatization of Communication. In K. Lundby (Ed.), 
Mediatization of Communication. Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter. 
Lundby, K. (2014b). Mediatization of communication: Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter Mouton. 
Lunt, P., & Livingstone, S. (2016). Is ‘ mediatization’ the new paradigm for our field? A 
commentary on Deacon and Stanyer (2014, 2015) and Hepp, Hjarvard and Lundby 
(2015). Media, Culture and Society, 38(3), 462-470. doi: 
10.1177/0163443716631288 
Maartens, B. (2016). From Propaganda to 'Information': Reforming Government 
Communications in Britain. Contemporary British History.  
Machinery of Government Committee. (1918). Report of the Machinery of Government 
Committee.  London: HMSO. 
Macintyre, D. (1999). Mandelson and the Making of New Labour. London: HarperCollins. 
Macnamara, J. (2014). Journalism and PR: Unpacking 'Spin', Stereotypes, and Media Myths. 
New York: Peter Lang. 
Mair, P. (2013). Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy. New York: Verso. 
Major, J. (2003). The Erosion of Parliamentary Government. London: Centre for Policy 
Studies. 
282 
 
Major, J. (2012). Leveson: witness statement.  London. 
Mandelson, P. (2012). The Unstarted Revolution. In D. Kavanagh (Ed.), Philip Gould: An 
Unfinished Life. London: Palgrave. 
Manin, B. (1997). The Principles of Representative Government. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1984). The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in 
Political Life. The American Political Science Review, 78(3), 734-749.  
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2009). The logic of appropriateness. ARENA Working Papers. 
Oslo. 
Marquand, D. (2004). Decline of the Public: the hollowing-out of citizenship. Cambridge: 
Polity. 
Marquand, D. (2008). Britain since 1918: the strange career of British democracy. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 
Marsh, D. (2001). Changing patterns of governance in the United Kingdom : reinventing 
Whitehall? Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Marsh, I. (2013). How contemporary politics became trapped in the short term and 
whether it can be repaired.  
Mason, R. (2012, 1 October). No, minister! Senior civil servants deliverately block policy, 
says Francis Maude. Daily Telegraph.  
Mattinson, D. (2010). Talking to a brick wall. London: Biteback. 
Maude, F. (2010, 7 February). Labour SPADs caught exploiting civil service. UK Party 
Political News.  Conservative Party News.  London; UK Party Political News.  
Maude, F.  (2013). Evidence session: The Future of the Civil Service, 24 June.  London: House 
of Commons Public Administration Select Committee.. 
Maude, F (2014). Debate on the Future of the Civil Service, 3 April.  Hansard. Col 1112.  
London: House of Commons. 
Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). "Mediatization" of politics: A challenge for democracy? 
Political Communication, 16(3), 247-261. doi: 10.1080/105846099198613 
McBride, D. (2013). Power Trip: a decade of policy, plots and spin. London: Biteback 
Publishing. 
McClory, J. (2011). Special advisers: the great cull or stealthy rise? In I. f. Government (Ed.). 
London: Institute for Government. 
McCrory, S. (2016). Interview: Former Home Office perm sec Helen Ghosh on the 
"confrontational" Francis Maude era – and life after Whitehall. Civil Service World, 
2016. 
McNair, B. (2007a). An Introduction to Political Communication. London: Routledge. 
McNair, B. (2007b). Theories of government communication and trends in the UK. In S. 
Young (Ed.), Government Communications in Australia (pp. 93-109). Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Meer, F. M. v. d. (2011). Civil service systems in Western Europe. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Mellado, C., & Van Dalen, A. (2014). Between Rhetoric and Practice: Explaining the gap 
between role conception and performance in journalism. Journalism Studies, 15(6), 
859-878. doi: 10.1080/1461670X.2013.838046 
Mendus, S. (2008). Impartiality. In J. Dryzek, B. Honig & A. Phillips (Eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Meyer, C. (2006). DC Confidential : the controversial memoirs of Britain's ambassador to the 
U.S. at the time of 9/11 and the run-up to the Iraq War. London: Phoenix. 
Meyer, T., & Hinchman, L. P. (2002). Media Democracy: how the media colonize politics. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
283 
 
Mickoleit, A. (2014). Social Media Use by Governments: A Policy Primer to Discuss Trends, 
Identify Policy Opportunities and Guide Decision Makers. OECD Working Papers on 
Public Governance (Vol. 26). Paris: OECD Publishing. 
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis: an expanded sourcebook. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Miller, D. (2008). A Century of Spin : how public relations became the cutting edge of 
corporate power. London ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press. 
Miller, P., Gordon, C., & Burchell, G. (1991). The Foucault effect : studies in 
governmentality: University of Chicago Press. 
Moloney, K. (2001). The rise and fall of spin: changes of fashion in the presentation of UK 
politics. Journal of Public Affairs, 1(2), 124-135. doi: 10.1002/pa.58 
Moloney, K. (2006). Rethinking public relations: PR propaganda and democracy. London: 
Routledge. 
Moore, M. (2006). The origins of modern spin: democratic government and the media in 
Britain, 1945-51. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Moran, M. (2005). Politics and governance in the UK. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Moss, G., and O’Loughlin, B.  (2008). Convincing claims? Democracy and representation in 
Post-9/11 [2001] Britain. Political Studies , 56(3), 75-725.  
Mountfield, R. (1997). Report of the working group on the Government Information and 
Communications Service.  London: Cabinet Office. 
Mountfield, R. (2002). Content of a civil service act. London: Civil Servant. 
Mulgan, R. (2008). How Much Responsiveness is Too Much or Too Little? Australian Journal 
of Public Administration, 67(3), 345-356. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8500.2008.00592.x 
Mullin, C., & Winstone, R. (2010). A view from the foothills: the diaries of Chris Mullin. 
London: Profile. 
National Audit Office. (2016). Accountability to Parliament for taxpayers’ money. (HC 849 
Session 2015-16 ). London: National Audit Office. 
Negrine, R. (2008). The transformation of a political communication: the global context. In 
R. Negrine (Ed.), The transformation of political communication: continuities and 
changes in media and politics (pp. 143-169). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Negrine, R., & Lilleker, D. (2002). The Professionalization of Political Communication: 
Continuities and Change in Media Practices. European Journal of Communication, 
17(3), 305-323.  
Norris, P. (2000a). The Rise of the Postmodern Campaign? In P. Norris (Ed.), A virtuous 
circle: political communications in Postindustrial Societies (pp. 162-180). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Norris, P. (2000b). A virtuous circle: political communications in postindustrial societies. 
New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. 
Norris, P. (2001). Political communications and Democratic Politics. In J. Bartle & D. Griffiths 
(Eds.), Political Communications Transformed (pp. 163-180). London: Palgrave. 
Northcote, S., & Trevelyan, C. (1854). Report on the Organisation of the Permanent Civil 
Service.  London: HMSO Retrieved from 
http://www.civilservant.org.uk/northcotetrevelyan.pdf. 
Norton-Taylor, R. (1985). The Ponting Affair. London: Cecil Woolf. 
Norton, P. (2000). Barons in a shrinking kingdom: senior ministers in British Government. In 
R. A. W. Rhodes (Ed.), Transforming British Government (Vol. 2). Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
O'Donnell, G. (2005). The Relationship between Economy and State Changing Times (pp. 
77-88). London: Office of the Civil Service Commissioners. 
284 
 
Oborne, P. (1999). Alastair Campbell: New Labour and the rise of the media class. London: 
Aurum. 
Oborne, P. (2005). The rise of political lying. London: Free Press. 
Oxford English Dictionary. (2016).  Retrieved 6 October, from Oxford University Press 
http://www.oed.com/ 
Oxford English Dictionary (2000). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Page, E. (2007). Where have all the powers gone?  The UK top civil service in comparative 
perspective. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual 
Meeting, Chicago, USA.  
Page, E. (2010). Has the Whitehall Model survived? International Review of Administrative 
Sciences, 76(3), 407-423. doi: 10.1177/0020852310373004 
Page, E. (2012). Policy without politicians : bureaucratic influence in comparative 
perspective. Oxford : Oxford University Press. 
Page, J., Pearson, J., Jurgeit, B., & Kidson, M. (2012). Transforming Whitehall: Leading major 
change in Whitehall Departments. London: Institute for Government. 
Pallas, J. (2016). Mediatization. In C. E. Carroll (Ed.), The SAGE Encyclopaedia of Corporate 
Reputation: Sage. 
Pallas, J., & Fredriksson, M. (2013). Corporate media work and micro-dynamics of 
mediatization. European Journal of Communication, 28(4), 420.  
Pallas, J., & Fredriksson, M. (2014). Mediability and organizational responses to institutional 
plurality: a case of a Swedish governmental agency. . Paper presented at the 30th 
European Group of Organizational Studies Colloquium - Reimagining, Rethinking, 
Reshaping: Organizational Scholarship in Unsettled Times Rotterdam. 
http://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A759149&dswid=2793 
Pallas, J., Fredriksson, M., & Schillemans, T. (2014). Determinants of Organizational 
Mediatization; An Analysis of the Adaptation of Swedish Government Agencies to 
News Media. Paper presented at the ECREA TWG Mediatization Workshop, London 
School of Economics and Political Science, London UK.  
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